|
Report Date : |
15.02.2013 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
|
Name : |
SDIL INC |
|
|
|
|
Registered Office : |
529 5th Avenue Suite 1700 New York NY 10017 |
|
|
|
|
Country : |
United States of America |
|
|
|
|
Date of Incorporation : |
25.08.2006 |
|
|
|
|
Com. Reg. No.: |
3404928 |
|
|
|
|
Legal Form : |
Corporation |
|
|
|
|
Line of Business : |
Wholesales of Jewelry, Precious Stones, Mainly Diamonds |
|
|
|
|
No. of Employees : |
4 |
RATING & COMMENTS
|
MIRA’s Rating : |
Ba |
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
Status : |
Satisfactory |
|
Payment Behaviour : |
No Complaints |
|
Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES :
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail: infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – June 30th, 2012
|
Country Name |
Previous Rating (31.03.2011) |
Current Rating (30.06.2012) |
|
United States |
A1 |
A1 |
|
Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
|
Insignificant |
A1 |
|
Low |
A2 |
|
Moderate |
B1 |
|
High |
B2 |
|
Very High |
C1 |
|
Restricted |
C2 |
|
Off-credit |
D |
UNITED STATES - ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
The US has the largest and
most technologically powerful economy in the world, with a per capita GDP of $48,100.
In this market-oriented economy, private individuals and business firms make
most of the decisions, and the federal and state governments buy needed goods
and services predominantly in the private marketplace. US business firms enjoy
greater flexibility than their counterparts in Western Europe and Japan in
decisions to expand capital plant, to lay off surplus workers, and to develop
new products. At the same time, they face higher barriers to enter their
rivals' home markets than foreign firms face entering US markets. US firms are
at or near the forefront in technological advances, especially in computers and
in medical, aerospace, and military equipment; their advantage has narrowed
since the end of World War II. The onrush of technology largely explains the
gradual development of a "two-tier labor market" in which those at
the bottom lack the education and the professional/technical skills of those at
the top and, more and more, fail to get comparable pay raises, health insurance
coverage, and other benefits. Since 1975, practically all the gains in
household income have gone to the top 20% of households. Since 1996, dividends
and capital gains have grown faster than wages or any other category of
after-tax income. Imported oil accounts for nearly 55% of US consumption. Oil
prices doubled between 2001 and 2006, the year home prices peaked; higher
gasoline prices ate into consumers' budgets and many individuals fell behind in
their mortgage payments. Oil prices increased another 50% between 2006 and
2008. In 2008, soaring oil prices threatened inflation and caused a
deterioration in the US merchandise trade deficit, which peaked at $840
billion. In 2009, with the global recession deepening, oil prices dropped 40%
and the US trade deficit shrank, as US domestic demand declined, but in 2011
the trade deficit ramped back up to $803 billion, as oil prices climbed once
more. The global economic downturn, the sub-prime mortgage crisis, investment
bank failures, falling home prices, and tight credit pushed the United States
into a recession by mid-2008. GDP contracted until the third quarter of 2009,
making this the deepest and longest downturn since the Great Depression. To
help stabilize financial markets, in October 2008 the US Congress established a
$700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The government used some of
these funds to purchase equity in US banks and industrial corporations, much of
which had been returned to the government by early 2011. In January 2009 the US
Congress passed and President Barack OBAMA signed a bill providing an
additional $787 billion fiscal stimulus to be used over 10 years - two-thirds
on additional spending and one-third on tax cuts - to create jobs and to help
the economy recover. In 2010 and 2011, the federal budget deficit reached
nearly 9% of GDP; total government revenues from taxes and other sources are
lower, as a percentage of GDP, than that of most other developed countries. The
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan required major shifts in national resources from
civilian to military purposes and contributed to the growth of the US budget
deficit and public debt - through 2011, the direct costs of the wars totaled
nearly $900 billion, according to US government figures. In March 2010,
President OBAMA signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
a health insurance reform bill that will extend coverage to an additional 32
million American citizens by 2016, through private health insurance for the
general population and Medicaid for the impoverished. Total spending on health
care - public plus private - rose from 9.0% of GDP in 1980 to 17.9% in 2010. In
July 2010, the president signed the DODD-FRANK Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, a law designed to promote financial stability by protecting
consumers from financial abuses, ending taxpayer bailouts of financial firms,
dealing with troubled banks that are "too big to fail," and improving
accountability and transparency in the financial system - in particular, by
requiring certain financial derivatives to be traded in markets that are
subject to government regulation and oversight. Long-term problems include
inadequate investment in deteriorating infrastructure, rapidly rising medical
and pension costs of an aging population, sizable current account and budget
deficits - including significant budget shortages for state governments -
energy shortages, and stagnation of wages for lower-income families.
Source : CIA
|
Verified |
|
|
||
|
Company Name: |
|
|||
|
Address: |
|
|||
|
City: |
|
|||
|
State/province: |
|
|||
|
Zip/postal code: |
|
|||
|
Country: |
|
|||
|
Telephone: |
|
|||
Credit Observation
Current Credit Observation: Thers is no Immediate Risk in
doing Business with this company
|
|
|||
Company History / Operations
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|
||
|
Capital Stock: |
100% by Officers |
|
||
|
Business Structure: |
Corporation |
|
||
|
How Listed: Business Started: |
Private Company 2006 |
|
||
|
Management Control: |
2006 |
|
||
|
Line of Business: |
Wholesales of
Jewelry, Precious Stones, Mainly Diamonds |
|
||
|
Territory:
Sales Terms:
Premises:
Branches: |
International Net 30 Rents Premises |
|
||
|
Affiliations / Subsidiaries: |
|
|
||
|
Company Registration & Status |
|
|
Date Registered: |
August 25 2006 |
|
Legal form: |
|
|
Registration no: |
|
|
Jurisdiction |
|
|
Registry status: |
|
|
|
|
|
4 |
|
|
Name & Title: |
Amit Mehta |
|
Trade Payment
Experience |
Date Reported August 2012 High Credit : 500 Now Owing : Zero Terms :
Net 30 Days Past Due 1-30 days – Zero Past Due 31-60 days – Zero Past Due 61-90 days – Zero Payments Made: As Agreed Date Reported August 2012 High Credit : 750 Now Owing : Zero Terms :
Net 30 Days Past Due 1-30 days – Zero Past Due 31-60 days – Zero Past Due 61-90 days – Zero Payments Made: As Agreed Date Reported July 2012 High Credit : 50 Now Owing : Zero Terms :
Net 30 Days Past Due 1-30 days – Zero Past Due 31-60 days – Zero Past Due 61-90 days – Zero Payments Made: As Agreed Date Reported July 2012 High Credit : 250 Now Owing : Zero Terms :
Net 30 Days Past Due 1-30 days – Zero Past Due 31-60 days – Zero Past Due 61-90 days – Zero Payments Made: As Agreed |
|
|
|
|
Payment Behaviour: |
|
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS |
|
|
|
Description |
|
|
|
Required to file: |
No |
|
|
Source: |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Comments |
Private Companies are not required to Publish Financial Statements |
|
INVESTIGATIVE
NOTES
|
|
|
|
|
|
Sources: |
Court Payment Exchange Data Bases Business Registries References & Vendors. |
DIAMOND INDUSTRY –
INDIA
-
From time immemorial, India is well known in the world as the birthplace
for diamonds. It is difficult to trace the origin of diamonds but history
says that in the remote past, diamonds were mined only in India. Diamond
production in India can be traced back to almost 8th Century B.C.
India, in fact, remained undisputed leader till 18th Century
when Brazilian fields were discovered in 1725 followed by emergence of S.
Africa, Russia and Australia.
-
The achievement of the Indian diamond industry was possible only due to
combination of the manufacturing skills of the Indian workforce and the untiring
and unflagging efforts of the Indian diamantaires, supported by progressive
Government policies.
-
The area of study of family owned diamond businesses derives its
importance from the huge conglomerate of family run organizations which operate
in the diamond industry since many generations.
-
Some of the basic traits of family run business enterprises include
spirit of entrepreneurship, mutual trust lowers transaction costs, small,
nimble and quick to react, information as a source of advantage and philanthropy.
-
Family owned diamond businesses need to improve on many fronts including
higher standard of corporate governance, long-term performance – focused
strategies, modern management and technology.
-
The diamond jewellery industry in India today may be more than Rs 60000
mil and is rated amongst the fastest growing in the world. Indi ranks
third in the world in domestic diamond consumption.
-
Utmost caution is to be exercised while dealing with some medium and
large diamond traders which are usually engaged in fictitious import – export,
inter-company transactions, financially assisted by banks. In the process,
several public sector banks lost several hundred million rupees. They mostly
diverted borrowed money for diamond business into real estate and capital
markets.
-
Excerpts from Times of India dated 30th October 2010 is as
under –
DIAMOND SAGA –
DIRTY DOZEN STUCK WITH 2K CR DEBT
This could be the biggest credibility crisis
the Indian diamond industry has ever faced. Fifteen banks run the risk of
losing Rs 2000 crore lent to a dozen diamond firms in Surat. Until about two
months ago, they had not repaid these dues. Bankers believe many
diamantaires borrowed money during the economic downturn two years ago and
diverted funds to businesses like real estate and capital markets. Many of
themselves made money from these businesses but their diamond companies have
gone sick and declared insolvency.
-
Most of the money borrowed from the banks in the name of their diamond business
has been diverted in real estate and the share market. The banks are not in a
position to seize their properties because in many cases, these were purchased
in the name of their relatives and friends.
Standard & Poor’s
|
United
States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'AA+' Due To Political Risks,
Rising Debt Burden; Outlook Negative |
|
Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
·
We have lowered our long-term
sovereign credit rating on the United States of America to 'AA+' from 'AAA' and
affirmed the 'A-1+' short-term rating.
·
We have also removed both the short- and long-term ratings
from CreditWatch negative.
·
The downgrade reflects our opinion
that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration
recently agreed to falls short of what, in our view, would be necessary to
stabilize the government's medium-term debt dynamics.
·
More broadly, the downgrade
reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of
American policymaking and political institutions have weakened at a time of
ongoing fiscal and economic challenges to a degree more than we envisioned when
we assigned a negative outlook to the rating on April 18, 2011.
·
Since then, we have changed our
view of the difficulties in bridging the gulf between the political parties
over fiscal policy, which makes us pessimistic about the capacity of Congress
and the Administration to be able to leverage their agreement this week into a
broader fiscal consolidation plan that stabilizes the government's debt dynamics
any time soon.
·
The outlook on the long-term rating
is negative. We could lower the long-term rating to 'AA' within the next two
years if we see that less reduction in spending than agreed to, higher interest
rates, or new fiscal pressures during the period result in a higher general
government debt trajectory than we currently assume in our base case.
TORONTO (Standard &
Poor's) Aug. 5, 2011--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that it
lowered its long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of America
to 'AA+' from 'AAA'. Standard & Poor's also said that the outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. At the same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed
its 'A-1+' short-term rating on the U.S. In addition, Standard & Poor's
removed both ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed on July 14, 2011,
with negative implications.
The
transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment of the U.S.--our assessment of
the likelihood of official interference in the ability of U.S.-based public- and
private-sector issuers to secure foreign exchange for
debt service--remains
'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term
rating on the U.S. because we believe that the prolonged controversy over raising
the statutory debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate indicate that
further near-term progress containing the growth in public spending, especially
on entitlements, or on reaching an agreement on raising revenues is less likely
than we previously assumed and will remain a contentious and fitful process. We
also believe that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the
Administration agreed to this week falls short of the amount that we believe is
necessary to stabilize the general government debt burden by the middle of the
decade.
Our lowering of the
rating was prompted by our view on the rising public debt burden and our
perception of greater policymaking uncertainty, consistent with our criteria
(see "Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and
Assumptions ," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41).
Nevertheless, we view the U.S. federal government's other economic, external,
and monetary credit attributes, which form the basis for the sovereign rating,
as broadly unchanged.
We have taken the ratings
off CreditWatch because the Aug. 2 passage of the Budget Control Act Amendment
of 2011 has removed any perceived immediate threat of payment default posed by
delays to raising the government's debt ceiling. In addition, we believe that
the act provides sufficient clarity to allow us to evaluate the likely course
of U.S. fiscal policy for the next few years.
The
political brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as America's
governance and policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and less
predictable than what we previously believed. The statutory debt ceiling and
the threat of default have become political bargaining chips in the debate over
fiscal policy. Despite this year's wide-ranging debate, in our view, the
differences between political parties have proven to be extraordinarily
difficult to bridge, and, as we see it, the resulting agreement fell well short
of the comprehensive fiscal consolidation program that some proponents had
envisaged until quite recently. Republicans and Democrats have only been able
to agree to relatively modest savings on discretionary spending while
delegating to the Select Committee decisions on more comprehensive measures. It
appears that for now, new revenues have dropped down on the menu of policy
options. In addition, the plan envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare
and little change in other entitlements,
the containment of which
we and most other independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal
sustainability.
Our opinion is that
elected officials remain wary of tackling the structural issues required to
effectively address the rising U.S. public debt burden in a manner consistent
with a 'AAA' rating and with 'AAA' rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and
Assumptions," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41). In
our view, the difficulty in framing a consensus on fiscal policy weakens the
government's ability to manage public finances and diverts attention from the
debate over how to achieve more balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era of
fiscal stringency and private-sector deleveraging (ibid). A new political
consensus might (or might not) emerge after the 2012 elections, but we believe
that by then, the government debt burden will likely be higher, the needed
medium-term fiscal adjustment potentially greater, and the inflection point on
the U.S. population's demographics and other age-related spending drivers
closer at hand (see "Global Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Likely
Cost Even More Green, Now," June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's
takes no position on the mix of spending and revenue measures that Congress and
the Administration might conclude is appropriate for putting the U.S.'s finances
on a sustainable footing.
The act calls for as much
as $2.4 trillion of reductions in expenditure growth over the 10 years through
2021. These cuts will be implemented in two steps: the $917 billion agreed to
initially, followed by an additional $1.5 trillion that the newly formed
Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction is supposed to
recommend by November 2011. The act contains no measures to raise taxes or
otherwise enhance revenues, though the committee could recommend them.
The act further provides
that if Congress does not enact the committee's recommendations, cuts of $1.2
trillion will be implemented over the same time period. The reductions would
mainly affect outlays for civilian discretionary spending, defense, and Medicare.
We understand that this fall-back mechanism is designed to encourage Congress
to embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure savings, as the committee might
recommend.
We note that in a letter
to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated
total budgetary savings under the act to be at least $2.1 trillion over the
next 10 years relative to its baseline assumptions. In updating our own fiscal
projections, with certain modifications outlined below, we have relied on the CBO's
latest "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" of June 2011, updated to include
the CBO assumptions contained in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In general, the
CBO's "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" assumes a continuation of recent
Congressional action overriding existing law.
We view the act's
measures as a step toward fiscal consolidation. However, this is within the
framework of a legislative mechanism that leaves open the details of what is
finally agreed to until the end of 2011, and Congress and the Administration
could modify any agreement in the future. Even assuming that at least $2.1
trillion of the spending reductions the act envisages are implemented, we
maintain our view that the U.S. net general government debt burden (all levels
of government combined, excluding liquid financial assets) will likely continue
to grow. Under our revised base case fiscal scenario--which we consider to be
consistent with a 'AA+' long-term rating and a negative outlook--we now project
that net general government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the
end of 2011 to 79% in 2015 and 85% by 2021. Even the projected 2015 ratio of
sovereign indebtedness is high in relation to those of peer credits and, as
noted, would continue to rise under the act's revised policy settings.
Compared with previous
projections, our revised base case scenario now assumes that the 2001 and 2003
tax cuts, due to expire by the end of 2012, remain in place. We have changed
our assumption on this because the majority of Republicans in Congress continue
to resist any measure that would raise revenues, a position we believe Congress
reinforced by passing the act. Key macroeconomic assumptions in the base case
scenario include trend real GDP growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near
2% annually over the decade.
Our revised upside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as consistent with the
outlook on the 'AA+' long-term rating being revised to stable--retains these
same macroeconomic assumptions. In addition, it incorporates $950 billion of
new revenues on the assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners
lapse from 2013 onwards, as the Administration is advocating. In this scenario,
we project that the net general government debt would rise from an estimated
74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as being consistent with a
possible further downgrade to a 'AA' long-term rating--features less-favorable macroeconomic
assumptions, as outlined below and also assumes that the second round of
spending cuts (at least $1.2 trillion) that the act calls for does not occur.
This scenario also assumes somewhat higher nominal interest rates for U.S.
Treasuries. We still believe that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key
reserve currency confers a government funding advantage, one that could change
only slowly over time, and that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose
monetary policy at a time of fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible
that interest rates could rise if investors re-price relative risks. As a
result, our alternate scenario factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in
10-year bond yields relative to the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In
this scenario, we project the net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP
in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to 101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios
also take into account the significant negative revisions to historical GDP
data that the Bureau of Economic Analysis announced on July 29. From our
perspective, the effect of these revisions underscores two related points when
evaluating the likely debt trajectory of the U.S. government. First, the
revisions show that the recent recession was deeper than previously assumed, so
the GDP this year is lower than previously thought in both nominal and real
terms. Consequently, the debt burden is slightly higher. Second, the revised
data highlight the sub-par path of the current economic recovery when compared
with rebounds following previous post-war recessions. We believe the sluggish
pace of the current economic recovery could be consistent with the experiences
of countries that have had financial crises in which the slow process of debt
deleveraging in the private sector leads to a persistent drag on demand. As a
result, our downside case scenario assumes relatively modest real trend GDP
growth of 2.5% and inflation of near 1.5% annually going forward.
When comparing the U.S.
to sovereigns with 'AAA' long-term ratings that we view as relevant
peers--Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K.--we also observe, based on our
base case scenarios for each, that the trajectory of the U.S.'s net public debt
is diverging from the others. Including the U.S., we estimate that these five
sovereigns will have net general government debt to GDP ratios this year
ranging from 34% (Canada) to 80% (the U.K.), with the U.S. debt burden at 74%.
By 2015, we project that their net public debt to GDP ratios will range between
30% (lowest, Canada) and 83% (highest, France), with the U.S. debt burden at
79%. However, in contrast with the U.S., we project that the net public debt
burdens of these other sovereigns will begin to decline, either before or by
2015.
Standard & Poor's
transfer T&C assessment of the U.S. remains 'AAA'. Our T&C assessment
reflects our view of the likelihood of the sovereign restricting other public
and private issuers' access to foreign exchange needed to meet debt service.
Although in our view the credit standing of the U.S. government has
deteriorated modestly, we see little indication that official interference of
this kind is entering onto the policy agenda of either Congress or the
Administration. Consequently, we continue to view this risk as being highly remote.
The outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. As our downside alternate fiscal scenario
illustrates, a higher public debt trajectory than we currently assume could
lead us to lower the long-term rating again. On the other hand, as our upside
scenario highlights, if the recommendations of the Congressional Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction--independently or coupled with other
initiatives, such as the lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high
earners--lead to fiscal consolidation measures beyond the minimum mandated, and
we believe they are likely to slow the deterioration of the government's debt
dynamics, the long-term rating could stabilize at 'AA+'.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.53.87 |
|
|
1 |
Rs.83.59 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.72.37 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Report
Prepared by : |
PRL |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest
capability for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit transaction.
It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest and
principal sums |
Large |
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General unfavourable
factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for payment of
interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with full
security |
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
-- |
NB |
New Business |
-- |
This score serves as a reference to assess SC’s credit risk and
to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is calculated from a composite
of weighted scores obtained from each of the major sections of this report. The
assessed factors and their relative weights (as indicated through %) are as
follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend
(10%) Operational
size (10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL)
or its officials.