|
Report Date : |
24.06.2013 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
|
Name : |
MACY’S MERCHANDISING GROUP, INC |
|
|
|
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Registered Office : |
11 Penn Plaza, 7th floor, |
|
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Country : |
|
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Date of Incorporation : |
22.10.2004 |
|
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Legal Form : |
Corporation - Profit |
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Line of Business : |
Subject provides merchandising services. Its services include conceptualizing, designing, sourcing, and marketing of private label and private branded goods. |
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No. of Employees : |
600 |
RATING & COMMENTS
|
MIRA’s Rating : |
B |
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively below
average. |
Small |
|
Status : |
Moderate |
|
Payment Behaviour : |
Slow |
|
Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES :
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail: infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – March 31st, 2013
|
Country Name |
Previous Rating (31.12.2012) |
Current Rating (31.03.2013) |
|
United States |
A1 |
A1 |
|
Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
|
Insignificant |
A1 |
|
Low |
A2 |
|
Moderate |
B1 |
|
High |
B2 |
|
Very High |
C1 |
|
Restricted |
C2 |
|
Off-credit |
D |
UNITED STATES - ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
The US has the largest and most technologically powerful economy
in the world, with a per capita GDP of $49,800. In this market-oriented
economy, private individuals and business firms make most of the decisions, and
the federal and state governments buy needed goods and services predominantly
in the private marketplace. US business firms enjoy greater flexibility than
their counterparts in Western Europe and Japan in decisions to expand capital
plant, to lay off surplus workers, and to develop new products. At the same
time, they face higher barriers to enter their rivals'' home markets than
foreign firms face entering US markets. US firms are at or near the forefront
in technological advances, especially in computers and in medical, aerospace,
and military equipment; their advantage has narrowed since the end of World War
II. The onrush of technology largely explains the gradual development of a
"two-tier labor market" in which those at the bottom lack the
education and the professional/technical skills of those at the top and, more
and more, fail to get comparable pay raises, health insurance coverage, and
other benefits. Since 1975, practically all the gains in household income have
gone to the top 20% of households. Since 1996, dividends and capital gains have
grown faster than wages or any other category of after-tax income. Imported oil
accounts for nearly 55% of US consumption. Crude oil prices doubled between
2001 and 2006, the year home prices peaked; higher gasoline prices ate into
consumers'' budgets and many individuals fell behind in their mortgage payments.
Oil prices climbed another 50% between 2006 and 2008, and bank foreclosures
more than doubled in the same period. Besides dampening the housing market,
soaring oil prices caused a drop in the value of the dollar and a deterioration
in the US merchandise trade deficit, which peaked at $840 billion in 2008. The
sub-prime mortgage crisis, falling home prices, investment bank failures, tight
credit, and the global economic downturn pushed the United States into a
recession by mid-2008. GDP contracted until the third quarter of 2009, making
this the deepest and longest downturn since the Great Depression. To help
stabilize financial markets, in October 2008 the US Congress established a $700
billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The government used some of these
funds to purchase equity in US banks and industrial corporations, much of which
had been returned to the government by early 2011. In January 2009 the US
Congress passed and President Barack OBAMA signed a
bill providing an additional $787 billion fiscal stimulus to be used over 10
years - two-thirds on additional spending and one-third on tax cuts - to create
jobs and to help the economy recover. In 2010 and 2011, the federal budget
deficit reached nearly 9% of GDP. In 2012 the federal government reduced the
growth of spending and the deficit shrank to 7.6% of GDP. Wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan required major shifts in national resources from civilian to
military purposes and contributed to the growth of the budget deficit and
public debt. Through 2011, the direct costs of the wars totaled nearly $900
billion, according to US government figures. US revenues from taxes and other
sources are lower, as a percentage of GDP, than those of most other countries.
In March 2010, President OBAMA signed into law the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, a health insurance reform that will extend coverage to an
additional 32 million American citizens by 2016, through private health
insurance for the general population and Medicaid for the impoverished. Total
spending on health care - public plus private - rose from 9.0% of GDP in 1980
to 17.9% in 2010. In July 2010, the president signed the DODD-FRANK Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, a law designed to promote financial
stability by protecting consumers from financial abuses, ending taxpayer
bailouts of financial firms, dealing with troubled banks that are "too big
to fail," and improving accountability and transparency in the financial
system - in particular, by requiring certain financial derivatives to be traded
in markets that are subject to government regulation and oversight. In December
2012, the Federal Reserve Board announced plans to purchase $85 billion per
month of mortgage-backed and Treasury securities in an effort to hold down
long-term interest rates, and to keep short term rates near zero until
unemployment drops to 6.5% from the December rate of 7.8%, or until inflation
rises above 2.5%. Long-term problems include stagnation of wages for
lower-income families, inadequate investment in deteriorating infrastructure,
rapidly rising medical and pension costs of an aging population, energy
shortages, and sizable current account and budget deficits - including
significant budget shortages for state governments.
Source
: CIA
Company name: MACY’S MERCHANDISING GROUP, INC
Headquarters: 11 Penn Plaza, 7th floor,
New York, NY 10001 – USA
Telephone: +1
646-429-6000
Fax: +1 212-494-6824
Website: www.macysinc.com
Corporate ID#: 3870156
State: Delaware
Judicial form: Corporation - Profit
Date founded: October 22, 2004
Stock: -
Value: -
Name of manager: Janet
E. GROVE
Business:
Macy's Merchandising Group Inc. provides merchandising services.
Its services include conceptualizing, designing, sourcing, and marketing
of private label and private branded goods.
It works with brands such as Polo/Ralph Lauren, Kenneth Cole, DKNY,
Jones New York, Liz Claiborne, Nine West, Tommy Hilfiger, and Estee Lauder. In addition it identifies targeted market
segments for brands exclusive to Federated, and develops and implements
marketing programs to reach the defined customer groups. Macy's Merchandising
Group was formerly known as Federated Merchandising Group.
The company was incorporated in 2004 and is based in New York, New York.
Macy's Merchandising Group Inc. operates as a subsidiary of Macy's, Inc.
EIN: -
Staff: 600
Operations & branches:
At above address, we find
the corporate headquarters, on lease.
The Company maintains an
executive office located:
7 West 7th
Street
Cincinnati, OH 45202
SHAREHOLDERS &
MANAGERS
Shareholders:
MACY'S, INC.
7 West 7th Street
Cincinnati, OH 45202
Phone: 513-579-7000
Fax: 513-579-7555
Macy’s, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, operates department stores
and Internet Websites in the United States. The company’s retail stores and
Websites sell a range of merchandise, including men’s, women’s, and children’s
apparel; and accessories, cosmetics, home furnishings, and other consumer
goods. As of January 30, 2010, it operated 850 stores in 45 states, the
District of Columbia, Guam, and Puerto Rico under the names Macy’s and
Bloomingdale’s, as well as Websites under macys.com and bloomingdales.com
names. The company was formerly known as Federated Department Stores, Inc. and
changed its name to Macy’s, Inc. in June 2007.
Macy’s, Inc. was founded in 1820 and is based in Cincinnati, Ohio.
The Company is listed with the NYSE under symbol M.
Management:
Janet E. GROVE is the Chairman, Director and CEO.
Born in 1950
Ms. Janet E. Grove has been Chief Executive Officer at Federated
Merchandising Group (FMG), a subsidiary of Federated Department Stores Inc.
since 1999. Ms. Grove serves as the Chief Executive Officer of Macy's
Merchandising Group. In these capacities, Ms. Grove leads a management team
responsible for the process of conceptualizing, designing, sourcing, and
marketing private label and branded goods across all Macy's Stores and for
the strategic merchandising direction of Macy's Stores.
She also has overall responsibility for managing its core vendor
relationships and for identifying targeted market segments for brands exclusive
to Macy's Stores. Prior to her current position,
Ms. Grove served as Executive Vice President for Center Core, Cosmetics,
and Ready to Wear. Prior to FMG, she spent two decades with Macy's San
Francisco and held a variety of operating and merchandising positions including
store manager and General Merchandise Manager.
She also served as Senior Vice President for the Broadway Stores. S
he began her career in 1973 at Macy's West in San Francisco. Ms. Grove
has 35 years of retail experience. Ms. Grove has been Chairman of Federated
Merchandising Group (FMG), a subsidiary of Federated Department Stores Inc.
since 1998.
Ms. Grove has been Vice Chairman of Macy's, Inc. since February 2009.
She serves as Chairman of the Board of Macy's Merchandising Group Inc.
Ms. Grove serves as a Vice Chairman of Federated Department Stores Inc.
She served as Vice Chairman for Merchandising, Private Brand and Product
Development at Macy's, Inc. (formerly, Federated Department Stores Inc.)
of May Department Stores Co. since February 26, 2003.
She has been a Director of Aéropostale, Inc.
since February 1, 2012.
Ms. Grove has been a Director of Genuardi's
Family Markets, Inc. and Safeway Inc. since October 21, 2004. She serves as a
Director of FMG.
Ms. Grove holds a B.S. in Marketing from the California State University
at Hayward.
Leonard MARCUS is the
President.
Harry FRENKEL is Vice
President and CFO.
Subsidiaries &
Partnership: None
In United States, privately
held corporations are not required to publish any financials.
On a direct call, a
financial assistant controlled the present report and declared that all financials
are consolidated into the parent company MACY’S INC, which reported the
following:
|
Currency in |
As of: |
Jan 30 |
Jan 29 |
Jan 28 |
Feb 02 |
|
TOTAL REVENUES |
23,489.0 |
25,003.0 |
26,405.0 |
27,686.0 |
|
|
NET INCOME |
329.0 |
847.0 |
1,256.0 |
1,335.0 |
|
Banks: Bank of America
Legal filings & complaints:
State: Florida
Case number: 0:13-cv-60471-RSR
Plaintiff: Zumba Fitness, LLC
Defendant:
Macy's Merchandising Group, Inc. et al
Robin S. Rosenbaum, presiding
Patrick M. Hunt, referral
Date filed: 02/28/2013
Date of last filing: 06/18/2013
Cause: Trademark infringement
State: Texas
Case number: 4:13-cv-00233
Plaintiff: Eric Jay Robinson and Donna Sue Robinson
Defendant:
Macy's, Merchandising Group Inc. et al
George C. Hanks, Jr, presiding
Date filed: 01/30/2013
Date of last filing: 04/22/2013
Cause: Product Liability
Secured debts summary (UCC):
|
Trade references:
Date reported: May 2013
High credit: USD 18,000
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: April 2013
Line of business: Office supply
Paying status: 10 days beyond terms
Date reported: May 2013
High credit: USD 1,000,000+
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: April 2013
Line of business: Payroll
Paying status: As agreed
Date reported: May 2013
High credit: USD 1,200
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: April 2013
Line of business: Telecommunications
Paying status: 5 days beyond terms
Domestic credit history
appears as follow:
|
According to our credit analysts, during the last 6 months, 86% of trade
experience indicates a regular payment.
Payments of imports are currently made with an average of 10+ days
beyond terms.
The Company is improving
its payments, but the cash remains low, due to high inventories and a low
market.
The banks and financial
institutions confirmed slow payments.
The Company is in good
standing.
This means that all local
and federal taxes were paid on due date.
The risk is medium/high.
Our opinion:
We suggest you to be
careful.
Standard & Poor’s
|
United
States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'AA+' Due To Political Risks,
Rising Debt Burden; Outlook Negative |
|
Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
·
We have lowered our long-term sovereign
credit rating on the United States of America to 'AA+' from 'AAA' and affirmed
the 'A-1+' short-term rating.
·
We have also removed both the short- and long-term ratings
from CreditWatch negative.
·
The downgrade reflects our
opinion that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration
recently agreed to falls short of what, in our view, would be necessary to
stabilize the government's medium-term debt dynamics.
·
More broadly, the downgrade
reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of
American policymaking and political institutions have weakened at a time of
ongoing fiscal and economic challenges to a degree more than we envisioned when
we assigned a negative outlook to the rating on April 18, 2011.
·
Since then, we have changed our
view of the difficulties in bridging the gulf between the political parties
over fiscal policy, which makes us pessimistic about the capacity of Congress
and the Administration to be able to leverage their agreement this week into a
broader fiscal consolidation plan that stabilizes the government's debt
dynamics any time soon.
·
The outlook on the long-term
rating is negative. We could lower the long-term rating to 'AA' within the next
two years if we see that less reduction in spending than agreed to, higher
interest rates, or new fiscal pressures during the period result in a higher
general government debt trajectory than we currently assume in our base case.
TORONTO (Standard &
Poor's) Aug. 5, 2011--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that it
lowered its long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of America
to 'AA+' from 'AAA'. Standard & Poor's also said that the outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. At the same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed
its 'A-1+' short-term rating on the U.S. In addition, Standard & Poor's
removed both ratings from CreditWatch, where they
were placed on July 14, 2011, with negative implications.
The transfer and
convertibility (T&C) assessment of the U.S.--our assessment of the
likelihood of official interference in the ability of U.S.-based public- and
private-sector issuers to secure foreign exchange for
debt service--remains
'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term
rating on the U.S. because we believe that the prolonged controversy over
raising the statutory debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate
indicate that further near-term progress containing the growth in public
spending, especially on entitlements, or on reaching an agreement on raising
revenues is less likely than we previously assumed and will remain a
contentious and fitful process. We also believe that the fiscal consolidation
plan that Congress and the Administration agreed to this week falls short of
the amount that we believe is necessary to stabilize the general government
debt burden by the middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the
rating was prompted by our view on the rising public debt burden and our perception of greater policymaking uncertainty, consistent with our
criteria (see "Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and
Assumptions ," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41).
Nevertheless, we view the U.S. federal government's other economic, external,
and monetary credit attributes, which form the basis for the sovereign rating,
as broadly unchanged.
We have taken the ratings
off CreditWatch because the Aug. 2 passage of the
Budget Control Act Amendment of 2011 has removed any perceived immediate threat
of payment default posed by delays to raising the government's debt ceiling. In
addition, we believe that the act provides sufficient clarity to allow us to
evaluate the likely course of U.S. fiscal policy for the next few years.
The political
brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as America's governance
and policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and less predictable
than what we previously believed. The statutory debt ceiling and the threat of
default have become political bargaining chips in the debate over fiscal
policy. Despite this year's wide-ranging debate, in our view, the differences
between political parties have proven to be extraordinarily difficult to
bridge, and, as we see it, the resulting agreement fell well short of the
comprehensive fiscal consolidation program that some proponents had envisaged
until quite recently. Republicans and Democrats have only been able to agree to
relatively modest savings on discretionary spending while delegating to the
Select Committee decisions on more comprehensive measures. It appears that for
now, new revenues have dropped down on the menu of policy options. In addition,
the plan envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare and little change in
other entitlements,
the containment of which
we and most other independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal
sustainability.
Our opinion is that
elected officials remain wary of tackling the structural issues required to
effectively address the rising U.S. public debt burden in a manner consistent
with a 'AAA' rating and with 'AAA' rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and
Assumptions," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41). In
our view, the difficulty in framing a consensus on fiscal policy weakens the
government's ability to manage public finances and diverts attention from the
debate over how to achieve more balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era
of fiscal stringency and private-sector deleveraging
(ibid). A new political consensus might (or might not) emerge after the 2012
elections, but we believe that by then, the government debt burden will likely
be higher, the needed medium-term fiscal adjustment potentially greater, and
the inflection point on the U.S. population's demographics and other
age-related spending drivers closer at hand (see "Global Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Likely
Cost Even More Green, Now," June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's
takes no position on the mix of spending and revenue measures that Congress and
the Administration might conclude is appropriate for putting the U.S.'s
finances on a sustainable footing.
The act calls for as much
as $2.4 trillion of reductions in expenditure growth over the 10 years through
2021. These cuts will be implemented in two steps: the $917 billion agreed to
initially, followed by an additional $1.5 trillion that the newly formed
Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction is supposed to
recommend by November 2011. The act contains no measures to raise taxes or
otherwise enhance revenues, though the committee could recommend them.
The act further provides
that if Congress does not enact the committee's recommendations, cuts of $1.2
trillion will be implemented over the same time period. The reductions would mainly
affect outlays for civilian discretionary spending, defense, and Medicare. We
understand that this fall-back mechanism is designed to encourage Congress to
embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure savings, as the committee might
recommend.
We note that in a letter
to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated
total budgetary savings under the act to be at least $2.1 trillion over the
next 10 years relative to its baseline assumptions. In updating our own fiscal
projections, with certain modifications outlined below, we have relied on the CBO's latest "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" of June
2011, updated to include the CBO assumptions contained in its Aug. 1 letter to
Congress. In general, the CBO's "Alternate
Fiscal Scenario" assumes a continuation of recent Congressional action
overriding existing law.
We view the act's
measures as a step toward fiscal consolidation. However, this is within the
framework of a legislative mechanism that leaves open the details of what is finally
agreed to until the end of 2011, and Congress and the Administration could
modify any agreement in the future. Even assuming that at least $2.1 trillion
of the spending reductions the act envisages are implemented, we maintain our
view that the U.S. net general government debt burden (all levels of government
combined, excluding liquid financial assets) will likely continue to grow.
Under our revised base case fiscal scenario--which we consider to be consistent
with a 'AA+' long-term rating and a negative outlook--we now project that net
general government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the end of
2011 to 79% in 2015 and 85% by 2021. Even the projected 2015 ratio of sovereign
indebtedness is high in relation to those of peer credits and, as noted, would
continue to rise under the act's revised policy settings.
Compared with previous
projections, our revised base case scenario now assumes that the 2001 and 2003 tax
cuts, due to expire by the end of 2012, remain in place. We have changed our
assumption on this because the majority of Republicans in Congress continue to
resist any measure that would raise revenues, a position we believe Congress
reinforced by passing the act. Key macroeconomic assumptions in the base case
scenario include trend real GDP growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near
2% annually over the decade.
Our revised upside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as consistent with the
outlook on the 'AA+' long-term rating being revised to stable--retains these
same macroeconomic assumptions. In addition, it incorporates $950 billion of
new revenues on the assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners
lapse from 2013 onwards, as the Administration is advocating. In this scenario,
we project that the net general government debt would rise from an estimated
74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as being consistent with a
possible further downgrade to a 'AA' long-term rating--features less-favorable
macroeconomic assumptions, as outlined below and also assumes that the second
round of spending cuts (at least $1.2 trillion) that the act calls for does not
occur. This scenario also assumes somewhat higher nominal interest rates for
U.S. Treasuries. We still believe that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key
reserve currency confers a government funding advantage, one that could change
only slowly over time, and that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose
monetary policy at a time of fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible
that interest rates could rise if investors re-price relative risks. As a
result, our alternate scenario factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75
bp rise in 10-year bond yields relative to the base
and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In this scenario, we project the net public
debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to 101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios
also take into account the significant negative revisions to historical GDP
data that the Bureau of Economic Analysis announced on July 29. From our
perspective, the effect of these revisions underscores two related points when evaluating
the likely debt trajectory of the U.S. government. First, the revisions show
that the recent recession was deeper than previously assumed, so the GDP this
year is lower than previously thought in both nominal and real terms.
Consequently, the debt burden is slightly higher. Second, the revised data
highlight the sub-par path of the current economic recovery when compared with
rebounds following previous post-war recessions. We believe the sluggish pace
of the current economic recovery could be consistent with the experiences of
countries that have had financial crises in which the slow process of debt deleveraging in the private sector leads to a persistent
drag on demand. As a result, our downside case scenario assumes relatively
modest real trend GDP growth of 2.5% and inflation of near 1.5% annually going
forward.
When comparing the U.S.
to sovereigns with 'AAA' long-term ratings that we view as relevant
peers--Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K.--we also observe, based on our
base case scenarios for each, that the trajectory of the U.S.'s net public debt
is diverging from the others. Including the U.S., we estimate that these five
sovereigns will have net general government debt to GDP ratios this year
ranging from 34% (Canada) to 80% (the U.K.), with the U.S. debt burden at 74%.
By 2015, we project that their net public debt to GDP ratios will range between
30% (lowest, Canada) and 83% (highest, France), with the U.S. debt burden at
79%. However, in contrast with the U.S., we project that the net public debt
burdens of these other sovereigns will begin to decline, either before or by
2015.
Standard & Poor's
transfer T&C assessment of the U.S. remains 'AAA'. Our T&C assessment
reflects our view of the likelihood of the sovereign restricting other public
and private issuers' access to foreign exchange needed to meet debt service.
Although in our view the credit standing of the U.S. government has
deteriorated modestly, we see little indication that official interference of
this kind is entering onto the policy agenda of either Congress or the
Administration. Consequently, we continue to view this risk as being highly
remote.
The outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. As our downside alternate fiscal scenario
illustrates, a higher public debt trajectory than we currently assume could
lead us to lower the long-term rating again. On the other hand, as our upside
scenario highlights, if the recommendations of the Congressional Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction--independently or coupled with other
initiatives, such as the lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high
earners--lead to fiscal consolidation measures beyond the minimum mandated, and
we believe they are likely to slow the deterioration of the government's debt
dynamics, the long-term rating could stabilize at 'AA+'.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.59.35 |
|
|
1 |
Rs.92.11 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.78.59 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Report
Prepared by : |
PRL |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest
capability for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit
transaction. It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest
and principal sums |
Large |
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General unfavourable factors will not cause fatal effect.
Satisfactory capability for payment of interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with full
security |
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
-- |
NB |
New Business |
-- |
This score serves as a reference to assess SC’s credit risk and
to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is calculated from a composite
of weighted scores obtained from each of the major sections of this report. The
assessed factors and their relative weights (as indicated through %) are as
follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend
(10%) Operational
size (10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL)
or its officials.