MIRA INFORM REPORT
|
Report Date : |
12.08.2011 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
|
Name : |
KAMIN LLC |
|
|
|
|
Registered Office : |
2711 Centerville Road Suite 400, Wilmington, DE 19808 |
|
|
|
|
Country : |
United States |
|
|
|
|
Date of Incorporation : |
10.03.2008 |
|
|
|
|
Legal Form : |
Limited Liability Company |
|
|
|
|
Line of Business : |
Explores, mines, and processes kaolin clay. |
RATING & COMMENTS
|
MIRA’s Rating : |
Ba |
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
Maximum Credit Limit : |
USD 100,000 |
|
|
|
|
Status : |
Satisfactory |
|
|
|
|
Payment
Behaviour : |
Usually Correct |
|
|
|
|
Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES :
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail : infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – March 31st, 2011
|
Country Name |
Previous Rating (31.12.2010) |
Current Rating (31.03.2011) |
|
United States |
a1 |
a1 |
|
Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
|
Insignificant |
A1 |
|
Low |
A2 |
|
Moderate |
B1 |
|
High |
B2 |
|
Very High |
C1 |
|
Restricted |
C2 |
|
Off-credit |
D |
Comments on the rating:
A Credit line maybe considered
GEOPOLITICS - UNITED STATES
|
POLITICAL DATA |
ECONOMIC DATA |
|
Form of Government: Federal
|
Currency: USD |
IDENTIFICATION
|
Ordered as: |
Kamin LLC |
||
|
Address in the order: |
822 Huber Road Macon GA 31217 478 750 5424 |
||
|
|
|
||
|
Legal Name: |
Kamin LLC |
||
|
|
|
||
|
Legal Address |
2711 Centerville Road Suite 400, Wilmington, DE 19808, USA (Registered
Agent) |
||
|
Operative Address |
822 Huber Road, Macon, GA 31217, USA (Headquarters) |
||
|
Telephone: |
+1 (478) 750 5410 |
ID : |
4509963 |
|
Fax: |
+1 (478) 750 5410 |
Legal Form: |
Limited Liability Company |
|
Email: |
Registered in: |
Delaware |
|
|
Website: |
Date Created: |
2008 |
|
|
Manager: |
Rankin Hobbs, President |
Date Incorporated: |
March 10th 2008 |
|
Staff: |
510 |
Stock: |
NA |
|
|
|
Value: |
NA |
|
Activity: |
Explores, mines, and processes kaolin
clay. |
||
BANKS
|
Name of the Bank |
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK |
BUSINESS
|
HISTORY |
|
|
|
The company was created in 2008. |
|
PRINCIPAL ACTIVITY |
|
|
|
The company mines, produces, sells hydrous and kaolin clay products. |
|
Products/Services description: |
|
|
|
It offers coating clays that are used in a range of coated paper and
coated board applications; delaminated clays for low gloss applications, such
as matte and dull finishes; a range of water-washed and calcined products
that are used in various applications, including coatings, inks, adhesives,
and carrier; specially treated kaolin clays that imparts rheology with high
loadings in solvent and UV cure inks; and kaolin clays that are used for
partial thermal black replacement in rubber applications. Also, it offers an
organophilic kaolin clay for use in producing low foaming slab-dips and
pellet lubricants; an amino silane treated and high brightness water-washed
kaolin clay that is designed for peroxide cure systems; and kaolin clays that
include various extenders and gas barrier products, which are used in the
rubber, thermoplastic, and thermo set industries. In addition, it offers
kaolin clays for adhesives, rubber/plastics, crop protection, cement, brick
and pool plaster, paint, coatings, ink, adhesives, rubber, crop, and cement
and plastics manufacturers. |
|
Sales are: |
|
|
|
Wholesale |
|
Clients: |
|
|
|
Paper and industrial customers in the United States and
internationally |
|
Operations area: |
|
|
|
National, International |
|
The subject employs 510 employee(s) |
|
|
PAYMENTS |
|
|
|
regular |
|
LOCATION |
|
|
Headquarters |
|
|
|
The company was incorporated in Delaware for tax purposes. It is headquartered at 822 Huber Road, Macon, GA 31217, USA. |
|
Branches: |
|
|
|
Sandersville (plant) 530 Beck Blvd Sandersville, GA 31082 Wrens (plant) 2069 Howard Mill Rd. Wrens, GA 30833 |
Shareholders - Manager - Related Companies
|
Listed at the stock exchange: |
|
|
|
NO |
|
Shareholders Parent Company(ies): |
|
|
|
This company is privately held. It is a subsidiary of IMin Partners,
located in: 301 Commerce Street, suite 3025 Fort Worth, TX 76102, USA. |
|
Management: |
|
|
|
Rankin Hobbs, CEO Tom Anderskow, Vice President of Commercial Peggy Blair, Administrative Maureen Halstead, Director, Global Product Management Jason Maxwell, Global Product Manager |
Financials - COMMERCIAL TRENDS AND FORECAST
|
As a private company the subject does not publish any financial
statements. |
|
We have left a voicemail to Cynthia Branin, from the Accounts Payable
Department. As far as today, we haven't received any response. |
|
Legal Fillings |
|
There are several UCCs files
listed with the Secretary of State of Georgia. There are no legal filings listed with the District Court. For information: The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is one of a number of uniform acts
that have been promulgated in conjunction with efforts to harmonize the law
of sales and other commercial transactions in all 50 states within the United
States of America. The UCC deals primarily with transactions involving personal property
(movable property), not real property (immovable property). It allows a creditor to notify other creditors about a debtor’s assets
used as collateral for a secured transaction by filing a public notice
(financing statement) with a particular filing office. The Uniform Commercial Code Bureau files and maintains on financial
obligations (including IRS liens) incurred by individuals (in business as a
sole proprietor), business entities and corporations. |
Rating
|
Local credit bureau gave a Correct credit rate. The company is in Good Standing. This
means that all local and federal taxes were paid on due date. |
|
|
Final Opinion |
|
|
|
KAMIN LLC is a big sized US company as it currently has a staff of 510
employees. It was incorporated for business in 2008. Therefore, it has more than
2 years of experience. The company mines, produces, sells hydrous and kaolin clay products to
paper and industrial customers in the United States and internationally. There were no legal filings found against the company or its legal
representatives. There is current payment experience. The company has an account with a high profiled banking institution. Credit line may be considered for USD 100,000-. |
SUMMARY
|
|
|
||
|
Profitability |
N.A. |
Public Records |
NO |
|
Indebtedness |
N.A. |
Payments |
REGULAR |
|
Cash |
NORMAL |
|
|
APPENDIX
|
Person Interviewed |
|
|
|
Cynthia Branin |
|
Comments |
|
|
|
We have left a voicemail to the Accounts Payable Department. As far as
today, we haven't received any response. |
Standard
& Poor’s
|
United
States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'AA+' Due To Political Risks, Rising
Debt Burden; Outlook Negative |
|
Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
·
We have lowered our long-term
sovereign credit rating on the United States of America to 'AA+' from 'AAA' and
affirmed the 'A-1+' short-term rating.
·
We have also removed both the short- and long-term ratings
from CreditWatch negative.
·
The downgrade reflects our opinion
that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration
recently agreed to falls short of what, in our view, would be necessary to
stabilize the government's medium-term debt dynamics.
·
More broadly, the downgrade
reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of
American policymaking and political institutions have weakened at a time of
ongoing fiscal and economic challenges to a degree more than we envisioned when
we assigned a negative outlook to the rating on April 18, 2011.
·
Since then, we have changed our
view of the difficulties in bridging the gulf between the political parties
over fiscal policy, which makes us pessimistic about the capacity of Congress
and the Administration to be able to leverage their agreement this week into a
broader fiscal consolidation plan that stabilizes the government's debt
dynamics any time soon.
·
The outlook on the long-term rating
is negative. We could lower the long-term rating to 'AA' within the next two
years if we see that less reduction in spending than agreed to, higher interest
rates, or new fiscal pressures during the period result in a higher general government
debt trajectory than we currently assume in our base case.
TORONTO (Standard &
Poor's) Aug. 5, 2011--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that it
lowered its long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of America
to 'AA+' from 'AAA'. Standard & Poor's also said that the outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. At the same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed
its 'A-1+' short-term rating on the U.S. In addition, Standard & Poor's
removed both ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed on July 14, 2011,
with negative implications.
The
transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment of the U.S.--our assessment of
the likelihood of official interference in the ability of U.S.-based public-
and private-sector issuers to secure foreign exchange for
debt service--remains
'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term
rating on the U.S. because we believe that the prolonged controversy over
raising the statutory debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate indicate
that further near-term progress containing the growth in public spending,
especially on entitlements, or on reaching an agreement on raising revenues is
less likely than we previously assumed and will remain a contentious and fitful
process. We also believe that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and
the Administration agreed to this week falls short of the amount that we
believe is necessary to stabilize the general government debt burden by the
middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the rating
was prompted by our view on the rising public debt burden and our perception of
greater policymaking uncertainty, consistent with our criteria (see "Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and
Assumptions ," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41).
Nevertheless, we view the U.S. federal government's other economic, external,
and monetary credit attributes, which form the basis for the sovereign rating,
as broadly unchanged.
We have taken the ratings
off CreditWatch because the Aug. 2 passage of the Budget Control Act Amendment
of 2011 has removed any perceived immediate threat of payment default posed by
delays to raising the government's debt ceiling. In addition, we believe that
the act provides sufficient clarity to allow us to evaluate the likely course
of U.S. fiscal policy for the next few years.
The
political brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as America's
governance and policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and less
predictable than what we previously believed. The statutory debt ceiling and
the threat of default have become political bargaining chips in the debate over
fiscal policy. Despite this year's wide-ranging debate, in our view, the
differences between political parties have proven to be extraordinarily
difficult to bridge, and, as we see it, the resulting agreement fell well short
of the comprehensive fiscal consolidation program that some proponents had envisaged
until quite recently. Republicans and Democrats have only been able to agree to
relatively modest savings on discretionary spending while delegating to the
Select Committee decisions on more comprehensive measures. It appears that for
now, new revenues have dropped down on the menu of policy options. In addition,
the plan envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare and little change in
other entitlements,
the containment of which
we and most other independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal
sustainability.
Our opinion is that
elected officials remain wary of tackling the structural issues required to
effectively address the rising U.S. public debt burden in a manner consistent
with a 'AAA' rating and with 'AAA' rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and
Assumptions," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41). In
our view, the difficulty in framing a consensus on fiscal policy weakens the
government's ability to manage public finances and diverts attention from the
debate over how to achieve more balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era
of fiscal stringency and private-sector deleveraging (ibid). A new political
consensus might (or might not) emerge after the 2012 elections, but we believe
that by then, the government debt burden will likely be higher, the needed
medium-term fiscal adjustment potentially greater, and the inflection point on
the U.S. population's demographics and other age-related spending drivers
closer at hand (see "Global Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Likely
Cost Even More Green, Now," June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's
takes no position on the mix of spending and revenue measures that Congress and
the Administration might conclude is appropriate for putting the U.S.'s
finances on a sustainable footing.
The act calls for as much
as $2.4 trillion of reductions in expenditure growth over the 10 years through
2021. These cuts will be implemented in two steps: the $917 billion agreed to
initially, followed by an additional $1.5 trillion that the newly formed
Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction is supposed to
recommend by November 2011. The act contains no measures to raise taxes or
otherwise enhance revenues, though the committee could recommend them.
The act further provides
that if Congress does not enact the committee's recommendations, cuts of $1.2
trillion will be implemented over the same time period. The reductions would
mainly affect outlays for civilian discretionary spending, defense, and
Medicare. We understand that this fall-back mechanism is designed to encourage
Congress to embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure savings, as the
committee might recommend.
We note that in a letter
to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated
total budgetary savings under the act to be at least $2.1 trillion over the
next 10 years relative to its baseline assumptions. In updating our own fiscal
projections, with certain modifications outlined below, we have relied on the
CBO's latest "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" of June 2011, updated to
include the CBO assumptions contained in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In
general, the CBO's "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" assumes a continuation
of recent Congressional action overriding existing law.
We view the act's
measures as a step toward fiscal consolidation. However, this is within the
framework of a legislative mechanism that leaves open the details of what is
finally agreed to until the end of 2011, and Congress and the Administration
could modify any agreement in the future. Even assuming that at least $2.1
trillion of the spending reductions the act envisages are implemented, we
maintain our view that the U.S. net general government debt burden (all levels
of government combined, excluding liquid financial assets) will likely continue
to grow. Under our revised base case fiscal scenario--which we consider to be
consistent with a 'AA+' long-term rating and a negative outlook--we now project
that net general government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the
end of 2011 to 79% in 2015 and 85% by 2021. Even the projected 2015 ratio of
sovereign indebtedness is high in relation to those of peer credits and, as
noted, would continue to rise under the act's revised policy settings.
Compared with previous
projections, our revised base case scenario now assumes that the 2001 and 2003
tax cuts, due to expire by the end of 2012, remain in place. We have changed
our assumption on this because the majority of Republicans in Congress continue
to resist any measure that would raise revenues, a position we believe Congress
reinforced by passing the act. Key macroeconomic assumptions in the base case
scenario include trend real GDP growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near
2% annually over the decade.
Our revised upside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as consistent with the
outlook on the 'AA+' long-term rating being revised to stable--retains these
same macroeconomic assumptions. In addition, it incorporates $950 billion of
new revenues on the assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners
lapse from 2013 onwards, as the Administration is advocating. In this scenario,
we project that the net general government debt would rise from an estimated
74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as being consistent with a
possible further downgrade to a 'AA' long-term rating--features less-favorable
macroeconomic assumptions, as outlined below and also assumes that the second
round of spending cuts (at least $1.2 trillion) that the act calls for does not
occur. This scenario also assumes somewhat higher nominal interest rates for
U.S. Treasuries. We still believe that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key
reserve currency confers a government funding advantage, one that could change
only slowly over time, and that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose
monetary policy at a time of fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible
that interest rates could rise if investors re-price relative risks. As a
result, our alternate scenario factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in
10-year bond yields relative to the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In
this scenario, we project the net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP
in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to 101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios
also take into account the significant negative revisions to historical GDP
data that the Bureau of Economic Analysis announced on July 29. From our perspective,
the effect of these revisions underscores two related points when evaluating
the likely debt trajectory of the U.S. government. First, the revisions show
that the recent recession was deeper than previously assumed, so the GDP this
year is lower than previously thought in both nominal and real terms.
Consequently, the debt burden is slightly higher. Second, the revised data
highlight the sub-par path of the current economic recovery when compared with
rebounds following previous post-war recessions. We believe the sluggish pace
of the current economic recovery could be consistent with the experiences of
countries that have had financial crises in which the slow process of debt
deleveraging in the private sector leads to a persistent drag on demand. As a
result, our downside case scenario assumes relatively modest real trend GDP
growth of 2.5% and inflation of near 1.5% annually going forward.
When comparing the U.S.
to sovereigns with 'AAA' long-term ratings that we view as relevant
peers--Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K.--we also observe, based on our
base case scenarios for each, that the trajectory of the U.S.'s net public debt
is diverging from the others. Including the U.S., we estimate that these five
sovereigns will have net general government debt to GDP ratios this year
ranging from 34% (Canada) to 80% (the U.K.), with the U.S. debt burden at 74%.
By 2015, we project that their net public debt to GDP ratios will range between
30% (lowest, Canada) and 83% (highest, France), with the U.S. debt burden at
79%. However, in contrast with the U.S., we project that the net public debt
burdens of these other sovereigns will begin to decline, either before or by
2015.
Standard & Poor's
transfer T&C assessment of the U.S. remains 'AAA'. Our T&C assessment
reflects our view of the likelihood of the sovereign restricting other public
and private issuers' access to foreign exchange needed to meet debt service.
Although in our view the credit standing of the U.S. government has
deteriorated modestly, we see little indication that official interference of
this kind is entering onto the policy agenda of either Congress or the
Administration. Consequently, we continue to view this risk as being highly
remote.
The outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. As our downside alternate fiscal scenario
illustrates, a higher public debt trajectory than we currently assume could
lead us to lower the long-term rating again. On the other hand, as our upside
scenario highlights, if the recommendations of the Congressional Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction--independently or coupled with other
initiatives, such as the lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high
earners--lead to fiscal consolidation measures beyond the minimum mandated, and
we believe they are likely to slow the deterioration of the government's debt
dynamics, the long-term rating could stabilize at 'AA+'.
On Monday,
we will issue separate releases concerning affected ratings in the funds,
government-related entities, financial institutions, insurance, public finance,
and structured finance sectors.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.45.27 |
|
UK Pound |
1 |
Rs.73.34 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.64.58 |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest
capability for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit transaction.
It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest and
principal sums |
Large |
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General unfavourable
factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for payment of
interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with full
security |
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
---- |
NB |
New Business |
---- |
This score serves as a reference to assess SC’s credit risk and
to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is calculated from a composite
of weighted scores obtained from each of the major sections of this report. The
assessed factors and their relative weights (as indicated through %) are as
follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend
(10%) Operational
size (10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL)
or its officials.