MIRA INFORM REPORT
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Report Date : |
11.05.2012 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
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Name : |
SDIL INC |
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Registered Office : |
521 |
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Country : |
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Date of Incorporation : |
25.08.2006 |
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Legal Form : |
Corporation For Profit |
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LINE OF BUSINESS : |
WHOLESALER
OF DIAMOND JEWELRY |
RATING & COMMENTS
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MIRA’s Rating : |
B |
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RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
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26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
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Status : |
Moderate |
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Payment
Behaviour : |
No Complaints |
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Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES :
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail : infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – September 30th, 2011
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Country Name |
Previous Rating (30.06.2011) |
Current Rating (30.09.2011) |
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a1 |
a1 |
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Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
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Insignificant |
A1 |
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Low |
A2 |
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Moderate |
B1 |
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High |
B2 |
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Very High |
C1 |
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Restricted |
C2 |
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Off-credit |
D |
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POLITICAL DATA |
ECONOMIC DATA |
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Form of Government: Federal
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Currency: USD |
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Ordered as: |
SDIL INC |
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Address in the order: |
529, 17th Floor, 5th Avenue Suite No. 610,
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Legal Name: |
SDIL INC |
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Legal Address |
521 |
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Operative Address |
529, 17th Floor, 5th Avenue Suite No. 610, |
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Telephone: |
+1 (212) 457-2404 |
ID : |
3404928 |
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Fax: |
+1 (212) 457-2404 |
Legal Form: |
Corporation for Profit |
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Email: |
Registered in: |
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Website: |
N/A |
Date Created: |
- |
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Manager: |
Amit Mehta, President |
Date Incorporated: |
August 25th, 2006 |
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Staff: |
less than 10 |
Stock: |
200 |
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Value: |
No Par Value |
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Activity: |
Diamond Jewelry wholesaler |
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Name of the Bank |
ANTWERPSE DIAMANTBANK |
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PRINCIPAL ACTIVITY |
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Diamond Jewelry Wholesaler. |
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Products/Services description: |
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The company engages in wholesale distribution of diamond jewelry, precious
stones and precious metal. |
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Sales are: |
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Wholesale. |
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Clients: |
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Professionals of the Industry. |
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Operations area: |
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National. |
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The company imports from |
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The subject employs less than 10 employees. |
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PAYMENTS |
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Made on a 60 days basis - monitored over the last 12 months. |
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LOCATION |
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Headquarters |
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The company is headquartered at the following address: 529, 17th Floor, 5th Avenue Suite No. 610, |
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Listed at the stock exchange: |
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NO |
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Shareholders Parent Company(ies): |
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The company is privately held by Amit Mehta. |
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Management: |
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Amit Mehta, President. |
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Related Companies: |
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Sister companies: Kiran Jewels, Inc. Prestige Jewelry International, Inc. |
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As a private company the subject does not publish any financial
statements. |
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We contacted Amit Metha, President, who refused to provide any
financial information without knowing the name of the inquiring party. |
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However our financial sources could provide us with the following data
(estimates) |
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Currency |
DATE |
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USD |
2009 |
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Turnover |
150,000 |
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The cash flow is |
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Comments on the financial data: The company's
turnover for the 2010 period was of less than USD 500.000 |
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Legal Fillings |
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There are 2 UCC** files listed with the Secretary
of State of New York. There are no legal filings listed with the
District Court. THE COMPANY IS NOT LISTED ON THE OFAC
LIST.* For information: * The Specially Designated Nationals (SDN)
List is a publication of OFAC which lists individuals and organizations with
whom ** The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is
one of a number of uniform acts that have been promulgated in conjunction
with efforts to harmonize the law of sales and other commercial transactions
in all 50 states within the The UCC deals primarily with transactions
involving personal property (movable property), not real property (immovable
property). It allows a creditor to notify other
creditors about a debtor’s assets used as
collateral for a secured transaction by filing a public notice (financing
statement) with a particular filing office. The Uniform Commercial Code Bureau files and
maintains on financial obligations (including IRS liens) incurred by
individuals (in business as a sole proprietor), business entities and
corporations. |
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Local credit bureau gave a LOW credit
rate. The company is in Good Standing. This
means that all local and federal taxes were paid on due date. |
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Final Opinion |
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This is a small sized The company is active and in good
standing. We have found payment experience recorded. |
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Profitability |
N.A. |
Public Records |
NO |
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Indebtedness |
N.A. |
Payments |
REGULAR |
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Cash |
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Person Interviewed |
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Amit Mehta |
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Position |
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President |
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Comments |
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The contacted person provided us with the following information:
Company Name, Location, Activity, Products, Shareholder, Management Staff, Imports
information, Related Companies. |
DIAMOND INDUSTRY
–
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From time immemorial,
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The achievement of the Indian diamond industry was possible only due to
combination of the manufacturing skills of the Indian workforce and the
untiring and unflagging efforts of the Indian diamantaires, supported by
progressive Government policies.
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The area of study of family owned diamond businesses derives its
importance from the huge conglomerate of family run organizations which operate
in the diamond industry since many generations.
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Some of the basic traits of family run business enterprises include
spirit of entrepreneurship, mutual trust lowers transaction costs, small,
nimble and quick to react, information as a source of advantage and
philanthropy.
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Family owned diamond businesses need to improve on many fronts including
higher standard of corporate governance, long-term performance – focused
strategies, modern management and technology.
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The diamond jewellery industry in
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Utmost caution is to be exercised while dealing with some medium and
large diamond traders which are usually engaged in fictitious import – export,
inter-company transactions, financially assisted by banks. In the process,
several public sector banks lost several hundred million rupees. They mostly
diverted borrowed money for diamond business into real estate and capital
markets.
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Excerpts from Times of India dated 30th October 2010 is as
under –
DIAMOND SAGA –
DIRTY DOZEN STUCK WITH 2K CR DEBT
This could be the biggest credibility crisis the Indian diamond industry
has ever faced. Fifteen banks run the risk of losing Rs 2000 crore lent to a
dozen diamond firms in
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Most of the money borrowed from the banks in the name of their diamond
business has been diverted in real estate and the share market. The banks are
not in a position to seize their properties because in many cases, these were
purchased in the name of their relatives and friends.
Standard
& Poor’s
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Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
·
We have lowered our long-term
sovereign credit rating on the United States of America to 'AA+' from 'AAA' and
affirmed the 'A-1+' short-term rating.
·
We have also removed both the short- and long-term ratings from
CreditWatch negative.
·
The downgrade reflects our opinion
that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration
recently agreed to falls short of what, in our view, would be necessary to
stabilize the government's medium-term debt dynamics.
·
More broadly, the downgrade
reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of
American policymaking and political institutions have weakened at a time of
ongoing fiscal and economic challenges to a degree more than we envisioned when
we assigned a negative outlook to the rating on April 18, 2011.
·
Since then, we have changed our
view of the difficulties in bridging the gulf between the political parties
over fiscal policy, which makes us pessimistic about the capacity of Congress
and the Administration to be able to leverage their agreement this week into a
broader fiscal consolidation plan that stabilizes the government's debt
dynamics any time soon.
·
The outlook on the long-term rating
is negative. We could lower the long-term rating to 'AA' within the next two
years if we see that less reduction in spending than agreed to, higher interest
rates, or new fiscal pressures during the period result in a higher general
government debt trajectory than we currently assume in our base case.
The transfer and
convertibility (T&C) assessment of the
debt service--remains
'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term
rating on the U.S. because we believe that the prolonged controversy over
raising the statutory debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate
indicate that further near-term progress containing the growth in public
spending, especially on entitlements, or on reaching an agreement on raising
revenues is less likely than we previously assumed and will remain a
contentious and fitful process. We also believe that the fiscal consolidation
plan that Congress and the Administration agreed to this week falls short of
the amount that we believe is necessary to stabilize the general government
debt burden by the middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the
rating was prompted by our view on the rising public debt burden and our
perception of greater policymaking uncertainty, consistent with our criteria
(see "Sovereign Government Rating
Methodology and Assumptions ," June 30, 2011, especially
Paragraphs 36-41). Nevertheless, we view the
We have taken the ratings
off CreditWatch because the Aug. 2 passage of the Budget Control Act Amendment
of 2011 has removed any perceived immediate threat of payment default posed by
delays to raising the government's debt ceiling. In addition, we believe that
the act provides sufficient clarity to allow us to evaluate the likely course
of
The political
brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as
the containment of which
we and most other independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal
sustainability.
Our opinion is that elected
officials remain wary of tackling the structural issues required to effectively
address the rising U.S. public debt burden in a manner consistent with a 'AAA'
rating and with 'AAA' rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign Government Rating
Methodology and Assumptions," June 30, 2011,
especially Paragraphs 36-41). In our view, the difficulty in framing a
consensus on fiscal policy weakens the government's ability to manage public
finances and diverts attention from the debate over how to achieve more
balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era of fiscal stringency and
private-sector deleveraging (ibid). A new political consensus might (or might
not) emerge after the 2012 elections, but we believe that by then, the
government debt burden will likely be higher, the needed medium-term fiscal
adjustment potentially greater, and the inflection point on the U.S.
population's demographics and other age-related spending drivers closer at hand
(see "Global Aging 2011: In The
U.S., Going Gray Will Likely Cost Even More Green, Now,"
June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's
takes no position on the mix of spending and revenue measures that Congress and
the Administration might conclude is appropriate for putting the
The act calls for as much
as $2.4 trillion of reductions in expenditure growth over the 10 years through
2021. These cuts will be implemented in two steps: the $917 billion agreed to
initially, followed by an additional $1.5 trillion that the newly formed
Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction is supposed to
recommend by November 2011. The act contains no measures to raise taxes or
otherwise enhance revenues, though the committee could recommend them.
The act further provides
that if Congress does not enact the committee's recommendations, cuts of $1.2
trillion will be implemented over the same time period. The reductions would
mainly affect outlays for civilian discretionary spending, defense, and
Medicare. We understand that this fall-back mechanism is designed to encourage
Congress to embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure savings, as the
committee might recommend.
We note that in a letter
to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated
total budgetary savings under the act to be at least $2.1 trillion over the
next 10 years relative to its baseline assumptions. In updating our own fiscal
projections, with certain modifications outlined below, we have relied on the
CBO's latest "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" of June 2011, updated to
include the CBO assumptions contained in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In
general, the CBO's "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" assumes a continuation
of recent Congressional action overriding existing law.
We view the act's
measures as a step toward fiscal consolidation. However, this is within the
framework of a legislative mechanism that leaves open the details of what is
finally agreed to until the end of 2011, and Congress and the Administration
could modify any agreement in the future. Even assuming that at least $2.1
trillion of the spending reductions the act envisages are implemented, we
maintain our view that the
Compared with previous
projections, our revised base case scenario now assumes that the 2001 and 2003
tax cuts, due to expire by the end of 2012, remain in place. We have changed
our assumption on this because the majority of Republicans in Congress continue
to resist any measure that would raise revenues, a position we believe Congress
reinforced by passing the act. Key macroeconomic assumptions in the base case
scenario include trend real GDP growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near
2% annually over the decade.
Our revised upside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as consistent with the
outlook on the 'AA+' long-term rating being revised to stable--retains these
same macroeconomic assumptions. In addition, it incorporates $950 billion of
new revenues on the assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners
lapse from 2013 onwards, as the Administration is advocating. In this scenario,
we project that the net general government debt would rise from an estimated
74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as being consistent with a
possible further downgrade to a 'AA' long-term rating--features less-favorable
macroeconomic assumptions, as outlined below and also assumes that the second
round of spending cuts (at least $1.2 trillion) that the act calls for does not
occur. This scenario also assumes somewhat higher nominal interest rates for
U.S. Treasuries. We still believe that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key
reserve currency confers a government funding advantage, one that could change
only slowly over time, and that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose
monetary policy at a time of fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible
that interest rates could rise if investors re-price relative risks. As a
result, our alternate scenario factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in
10-year bond yields relative to the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In
this scenario, we project the net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP
in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to 101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios
also take into account the significant negative revisions to historical GDP
data that the Bureau of Economic Analysis announced on July 29. From our
perspective, the effect of these revisions underscores two related points when
evaluating the likely debt trajectory of the
When comparing the U.S.
to sovereigns with 'AAA' long-term ratings that we view as relevant
peers--Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K.--we also observe, based on our
base case scenarios for each, that the trajectory of the U.S.'s net public debt
is diverging from the others. Including the
Standard & Poor's
transfer T&C assessment of the
The outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. As our downside alternate fiscal scenario
illustrates, a higher public debt trajectory than we currently assume could
lead us to lower the long-term rating again. On the other hand, as our upside
scenario highlights, if the recommendations of the Congressional Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction--independently or coupled with other initiatives,
such as the lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners--lead to
fiscal consolidation measures beyond the minimum mandated, and we believe they
are likely to slow the deterioration of the government's debt dynamics, the
long-term rating could stabilize at 'AA+'.
On Monday, we will
issue separate releases concerning affected ratings in the funds,
government-related entities, financial institutions, insurance, public finance,
and structured finance sectors.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.53.33 |
|
|
1 |
Rs.86.10 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.69.06 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Report Prepared
by : |
PDT |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest
capability for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit transaction.
It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest and
principal sums |
Large |
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General unfavourable
factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for payment of
interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
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11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with full
security |
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
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NB |
New Business |
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This score serves as a reference to assess SC’s credit risk and
to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is calculated from a composite
of weighted scores obtained from each of the major sections of this report. The
assessed factors and their relative weights (as indicated through %) are as
follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend
(10%) Operational
size (10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL)
or its officials.