MIRA INFORM REPORT
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Report Date : |
06.12.2011 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
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Name : |
TEKKOTE CORPORATION |
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Registered Office : |
1209 Orange Street Wilmington New Castle DE 19801 |
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Country : |
United States |
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Date of Incorporation : |
12.02.2009 |
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Legal Form : |
Corporation for Profit |
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Line of Business : |
Custom Silicone Coated Manufacturer. |
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No. of Employees
: |
100 Persons |
RATING & COMMENTS
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MIRA’s Rating : |
Ba |
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RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
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41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
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Maximum Credit Limit : |
USD 800,000. |
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Status : |
Satisfactory |
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Payment
Behaviour : |
No Complaints |
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Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES :
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail : infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – September 30th, 2011
|
Country Name |
Previous Rating (30.06.2011) |
Current Rating (30.09.2011) |
|
United States |
a1 |
a1 |
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Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
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Insignificant |
A1 |
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Low |
A2 |
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Moderate |
B1 |
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High |
B2 |
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Very High |
C1 |
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Restricted |
C2 |
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Off-credit |
D |
GEOPOLITICS - UNITED STATES
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POLITICAL DATA |
ECONOMIC DATA |
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Form of Government: Federal
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Currency: USD |
IDENTIFICATION
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Ordered as: |
Tekkote Corporation |
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Address in the order: |
580 Willow Tree Rd Leonia 07605 NJ USA |
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Legal Name: |
TEKKOTE CORPORATION |
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|
Legal Address |
1209 Orange Street Wilmington New Castle DE 19801 (Registered agent
address) |
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Operative Address |
580 Willow Tree Rd Leonia 07605 NJ USA |
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Telephone: |
+1 (201) 585-8875 |
ID : |
4655070 |
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Fax: |
+1 (201) 585-9122 |
Legal Form: |
Corporation for Profit |
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Email: |
Registered in: |
Delaware |
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Website: |
Date Created: |
1988 |
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Manager: |
Lawrence Goldman, President |
Date Incorporated: |
February 12th, 2009 |
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Staff: |
100 |
Stock: |
1,000,000 |
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|
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Value: |
$0.001 Par value |
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Activity: |
Custom silicone coated manufacturer. |
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BANKS
|
Name of the Bank |
Summit Bank |
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Name of the Bank |
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A |
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Name of the Bank |
National Westminster Bank |
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Name of the Bank |
First Jersey National Bank |
BUSINESS
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HISTORY |
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This company was created in the year 1988. |
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PRINCIPAL ACTIVITY |
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The subject manufactures silicone coated release liners. |
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Sales are: |
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Wholesale |
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Clients: |
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Construction industries Hygiene industries Healthcare industries Printing, packaging, paper, office products, crafts and graphics Security Among others. |
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Operations area: |
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National, Local |
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The company imports from |
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The company export to |
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The subject employs 100 employee(s) |
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PAYMENTS |
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regular |
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LOCATION |
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Headquarters |
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The company is headquartered at 580 Willow Tree Rd Leonia 07605 NJ
USA. |
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Surface area: |
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100,000 Sq Ft |
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The property is: |
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Owned |
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Comments on location: |
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The company is incorporated in Delaware for tax purposes. However, it is
headquartered in New Jersey. |
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Branches: |
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The company has a manufacturing plant located at 1100 Slocum Avenue
Ridgefield, NJ 07657. |
Shareholders - Manager - Related Companies
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Shareholders Parent Company(ies): |
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This is a privately held company. Despite our long searches it has not
been possible to identify the shareholders. |
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Management: |
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Lawrence Goldman, President and CEO |
Financials - COMMERCIAL TRENDS AND FORECAST
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As a private company the subject does not publish any financial
statements. |
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We have contacted Debby who refused to provide us any financial data
on grounds of confidentiality. |
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However our financial sources could provide us with the following
data. Those figures are estimates provided by confidential banking and
financial institutions working with the company. |
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Currency |
DATE |
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USD |
2010 |
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Turnover |
50,000,000 |
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The cash flow is |
Normal |
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Legal Fillings |
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There are 26UCC** files listed with the
Secretary of State of Delaware. There are no legal filings listed with the
District Court. THE COMPANY IS NOT LISTED ON THE OFAC
LIST.* For information: * The Specially Designated Nationals (SDN)
List is a publication of OFAC which lists individuals and organizations with
whom United States citizens and permanent residents are prohibited from doing
business. ** The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is
one of a number of uniform acts that have been promulgated in conjunction
with efforts to harmonize the law of sales and other commercial transactions
in all 50 states within the United States of America. The UCC deals primarily with transactions
involving personal property (movable property), not real property (immovable
property). It allows a creditor to notify other
creditors about a debtor’s assets used as collateral for a secured
transaction by filing a public notice (financing statement) with a particular
filing office. The Uniform Commercial Code Bureau files
and maintains on financial obligations (including IRS liens) incurred by
individuals (in business as a sole proprietor), business entities and
corporations. |
Rating
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Local credit bureau gave a medium credit
rate. The company is in Good Standing. This
means that all local and federal taxes were paid on due date. |
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Final Opinion |
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This is a medium sized company with 100
employees and 23 years of experience. The subject is an ISO 9001 Registered
agent, which allows the company to operate as an international supplier. There were no legal filings found against
the company or its legal representatives. At this time, the income per employee is
really good for its size. Therefore a credit line may be considered
for USD 800,000. |
SUMMARY
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Profitability |
N.A. |
Public Records |
NO |
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Indebtedness |
N.A. |
Payments |
REGULAR |
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Cash |
NORMAL |
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APPENDIX
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Person Interviewed |
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Debby |
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Position |
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Representative |
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Comments |
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She refused to provide us any information about the company per
security purposes. |
Standard &
Poor’s
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United States of
America Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'AA+' Due To Political Risks, Rising Debt
Burden; Outlook Negative |
|
Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
We have lowered our long-term sovereign credit rating
on the United States of America to 'AA+' from 'AAA' and affirmed the 'A-1+'
short-term rating.
We have also removed
both the short- and long-term ratings from CreditWatch negative.
The downgrade reflects our opinion
that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration
recently agreed to falls short of what, in our view, would be necessary to
stabilize the government's medium-term debt dynamics.
More broadly, the downgrade
reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of
American policymaking and political institutions have weakened at a time of
ongoing fiscal and economic challenges to a degree more than we envisioned when
we assigned a negative outlook to the rating on April 18, 2011.
Since then, we have changed
our view of the difficulties in bridging the gulf between the political parties
over fiscal policy, which makes us pessimistic about the capacity of Congress
and the Administration to be able to leverage their agreement this week into a
broader fiscal consolidation plan that stabilizes the government's debt
dynamics any time soon.
The outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. We could lower the long-term rating to 'AA'
within the next two years if we see that less reduction in spending than agreed
to, higher interest rates, or new fiscal pressures during the period result in
a higher general government debt trajectory than we currently assume in our
base case.
TORONTO (Standard & Poor's) Aug. 5, 2011--Standard
& Poor's Ratings Services said today that it lowered its long-term
sovereign credit rating on the United States of America to 'AA+' from 'AAA'.
Standard & Poor's also said that the outlook on the long-term rating is
negative. At the same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed its 'A-1+'
short-term rating on the U.S. In addition, Standard & Poor's removed both
ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed on July 14, 2011, with
negative implications.
The transfer and
convertibility (T&C) assessment of the U.S.--our assessment of the
likelihood of official interference in the ability of U.S.-based public- and
private-sector issuers to secure foreign exchange for debt service--remains
'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term rating on the U.S. because
we believe that the prolonged controversy over raising the statutory debt
ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate indicate that further near-term
progress containing the growth in public spending, especially on entitlements,
or on reaching an agreement on raising revenues is less likely than we
previously assumed and will remain a contentious and fitful process. We also
believe that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration
agreed to this week falls short of the amount that we believe is necessary to
stabilize the general government debt burden by the middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the rating was prompted by our view
on the rising public debt burden and our perception of greater policymaking
uncertainty, consistent with our criteria (see "Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and
Assumptions ," June 30, 2011,
especially Paragraphs 36-41). Nevertheless, we view the U.S. federal
government's other economic, external, and monetary credit attributes, which
form the basis for the sovereign rating, as broadly unchanged.
We have taken the ratings off CreditWatch because the
Aug. 2 passage of the Budget Control Act Amendment of 2011 has removed any
perceived immediate threat of payment default posed by delays to raising the
government's debt ceiling. In addition, we believe that the act provides
sufficient clarity to allow us to evaluate the likely course of U.S. fiscal
policy for the next few years.
The political brinksmanship
of recent months highlights what we see as America's governance and
policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and less predictable than
what we previously believed. The statutory debt ceiling and the threat of
default have become political bargaining chips in the debate over fiscal
policy. Despite this year's wide-ranging debate, in our view, the differences
between political parties have proven to be extraordinarily difficult to
bridge, and, as we see it, the resulting agreement fell well short of the
comprehensive fiscal consolidation program that some proponents had envisaged
until quite recently. Republicans and Democrats have only been able to agree to
relatively modest savings on discretionary spending while delegating to the
Select Committee decisions on more comprehensive measures. It appears that for
now, new revenues have dropped down on the menu of policy options. In addition,
the plan envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare and little change in
other entitlements, the containment of which we and most other independent observers
regard as key to long-term fiscal sustainability.
Our opinion is that elected officials remain wary of
tackling the structural issues required to effectively address the rising U.S.
public debt burden in a manner consistent with a 'AAA' rating and with 'AAA'
rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and
Assumptions," June 30, 2011,
especially Paragraphs 36-41). In our view, the difficulty in framing a
consensus on fiscal policy weakens the government's ability to manage public
finances and diverts attention from the debate over how to achieve more
balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era of fiscal stringency and
private-sector deleveraging (ibid). A new political consensus might (or might
not) emerge after the 2012 elections, but we believe that by then, the
government debt burden will likely be higher, the needed medium-term fiscal
adjustment potentially greater, and the inflection point on the U.S.
population's demographics and other age-related spending drivers closer at hand
(see "Global Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Likely
Cost Even More Green, Now,"
June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's takes no position on the mix of
spending and revenue measures that Congress and the Administration might
conclude is appropriate for putting the U.S.'s finances on a sustainable
footing.
The act calls for as much as $2.4 trillion of
reductions in expenditure growth over the 10 years through 2021. These cuts
will be implemented in two steps: the $917 billion agreed to initially,
followed by an additional $1.5 trillion that the newly formed Congressional
Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction is supposed to recommend by
November 2011. The act contains no measures to raise taxes or otherwise enhance
revenues, though the committee could recommend them.
The act further provides that if Congress does not
enact the committee's recommendations, cuts of $1.2 trillion will be
implemented over the same time period. The reductions would mainly affect
outlays for civilian discretionary spending, defense, and Medicare. We
understand that this fall-back mechanism is designed to encourage Congress to
embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure savings, as the committee might
recommend.
We note that in a letter to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011,
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated total budgetary savings under
the act to be at least $2.1 trillion over the next 10 years relative to its
baseline assumptions. In updating our own fiscal projections, with certain
modifications outlined below, we have relied on the CBO's latest
"Alternate Fiscal Scenario" of June 2011, updated to include the CBO
assumptions contained in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In general, the CBO's
"Alternate Fiscal Scenario" assumes a continuation of recent
Congressional action overriding existing law.
We view the act's measures as a step toward fiscal
consolidation. However, this is within the framework of a legislative mechanism
that leaves open the details of what is finally agreed to until the end of
2011, and Congress and the Administration could modify any agreement in the
future. Even assuming that at least $2.1 trillion of the spending reductions
the act envisages are implemented, we maintain our view that the U.S. net
general government debt burden (all levels of government combined, excluding
liquid financial assets) will likely continue to grow. Under our revised base
case fiscal scenario--which we consider to be consistent with a 'AA+' long-term
rating and a negative outlook--we now project that net general government debt
would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 79% in 2015 and
85% by 2021. Even the projected 2015 ratio of sovereign indebtedness is high in
relation to those of peer credits and, as noted, would continue to rise under
the act's revised policy settings.
Compared with previous projections, our revised base
case scenario now assumes that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, due to expire by the
end of 2012, remain in place. We have changed our assumption on this because
the majority of Republicans in Congress continue to resist any measure that
would raise revenues, a position we believe Congress reinforced by passing the
act. Key macroeconomic assumptions in the base case scenario include trend real
GDP growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near 2% annually over the decade.
Our revised upside scenario--which, other things
being equal, we view as consistent with the outlook on the 'AA+' long-term
rating being revised to stable--retains these same macroeconomic assumptions.
In addition, it incorporates $950 billion of new revenues on the assumption
that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners lapse from 2013 onwards, as
the Administration is advocating. In this scenario, we project that the net
general government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the end of
2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside scenario--which, other things
being equal, we view as being consistent with a possible further downgrade to a
'AA' long-term rating--features less-favorable macroeconomic assumptions, as
outlined below and also assumes that the second round of spending cuts (at
least $1.2 trillion) that the act calls for does not occur. This scenario also
assumes somewhat higher nominal interest rates for U.S. Treasuries. We still
believe that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key reserve currency confers a
government funding advantage, one that could change only slowly over time, and
that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose monetary policy at a time of
fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible that interest rates could rise
if investors re-price relative risks. As a result, our alternate scenario
factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in 10-year bond yields relative to
the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In this scenario, we project the
net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to
101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios also take into account the
significant negative revisions to historical GDP data that the Bureau of
Economic Analysis announced on July 29. From our perspective, the effect of
these revisions underscores two related points when evaluating the likely debt
trajectory of the U.S. government. First, the revisions show that the recent
recession was deeper than previously assumed, so the GDP this year is lower
than previously thought in both nominal and real terms. Consequently, the debt
burden is slightly higher. Second, the revised data highlight the sub-par path
of the current economic recovery when compared with rebounds following previous
post-war recessions. We believe the sluggish pace of the current economic
recovery could be consistent with the experiences of countries that have had
financial crises in which the slow process of debt deleveraging in the private
sector leads to a persistent drag on demand. As a result, our downside case
scenario assumes relatively modest real trend GDP growth of 2.5% and inflation
of near 1.5% annually going forward.
When comparing the U.S. to sovereigns with 'AAA'
long-term ratings that we view as relevant peers--Canada, France, Germany, and
the U.K.--we also observe, based on our base case scenarios for each, that the
trajectory of the U.S.'s net public debt is diverging from the others.
Including the U.S., we estimate that these five sovereigns will have net
general government debt to GDP ratios this year ranging from 34% (Canada) to
80% (the U.K.), with the U.S. debt burden at 74%. By 2015, we project that
their net public debt to GDP ratios will range between 30% (lowest, Canada) and
83% (highest, France), with the U.S. debt burden at 79%. However, in contrast
with the U.S., we project that the net public debt burdens of these other sovereigns
will begin to decline, either before or by 2015.
Standard & Poor's transfer T&C assessment of
the U.S. remains 'AAA'. Our T&C assessment reflects our view of the
likelihood of the sovereign restricting other public and private issuers'
access to foreign exchange needed to meet debt service. Although in our view
the credit standing of the U.S. government has deteriorated modestly, we see
little indication that official interference of this kind is entering onto the
policy agenda of either Congress or the Administration. Consequently, we
continue to view this risk as being highly remote.
The outlook on the long-term rating is negative. As
our downside alternate fiscal scenario illustrates, a higher public debt trajectory
than we currently assume could lead us to lower the long-term rating again. On
the other hand, as our upside scenario highlights, if the recommendations of
the Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction--independently or
coupled with other initiatives, such as the lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax
cuts for high earners--lead to fiscal consolidation measures beyond the minimum
mandated, and we believe they are likely to slow the deterioration of the
government's debt dynamics, the long-term rating could stabilize at 'AA+'.
On Monday, we will issue
separate releases concerning affected ratings in the funds, government-related
entities, financial institutions, insurance, public finance, and structured
finance sectors.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.51.40 |
|
UK Pound |
1 |
Rs.80.20 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.68.92 |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest
capability for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit
transaction. It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest
and principal sums |
Large |
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General
unfavourable factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for
payment of interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively below
average. |
Small |
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with
full security |
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
---- |
NB |
New Business |
---- |
This score serves as a reference to assess SC’s credit risk and
to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is calculated from a composite
of weighted scores obtained from each of the major sections of this report. The
assessed factors and their relative weights (as indicated through %) are as
follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend
(10%) Operational
size (10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL)
or its officials.