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Report Date : |
23.08.2012 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
|
Name : |
SHIVANI GEMS INC |
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Registered Office : |
50 E. 42nd Street, Suite 1001, New York, New York, 10017 |
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Country : |
United States |
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Date of Incorporation : |
29.02.1984 |
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Legal Form : |
Corporation for Profit |
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Line of Business : |
Wholesales Jewellery and Precious Stones. |
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No. of Employees : |
07 |
RATING & COMMENTS
|
MIRA’s Rating |
Ba |
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RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
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41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
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Status : |
Satisfactory |
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Payment Behaviour : |
No Complaints |
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Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES :
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail: infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – March 31st, 2012
|
Country Name |
Previous Rating (31.12.2011) |
Current Rating (31.03.2012) |
|
United States |
A1 |
A1 |
|
Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
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Insignificant |
A1 |
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Low |
A2 |
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Moderate |
B1 |
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High |
B2 |
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Very High |
C1 |
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Restricted |
C2 |
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Off-credit |
D |
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POLITICAL DATA |
ECONOMIC DATA |
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Form of Government: Federal
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Currency: USD |
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Legal Name: |
SHIVANI GEMS INC |
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Legal Address |
50 E. 42ND STREET SUITE 1001 NEW YORK, NEW YORK, 10017, USA |
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Operative Address |
589, Fifth Avenue, Suit No. 1107 New York NY 10017, USA |
||
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Telephone: |
+1 (212) 593-2750 |
ID : |
898229 |
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Fax: |
+ 1 (212) 593-2844 |
Legal Form: |
Corporation for Profit |
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Email: |
Registered in: |
New York |
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Website: |
Date Created: |
1984 |
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Manager: |
Mehul Shah, President |
Date Incorporated: |
February 29th, 1984 |
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Staff: |
7 |
Stock: |
200 |
|
|
|
Value: |
No Par Value |
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Activity: |
Wholesales jewellery and precious stones. |
||
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Name of the Bank |
Midwest Heritage Bank |
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Name of the Bank |
HSBC BANK USA, F/K/A REPUBLIC NATIONAL BANK OF NEW YORK |
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Location |
452 5TH AVE NEW YORK NY 10018- 2706 |
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HISTORY |
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Shivani Gems Inc., was founded in 1984 and it was
established in New York, USA. The company´s home office is in Mumbai
(Bombay) and it has offices in Antwerp, Bangkok, Hong Kong, Tokyo and Dubai. |
|
PRINCIPAL ACTIVITY |
|
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It is a supplier of Fancy Shaped Diamonds. Moreover, the company is a wholesaler of Marquises. Shivani Gems also manufactures its own jewelry
line through its subsidiary S&S Jewelry Corp. |
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Products/Services description: |
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The company offers the following products: Diamonds, Necklaces, Rings, Earrings, among other products. It also offers: .Jewelry repair jobs .Matched sets .Layouts .Exclusive branded diamonds customized to our customers specific
needs. .Detail oriented staff operating under strict diamond grading practices. .Overnight delivery .Loose diamond buy-back program .Diamond re-cutting done in NY for quick turnaround |
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Sales are: |
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Wholesale |
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Brands: |
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The company operates with the Shivani Gems
brand. |
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Clients: |
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The company offers its products to jewelry retail stores and to the
public. |
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Suppliers: |
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We could not obtain suppliers information from North America or near
regions for us to check trade references. |
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Operations area: |
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National |
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The company imports from India |
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The company does not export |
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The subject employs 7 employee(s) |
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Comments on staff: |
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We could not confirm this information with the company. |
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PAYMENTS |
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regular |
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LOCATION |
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Headquarters |
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589 5th Avenue Room 1107 New York, NY 10017-7264 , U.S. |
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Branches: |
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The company does not have branches. |
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Business Overview: |
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The US jewelry manufacturing industry includes about 1,600 companies with
combined annual revenue of about $8 billion. Major companies include Tiffany,
AAC Group Holding (ArtCarved and Balfour), and Richline Group (Aurafin and Bel-Oro International). The industry is concentrated: the
50 largest companies account for about 70 percent of industry revenue. |
- Manager - Related
Companies
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Listed at the stock exchange: |
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|
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NO |
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Shareholders Parent Company(ies): |
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This is a private company and Mr. Mehun Sheh might be the owner. |
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Management: |
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Mehul Shah, President Mike Cantjive, Manager. |
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Related Companies: |
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Dubai, UAE Tel: 971 4-235 3290 Fax: 971 4-235 3292 Email: sales@fancystardiamonds.com
Tokyo, Japan Tel: 81-3-3834-2906 Fax: 81-3-3834-2907 Email: sales@shivanigems.com
Antwerp, Belgium Tel: 32-3 231 36 57 Fax: 32-3 226 04 61 Email: sales.simonigems@skynet.be Bangkok, Thailand Tel: 662-630 07 49/50 Fax: 662-630 07 51 Email: sales@shivanigems.com
Hong Kong Tel: 852 2723 2005 Fax: 852 2723 2005 Email: sales@simonigems.com Mumbai (Bombay), India Tel: 91 22-2369 0282 Fax: 91 22-2363 4805 Email: sales@ashwindiam.com |
- COMMERCIAL TRENDS AND FORECAST
|
As a private company the subject does not publish any financial
statements. |
|
We have contacted a female operator from the accounting department who
refused rudely to provide any financial data, despite the fact we released
the name of the inquiring party and we explained her the reason why we were
contacting the company. |
|
However our financial sources could provide us with the following
data. Those figures are estimates provided by confidential banking and
financial institutions working with the company. |
|
Currency |
DATE |
|
USD |
2010 |
|
Turnover |
780.000 |
|
Currency |
DATE |
|
USD |
2009 |
|
Turnover |
850.000 |
|
Currency |
DATE |
|
USD |
2007 |
|
Turnover |
1.400.000 |
|
Comments on the financial data: The company´s annual revenues for 2011 are between USD
1,000,000 and 2,500,000. |
|
Legal Fillings |
|
There is one UCC\’s file listed with the Secretary
of State of New York. Filing Number: 95152917 Filing Date: 07-28-1995 Secured Party: HSBC BANK USA, F/K/A
REPUBLIC NATIONAL BANK OF NEW YORK There are no legal filings listed with the
District Court. THE COMPANY IS NOT LISTED ON THE OFAC
LIST.* For information: * The Specially Designated Nationals (SDN)
List is a publication of OFAC which lists individuals and organizations with
whom United States citizens and permanent residents are prohibited from doing
business. ** The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is
one of a number of uniform acts that have been promulgated in conjunction
with efforts to harmonize the law of sales and other commercial transactions
in all 50 states within the United States of America. The UCC deals primarily with transactions
involving personal property (movable property), not real property (immovable
property). It allows a creditor to notify other
creditors about a debtor’s assets used as collateral for a secured
transaction by filing a public notice (financing statement) with a particular
filing office. The Uniform Commercial Code Bureau files
and maintains records on financial obligations (including IRS liens) incurred
by individuals (in business as a sole proprietor), business entities and corporations. |
|
Local credit bureau gave a Normal credit
rate. The company is in Good Standing. This
means that all local and federal taxes were paid on due date. |
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Final Opinion |
|
|
|
Shivani Gems Inc., was
founded in 1984 and it was established in New York, USA. The company´s
home office is in Mumbai (Bombay) and it has offices in Antwerp, Bangkok,
Hong Kong, Tokyo and Dubai. It is a small size, privately-held
company, which wholesales jewellery and precious
stones. There are no legal filings listed with the
District Court. |
|
|
|
||
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Profitability |
N.A. |
Public Records |
NO |
|
Indebtedness |
CONTROLLED |
Payments |
REGULAR |
|
Cash |
NORMAL |
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|
|
Comments |
|
|
|
We have contacted a female operator from the accounting department,
who refused rudely to provide the information requested, despite the fact we
released the name of the inquiring party and we explained her, the reason why
we were contacting the company. |
DIAMOND INDUSTRY –
INDIA
-
From time immemorial, India is well known in the world
as the birthplace for diamonds. It is difficult to trace the origin of diamonds
but history says that in the remote past, diamonds were mined only in India.
Diamond production in India can be traced back to almost 8th Century
B.C. India, in fact, remained undisputed leader till 18th
Century when Brazilian fields were discovered in 1725 followed by emergence of
S. Africa, Russia and Australia.
-
The achievement of the Indian diamond industry was
possible only due to combination of the manufacturing skills of the Indian
workforce and the untiring and unflagging efforts of the Indian diamantaires, supported by progressive Government policies.
-
The area of study of family owned diamond businesses
derives its importance from the huge conglomerate of family run organizations
which operate in the diamond industry since many generations.
-
Some of the basic traits of family run business
enterprises include spirit of entrepreneurship, mutual trust lowers transaction
costs, small, nimble and quick to react, information as a source of advantage
and philanthropy.
-
Family owned diamond businesses need to improve on
many fronts including higher standard of corporate governance, long-term
performance – focused strategies, modern management and technology.
-
The diamond jewellery
industry in India today may be more than Rs 60000 mil
and is rated amongst the fastest growing in the world. Indi ranks third in the world in domestic diamond
consumption.
-
Utmost caution is to be exercised while dealing with
some medium and large diamond traders which are usually engaged in fictitious
import – export, inter-company transactions, financially assisted by banks. In
the process, several public sector banks lost several hundred million rupees.
They mostly diverted borrowed money for diamond business into real estate and
capital markets.
-
Excerpts from Times of India dated 30th
October 2010 is as under –
DIAMOND SAGA – DIRTY DOZEN STUCK WITH 2K CR DEBT
This could be the biggest credibility crisis
the Indian diamond industry has ever faced. Fifteen banks run the risk of
losing Rs 2000 crore lent
to a dozen diamond firms in Surat. Until about two
months ago, they had not repaid these dues. Bankers believe many diamantaires borrowed money during the economic downturn
two years ago and diverted funds to businesses like real estate and capital
markets. Many of themselves made money from these businesses but their diamond
companies have gone sick and declared insolvency.
-
Most of the money borrowed from the banks in the name
of their diamond business has been diverted in real estate and the share
market. The banks are not in a position to seize their properties because in
many cases, these were purchased in the name of their relatives and friends.
Standard
& Poor’s
|
United
States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'AA+' Due To Political Risks, Rising
Debt Burden; Outlook Negative |
|
Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
·
We have lowered our long-term
sovereign credit rating on the United States of America to 'AA+' from 'AAA' and
affirmed the 'A-1+' short-term rating.
·
We have also removed both the short- and
long-term ratings from CreditWatch negative.
·
The downgrade
reflects our opinion that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the
Administration recently agreed to falls short of what, in our view, would be necessary
to stabilize the government's medium-term debt dynamics.
·
More broadly, the
downgrade reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability, and
predictability of American policymaking and political institutions have
weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic challenges to a degree more
than we envisioned when we assigned a negative outlook to the rating on April
18, 2011.
·
Since then, we
have changed our view of the difficulties in bridging the gulf between the
political parties over fiscal policy, which makes us pessimistic about the
capacity of Congress and the Administration to be able to leverage their
agreement this week into a broader fiscal consolidation plan that stabilizes
the government's debt dynamics any time soon.
·
The outlook on
the long-term rating is negative. We could lower the long-term rating to 'AA'
within the next two years if we see that less reduction in spending than agreed
to, higher interest rates, or new fiscal pressures during the period result in
a higher general government debt trajectory than we currently assume in our
base case.
TORONTO (Standard &
Poor's) Aug. 5, 2011--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that it
lowered its long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of America
to 'AA+' from 'AAA'. Standard & Poor's also said that the outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. At the same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed
its 'A-1+' short-term rating on the U.S. In addition, Standard & Poor's
removed both ratings from CreditWatch, where they were
placed on July 14, 2011, with negative implications.
The transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment of the U.S.--our
assessment of the likelihood of official interference in the ability of
U.S.-based public- and private-sector issuers to secure foreign exchange for
debt service--remains
'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term
rating on the U.S. because we believe that the prolonged controversy over
raising the statutory debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate indicate
that further near-term progress containing the growth in public spending,
especially on entitlements, or on reaching an agreement on raising revenues is
less likely than we previously assumed and will remain a contentious and fitful
process. We also believe that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and
the Administration agreed to this week falls short of the amount that we
believe is necessary to stabilize the general government debt burden by the
middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the rating
was prompted by our view on the rising public debt burden and our perception of greater policymaking uncertainty, consistent with our
criteria (see "Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and
Assumptions ," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41).
Nevertheless, we view the U.S. federal government's other economic, external,
and monetary credit attributes, which form the basis for the sovereign rating,
as broadly unchanged.
We have taken the ratings
off CreditWatch because the Aug. 2 passage of the
Budget Control Act Amendment of 2011 has removed any perceived immediate threat
of payment default posed by delays to raising the government's debt ceiling. In
addition, we believe that the act provides sufficient clarity to allow us to
evaluate the likely course of U.S. fiscal policy for the next few years.
The political brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as
America's governance and policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and
less predictable than what we previously believed. The statutory debt ceiling
and the threat of default have become political bargaining chips in the debate
over fiscal policy. Despite this year's wide-ranging debate, in our view, the
differences between political parties have proven to be extraordinarily
difficult to bridge, and, as we see it, the resulting agreement fell well short
of the comprehensive fiscal consolidation program that some proponents had envisaged
until quite recently. Republicans and Democrats have only been able to agree to
relatively modest savings on discretionary spending while delegating to the
Select Committee decisions on more comprehensive measures. It appears that for
now, new revenues have dropped down on the menu of policy options. In addition,
the plan envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare and little change in
other entitlements,
the containment of which
we and most other independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal
sustainability.
Our opinion is that
elected officials remain wary of tackling the structural issues required to
effectively address the rising U.S. public debt burden in a manner consistent
with a 'AAA' rating and with 'AAA' rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and
Assumptions," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41). In
our view, the difficulty in framing a consensus on fiscal policy weakens the
government's ability to manage public finances and diverts attention from the
debate over how to achieve more balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era
of fiscal stringency and private-sector deleveraging
(ibid). A new political consensus might (or might not) emerge after the 2012
elections, but we believe that by then, the government debt burden will likely
be higher, the needed medium-term fiscal adjustment potentially greater, and
the inflection point on the U.S. population's demographics and other
age-related spending drivers closer at hand (see "Global Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Likely
Cost Even More Green, Now," June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's
takes no position on the mix of spending and revenue measures that Congress and
the Administration might conclude is appropriate for putting the U.S.'s
finances on a sustainable footing.
The act calls for as much
as $2.4 trillion of reductions in expenditure growth over the 10 years through
2021. These cuts will be implemented in two steps: the $917 billion agreed to
initially, followed by an additional $1.5 trillion that the newly formed
Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction is supposed to
recommend by November 2011. The act contains no measures to raise taxes or
otherwise enhance revenues, though the committee could recommend them.
The act further provides
that if Congress does not enact the committee's recommendations, cuts of $1.2
trillion will be implemented over the same time period. The reductions would
mainly affect outlays for civilian discretionary spending, defense, and
Medicare. We understand that this fall-back mechanism is designed to encourage
Congress to embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure savings, as the
committee might recommend.
We note that in a letter
to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated
total budgetary savings under the act to be at least $2.1 trillion over the
next 10 years relative to its baseline assumptions. In updating our own fiscal
projections, with certain modifications outlined below, we have relied on the CBO's latest "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" of June
2011, updated to include the CBO assumptions contained in its Aug. 1 letter to
Congress. In general, the CBO's "Alternate
Fiscal Scenario" assumes a continuation of recent Congressional action
overriding existing law.
We view the act's
measures as a step toward fiscal consolidation. However, this is within the
framework of a legislative mechanism that leaves open the details of what is
finally agreed to until the end of 2011, and Congress and the Administration
could modify any agreement in the future. Even assuming that at least $2.1
trillion of the spending reductions the act envisages are implemented, we
maintain our view that the U.S. net general government debt burden (all levels
of government combined, excluding liquid financial assets) will likely continue
to grow. Under our revised base case fiscal scenario--which we consider to be
consistent with a 'AA+' long-term rating and a negative outlook--we now project
that net general government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the
end of 2011 to 79% in 2015 and 85% by 2021. Even the projected 2015 ratio of
sovereign indebtedness is high in relation to those of peer credits and, as
noted, would continue to rise under the act's revised policy settings.
Compared with previous
projections, our revised base case scenario now assumes that the 2001 and 2003
tax cuts, due to expire by the end of 2012, remain in place. We have changed
our assumption on this because the majority of Republicans in Congress continue
to resist any measure that would raise revenues, a position we believe Congress
reinforced by passing the act. Key macroeconomic assumptions in the base case
scenario include trend real GDP growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near
2% annually over the decade.
Our revised upside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as consistent with the
outlook on the 'AA+' long-term rating being revised to stable--retains these
same macroeconomic assumptions. In addition, it incorporates $950 billion of
new revenues on the assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners
lapse from 2013 onwards, as the Administration is advocating. In this scenario,
we project that the net general government debt would rise from an estimated
74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as being consistent with a
possible further downgrade to a 'AA' long-term rating--features less-favorable
macroeconomic assumptions, as outlined below and also assumes that the second
round of spending cuts (at least $1.2 trillion) that the act calls for does not
occur. This scenario also assumes somewhat higher nominal interest rates for
U.S. Treasuries. We still believe that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key
reserve currency confers a government funding advantage, one that could change
only slowly over time, and that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose
monetary policy at a time of fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible
that interest rates could rise if investors re-price relative risks. As a
result, our alternate scenario factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75
bp rise in 10-year bond yields relative to the base
and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In this scenario, we project the net public
debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to 101% by
2021.
Our revised scenarios
also take into account the significant negative revisions to historical GDP
data that the Bureau of Economic Analysis announced on July 29. From our perspective,
the effect of these revisions underscores two related points when evaluating
the likely debt trajectory of the U.S. government. First, the revisions show
that the recent recession was deeper than previously assumed, so the GDP this
year is lower than previously thought in both nominal and real terms.
Consequently, the debt burden is slightly higher. Second, the revised data
highlight the sub-par path of the current economic recovery when compared with
rebounds following previous post-war recessions. We believe the sluggish pace
of the current economic recovery could be consistent with the experiences of
countries that have had financial crises in which the slow process of debt deleveraging in the private sector leads to a persistent
drag on demand. As a result, our downside case scenario assumes relatively
modest real trend GDP growth of 2.5% and inflation of near 1.5% annually going
forward.
When comparing the U.S.
to sovereigns with 'AAA' long-term ratings that we view as relevant
peers--Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K.--we also observe, based on our
base case scenarios for each, that the trajectory of the U.S.'s net public debt
is diverging from the others. Including the U.S., we estimate that these five
sovereigns will have net general government debt to GDP ratios this year
ranging from 34% (Canada) to 80% (the U.K.), with the U.S. debt burden at 74%.
By 2015, we project that their net public debt to GDP ratios will range between
30% (lowest, Canada) and 83% (highest, France), with the U.S. debt burden at
79%. However, in contrast with the U.S., we project that the net public debt
burdens of these other sovereigns will begin to decline, either before or by
2015.
Standard & Poor's
transfer T&C assessment of the U.S. remains 'AAA'. Our T&C assessment
reflects our view of the likelihood of the sovereign restricting other public
and private issuers' access to foreign exchange needed to meet debt service.
Although in our view the credit standing of the U.S. government has
deteriorated modestly, we see little indication that official interference of
this kind is entering onto the policy agenda of either Congress or the
Administration. Consequently, we continue to view this risk as being highly
remote.
The outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. As our downside alternate fiscal scenario
illustrates, a higher public debt trajectory than we currently assume could
lead us to lower the long-term rating again. On the other hand, as our upside
scenario highlights, if the recommendations of the Congressional Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction--independently or coupled with other
initiatives, such as the lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high
earners--lead to fiscal consolidation measures beyond the minimum mandated, and
we believe they are likely to slow the deterioration of the government's debt
dynamics, the long-term rating could stabilize at 'AA+'.
On Monday, we will issue separate releases concerning affected ratings
in the funds, government-related entities, financial institutions, insurance,
public finance, and structured finance sectors.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.55.19 |
|
UK Pound |
1 |
Rs.87.65 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.69.16 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Report Prepared
by : |
MNL |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest
capability for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit
transaction. It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest
and principal sums |
Large |
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General unfavourable factors will not cause fatal effect.
Satisfactory capability for payment of interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with
full security |
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
---- |
NB |
New Business |
---- |
This score serves as a reference to assess SC’s credit risk
and to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is calculated from a
composite of weighted scores obtained from each of the major sections of this
report. The assessed factors and their relative weights (as indicated through
%) are as follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend
(10%) Operational
size (10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL)
or its officials.