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Report Date : |
28.05.2012 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
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Name : |
SHIVANI GEMS INC |
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Registered Office : |
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Country : |
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Date of Incorporation : |
29.02.1984 |
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Legal Form : |
Corporation for Profit |
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Line of Business : |
Wholesales Jewellery and Precious Stones. |
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No. of Employees : |
07 |
RATING & COMMENTS
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MIRA’s Rating : |
B |
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RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
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26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
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Status : |
Small company |
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Payment Behaviour : |
Unknown |
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Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES :
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail: infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – March 31st, 2012
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Country Name |
Previous Rating (31.12.2011) |
Current Rating (31.03.2012) |
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A1 |
A1 |
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Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
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Insignificant |
A1 |
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Low |
A2 |
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Moderate |
B1 |
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High |
B2 |
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Very High |
C1 |
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Restricted |
C2 |
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Off-credit |
D |
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POLITICAL DATA |
ECONOMIC DATA |
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Form of Government: Federal
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Currency: USD |
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Legal Name: |
Shivani Gems Inc |
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Legal Address |
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Operative Address |
589, |
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Telephone: |
+1 (212) 593-2750 |
ID : |
898229 |
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Fax: |
+ 1 (212) 593-2844 |
Legal Form: |
Corporation for Profit |
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Email: |
Registered in: |
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Website: |
Date Created: |
NA |
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Manager: |
Mehul Shah, President |
Date Incorporated: |
FEBRUARY 29, 1984 |
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Staff: |
7 |
Stock: |
200 |
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Value: |
No Par Value |
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Activity: |
Wholesales jewellery and precious stones. |
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Name of the Bank |
Midwest Heritage Bank |
BUSINESS
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PRINCIPAL ACTIVITY |
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The company established itself as a major supplier of Fancy Shaped
Diamonds. Initially Shivani specialized in Marquise Diamonds and carved out a
very unique niche in the marketplace as the largest wholesaler of Marquises in
the world. Shivani’s home office is in Mumbai ( The Shivani brand is represented in full force with offices in Shivani Gems also manufactures its own jewelry line through its
subsidiary S&S Jewelry Corp. |
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Products/Services description: |
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Diamonds Necklaces Rings Earrings |
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Sales are: |
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Wholesale |
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Clients: |
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General Clientele |
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Operations area: |
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National |
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The company imports from |
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The company does not export |
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The subject employs 7 employee(s) |
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LOCATION |
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Headquarters |
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The company is headquartered at |
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Shareholders Parent Company(ies): |
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This is a privately held company. Despite our long searches it has not
been possible to identify the shareholders |
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Management: |
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Mehul Shah, President Mike Cantjive, Manager. |
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Related Companies: |
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Tel: 971 4-235 3290 Fax: 971 4-235 3292 Email: sales@fancystardiamonds.com Tel: 81-3-3834-2906 Fax: 81-3-3834-2907 Email: sales@shivanigems.com Tel: 32-3 231 36 57 Fax: 32-3 226 04 61 Email: sales.simonigems@skynet.be
Tel: 662-630 07 49/50 Fax: 662-630 07 51 Email: sales@shivanigems.com Tel: 852 2723 2005 Fax: 852 2723 2005 Email: sales@simonigems.com Mumbai ( Tel: 91 22-2369 0282 Fax: 91 22-2363 4805 Email: sales@ashwindiam.com |
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As a private company the subject does not publish any financial
statements. |
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We have contacted the company but refused to provide us any financial
data on grounds of confidentiality. |
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However our financial sources could provide us with the following data. Those figures are estimates provided by confidential banking and
financial institutions working with the company. |
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Currency |
DATE |
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USD |
2010 |
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Turnover |
780.000 |
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Currency |
DATE |
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USD |
2009 |
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Turnover |
850.000 |
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Comments on the financial data: For the year 2011 the sales would be
around 1 Million. |
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Legal Fillings |
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There are 9 UCC's files listed
with the Secretary of State of New York. There are no legal filings listed with the District Court. The last annual report was filed in 2011 THE COMPANY IS NOT LISTED ON THE OFAC LIST.* For information: * The Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List is a publication of
OFAC which lists individuals and organizations with whom ** The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is one of a number of uniform
acts that have been promulgated in conjunction with efforts to harmonize the
law of sales and other commercial transactions in all 50 states within the The UCC deals primarily with transactions involving personal property
(movable property), not real property (immovable property). It allows a creditor to notify other creditors about a debtor’s assets used as collateral for a secured transaction by filing a
public notice (financing statement) with a particular filing office. The Uniform Commercial Code Bureau files and maintains on financial obligations
(including IRS liens) incurred by individuals (in business as a sole
proprietor), business entities and corporations. |
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Local credit bureau gave a Correct credit rate. The company is in Good Standing. This means that all local and federal
taxes were paid on due date. |
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Final Opinion |
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This is a small company with experience in this industry. The company's income has dropped compared to previous years. The UCC found demonstrate relative creditworthiness from the financial
institution. We suggest monitoring for the company's length of payment. We believe that a small credit line can be granted. A review within 12 months is strictly required to assess the company's
evolution. |
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Profitability |
CORRECT |
Public Records |
NO |
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Indebtedness |
CONTROLLED |
Payments |
TO BE MONITORED |
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Cash |
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Person Interviewed |
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Receptionist |
DIAMOND INDUSTRY –
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From time immemorial,
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The achievement of the Indian diamond industry was
possible only due to combination of the manufacturing skills of the Indian
workforce and the untiring and unflagging efforts of the Indian diamantaires,
supported by progressive Government policies.
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The area of study of family owned diamond businesses
derives its importance from the huge conglomerate of family run organizations
which operate in the diamond industry since many generations.
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Some of the basic traits of family run business
enterprises include spirit of entrepreneurship, mutual trust lowers transaction
costs, small, nimble and quick to react, information as a source of advantage
and philanthropy.
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Family owned diamond businesses need to improve on
many fronts including higher standard of corporate governance, long-term
performance – focused strategies, modern management and technology.
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The diamond jewellery industry in
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Utmost caution is to be exercised while dealing with
some medium and large diamond traders which are usually engaged in fictitious
import – export, inter-company transactions, financially assisted by banks. In
the process, several public sector banks lost several hundred million rupees.
They mostly diverted borrowed money for diamond business into real estate and
capital markets.
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Excerpts from Times of India dated 30th
October 2010 is as under –
DIAMOND SAGA – DIRTY DOZEN STUCK WITH 2K CR DEBT
This could be the biggest credibility crisis
the Indian diamond industry has ever faced. Fifteen banks run the risk of
losing Rs 2000 crore lent to a dozen diamond firms in
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Most of the money borrowed from the banks in the name
of their diamond business has been diverted in real estate and the share
market. The banks are not in a position to seize their properties because in
many cases, these were purchased in the name of their relatives and friends.
Standard & Poor’s
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Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
·
We have lowered our long-term
sovereign credit rating on the United States of America to 'AA+' from 'AAA' and
affirmed the 'A-1+' short-term rating.
·
We have also removed both the short- and
long-term ratings from CreditWatch negative.
·
The downgrade
reflects our opinion that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the
Administration recently agreed to falls short of what, in our view, would be necessary
to stabilize the government's medium-term debt dynamics.
·
More broadly, the
downgrade reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability, and
predictability of American policymaking and political institutions have
weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic challenges to a degree more
than we envisioned when we assigned a negative outlook to the rating on April
18, 2011.
·
Since then, we
have changed our view of the difficulties in bridging the gulf between the
political parties over fiscal policy, which makes us pessimistic about the
capacity of Congress and the Administration to be able to leverage their
agreement this week into a broader fiscal consolidation plan that stabilizes
the government's debt dynamics any time soon.
·
The outlook on
the long-term rating is negative. We could lower the long-term rating to 'AA'
within the next two years if we see that less reduction in spending than agreed
to, higher interest rates, or new fiscal pressures during the period result in
a higher general government debt trajectory than we currently assume in our
base case.
The transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment of the
debt service--remains
'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term
rating on the U.S. because we believe that the prolonged controversy over
raising the statutory debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate
indicate that further near-term progress containing the growth in public
spending, especially on entitlements, or on reaching an agreement on raising
revenues is less likely than we previously assumed and will remain a
contentious and fitful process. We also believe that the fiscal consolidation
plan that Congress and the Administration agreed to this week falls short of
the amount that we believe is necessary to stabilize the general government
debt burden by the middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the
rating was prompted by our view on the rising public debt burden and our
perception of greater policymaking uncertainty, consistent with our criteria
(see "Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions
," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41). Nevertheless, we view the
We have taken the ratings
off CreditWatch because the Aug. 2 passage of the Budget Control Act Amendment
of 2011 has removed any perceived immediate threat of payment default posed by
delays to raising the government's debt ceiling. In addition, we believe that
the act provides sufficient clarity to allow us to evaluate the likely course
of
The political brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as
the containment of which
we and most other independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal
sustainability.
Our opinion is that
elected officials remain wary of tackling the structural issues required to
effectively address the rising U.S. public debt burden in a manner consistent
with a 'AAA' rating and with 'AAA' rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and
Assumptions," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41). In
our view, the difficulty in framing a consensus on fiscal policy weakens the government's
ability to manage public finances and diverts attention from the debate over
how to achieve more balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era of fiscal
stringency and private-sector deleveraging (ibid). A new political consensus
might (or might not) emerge after the 2012 elections, but we believe that by
then, the government debt burden will likely be higher, the needed medium-term
fiscal adjustment potentially greater, and the inflection point on the U.S.
population's demographics and other age-related spending drivers closer at hand
(see "Global Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Likely
Cost Even More Green, Now," June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's
takes no position on the mix of spending and revenue measures that Congress and
the Administration might conclude is appropriate for putting the
The act calls for as much
as $2.4 trillion of reductions in expenditure growth over the 10 years through
2021. These cuts will be implemented in two steps: the $917 billion agreed to
initially, followed by an additional $1.5 trillion that the newly formed
Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction is supposed to
recommend by November 2011. The act contains no measures to raise taxes or
otherwise enhance revenues, though the committee could recommend them.
The act further provides
that if Congress does not enact the committee's recommendations, cuts of $1.2
trillion will be implemented over the same time period. The reductions would
mainly affect outlays for civilian discretionary spending, defense, and
Medicare. We understand that this fall-back mechanism is designed to encourage
Congress to embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure savings, as the
committee might recommend.
We note that in a letter
to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated
total budgetary savings under the act to be at least $2.1 trillion over the next
10 years relative to its baseline assumptions. In updating our own fiscal
projections, with certain modifications outlined below, we have relied on the
CBO's latest "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" of June 2011, updated to
include the CBO assumptions contained in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In
general, the CBO's "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" assumes a continuation
of recent Congressional action overriding existing law.
We view the act's
measures as a step toward fiscal consolidation. However, this is within the
framework of a legislative mechanism that leaves open the details of what is
finally agreed to until the end of 2011, and Congress and the Administration
could modify any agreement in the future. Even assuming that at least $2.1
trillion of the spending reductions the act envisages are implemented, we
maintain our view that the
Compared with previous
projections, our revised base case scenario now assumes that the 2001 and 2003
tax cuts, due to expire by the end of 2012, remain in place. We have changed
our assumption on this because the majority of Republicans in Congress continue
to resist any measure that would raise revenues, a position we believe Congress
reinforced by passing the act. Key macroeconomic assumptions in the base case
scenario include trend real GDP growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near
2% annually over the decade.
Our revised upside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as consistent with the
outlook on the 'AA+' long-term rating being revised to stable--retains these
same macroeconomic assumptions. In addition, it incorporates $950 billion of
new revenues on the assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners
lapse from 2013 onwards, as the Administration is advocating. In this scenario,
we project that the net general government debt would rise from an estimated
74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as being consistent with a
possible further downgrade to a 'AA' long-term rating--features less-favorable
macroeconomic assumptions, as outlined below and also assumes that the second
round of spending cuts (at least $1.2 trillion) that the act calls for does not
occur. This scenario also assumes somewhat higher nominal interest rates for
U.S. Treasuries. We still believe that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key
reserve currency confers a government funding advantage, one that could change
only slowly over time, and that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose
monetary policy at a time of fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible
that interest rates could rise if investors re-price relative risks. As a
result, our alternate scenario factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in
10-year bond yields relative to the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In
this scenario, we project the net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP
in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to 101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios
also take into account the significant negative revisions to historical GDP
data that the Bureau of Economic Analysis announced on July 29. From our
perspective, the effect of these revisions underscores two related points when
evaluating the likely debt trajectory of the U.S. government. First, the
revisions show that the recent recession was deeper than previously assumed, so
the GDP this year is lower than previously thought in both nominal and real
terms. Consequently, the debt burden is slightly higher. Second, the revised
data highlight the sub-par path of the current economic recovery when compared
with rebounds following previous post-war recessions. We believe the sluggish
pace of the current economic recovery could be consistent with the experiences
of countries that have had financial crises in which the slow process of debt
deleveraging in the private sector leads to a persistent drag on demand. As a
result, our downside case scenario assumes relatively modest real trend GDP
growth of 2.5% and inflation of near 1.5% annually going forward.
When comparing the U.S.
to sovereigns with 'AAA' long-term ratings that we view as relevant
peers--Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K.--we also observe, based on our
base case scenarios for each, that the trajectory of the U.S.'s net public debt
is diverging from the others. Including the U.S., we estimate that these five
sovereigns will have net general government debt to GDP ratios this year
ranging from 34% (Canada) to 80% (the U.K.), with the U.S. debt burden at 74%.
By 2015, we project that their net public debt to GDP ratios will range between
30% (lowest, Canada) and 83% (highest, France), with the U.S. debt burden at
79%. However, in contrast with the U.S., we project that the net public debt
burdens of these other sovereigns will begin to decline, either before or by
2015.
Standard & Poor's
transfer T&C assessment of the U.S. remains 'AAA'. Our T&C assessment
reflects our view of the likelihood of the sovereign restricting other public
and private issuers' access to foreign exchange needed to meet debt service.
Although in our view the credit standing of the U.S. government has
deteriorated modestly, we see little indication that official interference of
this kind is entering onto the policy agenda of either Congress or the
Administration. Consequently, we continue to view this risk as being highly
remote.
The outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. As our downside alternate fiscal scenario
illustrates, a higher public debt trajectory than we currently assume could
lead us to lower the long-term rating again. On the other hand, as our upside
scenario highlights, if the recommendations of the Congressional Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction--independently or coupled with other
initiatives, such as the lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high
earners--lead to fiscal consolidation measures beyond the minimum mandated, and
we believe they are likely to slow the deterioration of the government's debt
dynamics, the long-term rating could stabilize at 'AA+'.
On Monday, we will issue separate releases concerning affected ratings
in the funds, government-related entities, financial institutions, insurance,
public finance, and structured finance sectors.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
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Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.55.73 |
|
|
1 |
Rs.87.26 |
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Euro |
1 |
Rs.69.84 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Report Prepared
by : |
PDT |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest
capability for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit transaction.
It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest and
principal sums |
Large |
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General unfavourable
factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for payment of
interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with full
security |
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
-- |
NB |
New Business |
-- |
This score serves as a reference to assess SC’s credit risk and
to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is calculated from a composite
of weighted scores obtained from each of the major sections of this report. The
assessed factors and their relative weights (as indicated through %) are as
follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend
(10%) Operational
size (10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL)
or its officials.