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Report Date : |
10.05.2012 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
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Name : |
TRANE INDIA LTD. |
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Registered Office : |
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Country : |
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Date of Incorporation : |
06.08.1993 |
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Legal Form : |
Limited Company |
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Line of Business : |
Wholesalers of heating and Air-Conditioning Equipment. |
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No. of Employees : |
10 employees |
RATING & COMMENTS
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MIRA’s Rating : |
Ba |
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RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
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41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
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Status : |
Satisfactory |
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Payment Behaviour : |
Regular |
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Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES :
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail: infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – September 30, 2011
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Country Name |
Previous Rating (30.06.2011) |
Current Rating (30.09.2011) |
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A1 |
A1 |
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Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
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Insignificant |
A1 |
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Low |
A2 |
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Moderate |
B1 |
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High |
B2 |
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Very High |
C1 |
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Restricted |
C2 |
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Off-credit |
D |
GEOPOLITICS - UNITED STATES
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POLITICAL DATA |
ECONOMIC DATA |
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Form of Government: Federal
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Currency: USD |
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IDENTIFICATION
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Legal Name: |
TRANE INDIA LTD. |
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Legal Address |
CORPORATION TRUST CENTER 1209 ORANGE STREET, WILMINGTON, NEW CASTLE,
DE 19801,USA (registered agent) |
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Operative Address |
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Telephone: |
+1 (608) 787 26 50 |
ID : |
2346623 |
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Fax: |
+1 (608) 787 26 50 |
Legal Form: |
Limited Company |
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Email: |
N/A |
Registered in: |
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Website: |
N/A |
Date Created: |
1993 |
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Manager: |
Pravin Dhamanse, Manager |
Date Incorporated: |
August 6th, 1993 |
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Staff: |
10 employees |
Stock: |
NA |
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Value: |
NA |
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Activity: |
Wholesalers of heating and Air-Conditioning Equipment. |
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BANKS
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Name of the Bank |
PNC BANK |
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BUSINESS
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HISTORY |
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This company was created in the year 1993. |
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PRINCIPAL ACTIVITY |
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The company is working as global provider of indoor comfort systems
and comprehensive facility solutions. |
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Products/Services description: |
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Its offerings include energy efficient heating, ventilating and air
conditioning systems, service and parts support, advanced building controls
and financing solutions. Each Trane system is designed to meet the specific
needs of customers who want heating, cooling, dehumidifying and air cleaning
systems for residential, commercial, institutional and industrial
applications. |
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Sales are: |
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Wholesale |
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Clients: |
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Various industries |
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Suppliers: |
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Frost & Sullivan IDBI Bank Limited |
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Operations area: |
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National, International |
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The company imports from worldwide |
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The company export to |
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The subject employs 10 employee(s) |
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PAYMENTS |
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regular |
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LOCATION |
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Headquarters |
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The company is headquartered at |
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Comments on location: |
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The company is incorporated in |
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Branches: |
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There were no branches found for this company. |
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Shareholders - Manager - Related Companies
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Shareholders Parent Company(ies): |
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Since June, 2008, The company became wholly own subsidiary of
Ingersoll-Rand Plc, a public company that tradeat the stock exchange NYSE
under tiker symbol "IR" Swords, Co. |
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Management: |
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Pravin Dhamanse, Manager Robert Smolen, Treasurer Melissa Johnson, Financial Manager |
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Related Companies: |
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"TRANE INTERNATIONAL INC." "TRANE U.S. INC." "TRANE INC." The company also has another location in |
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Financials - COMMERCIAL TRENDS AND FORECAST
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As a private company the subject does not publish any financial
statements. |
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We have contacted Judy who confirmed and provided us with baic
information, however she refused to provide us any financial data without
knowing the name of the inquiring party. |
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Currency |
DATE |
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USD |
2009 |
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Turnover |
1,600,000 |
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Operating Income |
67,000 |
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Net Income |
51,000 |
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Net worth |
300,000 |
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Liabilities |
20,000 |
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The cash flow is |
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Comments on the financial data: The financial
data was consolidated with that of the parent company´s "Ingersoll-Rand
plc" |
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Legal Fillings |
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There are no UCC files listed
with the Secretary of State of Wisconsin. There are no legal filings listed with the District Court. THE COMPANY IS NOT LISTED ON THE OFAC LIST.* For information: * The Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List is a publication of
OFAC which lists individuals and organizations with whom ** The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is one of a number of uniform
acts that have been promulgated in conjunction with efforts to harmonize the
law of sales and other commercial transactions in all 50 states within the The UCC deals primarily with transactions involving personal property
(movable property), not real property (immovable property). It allows a creditor to notify other creditors about a debtor’s assets
used as collateral for a secured transaction by filing a public notice
(financing statement) with a particular filing office. The Uniform Commercial Code Bureau files and maintains on financial
obligations (including IRS liens) incurred by individuals (in business as a
sole proprietor), business entities and corporations. |
Rating |
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Local credit bureau gave a correct credit rate. |
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The company is in Good Standing. This means that all local and federal taxes were paid on due d |
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ate. |
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Final Opinion |
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This company has been in business for 8 years. It has a staff of 10 employees which makes it a medium sized company. |
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There were no legal filings found against the company or its legal representatives. |
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This company became subsi |
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diary of Ingersoll-Rand Plc (NYSE:IR). |
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Despite our long searches, we were unable to get financial information for the year 2010. |
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Our financial sources though, provided us with the financial information for the year 2009. |
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The company gave a correct prof |
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itability for that year. |
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SUMMARY |
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Profitability |
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CORRECT |
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Public Records |
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NO |
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Indebtedness |
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CONTROLLED |
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Payments |
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REGULAR |
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Cash |
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APPENDIX |
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Person Interviewed |
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Judy |
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Position |
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Representative |
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Comments |
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She confirmed and provided us with basic information, however she refused to provide us any financial data without knowing the name of the inquiring party. |
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Standard & Poor’s
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United States of America |
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Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'AA+' Due To |
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Political Risks, Rising Debt Burden; Outlook Negative |
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Publication date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
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·
We have lowered our long-term
sovereign credit rating on the United
States of America to 'AA+' from 'AAA'
and affirmed the 'A-1+' short-term
rating.
·
We have also
removed both the short- and long-term
ratings from CreditWatch negative.
·
The downgrade
reflects our opinion that the fiscal
consolidation plan that Congress and
the Administration recently agreed to
falls short of what, in our view, would
be necessary to stabilize the
government's medium-term debt dynamics.
·
More broadly,
the downgrade reflects our view that
the effectiveness, stability, and
predictability of American policymaking
and political institutions have
weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and
economic challenges to a degree more
than we envisioned when we assigned a
negative outlook to the rating on April
18, 2011.
·
Since then,
we have changed our view of the
difficulties in bridging the gulf
between the political parties over
fiscal policy, which makes us
pessimistic about the capacity of
Congress and the Administration to be
able to leverage their agreement this
week into a broader fiscal
consolidation plan that stabilizes the
government's debt dynamics any time
soon.
·
The outlook
on the long-term rating is negative. We
could lower the long-term rating to
'AA' within the next two years if we
see that less reduction in spending
than agreed to, higher interest rates,
or new fiscal pressures during the
period result in a higher general
government debt trajectory than we
currently assume in our base case.
TORONTO (Standard
& Poor's) Aug. 5, 2011--Standard
& Poor's Ratings Services said
today that it lowered its long-term
sovereign credit rating on the United
States of America to 'AA+' from 'AAA'.
Standard & Poor's also said that
the outlook on the long-term rating is
negative. At the same time, Standard
& Poor's affirmed its 'A-1+'
short-term rating on the U.S. In
addition, Standard & Poor's removed
both ratings from CreditWatch, where
they were placed on July 14, 2011, with
negative implications.
The transfer
and convertibility (T&C) assessment
of the U.S.--our assessment of the
likelihood of official interference in
the ability of U.S.-based public- and
private-sector issuers to secure
foreign exchange for
debt
service--remains 'AAA'.
We lowered our
long-term rating on the U.S. because we
believe that the prolonged controversy
over raising the statutory debt ceiling
and the related fiscal policy debate
indicate that further near-term
progress containing the growth in
public spending, especially on
entitlements, or on reaching an
agreement on raising revenues is less
likely than we previously assumed and
will remain a contentious and fitful
process. We also believe that the
fiscal consolidation plan that Congress
and the Administration agreed to this
week falls short of the amount that we
believe is necessary to stabilize the
general government debt burden by the
middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the
rating was prompted by our view on the
rising public debt burden and our
perception of greater policymaking
uncertainty, consistent with our
criteria (see "Sovereign
Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions
," June 30, 2011, especially
Paragraphs 36-41). Nevertheless, we
view the U.S. federal government's
other economic, external, and monetary
credit attributes, which form the basis
for the sovereign rating, as broadly
unchanged.
We have taken the
ratings off CreditWatch because the
Aug. 2 passage of the Budget Control
Act Amendment of 2011 has removed any
perceived immediate threat of payment
default posed by delays to raising the
government's debt ceiling. In addition,
we believe that the act provides
sufficient clarity to allow us to
evaluate the likely course of U.S.
fiscal policy for the next few years.
The political
brinksmanship of recent months
highlights what we see as America's
governance and policymaking becoming
less stable, less effective, and less
predictable than what we previously
believed. The statutory debt ceiling
and the threat of default have become
political bargaining chips in the
debate over fiscal policy. Despite this
year's wide-ranging debate, in our
view, the differences between political
parties have proven to be
extraordinarily difficult to bridge,
and, as we see it, the resulting
agreement fell well short of the
comprehensive fiscal consolidation
program that some proponents had
envisaged until quite recently.
Republicans and Democrats have only
been able to agree to relatively modest
savings on discretionary spending while
delegating to the Select Committee
decisions on more comprehensive
measures. It appears that for now, new
revenues have dropped down on the menu
of policy options. In addition, the
plan envisions only minor policy
changes on Medicare and little change
in other entitlements,
the containment of
which we and most other independent
observers regard as key to long-term
fiscal sustainability.
Our opinion is that
elected officials remain wary of
tackling the structural issues required
to effectively address the rising U.S.
public debt burden in a manner
consistent with a 'AAA' rating and with
'AAA' rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign
Government Rating Methodology and
Assumptions," June 30,
2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41). In
our view, the difficulty in framing a
consensus on fiscal policy weakens the
government's ability to manage public
finances and diverts attention from the
debate over how to achieve more
balanced and dynamic economic growth in
an era of fiscal stringency and
private-sector deleveraging (ibid). A
new political consensus might (or might
not) emerge after the 2012 elections,
but we believe that by then, the
government debt burden will likely be
higher, the needed medium-term fiscal
adjustment potentially greater, and the
inflection point on the U.S.
population's demographics and other
age-related spending drivers closer at
hand (see "Global Aging
2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will
Likely Cost Even More Green, Now,"
June 21, 2011).
Standard &
Poor's takes no position on the mix of
spending and revenue measures that
Congress and the Administration might
conclude is appropriate for putting the
U.S.'s finances on a sustainable
footing.
The act calls for
as much as $2.4 trillion of reductions
in expenditure growth over the 10 years
through 2021. These cuts will be
implemented in two steps: the $917
billion agreed to initially, followed
by an additional $1.5 trillion that the
newly formed Congressional Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction is
supposed to recommend by November 2011.
The act contains no measures to raise
taxes or otherwise enhance revenues,
though the committee could recommend
them.
The act further
provides that if Congress does not
enact the committee's recommendations,
cuts of $1.2 trillion will be
implemented over the same time period.
The reductions would mainly affect
outlays for civilian discretionary
spending, defense, and Medicare. We
understand that this fall-back
mechanism is designed to encourage
Congress to embrace a more balanced mix
of expenditure savings, as the
committee might recommend.
We note that in a
letter to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011, the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
estimated total budgetary savings under
the act to be at least $2.1 trillion
over the next 10 years relative to its
baseline assumptions. In updating our
own fiscal projections, with certain
modifications outlined below, we have
relied on the CBO's latest
"Alternate Fiscal Scenario"
of June 2011, updated to include the
CBO assumptions contained in its Aug. 1
letter to Congress. In general, the
CBO's "Alternate Fiscal
Scenario" assumes a continuation
of recent Congressional action
overriding existing law.
We view the act's
measures as a step toward fiscal
consolidation. However, this is within
the framework of a legislative
mechanism that leaves open the details
of what is finally agreed to until the
end of 2011, and Congress and the
Administration could modify any
agreement in the future. Even assuming
that at least $2.1 trillion of the
spending reductions the act envisages
are implemented, we maintain our view
that the U.S. net general government
debt burden (all levels of government
combined, excluding liquid financial
assets) will likely continue to grow.
Under our revised base case fiscal
scenario--which we consider to be
consistent with a 'AA+' long-term
rating and a negative outlook--we now
project that net general government
debt would rise from an estimated 74%
of GDP by the end of 2011 to 79% in
2015 and 85% by 2021. Even the
projected 2015 ratio of sovereign
indebtedness is high in relation to
those of peer credits and, as noted,
would continue to rise under the act's
revised policy settings.
Compared with
previous projections, our revised base
case scenario now assumes that the 2001
and 2003 tax cuts, due to expire by the
end of 2012, remain in place. We have
changed our assumption on this because
the majority of Republicans in Congress
continue to resist any measure that
would raise revenues, a position we
believe Congress reinforced by passing
the act. Key macroeconomic assumptions
in the base case scenario include trend
real GDP growth of 3% and consumer
price inflation near 2% annually over
the decade.
Our revised upside
scenario--which, other things being
equal, we view as consistent with the
outlook on the 'AA+' long-term rating
being revised to stable--retains these
same macroeconomic assumptions. In
addition, it incorporates $950 billion
of new revenues on the assumption that
the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high
earners lapse from 2013 onwards, as the
Administration is advocating. In this
scenario, we project that the net
general government debt would rise from
an estimated 74% of GDP by the end of
2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised
downside scenario--which, other things
being equal, we view as being
consistent with a possible further
downgrade to a 'AA' long-term
rating--features less-favorable
macroeconomic assumptions, as outlined
below and also assumes that the second
round of spending cuts (at least $1.2
trillion) that the act calls for does
not occur. This scenario also assumes
somewhat higher nominal interest rates
for U.S. Treasuries. We still believe
that the role of the U.S. dollar as the
key reserve currency confers a
government funding advantage, one that
could change only slowly over time, and
that Fed policy might lean toward
continued loose monetary policy at a
time of fiscal tightening. Nonetheless,
it is possible that interest rates
could rise if investors re-price
relative risks. As a result, our
alternate scenario factors in a 50
basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in 10-year
bond yields relative to the base and
upside cases from 2013 onwards. In this
scenario, we project the net public
debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP
in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to 101% by
2021.
Our revised
scenarios also take into account the
significant negative revisions to
historical GDP data that the Bureau of
Economic Analysis announced on July 29.
From our perspective, the effect of
these revisions underscores two related
points when evaluating the likely debt
trajectory of the U.S. government.
First, the revisions show that the
recent recession was deeper than
previously assumed, so the GDP this
year is lower than previously thought
in both nominal and real terms.
Consequently, the debt burden is
slightly higher. Second, the revised
data highlight the sub-par path of the
current economic recovery when compared
with rebounds following previous
post-war recessions. We believe the
sluggish pace of the current economic
recovery could be consistent with the
experiences of countries that have had
financial crises in which the slow
process of debt deleveraging in the
private sector leads to a persistent
drag on demand. As a result, our
downside case scenario assumes
relatively modest real trend GDP growth
of 2.5% and inflation of near 1.5%
annually going forward.
When comparing the
U.S. to sovereigns with 'AAA' long-term
ratings that we view as relevant
peers--Canada, France, Germany, and the
U.K.--we also observe, based on our
base case scenarios for each, that the
trajectory of the U.S.'s net public
debt is diverging from the others.
Including the U.S., we estimate that
these five sovereigns will have net
general government debt to GDP ratios
this year ranging from 34% (Canada) to
80% (the U.K.), with the U.S. debt
burden at 74%. By 2015, we project that
their net public debt to GDP ratios
will range between 30% (lowest, Canada)
and 83% (highest, France), with the U.S.
debt burden at 79%. However, in
contrast with the U.S., we project that
the net public debt burdens of these
other sovereigns will begin to decline,
either before or by 2015.
Standard &
Poor's transfer T&C assessment of
the U.S. remains 'AAA'. Our T&C
assessment reflects our view of the
likelihood of the sovereign restricting
other public and private issuers'
access to foreign exchange needed to
meet debt service. Although in our view
the credit standing of the U.S.
government has deteriorated modestly,
we see little indication that official
interference of this kind is entering
onto the policy agenda of either
Congress or the Administration.
Consequently, we continue to view this
risk as being highly remote.
The outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. As our
downside alternate fiscal scenario
illustrates, a higher public debt
trajectory than we currently assume
could lead us to lower the long-term
rating again. On the other hand, as our
upside scenario highlights, if the
recommendations of the Congressional
Joint Select Committee on Deficit
Reduction--independently or coupled
with other initiatives, such as the
lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts
for high earners--lead to fiscal
consolidation measures beyond the
minimum mandated, and we believe they
are likely to slow the deterioration of
the government's debt dynamics, the
long-term rating could stabilize at
'AA+'.
On Monday, we
will issue separate releases concerning
affected ratings in the funds,
government-related entities, financial
institutions, insurance, public
finance, and structured finance
sectors.
FOREIGN
EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
|
|
Unit |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Indian Rupees |
|
|
|
US Dollar |
|
|
|
1 |
|
|
|
Rs. |
|
53.46 |
|
|
|
UK |
|
Pound |
|
|
|
1 |
|
|
|
Rs. |
|
86.27 |
|
|
|
Euro |
INFORMATION
DETAILS
|
Report
Prepared by : |
RATING
EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED
CREDIT LINE |
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses
an extremely sound financial base with
the strongest capability for timely
payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses
adequate working capital. No caution
needed for credit transaction. It has
above average (strong) capability for
payment of interest and principal sums |
Large |
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial
& operational base are regarded
healthy. General unfavourable factors
will not cause fatal effect.
Satisfactory capability for payment of
interest and principal sums |
Fairly
Large |
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall
operation is considered normal. Capable
to meet normal commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability
to overcome financial difficulties
seems comparatively below average. |
Small |
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse
factors are apparent. Repayment of
interest and principal sums in default
or expected to be in default upon
maturity |
Limited
with full security |
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute
credit risk exists. Caution needed to
be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
-- |
NB |
New Business |
-- |
This score serves as
a reference to assess SC’s credit risk
and to set the amount of credit to be
extended. It is calculated from a
composite of weighted scores obtained
from each of the major sections of this
report. The assessed factors and their
relative weights (as indicated through
%) are as follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit
history (10%) Market
trend (10%) Operational
size (10%)