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Report Date : |
28.04.2012 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
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Name : |
THE DAVID J. JOSEPH COMPANY |
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Registered Office : |
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Country : |
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Financials (as on) : |
31.12.2011 |
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Year of Establishment : |
1885 |
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Legal Form : |
Corporation for Profit |
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Line of Business : |
Ferrous Metal Scrap |
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No. of Employees : |
2,013 (not verified) |
RATING & COMMENTS
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MIRAs Rating : |
Ba |
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RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
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41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
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Status : |
Good |
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Payment Behaviour : |
Regular |
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Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES:
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail: infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List March 31st, 2012
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Country Name |
Previous Rating (31.12.2011) |
Current Rating (31.03.2012) |
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A1 |
A1 |
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Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
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Insignificant |
A1 |
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Low |
A2 |
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Moderate |
B1 |
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High |
B2 |
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Very High |
C1 |
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Restricted |
C2 |
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Off-credit |
D |
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POLITICAL DATA |
ECONOMIC DATA |
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Form of
GovernmentGOVERNMENT |
Federal |
Currency |
USD |
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Economic Risk |
Nil |
Branch Situation |
Stable |
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Legal Name: |
THE DAVID J.
JOSEPH COMPANY |
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Trade Name: |
DJJ |
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Legal Address: |
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Telephone: |
+1 (513)
419-6200 |
ID: |
0358901 |
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Fax: |
+1 (513)
419-6222 |
Legal Form: |
Corporation
for Profit |
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Email: |
Registerd In: |
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Website: |
Date Created: |
1885 |
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Manager: |
Keith Grass,
CEO |
Date
Incorporated |
May 27th, 1937 |
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Staff: |
2,013 (not
verified) |
Stock: |
NA |
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Value: |
NA |
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Activity: |
Ferrous Metal
Scrap. |
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Name of the Bank |
Bank of |
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HISTORY: |
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This company was created in 1885. |
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PRINCIPAL ACTIVITY: |
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The Company engages in trading and processing ferrous and nonferrous scrap,
as well as ferro-alloys, pig iron, and HBI/DRI. |
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Products/Services description: |
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The company offers: |
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Sales are: |
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Wholesale |
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Clients: |
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Various industries |
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Operations area: |
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National, |
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The company imports from |
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Trade References : |
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- Nu-Iron Unlimited, |
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Competitors: |
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- OmniSource Corporation, Fort Wayne, IN,
USA |
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The subject employs 2,013 (not verified) employee(s) |
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Payments : |
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regular |
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LOCATION : |
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Headquarters: |
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Comments on location: |
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This company is incorporated in |
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Branches: |
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The company has numerous branches around
the country, including: |
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Listed at the stock exchange: |
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NO |
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Shareholders Parent Company(ies): |
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The company is wholly own subsidiary of
Nucor Corporation, a public company that operates at the ctock exchange NYSE
under ticker symbol "NUE". |
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Management: |
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Keith Grass, CEO |
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As a private company the subject does not publish any financial
statements. |
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We couldn�t contact any representative from the company to
ask for financial information. |
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However our financial sources could
provide us with the following data. |
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Comments on the financial
data : Dear client we have consolidated the financial statements with those
of the subjects parents company. |
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legal fillings |
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Local credit bureau gave a Correct credit
rate. |
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The company is in Good Standing. This
means that all local and federal taxes were paid on due date. |
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FINAL OPINION: |
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This is a large sized company with 2.200
employees and a long trayectory in business. |
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FINANCIAL SUMMARY |
DEBT COLLECTIONS AND PAYMENTS |
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Profitability |
CORRECT |
Public Records |
NO |
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Indebtedness |
CONTROLLED |
Payments |
REGULAR |
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Cash |
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Comments: |
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Currency in USD. |
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Currency in USD. |
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Currency in USD. |
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Quarterly Data
All
numbers in thousands |
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Currency in USD.
Standard & Poors
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Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
·
We have lowered our long-term sovereign
credit rating on the United States of America to 'AA+' from 'AAA' and affirmed
the 'A-1+' short-term rating.
·
We have also removed both the short- and long-term ratings
from CreditWatch negative.
·
The downgrade reflects our opinion that the fiscal consolidation
plan that Congress and the Administration recently agreed to falls short of
what, in our view, would be necessary to stabilize the government's medium-term
debt dynamics.
·
More broadly, the downgrade reflects our view that
the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of American policymaking and
political institutions have weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic
challenges to a degree more than we envisioned when we assigned a negative
outlook to the rating on April 18, 2011.
·
Since then, we have changed our view of the
difficulties in bridging the gulf between the political parties over fiscal
policy, which makes us pessimistic about the capacity of Congress and the
Administration to be able to leverage their agreement this week into a broader
fiscal consolidation plan that stabilizes the government's debt dynamics any
time soon.
·
The outlook on the long-term rating is negative. We
could lower the long-term rating to 'AA' within the next two years if we see
that less reduction in spending than agreed to, higher interest rates, or new
fiscal pressures during the period result in a higher general government debt
trajectory than we currently assume in our base case.
The transfer and
convertibility (T&C) assessment of the U.S.--our assessment of the
likelihood of official interference in the ability of U.S.-based public- and
private-sector issuers to secure foreign exchange for
debt service--remains
'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term
rating on the U.S. because we believe that the prolonged controversy over
raising the statutory debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate
indicate that further near-term progress containing the growth in public
spending, especially on entitlements, or on reaching an agreement on raising
revenues is less likely than we previously assumed and will remain a
contentious and fitful process. We also believe that the fiscal consolidation
plan that Congress and the Administration agreed to this week falls short of
the amount that we believe is necessary to stabilize the general government
debt burden by the middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the
rating was prompted by our view on the rising public debt burden and our
perception of greater policymaking uncertainty, consistent with our criteria
(see "Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and
Assumptions ," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41).
Nevertheless, we view the U.S. federal government's other economic, external,
and monetary credit attributes, which form the basis for the sovereign rating,
as broadly unchanged.
We have taken the ratings
off CreditWatch because the Aug. 2 passage of the Budget Control Act Amendment of
2011 has removed any perceived immediate threat of payment default posed by
delays to raising the government's debt ceiling. In addition, we believe that
the act provides sufficient clarity to allow us to evaluate the likely course
of U.S. fiscal policy for the next few years.
The political
brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as America's governance
and policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and less predictable
than what we previously believed. The statutory debt ceiling and the threat of
default have become political bargaining chips in the debate over fiscal
policy. Despite this year's wide-ranging debate, in our view, the differences
between political parties have proven to be extraordinarily difficult to
bridge, and, as we see it, the resulting agreement fell well short of the
comprehensive fiscal consolidation program that some proponents had envisaged
until quite recently. Republicans and Democrats have only been able to agree to
relatively modest savings on discretionary spending while delegating to the
Select Committee decisions on more comprehensive measures. It appears that for
now, new revenues have dropped down on the menu of policy options. In addition,
the plan envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare and little change in
other entitlements,
the containment of which
we and most other independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal
sustainability.
Our opinion is that
elected officials remain wary of tackling the structural issues required to
effectively address the rising U.S. public debt burden in a manner consistent
with a 'AAA' rating and with 'AAA' rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and
Assumptions," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41). In
our view, the difficulty in framing a consensus on fiscal policy weakens the
government's ability to manage public finances and diverts attention from the
debate over how to achieve more balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era
of fiscal stringency and private-sector deleveraging (ibid). A new political
consensus might (or might not) emerge after the 2012 elections, but we believe
that by then, the government debt burden will likely be higher, the needed
medium-term fiscal adjustment potentially greater, and the inflection point on
the U.S. population's demographics and other age-related spending drivers
closer at hand (see "Global Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Likely
Cost Even More Green, Now," June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's
takes no position on the mix of spending and revenue measures that Congress and
the Administration might conclude is appropriate for putting the U.S.'s
finances on a sustainable footing.
The act calls for as much
as $2.4 trillion of reductions in expenditure growth over the 10 years through
2021. These cuts will be implemented in two steps: the $917 billion agreed to
initially, followed by an additional $1.5 trillion that the newly formed
Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction is supposed to
recommend by November 2011. The act contains no measures to raise taxes or
otherwise enhance revenues, though the committee could recommend them.
The act further provides
that if Congress does not enact the committee's recommendations, cuts of $1.2
trillion will be implemented over the same time period. The reductions would
mainly affect outlays for civilian discretionary spending, defense, and
Medicare. We understand that this fall-back mechanism is designed to encourage
Congress to embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure savings, as the
committee might recommend.
We note that in a letter
to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated
total budgetary savings under the act to be at least $2.1 trillion over the
next 10 years relative to its baseline assumptions. In updating our own fiscal
projections, with certain modifications outlined below, we have relied on the
CBO's latest "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" of June 2011, updated to
include the CBO assumptions contained in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In
general, the CBO's "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" assumes a continuation
of recent Congressional action overriding existing law.
We view the act's
measures as a step toward fiscal consolidation. However, this is within the
framework of a legislative mechanism that leaves open the details of what is
finally agreed to until the end of 2011, and Congress and the Administration
could modify any agreement in the future. Even assuming that at least $2.1
trillion of the spending reductions the act envisages are implemented, we
maintain our view that the U.S. net general government debt burden (all levels
of government combined, excluding liquid financial assets) will likely continue
to grow. Under our revised base case fiscal scenario--which we consider to be
consistent with a 'AA+' long-term rating and a negative outlook--we now project
that net general government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the
end of 2011 to 79% in 2015 and 85% by 2021. Even the projected 2015 ratio of
sovereign indebtedness is high in relation to those of peer credits and, as
noted, would continue to rise under the act's revised policy settings.
Compared with previous
projections, our revised base case scenario now assumes that the 2001 and 2003
tax cuts, due to expire by the end of 2012, remain in place. We have changed
our assumption on this because the majority of Republicans in Congress continue
to resist any measure that would raise revenues, a position we believe Congress
reinforced by passing the act. Key macroeconomic assumptions in the base case
scenario include trend real GDP growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near
2% annually over the decade.
Our revised upside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as consistent with the
outlook on the 'AA+' long-term rating being revised to stable--retains these
same macroeconomic assumptions. In addition, it incorporates $950 billion of
new revenues on the assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners
lapse from 2013 onwards, as the Administration is advocating. In this scenario,
we project that the net general government debt would rise from an estimated
74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as being consistent with a
possible further downgrade to a 'AA' long-term rating--features less-favorable
macroeconomic assumptions, as outlined below and also assumes that the second
round of spending cuts (at least $1.2 trillion) that the act calls for does not
occur. This scenario also assumes somewhat higher nominal interest rates for
U.S. Treasuries. We still believe that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key
reserve currency confers a government funding advantage, one that could change
only slowly over time, and that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose
monetary policy at a time of fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible
that interest rates could rise if investors re-price relative risks. As a
result, our alternate scenario factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in
10-year bond yields relative to the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In
this scenario, we project the net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP
in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to 101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios
also take into account the significant negative revisions to historical GDP
data that the Bureau of Economic Analysis announced on July 29. From our
perspective, the effect of these revisions underscores two related points when
evaluating the likely debt trajectory of the U.S. government. First, the
revisions show that the recent recession was deeper than previously assumed, so
the GDP this year is lower than previously thought in both nominal and real
terms. Consequently, the debt burden is slightly higher. Second, the revised
data highlight the sub-par path of the current economic recovery when compared
with rebounds following previous post-war recessions. We believe the sluggish
pace of the current economic recovery could be consistent with the experiences
of countries that have had financial crises in which the slow process of debt
deleveraging in the private sector leads to a persistent drag on demand. As a
result, our downside case scenario assumes relatively modest real trend GDP
growth of 2.5% and inflation of near 1.5% annually going forward.
When comparing the U.S.
to sovereigns with 'AAA' long-term ratings that we view as relevant
peers--Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K.--we also observe, based on our
base case scenarios for each, that the trajectory of the U.S.'s net public debt
is diverging from the others. Including the U.S., we estimate that these five
sovereigns will have net general government debt to GDP ratios this year
ranging from 34% (Canada) to 80% (the U.K.), with the U.S. debt burden at 74%.
By 2015, we project that their net public debt to GDP ratios will range between
30% (lowest, Canada) and 83% (highest, France), with the U.S. debt burden at
79%. However, in contrast with the U.S., we project that the net public debt
burdens of these other sovereigns will begin to decline, either before or by 2015.
Standard & Poor's
transfer T&C assessment of the U.S. remains 'AAA'. Our T&C assessment
reflects our view of the likelihood of the sovereign restricting other public
and private issuers' access to foreign exchange needed to meet debt service. Although
in our view the credit standing of the U.S. government has deteriorated
modestly, we see little indication that official interference of this kind is
entering onto the policy agenda of either Congress or the Administration.
Consequently, we continue to view this risk as being highly remote.
The outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. As our downside alternate fiscal scenario
illustrates, a higher public debt trajectory than we currently assume could
lead us to lower the long-term rating again. On the other hand, as our upside
scenario highlights, if the recommendations of the Congressional Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction--independently or coupled with other
initiatives, such as the lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners--lead
to fiscal consolidation measures beyond the minimum mandated, and we believe
they are likely to slow the deterioration of the government's debt dynamics,
the long-term rating could stabilize at 'AA+'.
On Monday, we
will issue separate releases concerning affected ratings in the funds,
government-related entities, financial institutions, insurance, public finance,
and structured finance sectors.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.52.68 |
|
UK Pound |
1 |
Rs.85.12 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.69.38 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Report Prepared
by : |
MNL |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest capability
for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit
transaction. It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest
and principal sums |
Large |
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General
unfavourable factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for
payment of interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with
full security |
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
---- |
NB |
New Business |
---- |
This score serves as a reference to assess SCs credit risk
and to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is calculated from a
composite of weighted scores obtained from each of the major sections of this report.
The assessed factors and their relative weights (as indicated through %) are as
follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend
(10%) Operational
size (10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL)
or its officials.