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Report Date : |
18.08.2012 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
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Name : |
EXPRESS TRADE CAPITAL INC |
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Registered Office : |
18 Shorecliff Place, Great Neck,
NY 11023 |
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Country : |
United States of America |
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Date of Incorporation : |
09.07.1993 |
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Com. Reg. No.: |
1740625 |
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Legal Form : |
Corporation |
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Line of Business : |
Financing Services, Customs Brokers,
Commercial Frieght Services |
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No. of Employees : |
9 |
RATING & COMMENTS
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MIRA’s Rating : |
Ba |
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RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
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41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
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Status : |
Satisfactory |
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Payment Behaviour : |
No Complaints |
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Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES
:
Any query related to this report
can be made on e-mail: infodept@mirainform.com while quoting report
number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – March 31st,
2012
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Country Name |
Previous Rating (31.12.2011) |
Current Rating (31.03.2012) |
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United States |
A1 |
A1 |
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Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
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Insignificant |
A1 |
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Low |
A2 |
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Moderate |
B1 |
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High |
B2 |
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Very High |
C1 |
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Restricted |
C2 |
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Off-credit |
D |
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Verified |
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Company Name: |
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Address: |
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City: |
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State/province: |
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Zip/postal code: |
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Country: |
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Telephone: |
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Fax: |
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Credit Recommendation &
Observation
Current Credit Observation: Thers is no Immediate Risk in doing
Business with this company
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Company History / Operations
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Capital Stock: |
100% by Officers |
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Business Structure: |
Corporation |
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How Listed: Business Started: |
Private
Company 1993 |
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Management Control: |
1993 |
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Line of Business: |
Financing
Services, Customs Brokers, Commercial Frieght Services |
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Territory: Sales Terms: Premises: Branches: |
International Net 30 Rents Premises |
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Company Registration &
Status
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Date Registered: |
July
9 1993 |
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Legal form: |
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Registration no: |
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Jurisdiction |
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Registry status: |
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9 |
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Name & Title: |
Peter
Stern , President |
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Name & Title: |
Benjamin Ellis, V President |
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Name & Title: |
Mark Bienstock, V President |
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Trade Payment Experience |
Date Reported July 2012 High Credit : 60000 Now Owing : Zero Terms : Net 30 Days Past Due 1-30 days – Zero Past Due 31-60 days – Zero Past Due 61-90 days – Zero Payments Made: As Agreed Date Reported July 2012 High Credit : 2500 Now Owing : Zero Terms : Net 30 Days Past Due 1-30 days – Zero Past Due 31-60 days – Zero Past Due 61-90 days – Zero Payments Made: As Agreed Date Reported July 2012 High Credit : 500 Now Owing : Zero Terms : Net 30 Days Past Due 1-30 days – Zero Past Due 31-60 days – Zero Past Due 61-90 days – Zero Payments Made: As Agreed Date Reported June 2012 High Credit : 250 Now Owing : Zero Terms : Net 30 Days Past Due 1-30 days – Zero Past Due 31-60 days – Zero Past Due 61-90 days – Zero Payments Made: As Agreed |
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Payment Behaviour: |
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FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS |
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Description |
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Required to file: |
No |
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Comments |
Private Companies are not required to Publish Financial Statements |
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INVESTIGATIVE NOTES
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Sources: |
Court Records Payment Exchange Data Bases Business Registries References & Vendors. |
Standard & Poor’s
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United States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'AA+' Due
To Political Risks, Rising Debt Burden; Outlook Negative |
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Publication date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
·
We have lowered our long-term
sovereign credit rating on the United States of America to 'AA+' from 'AAA' and
affirmed the 'A-1+' short-term rating.
·
We have also removed both the short- and
long-term ratings from CreditWatch negative.
·
The downgrade
reflects our opinion that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the
Administration recently agreed to falls short of what, in our view, would be
necessary to stabilize the government's medium-term debt dynamics.
·
More broadly, the
downgrade reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability, and
predictability of American policymaking and political institutions have
weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic challenges to a degree more
than we envisioned when we assigned a negative outlook to the rating on April
18, 2011.
·
Since then, we have
changed our view of the difficulties in bridging the gulf between the political
parties over fiscal policy, which makes us pessimistic about the capacity of
Congress and the Administration to be able to leverage their agreement this
week into a broader fiscal consolidation plan that stabilizes the government's
debt dynamics any time soon.
·
The outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. We could lower the long-term rating to 'AA'
within the next two years if we see that less reduction in spending than agreed
to, higher interest rates, or new fiscal pressures during the period result in
a higher general government debt trajectory than we currently assume in our
base case.
TORONTO
(Standard & Poor's) Aug. 5, 2011--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services
said today that it lowered its long-term sovereign credit rating on the United
States of America to 'AA+' from 'AAA'. Standard & Poor's also said that the
outlook on the long-term rating is negative. At the same time, Standard & Poor's
affirmed its 'A-1+' short-term rating on the U.S. In addition, Standard &
Poor's removed both ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed on July
14, 2011, with negative implications.
The transfer and convertibility (T&C)
assessment of the U.S.--our assessment of the likelihood of official
interference in the ability of U.S.-based public- and private-sector issuers to
secure foreign exchange for
debt
service--remains 'AAA'.
We lowered
our long-term rating on the U.S. because we believe that the prolonged
controversy over raising the statutory debt ceiling and the related fiscal
policy debate indicate that further near-term progress containing the growth in
public spending, especially on entitlements, or on reaching an agreement on
raising revenues is less likely than we previously assumed and will remain a
contentious and fitful process. We also believe that the fiscal consolidation
plan that Congress and the Administration agreed to this week falls short of
the amount that we believe is necessary to stabilize the general government
debt burden by the middle of the decade.
Our lowering
of the rating was prompted by our view on the rising public debt burden and our
perception of greater policymaking uncertainty, consistent with our criteria
(see "Sovereign
Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions ," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41). Nevertheless,
we view the U.S. federal government's other economic, external, and monetary
credit attributes, which form the basis for the sovereign rating, as broadly
unchanged.
We have taken
the ratings off CreditWatch because the Aug. 2 passage of the Budget Control
Act Amendment of 2011 has removed any perceived immediate threat of payment
default posed by delays to raising the government's debt ceiling. In addition,
we believe that the act provides sufficient clarity to allow us to evaluate the
likely course of U.S. fiscal policy for the next few years.
The political brinksmanship of recent
months highlights what we see as America's governance and policymaking becoming
less stable, less effective, and less predictable than what we previously
believed. The statutory debt ceiling and the threat of default have become
political bargaining chips in the debate over fiscal policy. Despite this
year's wide-ranging debate, in our view, the differences between political
parties have proven to be extraordinarily difficult to bridge, and, as we see
it, the resulting agreement fell well short of the comprehensive fiscal
consolidation program that some proponents had envisaged until quite recently.
Republicans and Democrats have only been able to agree to relatively modest
savings on discretionary spending while delegating to the Select Committee
decisions on more comprehensive measures. It appears that for now, new revenues
have dropped down on the menu of policy options. In addition, the plan
envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare and little change in other
entitlements,
the
containment of which we and most other independent observers regard as key to
long-term fiscal sustainability.
Our opinion
is that elected officials remain wary of tackling the structural issues
required to effectively address the rising U.S. public debt burden in a manner
consistent with a 'AAA' rating and with 'AAA' rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign
Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41). In our
view, the difficulty in framing a consensus on fiscal policy weakens the
government's ability to manage public finances and diverts attention from the
debate over how to achieve more balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era
of fiscal stringency and private-sector deleveraging (ibid). A new political
consensus might (or might not) emerge after the 2012 elections, but we believe
that by then, the government debt burden will likely be higher, the needed
medium-term fiscal adjustment potentially greater, and the inflection point on
the U.S. population's demographics and other age-related spending drivers
closer at hand (see "Global
Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Likely Cost Even More Green, Now," June 21, 2011).
Standard
& Poor's takes no position on the mix of spending and revenue measures that
Congress and the Administration might conclude is appropriate for putting the
U.S.'s finances on a sustainable footing.
The act calls
for as much as $2.4 trillion of reductions in expenditure growth over the 10
years through 2021. These cuts will be implemented in two steps: the $917
billion agreed to initially, followed by an additional $1.5 trillion that the
newly formed Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction is
supposed to recommend by November 2011. The act contains no measures to raise
taxes or otherwise enhance revenues, though the committee could recommend them.
The act
further provides that if Congress does not enact the committee's
recommendations, cuts of $1.2 trillion will be implemented over the same time
period. The reductions would mainly affect outlays for civilian discretionary
spending, defense, and Medicare. We understand that this fall-back mechanism is
designed to encourage Congress to embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure
savings, as the committee might recommend.
We note that
in a letter to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
estimated total budgetary savings under the act to be at least $2.1 trillion
over the next 10 years relative to its baseline assumptions. In updating our
own fiscal projections, with certain modifications outlined below, we have
relied on the CBO's latest "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" of June 2011,
updated to include the CBO assumptions contained in its Aug. 1 letter to
Congress. In general, the CBO's "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" assumes a
continuation of recent Congressional action overriding existing law.
We view the
act's measures as a step toward fiscal consolidation. However, this is within
the framework of a legislative mechanism that leaves open the details of what
is finally agreed to until the end of 2011, and Congress and the Administration
could modify any agreement in the future. Even assuming that at least $2.1
trillion of the spending reductions the act envisages are implemented, we
maintain our view that the U.S. net general government debt burden (all levels
of government combined, excluding liquid financial assets) will likely continue
to grow. Under our revised base case fiscal scenario--which we consider to be
consistent with a 'AA+' long-term rating and a negative outlook--we now project
that net general government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the
end of 2011 to 79% in 2015 and 85% by 2021. Even the projected 2015 ratio of
sovereign indebtedness is high in relation to those of peer credits and, as
noted, would continue to rise under the act's revised policy settings.
Compared with
previous projections, our revised base case scenario now assumes that the 2001
and 2003 tax cuts, due to expire by the end of 2012, remain in place. We have
changed our assumption on this because the majority of Republicans in Congress
continue to resist any measure that would raise revenues, a position we believe
Congress reinforced by passing the act. Key macroeconomic assumptions in the
base case scenario include trend real GDP growth of 3% and consumer price
inflation near 2% annually over the decade.
Our revised
upside scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as consistent with
the outlook on the 'AA+' long-term rating being revised to stable--retains
these same macroeconomic assumptions. In addition, it incorporates $950 billion
of new revenues on the assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high
earners lapse from 2013 onwards, as the Administration is advocating. In this
scenario, we project that the net general government debt would rise from an
estimated 74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised
downside scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as being consistent
with a possible further downgrade to a 'AA' long-term rating--features
less-favorable macroeconomic assumptions, as outlined below and also assumes
that the second round of spending cuts (at least $1.2 trillion) that the act
calls for does not occur. This scenario also assumes somewhat higher nominal
interest rates for U.S. Treasuries. We still believe that the role of the U.S.
dollar as the key reserve currency confers a government funding advantage, one
that could change only slowly over time, and that Fed policy might lean toward
continued loose monetary policy at a time of fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it
is possible that interest rates could rise if investors re-price relative
risks. As a result, our alternate scenario factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75
bp rise in 10-year bond yields relative to the base and upside cases from 2013
onwards. In this scenario, we project the net public debt burden would rise
from 74% of GDP in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to 101% by 2021.
Our revised
scenarios also take into account the significant negative revisions to
historical GDP data that the Bureau of Economic Analysis announced on July 29.
From our perspective, the effect of these revisions underscores two related
points when evaluating the likely debt trajectory of the U.S. government.
First, the revisions show that the recent recession was deeper than previously
assumed, so the GDP this year is lower than previously thought in both nominal
and real terms. Consequently, the debt burden is slightly higher. Second, the
revised data highlight the sub-par path of the current economic recovery when
compared with rebounds following previous post-war recessions. We believe the
sluggish pace of the current economic recovery could be consistent with the
experiences of countries that have had financial crises in which the slow
process of debt deleveraging in the private sector leads to a persistent drag
on demand. As a result, our downside case scenario assumes relatively modest
real trend GDP growth of 2.5% and inflation of near 1.5% annually going
forward.
When
comparing the U.S. to sovereigns with 'AAA' long-term ratings that we view as
relevant peers--Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K.--we also observe, based
on our base case scenarios for each, that the trajectory of the U.S.'s net
public debt is diverging from the others. Including the U.S., we estimate that
these five sovereigns will have net general government debt to GDP ratios this
year ranging from 34% (Canada) to 80% (the U.K.), with the U.S. debt burden at
74%. By 2015, we project that their net public debt to GDP ratios will range
between 30% (lowest, Canada) and 83% (highest, France), with the U.S. debt
burden at 79%. However, in contrast with the U.S., we project that the net
public debt burdens of these other sovereigns will begin to decline, either
before or by 2015.
Standard
& Poor's transfer T&C assessment of the U.S. remains 'AAA'. Our T&C
assessment reflects our view of the likelihood of the sovereign restricting other
public and private issuers' access to foreign exchange needed to meet debt
service. Although in our view the credit standing of the U.S. government has
deteriorated modestly, we see little indication that official interference of
this kind is entering onto the policy agenda of either Congress or the
Administration. Consequently, we continue to view this risk as being highly
remote.
The outlook
on the long-term rating is negative. As our downside alternate fiscal scenario
illustrates, a higher public debt trajectory than we currently assume could
lead us to lower the long-term rating again. On the other hand, as our upside
scenario highlights, if the recommendations of the Congressional Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction--independently or coupled with other
initiatives, such as the lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high
earners--lead to fiscal consolidation measures beyond the minimum mandated, and
we believe they are likely to slow the deterioration of the government's debt
dynamics, the long-term rating could stabilize at 'AA+'.
On Monday, we will issue separate
releases concerning affected ratings in the funds, government-related entities,
financial institutions, insurance, public finance, and structured finance
sectors.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian
Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.55.70 |
|
UK Pound |
1 |
Rs.87.54 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.68.85 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Report
Prepared by : |
NLM |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
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>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the
strongest capability for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit
transaction. It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest
and principal sums |
Large |
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy.
General unfavourable factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability
for payment of interest and principal sums |
Fairly
Large |
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet
normal commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
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11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and
principal sums in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited
with full security |
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<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be
exercised |
Credit
not recommended |
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NB |
New
Business |
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This score serves as a reference to assess SC’s
credit risk and to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is calculated from
a composite of weighted scores obtained from each of the major sections of this
report. The assessed factors and their relative weights (as indicated through
%) are as follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit
history (10%) Market
trend (10%) Operational
size (10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL)
or its officials.