|
Report Date : |
21.06.2013 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
|
Name : |
SDIL, INC. |
|
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Registered Office : |
|
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|
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Country : |
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Date of Incorporation : |
25.08.2006 |
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Legal Form : |
Corporation – Profit |
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|
Line of Business : |
Retail fine jewelry,
diamonds, and related products. |
|
|
|
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No. of Employees : |
4 |
RATING & COMMENTS
|
MIRA’s Rating : |
Ca |
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with
full security |
|
Status : |
Moderate |
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|
|
|
Payment Behaviour : |
Unknown |
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Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES:
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail: infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – March, 31st, 2013
|
Country Name |
Previous Rating (31.12.2012) |
Current Rating (31.03.2013) |
|
United States |
A1 |
A1 |
|
Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
|
Insignificant |
A1 |
|
Low |
A2 |
|
Moderate |
B1 |
|
High |
B2 |
|
Very High |
C1 |
|
Restricted |
C2 |
|
Off-credit |
D |
UNITED STATES - ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
The US has the largest and most technologically powerful
economy in the world, with a per capita GDP of $49,800. In this market-oriented
economy, private individuals and business firms make most of the decisions, and
the federal and state governments buy needed goods and services predominantly
in the private marketplace. US business firms enjoy greater flexibility than
their counterparts in Western Europe and Japan in decisions to expand capital
plant, to lay off surplus workers, and to develop new products. At the same
time, they face higher barriers to enter their rivals'' home markets than
foreign firms face entering US markets. US firms are at or near the forefront
in technological advances, especially in computers and in medical, aerospace,
and military equipment; their advantage has narrowed since the end of World War
II. The onrush of technology largely explains the gradual development of a
"two-tier labor market" in which those at the bottom lack the
education and the professional/technical skills of those at the top and, more
and more, fail to get comparable pay raises, health insurance coverage, and
other benefits. Since 1975, practically all the gains in household income have
gone to the top 20% of households. Since 1996, dividends and capital gains have
grown faster than wages or any other category of after-tax income. Imported oil
accounts for nearly 55% of US consumption. Crude oil prices doubled between
2001 and 2006, the year home prices peaked; higher gasoline prices ate into
consumers'' budgets and many individuals fell behind in their mortgage
payments. Oil prices climbed another 50% between 2006 and 2008, and bank
foreclosures more than doubled in the same period. Besides dampening the
housing market, soaring oil prices caused a drop in the value of the dollar and
a deterioration in the US merchandise trade deficit, which peaked at $840
billion in 2008. The sub-prime mortgage crisis, falling home prices, investment
bank failures, tight credit, and the global economic downturn pushed the United
States into a recession by mid-2008. GDP contracted until the third quarter of
2009, making this the deepest and longest downturn since the Great Depression.
To help stabilize financial markets, in October 2008 the US Congress
established a $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The government
used some of these funds to purchase equity in US banks and industrial
corporations, much of which had been returned to the government by early 2011.
In January 2009 the US Congress passed and President Barack OBAMA signed a bill
providing an additional $787 billion fiscal stimulus to be used over 10 years -
two-thirds on additional spending and one-third on tax cuts - to create jobs
and to help the economy recover. In 2010 and 2011, the federal budget deficit
reached nearly 9% of GDP. In 2012 the federal government reduced the growth of
spending and the deficit shrank to 7.6% of GDP. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
required major shifts in national resources from civilian to military purposes
and contributed to the growth of the budget deficit and public debt. Through 2011,
the direct costs of the wars totaled nearly $900 billion, according to US
government figures. US revenues from taxes and other sources are lower, as a
percentage of GDP, than those of most other countries. In March 2010, President
OBAMA signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, a health
insurance reform that will extend coverage to an additional 32 million American
citizens by 2016, through private health insurance for the general population
and Medicaid for the impoverished. Total spending on health care - public plus
private - rose from 9.0% of GDP in 1980 to 17.9% in 2010. In July 2010, the
president signed the DODD-FRANK Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
a law designed to promote financial stability by protecting consumers from
financial abuses, ending taxpayer bailouts of financial firms, dealing with
troubled banks that are "too big to fail," and improving
accountability and transparency in the financial system - in particular, by
requiring certain financial derivatives to be traded in markets that are
subject to government regulation and oversight. In December 2012, the Federal
Reserve Board announced plans to purchase $85 billion per month of
mortgage-backed and Treasury securities in an effort to hold down long-term
interest rates, and to keep short term rates near zero until unemployment drops
to 6.5% from the December rate of 7.8%, or until inflation rises above 2.5%.
Long-term problems include stagnation of wages for lower-income families,
inadequate investment in deteriorating infrastructure, rapidly rising medical
and pension costs of an aging population, energy shortages, and sizable current
account and budget deficits - including significant budget shortages for state
governments.
|
Source
: CIA |
Company name: SDIL, INC.
Address: 521 5th Avenue,
Ste 818, New York, NY 10075 - USA
Telephone: +1
212-457-2404
Fax: +1 212-297-1732
Website: www.sdilinc.com
Corporate ID#: 3404928
State: New York State
Judicial form: Corporation – Profit
Date incorporated: 08-25-2006
Stock: 200 shares common
Value: No
par value
Name of manager: Amit
MEHTA
Business:
Retail fine jewelry,
diamonds, and related products.
Suppliers include:
Kiran Gems Pvt Ltd
FE 5011; Bharat Diamond Bourse; ‘G’ Block; Bandra Kurla Complex; Bandra
(East); Mumbai- 400051, India.
EIN: -
Staff: 4
Operations & branches:
At the headquarters, we
find a showroom and office, on lease.
Shareholders:
Kiran Gems Pvt. Ltd.
FE5011, Bharat Diamond Bourse,
G Block, Bandra Kurla Complex,
Bandra (E), Mumbai - 400 051. India.
Tel: +91 22 4050 4444
Fax: +91 22 4050 4455
Kiran Gems Pvt. Ltd. is
also present through
KIRAN JEWELS, INC.
521 5th Avenue, Ste 610, New York, NY 10017 - USA
Management:
Amit MEHTA is the President and CEO.
As far as we know, he is not involved in other local corporations.
Subsidiaries
And partnership: None
In United States, privately
held corporations are not required to publish any financials.
On a direct call, nobody
accepted to answer our questions.
We sent a fax but no answer
received.
However, sales estimate for
year 2012 is in the range of USD 500,000=
The business is said to be
profitable.
Banks: Standard Chartered Bank
1095 Avenue of the
Americas, New York, NY 10036
Ph: 212-667-0700
Legal filings
& complaints:
As of today date, there is no legal filing pending with the Courts.
Secured debts
summary (UCC):
|
1. |
Debtor Names: |
SDIL INC. |
521 FIFTH AVENUE, SUITE 610, NEW YORK, NY
10175, USA |
|
|
Secured Party Names: |
TESSLER & WEISS/PREMESCO, INC. |
2389 VAUXHALL RD., UNION, NJ 07083, USA |
|
|
|
|
|
|
File no. |
File Date |
Lapse Date |
Filing Type |
|
|
|
200910260612836 |
10/26/2009 |
10/26/2014 |
Financing Statement |
|
|
|
2. |
Debtor Names: |
SDIL INC. |
529 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, NY 10017, USA |
|
|
|
SDIL INC. |
521 FIFTH AVENUE, SUITE 818, NEW YORK, NY
10175, USA |
|
|
Secured Party Names: |
ANTWERPSE DIAMANTBANK N.V. |
PELIKAANSTRAAT 54, ANTWERPEN 2018, BEL |
|
|
|
|
|
|
File no. |
File Date |
Lapse Date |
Filing Type |
|
|
|
201107155767201 |
07/15/2011 |
07/15/2016 |
Financing Statement |
|
|
|
201306050315034 |
06/05/2013 |
07/15/2016 |
Financing Statement Amendment |
|
|
|
3. |
Debtor Names: |
SDIL INC. |
521 FIFTH AVENUE - SUITE 610, NEW YORK, NY
10175, USA |
|
|
Secured Party Names: |
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK |
1095 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS, 38TH FLOOR, NEW
YORK, NY 10036, USA |
|
|
|
|
|
|
File no. |
File Date |
Lapse Date |
Filing Type |
|
|
|
201303205293695 |
03/20/2013 |
03/20/2018 |
Financing Statement |
|
|
Haut du formulaire
No trade references
available.
No domestic credit history.
Other comments:
The bank deferred any
information.
The Company is in good standing.
This means that all local
and federal taxes were paid on due date.
The risk is HIGH.
Our opinion:
We suggest you to be
extremely careful.
DIAMOND INDUSTRY – INDIA
-
From time immemorial, India is well known in the world as the birthplace
for diamonds. It is difficult to trace the origin of diamonds but history
says that in the remote past, diamonds were mined only in India. Diamond
production in India can be traced back to almost 8th Century B.C.
India, in fact, remained undisputed leader till 18th Century
when Brazilian fields were discovered in 1725 followed by emergence of S.
Africa, Russia and Australia.
-
The achievement of the Indian diamond industry was possible only due to
combination of the manufacturing skills of the Indian workforce and the
untiring and unflagging efforts of the Indian diamantaires, supported by
progressive Government policies.
-
The area of study of family owned diamond businesses derives its
importance from the huge conglomerate of family run organizations which operate
in the diamond industry since many generations.
-
Some of the basic traits of family run business enterprises include
spirit of entrepreneurship, mutual trust lowers transaction costs, small,
nimble and quick to react, information as a source of advantage and
philanthropy.
-
Family owned diamond businesses need to improve on many fronts including
higher standard of corporate governance, long-term performance – focused
strategies, modern management and technology.
-
Utmost caution is to be exercised while dealing with some medium and
large diamond traders which are usually engaged in fictitious import – export,
inter-company transactions, financially assisted by banks. In the process,
several public sector banks lost several hundred million rupees. They mostly diverted
borrowed money for diamond business into real estate and capital markets.
-
Excerpts from Times of India dated 30th October 2010 is as
under –
-
Gem & Jewellery Export Promotion Council in its statistical data has
shown the export of polished diamonds to have increase by 28 % in February
2013. Compared to $ 1.4 bn worth of polished diamond export in February, 2012,
India exported $ 1.84 billion worth of polished diamonds in February 2013. A
senior executive of GJEPC said, “Export of cut and polished diamonds started
falling month-wise after the imposition of 2 % of import duty on the polished
diamonds. But February, 2013 has given a new ray of hope to the industry as the
export of polished diamonds has actually increased by 28 %. It means the
industry is on the track of recovery and round tripping of diamonds has
stopped completely.” Demand has started coming from the US, the UK, Japan and
China. India’s polished diamond export is expected to cross $ 21 bn in 2013-14.
-
The banking sector has started exercising restraint while following
prudent risk management norms when lending money to gems and jewellery sector.
This follows the implementation of Basel III accord – a global voluntary
regulatory standard on bank capital adequacy, stress testing and market
liquidity.
Standard & Poor’s
United States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'AA+' Due To
Political Risks, Rising Debt Burden; Outlook Negative
Publication date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST
________________________________________
• We have lowered our
long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of America to 'AA+' from
'AAA' and affirmed the 'A-1+' short-term rating.
• We have also removed
both the short- and long-term ratings from CreditWatch negative.
• The downgrade reflects
our opinion that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the
Administration recently agreed to falls short of what, in our view, would be
necessary to stabilize the government's medium-term debt dynamics.
• More broadly, the
downgrade reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability, and
predictability of American policymaking and political institutions have
weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic challenges to a degree more
than we envisioned when we assigned a negative outlook to the rating on April
18, 2011.
• Since then, we have
changed our view of the difficulties in bridging the gulf between the political
parties over fiscal policy, which makes us pessimistic about the capacity of
Congress and the Administration to be able to leverage their agreement this
week into a broader fiscal consolidation plan that stabilizes the government's
debt dynamics any time soon.
• The outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. We could lower the long-term rating to 'AA' within
the next two years if we see that less reduction in spending than agreed to,
higher interest rates, or new fiscal pressures during the period result in a
higher general government debt trajectory than we currently assume in our base
case.
TORONTO (Standard & Poor's) Aug. 5, 2011--Standard & Poor's
Ratings Services said today that it lowered its long-term sovereign credit
rating on the United States of America to 'AA+' from 'AAA'. Standard &
Poor's also said that the outlook on the long-term rating is negative. At the
same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed its 'A-1+' short-term rating on the
U.S. In addition, Standard & Poor's removed both ratings from CreditWatch,
where they were placed on July 14, 2011, with negative implications.
The transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment of the U.S.--our
assessment of the likelihood of official interference in the ability of
U.S.-based public- and private-sector issuers to secure foreign exchange for
debt service--remains 'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term rating on the U.S. because we believe that the
prolonged controversy over raising the statutory debt ceiling and the related
fiscal policy debate indicate that further near-term progress containing the
growth in public spending, especially on entitlements, or on reaching an
agreement on raising revenues is less likely than we previously assumed and
will remain a contentious and fitful process. We also believe that the fiscal
consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration agreed to this week
falls short of the amount that we believe is necessary to stabilize the general
government debt burden by the middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the rating was prompted by our view on the rising public
debt burden and our perception of greater policymaking uncertainty, consistent
with our criteria (see "Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and
Assumptions ," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41). Nevertheless,
we view the U.S. federal government's other economic, external, and monetary
credit attributes, which form the basis for the sovereign rating, as broadly
unchanged.
We have taken the ratings off CreditWatch because the Aug. 2 passage of
the Budget Control Act Amendment of 2011 has removed any perceived immediate
threat of payment default posed by delays to raising the government's debt
ceiling. In addition, we believe that the act provides sufficient clarity to
allow us to evaluate the likely course of U.S. fiscal policy for the next few
years.
The political brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as
America's governance and policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and
less predictable than what we previously believed. The statutory debt ceiling
and the threat of default have become political bargaining chips in the debate
over fiscal policy. Despite this year's wide-ranging debate, in our view, the
differences between political parties have proven to be extraordinarily
difficult to bridge, and, as we see it, the resulting agreement fell well short
of the comprehensive fiscal consolidation program that some proponents had
envisaged until quite recently. Republicans and Democrats have only been able
to agree to relatively modest savings on discretionary spending while
delegating to the Select Committee decisions on more comprehensive measures. It
appears that for now, new revenues have dropped down on the menu of policy
options. In addition, the plan envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare
and little change in other entitlements,
the containment of which we and most other independent observers regard
as key to long-term fiscal sustainability.
Our opinion is that elected officials remain wary of tackling the
structural issues required to effectively address the rising U.S. public debt
burden in a manner consistent with a 'AAA' rating and with 'AAA' rated
sovereign peers (see Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and
Assumptions," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41). In our view,
the difficulty in framing a consensus on fiscal policy weakens the government's
ability to manage public finances and diverts attention from the debate over
how to achieve more balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era of fiscal
stringency and private-sector deleveraging (ibid). A new political consensus
might (or might not) emerge after the 2012 elections, but we believe that by
then, the government debt burden will likely be higher, the needed medium-term
fiscal adjustment potentially greater, and the inflection point on the U.S.
population's demographics and other age-related spending drivers closer at hand
(see "Global Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Likely Cost Even
More Green, Now," June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's takes no position on the mix of spending and
revenue measures that Congress and the Administration might conclude is
appropriate for putting the U.S.'s finances on a sustainable footing.
The act calls for as much as $2.4 trillion of reductions in expenditure
growth over the 10 years through 2021. These cuts will be implemented in two
steps: the $917 billion agreed to initially, followed by an additional $1.5
trillion that the newly formed Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit
Reduction is supposed to recommend by November 2011. The act contains no
measures to raise taxes or otherwise enhance revenues, though the committee
could recommend them.
The act further provides that if Congress does not enact the committee's
recommendations, cuts of $1.2 trillion will be implemented over the same time
period. The reductions would mainly affect outlays for civilian discretionary
spending, defense, and Medicare. We understand that this fall-back mechanism is
designed to encourage Congress to embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure
savings, as the committee might recommend.
We note that in a letter to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011, the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) estimated total budgetary savings under the act to be at
least $2.1 trillion over the next 10 years relative to its baseline
assumptions. In updating our own fiscal projections, with certain modifications
outlined below, we have relied on the CBO's latest "Alternate Fiscal
Scenario" of June 2011, updated to include the CBO assumptions contained
in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In general, the CBO's "Alternate Fiscal
Scenario" assumes a continuation of recent Congressional action overriding
existing law.
We view the act's measures as a step toward fiscal consolidation.
However, this is within the framework of a legislative mechanism that leaves
open the details of what is finally agreed to until the end of 2011, and
Congress and the Administration could modify any agreement in the future. Even
assuming that at least $2.1 trillion of the spending reductions the act
envisages are implemented, we maintain our view that the U.S. net general
government debt burden (all levels of government combined, excluding liquid
financial assets) will likely continue to grow. Under our revised base case
fiscal scenario--which we consider to be consistent with a 'AA+' long-term rating
and a negative outlook--we now project that net general government debt would
rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 79% in 2015 and 85% by
2021. Even the projected 2015 ratio of sovereign indebtedness is high in
relation to those of peer credits and, as noted, would continue to rise under
the act's revised policy settings.
Compared with previous projections, our revised base case scenario now
assumes that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, due to expire by the end of 2012,
remain in place. We have changed our assumption on this because the majority of
Republicans in Congress continue to resist any measure that would raise
revenues, a position we believe Congress reinforced by passing the act. Key
macroeconomic assumptions in the base case scenario include trend real GDP
growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near 2% annually over the decade.
Our revised upside scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as
consistent with the outlook on the 'AA+' long-term rating being revised to stable--retains
these same macroeconomic assumptions. In addition, it incorporates $950 billion
of new revenues on the assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high
earners lapse from 2013 onwards, as the Administration is advocating. In this
scenario, we project that the net general government debt would rise from an
estimated 74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside scenario--which, other things being equal, we view
as being consistent with a possible further downgrade to a 'AA' long-term
rating--features less-favorable macroeconomic assumptions, as outlined below
and also assumes that the second round of spending cuts (at least $1.2
trillion) that the act calls for does not occur. This scenario also assumes
somewhat higher nominal interest rates for U.S. Treasuries. We still believe
that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key reserve currency confers a
government funding advantage, one that could change only slowly over time, and
that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose monetary policy at a time of
fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible that interest rates could rise
if investors re-price relative risks. As a result, our alternate scenario
factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in 10-year bond yields relative to
the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In this scenario, we project the
net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to
101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios also take into account the significant negative
revisions to historical GDP data that the Bureau of Economic Analysis announced
on July 29. From our perspective, the effect of these revisions underscores two
related points when evaluating the likely debt trajectory of the U.S.
government. First, the revisions show that the recent recession was deeper than
previously assumed, so the GDP this year is lower than previously thought in
both nominal and real terms. Consequently, the debt burden is slightly higher.
Second, the revised data highlight the sub-par path of the current economic
recovery when compared with rebounds following previous post-war recessions. We
believe the sluggish pace of the current economic recovery could be consistent
with the experiences of countries that have had financial crises in which the
slow process of debt deleveraging in the private sector leads to a persistent
drag on demand. As a result, our downside case scenario assumes relatively
modest real trend GDP growth of 2.5% and inflation of near 1.5% annually going forward.
When comparing the U.S. to sovereigns with 'AAA' long-term ratings that
we view as relevant peers--Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K.--we also
observe, based on our base case scenarios for each, that the trajectory of the
U.S.'s net public debt is diverging from the others. Including the U.S., we
estimate that these five sovereigns will have net general government debt to
GDP ratios this year ranging from 34% (Canada) to 80% (the U.K.), with the U.S.
debt burden at 74%. By 2015, we project that their net public debt to GDP
ratios will range between 30% (lowest, Canada) and 83% (highest, France), with
the U.S. debt burden at 79%. However, in contrast with the U.S., we project
that the net public debt burdens of these other sovereigns will begin to
decline, either before or by 2015.
Standard & Poor's transfer T&C assessment of the U.S. remains
'AAA'. Our T&C assessment reflects our view of the likelihood of the
sovereign restricting other public and private issuers' access to foreign
exchange needed to meet debt service. Although in our view the credit standing
of the U.S. government has deteriorated modestly, we see little indication that
official interference of this kind is entering onto the policy agenda of either
Congress or the Administration. Consequently, we continue to view this risk as
being highly remote.
The outlook on the long-term rating is negative. As our downside
alternate fiscal scenario illustrates, a higher public debt trajectory than we
currently assume could lead us to lower the long-term rating again. On the
other hand, as our upside scenario highlights, if the recommendations of the
Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction--independently or
coupled with other initiatives, such as the lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax
cuts for high earners--lead to fiscal consolidation measures beyond the minimum
mandated, and we believe they are likely to slow the deterioration of the
government's debt dynamics, the long-term rating could stabilize at 'AA+'.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.59.70 |
|
|
1 |
Rs.92.22 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.79.19 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Report Prepared
by : |
SDA |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest
capability for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit transaction.
It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest and
principal sums |
Large |
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General unfavourable
factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for payment of
interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with full
security |
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
---- |
NB |
New Business |
---- |
This score serves as a reference to assess SC’s credit risk and
to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is calculated from a composite
of weighted scores obtained from each of the major sections of this report. The
assessed factors and their relative weights (as indicated through %) are as
follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend
(10%) Operational
size (10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL) or
its officials.