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Report Date : |
05.04.2013 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
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Name : |
TOKYO PEARL CO LTD |
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Registered Office : |
Tokyo Shinju Bldg, 6-16-3 Ginza Chuoku Tokyo 104-0061 |
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Country : |
Japan |
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Financials (as on) : |
31.03.2013 |
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Date of Incorporation : |
February 1959 |
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Com. Reg. No.: |
0100-01-061359 (Tokyo-Chuoku) |
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Legal Form : |
Limited Company |
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Line of Business : |
Import, export, wholesale of pearls, diamonds |
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No. of Employees : |
67 |
RATING & COMMENTS
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MIRA’s Rating : |
Ba |
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RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
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41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal commitments. |
Satisfactory |
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Status : |
Good |
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Payment Behaviour : |
Regular |
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Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES:
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail: infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – June 30th, 2012
|
Country Name |
Previous Rating (31.03.2012) |
Current Rating (30.06.2012) |
|
Japan |
A1 |
A1 |
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Risk Category |
ECGC Classification |
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Insignificant |
A1 |
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Low |
A2 |
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Moderate |
B1 |
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High |
B2 |
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Very High |
C1 |
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Restricted |
C2 |
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Off-credit |
D |
japan - ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
In the years following World War II, government-industry cooperation, a strong
work ethic, mastery of high technology, and a comparatively small defense
allocation (1% of GDP) helped Japan develop a technologically advanced economy.
Two notable characteristics of the post-war economy were the close interlocking
structures of manufacturers, suppliers, and distributors, known as keiretsu,
and the guarantee of lifetime employment for a substantial portion of the urban
labor force. Both features are now eroding under the dual pressures of global
competition and domestic demographic change. Japan's industrial sector is
heavily dependent on imported raw materials and fuels. A tiny agricultural
sector is highly subsidized and protected, with crop yields among the highest
in the world. Usually self-sufficient in rice, Japan imports about 60% of its
food on a caloric basis. Japan maintains one of the world's largest fishing
fleets and accounts for nearly 15% of the global catch. For three decades,
overall real economic growth had been spectacular - a 10% average in the 1960s,
a 5% average in the 1970s, and a 4% average in the 1980s. Growth slowed
markedly in the 1990s, averaging just 1.7%, largely because of the after
effects of inefficient investment and an asset price bubble in the late 1980s
that required a protracted period of time for firms to reduce excess debt,
capital, and labor. Measured on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis that
adjusts for price differences, Japan in 2011 stood as the fourth-largest
economy in the world after second-place China, which surpassed Japan in 2001, and
third-place India, which edged out Japan in 2011. A sharp downturn in business
investment and global demand for Japan's exports in late 2008 pushed Japan
further into recession. Government stimulus spending helped the economy recover
in late 2009 and 2010, but the economy contracted again in 2011 as the massive
9.0 magnitude earthquake in March disrupted manufacturing. Electricity supplies
remain tight because Japan has temporarily shut down almost all of its nuclear
power plants after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactors were crippled by the
earthquake and resulting tsunami. Estimates of the direct costs of the damage -
rebuilding homes, factories, and infrastructure - range from $235 billion to
$310 billion, and GDP declined almost 0.5% in 2011. Prime Minister Yoshihiko
NODA has proposed opening the agricultural and services sectors to greater
foreign competition and boosting exports through membership in the US-led
Trans-Pacific Partnership trade talks and by pursuing free-trade agreements
with the EU and others, but debate continues on restructuring the economy and
reining in Japan's huge government debt, which exceeds 200% of GDP. Persistent
deflation, reliance on exports to drive growth, and an aging and shrinking
population are other major long-term challenges for the economy.
|
Source : CIA |
TOKYO PEARL CO LTD
Tokyo Shinju KK
(Shinju means Pearl)
Tokyo Shinju Bldg,
6-16-3 Ginza Chuoku Tokyo 104-0061 JAPAN
Tel:
03-3543-6055 Fax: 03-3543-2127
URL: http://www.tokyopearl.com/
E-Mail address: info@tokyopearl.com
Import, export, wholesale of pearls, diamonds
Osaka,
Kofu
Antwerp,
Tel Aviv (-- rep offices)
TP
Diamond Co Ltd (Thailand); Tokyo Shinju Singapore Pte Ltd;
Tokyo
Shinju International Ltd (Taiwan) (--subsidiaries)
Ise
(Mie-Pref); Hong Kong, Taiwan
Takezo
Koyama, ch TOTA KOYAMA,
PRES
Itaru
Honjo, s/mgn dir Chozo
Higashi, dir
Yen
Amount: In million Yen, unless
otherwise stated
FINANCES FAIR A/SALES Yen 4,595 M
PAYMENTSREGULAR CAPITAL Yen
100 M
TREND UP WORTH Yen 2,193 M
STARTED 1959 EMPLOYES 67
TRADING
FIRM SPECIALIZING IN DIAMONDS & PEARLS.
FINANCIAL SITUATION CONSIDERED
FAIR AND GOOD FOR ORDINARY BUSINESS ENGAGEMENTS.
The subject company was established by Takezo Koyama in order to make
most of his experience in the subject line of business, as Tokyo Pearl
Ltd. Originally started as a pearl
trader, and in 1973, reorganized and renamed as captioned. In 1980 started the pearl business. In 2004, Takezo Koyama promoted to ch, when
Tota Koyama, his son, took the office of pres.
This is a trading firm specializing in import, export and wholesale of
polished diamonds, pearls, jewelry products, other. Diamonds are imported from Belgium, Israel,
Russia, Thailand, India, USA, other.
Pearls are exported. Also imports
black Tahiti pearls and South Sea pearls from Tahiti, Surabaya, Australia,
other. Clients are jewelers, jewelry
processors, other.
The sales volume for Mar/2012 fiscal term amounted to Yen 4,595 million,
a 1% up from Yen 4,551 million in the previous term. The net profit was posted at Yen 1,852
million, compared with Yen 1,771 million a year ago.
For the term that ended Mar 2013 the net profit was projected at Yen
1,880 million, on a 2% rise in turnover, to Yen 4,680 million. Final results are yet to be released.
The financial situation is considered FAIR and good for ORDINARY
business engagements.
Date Registered: Feb 1959
Regd No.: 0100-01-061359 (Tokyo-Chuoku)
Legal Status: Limited Company (Kabushiki Kaisha)
Authorized: 800,000 shares
Issued: 200,000 shares
Sum: Yen 100 million
Major shareholders (%): Takezo Koyama (42), Koyama
Kosan (20), Yoko Hasegawa (15), Company’s Treasury Stock (8), Toshimitsu
Kinoshita (6)
No. of shareholders: 15
Nothing
detrimental is known as to the commercial morality of executives.
Activities: Imports, exports
and wholesales polished diamonds, (60%), pearls
diamond/pearl jewelry (--40%).
Imports diamonds from Belgium, Israel, Russia, Thailand, USA, India,
Hong Kong, other.
Pearls are imported from Tahiti, Surabaya, Australia, etc. Pearls are also exported.
Clients: [Jewelry
processors, jewelry stores] Kashikey, Belita, Nagahori, Mikimoto Pearls,
Citizen Watch, Azumi, Tokyo Kiho, Kyocera Corp, Primo Japan, FDC
Products, other.
No. of accounts: 500
Domestic areas of activities: Nationwide
Suppliers: [Mfrs,
wholesalers] Imports diamonds from Belgium, Israel, Russia, Thailand,
USA, India, Hong Kong, other.
Imports pearls from Tahiti, Australia, Surabaya, other.
Payment record: Regular
Location: Business area in
Tokyo. Office premises at the caption
address are owned and maintained satisfactorily.
Bank References:
·
Norin Chukin Bank (H/O)
·
Mizuho Bank (Ginzadori)
Relations: Satisfactory
(In Million Yen)
|
Terms Ending: |
31/03/2013 |
31/03/2012 |
31/03/2011 |
31/03/2010 |
|
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Annual
Sales |
|
4,680 |
4,595 |
4,551 |
4,672 |
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Recur.
Profit |
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Net
Profit |
|
1,880 |
1,852 |
1,771 |
26 |
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Total
Assets |
|
|
6,108 |
N/A |
7,833 |
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Current
Assets |
|
|
3,249 |
|
4,768 |
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Current
Liabs |
|
|
3,773 |
|
9,130 |
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Net
Worth |
|
|
2,193 |
341 |
-1,430 |
|
Capital,
Paid-Up |
|
|
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
Div.P.Share(¥) |
|
|
0.00 |
0.00 |
0.00 |
|
<Analytical Data> |
(%) |
(%) |
(%) |
(%) |
|
|
S.Growth Rate |
1.85 |
0.97 |
-2.59 |
-0.60 |
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Current Ratio |
|
.. |
86.11 |
.. |
52.22 |
|
N.Worth Ratio |
.. |
35.90 |
.. |
-18.26 |
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R.Profit/Sales |
|
.. |
.. |
.. |
.. |
|
N.Profit/Sales |
40.17 |
40.30 |
38.91 |
0.56 |
|
|
Return On Equity |
.. |
84.45 |
519.35 |
1.81 |
|
Notes: Financials are only partially disclosed for the
31/03/2011 fiscal term.
Forecast
(or estimated) figures for the 31/03/2013 fiscal term.
DIAMOND INDUSTRY –
INDIA
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From time immemorial, India is well known in the world
as the birthplace for diamonds. It is difficult to trace the origin of
diamonds but history says that in the remote past, diamonds were mined only in
India. Diamond production in India can be traced back to almost 8th
Century B.C. India, in fact, remained undisputed leader till 18th
Century when Brazilian fields were discovered in 1725 followed by emergence of
S. Africa, Russia and Australia.
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The achievement of the Indian diamond industry was
possible only due to combination of the manufacturing skills of the Indian
workforce and the untiring and unflagging efforts of the Indian diamantaires,
supported by progressive Government policies.
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The area of study of family owned diamond businesses
derives its importance from the huge conglomerate of family run organizations
which operate in the diamond industry since many generations.
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Some of the basic traits of family run business
enterprises include spirit of entrepreneurship, mutual trust lowers transaction
costs, small, nimble and quick to react, information as a source of advantage
and philanthropy.
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Family owned diamond businesses need to improve on
many fronts including higher standard of corporate governance, long-term
performance – focused strategies, modern management and technology.
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The diamond jewellery industry in India today may be
more than Rs 60000 mil and is rated amongst the fastest growing in the
world. Indi ranks third in the world in domestic diamond consumption.
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Utmost caution is to be exercised while dealing with
some medium and large diamond traders which are usually engaged in fictitious
import – export, inter-company transactions, financially assisted by banks. In
the process, several public sector banks lost several hundred million rupees.
They mostly diverted borrowed money for diamond business into real estate and capital
markets.
-
Excerpts from Times of India dated 30th
October 2010 is as under –
DIAMOND
SAGA – DIRTY DOZEN STUCK WITH 2K CR DEBT
This could be the biggest credibility crisis
the Indian diamond industry has ever faced. Fifteen banks run the risk of losing
Rs 2000 crore lent to a dozen diamond firms in Surat. Until about two months
ago, they had not repaid these dues. Bankers believe many diamantaires
borrowed money during the economic downturn two years ago and diverted funds to
businesses like real estate and capital markets. Many of themselves made money
from these businesses but their diamond companies have gone sick and declared
insolvency.
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Most of the money borrowed from the banks in the name
of their diamond business has been diverted in real estate and the share
market. The banks are not in a position to seize their properties because in
many cases, these were purchased in the name of their relatives and friends.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.54.65 |
|
UK Pound |
1 |
Rs.82.41 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.70.08 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Report Prepared
by : |
MNL |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
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>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest
capability for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit
transaction. It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest
and principal sums |
Large |
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56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General
unfavourable factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for
payment of interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
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26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
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11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with
full security |
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<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
---- |
NB |
New Business |
---- |
This score serves as a reference to assess
SC’s credit risk and to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is
calculated from a composite of weighted scores obtained from each of the major
sections of this report. The assessed factors and their relative weights (as
indicated through %) are as follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend (10%) Operational size
(10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL)
or its officials.