MIRA
INFORM REPORT
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Report Date : |
29.09.2011 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
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Name : |
SANGHAVI DIAMOND
INC NY |
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Registered Office : |
1212 AVE of The |
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Country : |
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Date of Incorporation : |
17.05.1995 |
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Legal Form : |
Corporation for Profit |
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Line of Business : |
Diamond Wholesaler |
RATING & COMMENTS
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MIRA’s Rating : |
B |
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RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
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26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
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Status : |
Moderate |
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Payment Behaviour : |
Regular |
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Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES :
Any query related to this report can be made on
e-mail : infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – March 31st, 2011
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Country Name |
Previous Rating (31.12.2010) |
Current Rating (31.03.2011) |
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United States |
a1 |
a1 |
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Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
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Insignificant |
A1 |
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Low |
A2 |
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Moderate |
B1 |
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High |
B2 |
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Very High |
C1 |
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Restricted |
C2 |
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Off-credit |
D |
GEOPOLITICS - UNITED STATES
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POLITICAL DATA |
ECONOMIC DATA |
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Form of
Government: Federal
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Currency: USD |
IDENTIFICATION
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Ordered as: |
Sanghavi Diamond Inc NY |
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Address in the order: |
1212 Avenue of The |
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Legal Name: |
SANGHAVI DIAMONDS INC |
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Legal Address |
1212 AVE OF THE |
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Operative Address |
1212 AVE OF THE |
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Telephone: |
+1 (212) 764-7841 |
ID : |
1922864 |
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Fax: |
+1 (212) 719-4186 |
Legal Form: |
Corporation for Profit |
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Email: |
Registered in: |
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Website: |
Date Created: |
1995 |
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Manager: |
VASANT SANGHAVI, PRESIDENT |
Date Incorporated: |
May 17th, 1995 |
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Staff: |
25 |
Stock: |
200 |
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Value: |
No Par Value |
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Activity: |
Diamond wholesaler |
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BANKS
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Name of the Bank |
Bank Of |
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Comments |
The person we've contacted stayed they are currently working with this
bank. |
BUSINESS
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HISTORY |
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This company was created in the year 1995. |
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PRINCIPAL ACTIVITY |
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The company is categorized under Jewelry design and sellers. Diamond
importers and resellers. |
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Sales are: |
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Wholesale |
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Clients: |
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Jewelry stores Other related industries |
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Operations area: |
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National, Local |
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The company imports from |
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The subject employs 25 employee(s) |
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Comments on staff: |
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Mr. Shah told us that they currently have 25 employees. Therefore they had an increase on the staff of a 28% |
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PAYMENTS |
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regular |
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LOCATION |
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Headquarters |
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This company is headquartered at 1212 AVE OF THE |
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Comments on location: |
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Although the information found shows that this company has a branch in
California, Mr Shah, stated that they both had the same name; Though it has
nothing to do with the company located in Los Angeles, California. |
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Branches: |
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There were no branches found for this company. |
Shareholders - Manager - Related Companies
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Shareholders Parent Company(ies): |
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This company is privately held Vasant SANGHAVI as the main
shareholder. |
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Management: |
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VASANT SANGHAVI, PRESIDENT NITIN JOBANPUTRA, MANAGER Abhey Kahlon, Manager Yogesh Shah, Sales executive |
Financials - COMMERCIAL TRENDS AND FORECAST
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As a private
company the subject does not publish any financial statements. |
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We have
contacted Yogesh Shah who clarified relevant information about the company;
However he refused to provide us any financial data on grounds of
confidentiality. |
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However our
financial sources could provide us with the following data. Those figures
are estimates provided by confidential banking and financial institutions
working with the company. |
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Currency |
DATE |
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USD |
2008 |
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Turnover |
70 M |
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The cash flow is |
20 |
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Legal Fillings |
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There are 8 UCC files listed with the
Secretary of State of New York. There are no
legal filings listed with the District Court. THE COMPANY IS NOT
LISTED ON THE OFAC LIST.* For
information: * The Specially
Designated Nationals (SDN) List is a publication of OFAC which lists
individuals and organizations with whom ** The Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) is one of a number of uniform acts that have been
promulgated in conjunction with efforts to harmonize the law of sales and
other commercial transactions in all 50 states within the The UCC deals
primarily with transactions involving personal property (movable property),
not real property (immovable property). It allows a
creditor to notify other creditors about a debtor’s assets used as collateral
for a secured transaction by filing a public notice (financing statement)
with a particular filing office. The Uniform
Commercial Code Bureau files and maintains on financial obligations
(including IRS liens) incurred by individuals (in business as a sole
proprietor), business entities and corporations. |
Rating
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Local credit
bureau gave a Correct credit rate. The company is
in Good Standing. This means that all local and federal taxes were paid on
due date. |
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Final Opinion |
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This is a medium
sized company with 25 employees and 16 years of experience. There were no
legal filings found against the company or its legal representatives. Although the
representative we talked to, confirmed relevant information; he refused to provide
us any financial information on grounds of confidentiality. There was no
financial information found for the year 2010. Though the
financial information found for the year 2008, gave a correct profitability. |
SUMMARY
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Profitability |
CORRECT |
Public Records |
NO |
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Indebtedness |
CONTROLLED |
Payments |
REGULAR |
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Cash |
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APPENDIX
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Person
Interviewed |
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Yogesh Shah |
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Position |
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Sales executive |
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Comments |
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He confirmed
relevant information; he refused to provide us any financial information on
grounds of confidentiality |
DIAMOND INDUSTRY –
INDIA
- From time immemorial, India is well known in the world as the birthplace for diamonds. It is difficult to trace the origin of diamonds but history says that in the remote past, diamonds were mined only in India. Diamond production in India can be traced back to almost 8th Century B.C. India, in fact, remained undisputed leader till 18th Century when Brazilian fields were discovered in 1725 followed by emergence of S. Africa, Russia and Australia.
- The achievement of the Indian diamond industry was possible only due to combination of the manufacturing skills of the Indian workforce and the untiring and unflagging efforts of the Indian diamantaires, supported by progressive Government policies.
- The area of study of family owned diamond businesses derives its importance from the huge conglomerate of family run organizations which operate in the diamond industry since many generations.
- Some of the basic traits of family run business enterprises include spirit of entrepreneurship, mutual trust lowers transaction costs, small, nimble and quick to react, information as a source of advantage and philanthropy.
- Family owned diamond businesses need to improve on many fronts including higher standard of corporate governance, long-term performance – focused strategies, modern management and technology.
- The diamond jewellery industry in India today may be more than Rs 60000 mil and is rated amongst the fastest growing in the world. Indi ranks third in the world in domestic diamond consumption.
- Utmost caution is to be exercised while dealing with some medium and large diamond traders which are usually engaged in fictitious import – export, inter-company transactions, financially assisted by banks. In the process, several public sector banks lost several hundred million rupees. They mostly diverted borrowed money for diamond business into real estate and capital markets.
- Excerpts from Times of India dated 30th October 2010 is as under –
DIAMOND SAGA – DIRTY
DOZEN STUCK WITH 2K CR DEBT
This could be the biggest credibility crisis the Indian diamond industry has ever faced. Fifteen banks run the risk of losing Rs 2000 crore lent to a dozen diamond firms in Surat. Until about two months ago, they had not repaid these dues. Bankers believe many diamantaires borrowed money during the economic downturn two years ago and diverted funds to businesses like real estate and capital markets. Many of themselves made money from these businesses but their diamond companies have gone sick and declared insolvency.
- Most of the money borrowed from the banks in the name of their diamond business has been diverted in real estate and the share market. The banks are not in a position to seize their properties because in many cases, these were purchased in the name of their relatives and friends.
Standard
& Poor’s
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United
States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'AA+' Due To Political Risks,
Rising Debt Burden; Outlook Negative |
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Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
·
We have lowered our long-term sovereign
credit rating on the United States of America to 'AA+' from 'AAA' and affirmed
the 'A-1+' short-term rating.
·
We have also removed both the short- and long-term ratings
from CreditWatch negative.
·
The downgrade reflects our
opinion that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration
recently agreed to falls short of what, in our view, would be necessary to
stabilize the government's medium-term debt dynamics.
·
More broadly, the downgrade
reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of
American policymaking and political institutions have weakened at a time of
ongoing fiscal and economic challenges to a degree more than we envisioned when
we assigned a negative outlook to the rating on April 18, 2011.
·
Since then, we have changed our
view of the difficulties in bridging the gulf between the political parties
over fiscal policy, which makes us pessimistic about the capacity of Congress
and the Administration to be able to leverage their agreement this week into a
broader fiscal consolidation plan that stabilizes the government's debt
dynamics any time soon.
·
The outlook on the long-term
rating is negative. We could lower the long-term rating to 'AA' within the next
two years if we see that less reduction in spending than agreed to, higher
interest rates, or new fiscal pressures during the period result in a higher
general government debt trajectory than we currently assume in our base case.
TORONTO (Standard &
Poor's) Aug. 5, 2011--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that it
lowered its long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of America
to 'AA+' from 'AAA'. Standard & Poor's also said that the outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. At the same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed
its 'A-1+' short-term rating on the U.S. In addition, Standard & Poor's
removed both ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed on July 14, 2011,
with negative implications.
The transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment
of the U.S.--our assessment of the likelihood of official interference in the
ability of U.S.-based public- and private-sector issuers to secure foreign
exchange for
debt service--remains
'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term
rating on the U.S. because we believe that the prolonged controversy over
raising the statutory debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate
indicate that further near-term progress containing the growth in public
spending, especially on entitlements, or on reaching an agreement on raising
revenues is less likely than we previously assumed and will remain a
contentious and fitful process. We also believe that the fiscal consolidation
plan that Congress and the Administration agreed to this week falls short of
the amount that we believe is necessary to stabilize the general government
debt burden by the middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the
rating was prompted by our view on the rising public debt burden and our
perception of greater policymaking uncertainty, consistent with our criteria
(see "Sovereign Government Rating
Methodology and Assumptions ," June 30, 2011,
especially Paragraphs 36-41). Nevertheless, we view the U.S. federal
government's other economic, external, and monetary credit attributes, which
form the basis for the sovereign rating, as broadly unchanged.
We have taken the ratings
off CreditWatch because the Aug. 2 passage of the Budget Control Act Amendment
of 2011 has removed any perceived immediate threat of payment default posed by
delays to raising the government's debt ceiling. In addition, we believe that
the act provides sufficient clarity to allow us to evaluate the likely course
of U.S. fiscal policy for the next few years.
The political brinksmanship of recent months
highlights what we see as America's governance and policymaking becoming less
stable, less effective, and less predictable than what we previously believed.
The statutory debt ceiling and the threat of default have become political
bargaining chips in the debate over fiscal policy. Despite this year's
wide-ranging debate, in our view, the differences between political parties
have proven to be extraordinarily difficult to bridge, and, as we see it, the
resulting agreement fell well short of the comprehensive fiscal consolidation
program that some proponents had envisaged until quite recently. Republicans
and Democrats have only been able to agree to relatively modest savings on
discretionary spending while delegating to the Select Committee decisions on
more comprehensive measures. It appears that for now, new revenues have dropped
down on the menu of policy options. In addition, the plan envisions only minor
policy changes on Medicare and little change in other entitlements,
the containment of which
we and most other independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal
sustainability.
Our opinion is that
elected officials remain wary of tackling the structural issues required to
effectively address the rising U.S. public debt burden in a manner consistent
with a 'AAA' rating and with 'AAA' rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign Government Rating
Methodology and Assumptions," June 30, 2011,
especially Paragraphs 36-41). In our view, the difficulty in framing a
consensus on fiscal policy weakens the government's ability to manage public
finances and diverts attention from the debate over how to achieve more
balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era of fiscal stringency and
private-sector deleveraging (ibid). A new political consensus might (or might
not) emerge after the 2012 elections, but we believe that by then, the
government debt burden will likely be higher, the needed medium-term fiscal
adjustment potentially greater, and the inflection point on the U.S.
population's demographics and other age-related spending drivers closer at hand
(see "Global Aging 2011: In The
U.S., Going Gray Will Likely Cost Even More Green, Now,"
June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's
takes no position on the mix of spending and revenue measures that Congress and
the Administration might conclude is appropriate for putting the U.S.'s
finances on a sustainable footing.
The act calls for as much
as $2.4 trillion of reductions in expenditure growth over the 10 years through
2021. These cuts will be implemented in two steps: the $917 billion agreed to initially,
followed by an additional $1.5 trillion that the newly formed Congressional
Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction is supposed to recommend by
November 2011. The act contains no measures to raise taxes or otherwise enhance
revenues, though the committee could recommend them.
The act further provides
that if Congress does not enact the committee's recommendations, cuts of $1.2
trillion will be implemented over the same time period. The reductions would
mainly affect outlays for civilian discretionary spending, defense, and
Medicare. We understand that this fall-back mechanism is designed to encourage
Congress to embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure savings, as the
committee might recommend.
We note that in a letter
to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated
total budgetary savings under the act to be at least $2.1 trillion over the
next 10 years relative to its baseline assumptions. In updating our own fiscal
projections, with certain modifications outlined below, we have relied on the
CBO's latest "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" of June 2011, updated to
include the CBO assumptions contained in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In
general, the CBO's "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" assumes a continuation
of recent Congressional action overriding existing law.
We view the act's
measures as a step toward fiscal consolidation. However, this is within the
framework of a legislative mechanism that leaves open the details of what is
finally agreed to until the end of 2011, and Congress and the Administration
could modify any agreement in the future. Even assuming that at least $2.1
trillion of the spending reductions the act envisages are implemented, we
maintain our view that the U.S. net general government debt burden (all levels
of government combined, excluding liquid financial assets) will likely continue
to grow. Under our revised base case fiscal scenario--which we consider to be
consistent with a 'AA+' long-term rating and a negative outlook--we now project
that net general government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the
end of 2011 to 79% in 2015 and 85% by 2021. Even the projected 2015 ratio of
sovereign indebtedness is high in relation to those of peer credits and, as
noted, would continue to rise under the act's revised policy settings.
Compared with previous
projections, our revised base case scenario now assumes that the 2001 and 2003
tax cuts, due to expire by the end of 2012, remain in place. We have changed
our assumption on this because the majority of Republicans in Congress continue
to resist any measure that would raise revenues, a position we believe Congress
reinforced by passing the act. Key macroeconomic assumptions in the base case
scenario include trend real GDP growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near
2% annually over the decade.
Our revised upside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as consistent with the
outlook on the 'AA+' long-term rating being revised to stable--retains these
same macroeconomic assumptions. In addition, it incorporates $950 billion of
new revenues on the assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners
lapse from 2013 onwards, as the Administration is advocating. In this scenario,
we project that the net general government debt would rise from an estimated
74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as being consistent with a
possible further downgrade to a 'AA' long-term rating--features less-favorable
macroeconomic assumptions, as outlined below and also assumes that the second
round of spending cuts (at least $1.2 trillion) that the act calls for does not
occur. This scenario also assumes somewhat higher nominal interest rates for
U.S. Treasuries. We still believe that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key
reserve currency confers a government funding advantage, one that could change
only slowly over time, and that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose
monetary policy at a time of fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible
that interest rates could rise if investors re-price relative risks. As a
result, our alternate scenario factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in
10-year bond yields relative to the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In
this scenario, we project the net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP
in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to 101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios
also take into account the significant negative revisions to historical GDP
data that the Bureau of Economic Analysis announced on July 29. From our
perspective, the effect of these revisions underscores two related points when
evaluating the likely debt trajectory of the U.S. government. First, the
revisions show that the recent recession was deeper than previously assumed, so
the GDP this year is lower than previously thought in both nominal and real
terms. Consequently, the debt burden is slightly higher. Second, the revised
data highlight the sub-par path of the current economic recovery when compared
with rebounds following previous post-war recessions. We believe the sluggish
pace of the current economic recovery could be consistent with the experiences
of countries that have had financial crises in which the slow process of debt
deleveraging in the private sector leads to a persistent drag on demand. As a
result, our downside case scenario assumes relatively modest real trend GDP
growth of 2.5% and inflation of near 1.5% annually going forward.
When comparing the U.S.
to sovereigns with 'AAA' long-term ratings that we view as relevant
peers--Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K.--we also observe, based on our
base case scenarios for each, that the trajectory of the U.S.'s net public debt
is diverging from the others. Including the U.S., we estimate that these five
sovereigns will have net general government debt to GDP ratios this year
ranging from 34% (Canada) to 80% (the U.K.), with the U.S. debt burden at 74%.
By 2015, we project that their net public debt to GDP ratios will range between
30% (lowest, Canada) and 83% (highest, France), with the U.S. debt burden at
79%. However, in contrast with the U.S., we project that the net public debt
burdens of these other sovereigns will begin to decline, either before or by
2015.
Standard & Poor's
transfer T&C assessment of the U.S. remains 'AAA'. Our T&C assessment
reflects our view of the likelihood of the sovereign restricting other public
and private issuers' access to foreign exchange needed to meet debt service.
Although in our view the credit standing of the U.S. government has
deteriorated modestly, we see little indication that official interference of
this kind is entering onto the policy agenda of either Congress or the
Administration. Consequently, we continue to view this risk as being highly
remote.
The outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. As our downside alternate fiscal scenario
illustrates, a higher public debt trajectory than we currently assume could
lead us to lower the long-term rating again. On the other hand, as our upside
scenario highlights, if the recommendations of the Congressional Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction--independently or coupled with other
initiatives, such as the lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high
earners--lead to fiscal consolidation measures beyond the minimum mandated, and
we believe they are likely to slow the deterioration of the government's debt
dynamics, the long-term rating could stabilize at 'AA+'.
On Monday, we will issue separate releases concerning
affected ratings in the funds, government-related entities, financial
institutions, insurance, public finance, and structured finance sectors.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.48.91 |
|
|
1 |
Rs.76.53 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.66.43 |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest
capability for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit
transaction. It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest
and principal sums |
Large |
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General unfavourable
factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for payment of
interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with full
security |
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
-- |
NB |
New Business |
-- |
This score serves as a reference to assess SC’s credit risk and
to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is calculated from a composite
of weighted scores obtained from each of the major sections of this report. The
assessed factors and their relative weights (as indicated through %) are as
follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend
(10%) Operational
size (10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL)
or its officials.