MIRA INFORM REPORT
|
Report Date : |
28.08.2013 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
|
Name : |
DOW GEMS INC |
|
|
|
|
Registered Office : |
580 5th Avenue, Ste 1608, New York, NY 10036 |
|
|
|
|
Country : |
United States |
|
|
|
|
Date of Incorporation : |
11.09.1980 |
|
|
|
|
Legal Form : |
Corporation – Profit |
|
|
|
|
Line of Business : |
Importer and wholesaler
of diamonds and precious stones |
|
|
|
|
No. of Employees : |
04 |
RATING & COMMENTS
|
MIRA’s Rating : |
B |
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
Status : |
Small Company |
|
|
|
|
Payment Behaviour : |
Slow but Correct |
|
|
|
|
Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES:
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail: infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – March, 31st, 2013
|
Country Name |
Previous Rating (31.12.2012) |
Current Rating (31.03.2013) |
|
United States |
A1 |
A1 |
|
Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
|
Insignificant |
A1 |
|
Low |
A2 |
|
Moderate |
B1 |
|
High |
B2 |
|
Very High |
C1 |
|
Restricted |
C2 |
|
Off-credit |
D |
UNITED STATES - ECONOMIC
OVERVIEW
The US has the largest and most technologically powerful
economy in the world, with a per capita GDP of $49,800. In this market-oriented
economy, private individuals and business firms make most of the decisions, and
the federal and state governments buy needed goods and services predominantly
in the private marketplace. US business firms enjoy greater flexibility than
their counterparts in Western Europe and Japan in decisions to expand capital
plant, to lay off surplus workers, and to develop new products. At the same
time, they face higher barriers to enter their rivals' home markets than
foreign firms face entering US markets. US firms are at or near the forefront
in technological advances, especially in computers and in medical, aerospace,
and military equipment; their advantage has narrowed since the end of World War
II. The onrush of technology largely explains the gradual development of a
"two-tier labor market" in which those at the bottom lack the education
and the professional/technical skills of those at the top and, more and more,
fail to get comparable pay raises, health insurance coverage, and other
benefits. Since 1975, practically all the gains in household income have gone
to the top 20% of households. Since 1996, dividends and capital gains have
grown faster than wages or any other category of after-tax income. Imported oil
accounts for nearly 55% of US consumption. Crude oil prices doubled between
2001 and 2006, the year home prices peaked; higher gasoline prices ate into
consumers' budgets and many individuals fell behind in their mortgage payments.
Oil prices climbed another 50% between 2006 and 2008, and bank foreclosures
more than doubled in the same period. Besides dampening the housing market,
soaring oil prices caused a drop in the value of the dollar and a deterioration
in the US merchandise trade deficit, which peaked at $840 billion in 2008. The
sub-prime mortgage crisis, falling home prices, investment bank failures, tight
credit, and the global economic downturn pushed the United States into a
recession by mid-2008. GDP contracted until the third quarter of 2009, making
this the deepest and longest downturn since the Great Depression. To help
stabilize financial markets, in October 2008 the US Congress established a $700
billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The government used some of these
funds to purchase equity in US banks and industrial corporations, much of which
had been returned to the government by early 2011. In January 2009 the US
Congress passed and President Barack OBAMA signed a bill providing an
additional $787 billion fiscal stimulus to be used over 10 years - two-thirds
on additional spending and one-third on tax cuts - to create jobs and to help
the economy recover. In 2010 and 2011, the federal budget deficit reached
nearly 9% of GDP. In 2012 the federal government reduced the growth of spending
and the deficit shrank to 7.6% of GDP. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan required
major shifts in national resources from civilian to military purposes and
contributed to the growth of the budget deficit and public debt. Through 2011,
the direct costs of the wars totaled nearly $900 billion, according to US
government figures. US revenues from taxes and other sources are lower, as a
percentage of GDP, than those of most other countries. In March 2010, President
OBAMA signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, a health
insurance reform that will extend coverage to an additional 32 million American
citizens by 2016, through private health insurance for the general population
and Medicaid for the impoverished. Total spending on health care - public plus
private - rose from 9.0% of GDP in 1980 to 17.9% in 2010. In July 2010, the
president signed the DODD-FRANK Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
a law designed to promote financial stability by protecting consumers from
financial abuses, ending taxpayer bailouts of financial firms, dealing with
troubled banks that are "too big to fail," and improving accountability
and transparency in the financial system - in particular, by requiring certain
financial derivatives to be traded in markets that are subject to government
regulation and oversight. In December 2012, the Federal Reserve Board announced
plans to purchase $85 billion per month of mortgage-backed and Treasury
securities in an effort to hold down long-term interest rates, and to keep
short term rates near zero until unemployment drops to 6.5% from the December
rate of 7.8%, or until inflation rises above 2.5%. Long-term problems include
stagnation of wages for lower-income families, inadequate investment in
deteriorating infrastructure, rapidly rising medical and pension costs of an
aging population, energy shortages, and sizable current account and budget deficits
- including significant budget shortages for state governments.
|
Source
: CIA |
Company name and address
Company name: DOW GEMS INC
Address: 7 East 47th Street, 6th
floor, New York, NY 10017 - USA
Telephone: +1
212-755-3232
Fax: +1 212-755-2885
Website: -
Reg. address: 580 5th Avenue, Ste 1608,
New York, NY 10036 – USA
Company Summary
Corporate ID#: 650284
State: New York State
Judicial form: Corporation – Profit
Date incorporated: September
11, 1980
Stock: 200 shares common
Value: No
par value
Name of manager: Basant
JOHARI
ACTIVITIES &
OPERATIONS
Business:
Importer and wholesaler of diamonds and precious stones.
The Company imports mainly from India.
EIN: -
Staff: 4
Operations & branches:
At the headquarters, we
find the corporate office, on 600 sq. ft., leased.
SHAREHOLDERS & MANAGERS
Shareholders:
Basant JOHARI is one
shareholder.
Management:
Basant JOHARI, President,
Director and CEO
As far as we know, he is also involved in:
KUBER MFG. INC.
7 East 47th Street, 6th floor, New York, NY 10017
Incorporated in New York State on 05-17-1993
ID# 1727154
AK ENTERPRISES USA, LLC
7 East 47th Street, 6th floor, New York, NY 10017
Incorporated in New York State on 10-14-2004
ID# 3113449
FINANCIALS
In United States, privately
held corporations are not required to publish any financials.
On a direct call, nobody accepted
to answer our questions.
We sent a fax but no answer
received.
Outside sources (bank) gave
estimate sales for year 2012 in the range of
USD 400,000= (same as
2011).
Banks: Bank of India
New York, NY
LEGAL FILINGS
Legal filings
& complaints:
As of today date, there is no legal filing pending with the Courts.
Secured debts
summary (UCC):
|
1. |
Debtor Names: |
DOW GEMS INC |
Not Available |
|
|
|
DOW GEMS INC. |
7 EAST 47 STREET, 6 FLOOR, NEW YORK, NY
10017 USA |
|
|
|
DOW GEMS INC. |
580, 5TH AVENUE, # 2309,, NEW YORK, NY 10036
USA |
|
|
Secured Party Names: |
BANK OF INDIA |
Not Available |
|
|
|
|
|
|
File no. |
File Date |
Lapse Date |
Filing Type |
|
|
|
285973 |
09/18/1987 |
09/18/1992 |
Financing Statement |
|
|
|
105833 |
05/21/1992 |
09/18/1997 |
Continuation |
|
|
|
112555 |
06/05/1996 |
09/18/1997 |
Financing Statement Amendment |
|
|
|
060568 |
03/26/1997 |
09/18/2002 |
Continuation |
|
|
|
088732 |
04/17/2002 |
09/18/2007 |
Continuation |
|
|
|
200708230678966 |
08/23/2007 |
09/18/2012 |
Continuation |
|
|
|
201206110326444 |
06/11/2012 |
09/18/2017 |
Continuation |
|
|
COMPANY CREDIT HISTORY
Trade references:
Date reported: July 2013
High credit: USD 400
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: October 2012
Line of business: May 2013
Paying status: 2 days beyond terms
Date reported: July 2013
High credit: USD 5,000+
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: May 2013
Line of business: Payroll
Paying status: As agreed
Date reported: July 2013
High credit: USD 400
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: May 2013
Line of business: Telecommunications
Paying status: On terms
Domestic credit history:
Domestic credit history
appears as follow:
|
Monthly Payment Trends - Recent Activity |
|
Date |
Up to 30 DBT |
31-60 DBT |
61-90 DBT |
>90 DBT |
||
|
01/13 |
$700 |
100% |
0% |
0% |
0% |
0% |
|
02/13 |
$500 |
100% |
0% |
0% |
0% |
0% |
|
03/13 |
$600 |
100% |
0% |
0% |
0% |
0% |
|
04/13 |
$600 |
100% |
0% |
0% |
0% |
0% |
|
05/13 |
$700 |
100% |
0% |
0% |
0% |
0% |
|
06/13 |
$700 |
100% |
0% |
0% |
0% |
0% |
National Credit Bureaus gave
a satisfying credit rating.
International
credit history:
Payments of imports are currently made on terms.
Other comments:
The Company maintains a
regular business.
The Company is in good
standing.
This means that all local
and federal taxes were paid on due date.
The risk is low.
Our opinion:
A business connection may
be conducted.
DIAMOND INDUSTRY – INDIA
-
From time immemorial, India is well known in the world
as the birthplace for diamonds. It is difficult to trace the origin of
diamonds but history says that in the remote past, diamonds were mined only in
India. Diamond production in India can be traced back to almost 8th
Century B.C. India, in fact, remained undisputed leader till 18th
Century when Brazilian fields were discovered in 1725 followed by emergence of
S. Africa, Russia and Australia.
-
The achievement of the Indian diamond industry was
possible only due to combination of the manufacturing skills of the Indian
workforce and the untiring and unflagging efforts of the Indian diamantaires,
supported by progressive Government policies.
-
The area of study of family owned diamond businesses
derives its importance from the huge conglomerate of family run organizations
which operate in the diamond industry since many generations.
-
Some of the basic traits of family run business
enterprises include spirit of entrepreneurship, mutual trust lowers transaction
costs, small, nimble and quick to react, information as a source of advantage
and philanthropy.
-
Family owned diamond businesses need to improve on
many fronts including higher standard of corporate governance, long-term
performance – focused strategies, modern management and technology.
-
Utmost caution is to be exercised while dealing with
some medium and large diamond traders which are usually engaged in fictitious
import – export, inter-company transactions, financially assisted by banks. In
the process, several public sector banks lost several hundred million rupees.
They mostly diverted borrowed money for diamond business into real estate and
capital markets.
-
Excerpts from Times of India dated 30th
October 2010 is as under –
-
Gem & Jewellery Export Promotion Council in its
statistical data has shown the export of polished diamonds to have increase by
28 % in February 2013. Compared to $ 1.4 bn worth of polished diamond export in
February, 2012, India exported $ 1.84 billion worth of polished diamonds in
February 2013. A senior executive of GJEPC said, “Export of cut and polished
diamonds started falling month-wise after the imposition of 2 % of import duty
on the polished diamonds. But February, 2013 has given a new ray of hope to the
industry as the export of polished diamonds has actually increased by 28 %. It
means the industry is on the track of recovery and round tripping of
diamonds has stopped completely.” Demand has started coming from the US, the
UK, Japan and China. India’s polished diamond export is expected to cross $ 21
bn in 2013-14.
-
The banking sector has started exercising restraint
while following prudent risk management norms when lending money to gems and
jewellery sector. This follows the implementation of Basel III accord – a
global voluntary regulatory standard on bank capital adequacy, stress testing
and market liquidity.
Standard & Poor’s
|
United
States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'AA+' Due To Political Risks,
Rising Debt Burden; Outlook Negative |
|
Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
- We have lowered our long-term sovereign credit rating on the
United States of America to 'AA+' from 'AAA' and affirmed the 'A-1+'
short-term rating.
·
We have also removed both the short- and long-term ratings
from CreditWatch negative.
·
The downgrade reflects our opinion that the fiscal
consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration recently agreed to
falls short of what, in our view, would be necessary to stabilize the
government's medium-term debt dynamics.
·
More broadly, the downgrade reflects our view that the
effectiveness, stability, and predictability of American policymaking and political
institutions have weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic challenges
to a degree more than we envisioned when we assigned a negative outlook to the
rating on April 18, 2011.
·
Since then, we have changed our view of the difficulties in
bridging the gulf between the political parties over fiscal policy, which makes
us pessimistic about the capacity of Congress and the Administration to be able
to leverage their agreement this week into a broader fiscal consolidation plan
that stabilizes the government's debt dynamics any time soon.
·
The outlook on the long-term rating is negative. We could
lower the long-term rating to 'AA' within the next two years if we see that
less reduction in spending than agreed to, higher interest rates, or new fiscal
pressures during the period result in a higher general government debt
trajectory than we currently assume in our base case.
TORONTO (Standard &
Poor's) Aug. 5, 2011--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that it
lowered its long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of America
to 'AA+' from 'AAA'. Standard & Poor's also said that the outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. At the same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed
its 'A-1+' short-term rating on the U.S. In addition, Standard & Poor's
removed both ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed on July 14, 2011,
with negative implications.
The transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment of the U.S.--our
assessment of the likelihood of official interference in the ability of
U.S.-based public- and private-sector issuers to secure foreign exchange for
debt service--remains
'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term
rating on the U.S. because we believe that the prolonged controversy over
raising the statutory debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate
indicate that further near-term progress containing the growth in public
spending, especially on entitlements, or on reaching an agreement on raising
revenues is less likely than we previously assumed and will remain a
contentious and fitful process. We also believe that the fiscal consolidation
plan that Congress and the Administration agreed to this week falls short of
the amount that we believe is necessary to stabilize the general government
debt burden by the middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the
rating was prompted by our view on the rising public debt burden and our
perception of greater policymaking uncertainty, consistent with our criteria
(see "Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and
Assumptions ," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41).
Nevertheless, we view the U.S. federal government's other economic, external,
and monetary credit attributes, which form the basis for the sovereign rating,
as broadly unchanged.
We have taken the ratings
off CreditWatch because the Aug. 2 passage of the Budget Control Act Amendment
of 2011 has removed any perceived immediate threat of payment default posed by
delays to raising the government's debt ceiling. In addition, we believe that
the act provides sufficient clarity to allow us to evaluate the likely course
of U.S. fiscal policy for the next few years.
The political brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as
America's governance and policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and
less predictable than what we previously believed. The statutory debt ceiling
and the threat of default have become political bargaining chips in the debate
over fiscal policy. Despite this year's wide-ranging debate, in our view, the
differences between political parties have proven to be extraordinarily
difficult to bridge, and, as we see it, the resulting agreement fell well short
of the comprehensive fiscal consolidation program that some proponents had
envisaged until quite recently. Republicans and Democrats have only been able
to agree to relatively modest savings on discretionary spending while
delegating to the Select Committee decisions on more comprehensive measures. It
appears that for now, new revenues have dropped down on the menu of policy
options. In addition, the plan envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare
and little change in other entitlements,
the containment of which
we and most other independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal
sustainability.
Our opinion is that
elected officials remain wary of tackling the structural issues required to
effectively address the rising U.S. public debt burden in a manner consistent
with a 'AAA' rating and with 'AAA' rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and
Assumptions," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41). In our
view, the difficulty in framing a consensus on fiscal policy weakens the
government's ability to manage public finances and diverts attention from the
debate over how to achieve more balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era
of fiscal stringency and private-sector deleveraging (ibid). A new political
consensus might (or might not) emerge after the 2012 elections, but we believe
that by then, the government debt burden will likely be higher, the needed
medium-term fiscal adjustment potentially greater, and the inflection point on
the U.S. population's demographics and other age-related spending drivers
closer at hand (see "Global Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Likely
Cost Even More Green, Now," June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's
takes no position on the mix of spending and revenue measures that Congress and
the Administration might conclude is appropriate for putting the U.S.'s
finances on a sustainable footing.
The act calls for as much
as $2.4 trillion of reductions in expenditure growth over the 10 years through
2021. These cuts will be implemented in two steps: the $917 billion agreed to
initially, followed by an additional $1.5 trillion that the newly formed
Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction is supposed to
recommend by November 2011. The act contains no measures to raise taxes or
otherwise enhance revenues, though the committee could recommend them.
The act further provides
that if Congress does not enact the committee's recommendations, cuts of $1.2
trillion will be implemented over the same time period. The reductions would
mainly affect outlays for civilian discretionary spending, defense, and Medicare.
We understand that this fall-back mechanism is designed to encourage Congress
to embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure savings, as the committee might
recommend.
We note that in a letter
to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated
total budgetary savings under the act to be at least $2.1 trillion over the
next 10 years relative to its baseline assumptions. In updating our own fiscal
projections, with certain modifications outlined below, we have relied on the CBO's
latest "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" of June 2011, updated to include
the CBO assumptions contained in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In general, the
CBO's "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" assumes a continuation of recent
Congressional action overriding existing law.
We view the act's
measures as a step toward fiscal consolidation. However, this is within the
framework of a legislative mechanism that leaves open the details of what is
finally agreed to until the end of 2011, and Congress and the Administration
could modify any agreement in the future. Even assuming that at least $2.1
trillion of the spending reductions the act envisages are implemented, we
maintain our view that the U.S. net general government debt burden (all levels
of government combined, excluding liquid financial assets) will likely continue
to grow. Under our revised base case fiscal scenario--which we consider to be
consistent with a 'AA+' long-term rating and a negative outlook--we now project
that net general government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the
end of 2011 to 79% in 2015 and 85% by 2021. Even the projected 2015 ratio of
sovereign indebtedness is high in relation to those of peer credits and, as
noted, would continue to rise under the act's revised policy settings.
Compared with previous
projections, our revised base case scenario now assumes that the 2001 and 2003
tax cuts, due to expire by the end of 2012, remain in place. We have changed
our assumption on this because the majority of Republicans in Congress continue
to resist any measure that would raise revenues, a position we believe Congress
reinforced by passing the act. Key macroeconomic assumptions in the base case
scenario include trend real GDP growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near
2% annually over the decade.
Our revised upside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as consistent with the
outlook on the 'AA+' long-term rating being revised to stable--retains these
same macroeconomic assumptions. In addition, it incorporates $950 billion of
new revenues on the assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners
lapse from 2013 onwards, as the Administration is advocating. In this scenario,
we project that the net general government debt would rise from an estimated
74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as being consistent with a
possible further downgrade to a 'AA' long-term rating--features less-favorable
macroeconomic assumptions, as outlined below and also assumes that the second
round of spending cuts (at least $1.2 trillion) that the act calls for does not
occur. This scenario also assumes somewhat higher nominal interest rates for
U.S. Treasuries. We still believe that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key
reserve currency confers a government funding advantage, one that could change
only slowly over time, and that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose
monetary policy at a time of fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible
that interest rates could rise if investors re-price relative risks. As a
result, our alternate scenario factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in
10-year bond yields relative to the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In
this scenario, we project the net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP
in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to 101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios
also take into account the significant negative revisions to historical GDP
data that the Bureau of Economic Analysis announced on July 29. From our
perspective, the effect of these revisions underscores two related points when
evaluating the likely debt trajectory of the U.S. government. First, the
revisions show that the recent recession was deeper than previously assumed, so
the GDP this year is lower than previously thought in both nominal and real
terms. Consequently, the debt burden is slightly higher. Second, the revised
data highlight the sub-par path of the current economic recovery when compared
with rebounds following previous post-war recessions. We believe the sluggish
pace of the current economic recovery could be consistent with the experiences
of countries that have had financial crises in which the slow process of debt
deleveraging in the private sector leads to a persistent drag on demand. As a
result, our downside case scenario assumes relatively modest real trend GDP
growth of 2.5% and inflation of near 1.5% annually going forward.
When comparing the U.S.
to sovereigns with 'AAA' long-term ratings that we view as relevant
peers--Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K.--we also observe, based on our
base case scenarios for each, that the trajectory of the U.S.'s net public debt
is diverging from the others. Including the U.S., we estimate that these five
sovereigns will have net general government debt to GDP ratios this year
ranging from 34% (Canada) to 80% (the U.K.), with the U.S. debt burden at 74%.
By 2015, we project that their net public debt to GDP ratios will range between
30% (lowest, Canada) and 83% (highest, France), with the U.S. debt burden at
79%. However, in contrast with the U.S., we project that the net public debt
burdens of these other sovereigns will begin to decline, either before or by
2015.
Standard & Poor's
transfer T&C assessment of the U.S. remains 'AAA'. Our T&C assessment
reflects our view of the likelihood of the sovereign restricting other public
and private issuers' access to foreign exchange needed to meet debt service.
Although in our view the credit standing of the U.S. government has
deteriorated modestly, we see little indication that official interference of
this kind is entering onto the policy agenda of either Congress or the
Administration. Consequently, we continue to view this risk as being highly
remote.
The outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. As our downside alternate fiscal scenario
illustrates, a higher public debt trajectory than we currently assume could
lead us to lower the long-term rating again. On the other hand, as our upside
scenario highlights, if the recommendations of the Congressional Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction--independently or coupled with other
initiatives, such as the lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high
earners--lead to fiscal consolidation measures beyond the minimum mandated, and
we believe they are likely to slow the deterioration of the government's debt
dynamics, the long-term rating could stabilize at 'AA+'.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.64.23 |
|
UK Pound |
1 |
Rs.100.01 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.85.93 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Report Prepared
by : |
MNL |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest capability
for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit
transaction. It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest
and principal sums |
Large |
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General
unfavourable factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for
payment of interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with
full security |
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
---- |
NB |
New Business |
---- |
This score serves as a reference to assess
SC’s credit risk and to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is
calculated from a composite of weighted scores obtained from each of the major
sections of this report. The assessed factors and their relative weights (as
indicated through %) are as follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend (10%) Operational size
(10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL)
or its officials.