|
Report Date : |
29.03.2013 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
|
Name : |
EXIMP INTERNATIONAL INC |
|
|
|
|
Registered Office : |
8926 N Greenwood Ave # 221, Niles IL 60714 |
|
|
|
|
Country : |
United States Of America |
|
|
|
|
Date of Incorporation : |
13.11.2002 |
|
|
|
|
Com. Reg. No.: |
62683538 |
|
|
|
|
Legal Form : |
Corporation |
|
|
|
|
Line of Business : |
Business Management |
|
|
|
|
No. of Employees : |
2 Employees |
RATING & COMMENTS
|
MIRA’s Rating : |
Ca |
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and
principal sums in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited
with full security |
|
Status : |
Moderate |
|
Payment Behaviour : |
Unknown |
|
Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES
:
Any query related to this report
can be made on e-mail: infodept@mirainform.com while quoting report
number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – June 30th,
2012
|
Country Name |
Previous Rating (31.03.2012) |
Current Rating (30.06.2012) |
|
United States |
A1 |
A1 |
|
Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
|
Insignificant |
A1 |
|
Low |
A2 |
|
Moderate |
B1 |
|
High |
B2 |
|
Very High |
C1 |
|
Restricted |
C2 |
|
Off-credit |
D |
United States - ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
The US has the largest and most technologically powerful economy in the world, with a per capita GDP of $48,100. In this market-oriented economy, private individuals and business firms make most of the decisions, and the federal and state governments buy needed goods and services predominantly in the private marketplace. US business firms enjoy greater flexibility than their counterparts in Western Europe and Japan in decisions to expand capital plant, to lay off surplus workers, and to develop new products. At the same time, they face higher barriers to enter their rivals' home markets than foreign firms face entering US markets. US firms are at or near the forefront in technological advances, especially in computers and in medical, aerospace, and military equipment; their advantage has narrowed since the end of World War II. The onrush of technology largely explains the gradual development of a "two-tier labor market" in which those at the bottom lack the education and the professional/technical skills of those at the top and, more and more, fail to get comparable pay raises, health insurance coverage, and other benefits. Since 1975, practically all the gains in household income have gone to the top 20% of households. Since 1996, dividends and capital gains have grown faster than wages or any other category of after-tax income. Imported oil accounts for nearly 55% of US consumption. Oil prices doubled between 2001 and 2006, the year home prices peaked; higher gasoline prices ate into consumers' budgets and many individuals fell behind in their mortgage payments. Oil prices increased another 50% between 2006 and 2008. In 2008, soaring oil prices threatened inflation and caused a deterioration in the US merchandise trade deficit, which peaked at $840 billion. In 2009, with the global recession deepening, oil prices dropped 40% and the US trade deficit shrank, as US domestic demand declined, but in 2011 the trade deficit ramped back up to $803 billion, as oil prices climbed once more. The global economic downturn, the sub-prime mortgage crisis, investment bank failures, falling home prices, and tight credit pushed the United States into a recession by mid-2008. GDP contracted until the third quarter of 2009, making this the deepest and longest downturn since the Great Depression. To help stabilize financial markets, in October 2008 the US Congress established a $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The government used some of these funds to purchase equity in US banks and industrial corporations, much of which had been returned to the government by early 2011. In January 2009 the US Congress passed and President Barack OBAMA signed a bill providing an additional $787 billion fiscal stimulus to be used over 10 years - two-thirds on additional spending and one-third on tax cuts - to create jobs and to help the economy recover. In 2010 and 2011, the federal budget deficit reached nearly 9% of GDP; total government revenues from taxes and other sources are lower, as a percentage of GDP, than that of most other developed countries. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan required major shifts in national resources from civilian to military purposes and contributed to the growth of the US budget deficit and public debt - through 2011, the direct costs of the wars totaled nearly $900 billion, according to US government figures. In March 2010, President OBAMA signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, a health insurance reform bill that will extend coverage to an additional 32 million American citizens by 2016, through private health insurance for the general population and Medicaid for the impoverished. Total spending on health care - public plus private - rose from 9.0% of GDP in 1980 to 17.9% in 2010. In July 2010, the president signed the DODD-FRANK Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, a law designed to promote financial stability by protecting consumers from financial abuses, ending taxpayer bailouts of financial firms, dealing with troubled banks that are "too big to fail," and improving accountability and transparency in the financial system - in particular, by requiring certain financial derivatives to be traded in markets that are subject to government regulation and oversight. Long-term problems include inadequate investment in deteriorating infrastructure, rapidly rising medical and pension costs of an aging population, sizable current account and budget deficits - including significant budget shortages for state governments - energy shortages, and stagnation of wages for lower-income families.
|
Source
: CIA |
|
Verified |
|
|
Company Name: |
EXIMP INTERNATIONAL INC |
|
Address: |
8926 N Greenwood Ave # 221 |
|
City: |
Niles |
|
State/province: |
IL |
|
Zip/postal code: |
60714 |
|
Country: |
United States Of America |
|
Telephone: |
+1 847 779 4603 |
Current Credit
Observation:
Analysis
·
NO Payment Activity Reported
·
Registration is in NOT GOOD
STANDING STATUS
·
No Derogatory Items on Record
|
Capital Stock: |
100% by Officers |
|
Business
Structure: |
Corporation |
|
How Listed: Business Started: |
Private Company 2002 |
|
Management
Control: |
2002 |
|
Line of Business: |
Business Management |
|
Territory: Sales Terms: Premises: Branches: |
Local Net 30 Rents Premises |
|
Date Registered: |
November 13 2002 |
|
Legal form: |
Corporation |
|
Registration no: |
62683538 |
|
Jurisdiction |
IL |
|
Registry status: |
NOT GOOD STANDING |
|
|
|
|
No of Employees: |
2 |
|
Name & Title: |
Kris Thakkar, President |
|
Suits: |
None |
|
Court Judgements: |
None |
|
NSF Reported: |
None |
|
Liens / Collection: |
None |
|
Security Filings: |
No UCC Filings exist for leased equipment and assets. These secured creditors would take precedence
in the unlikely event of asset liquidation. |
|
Trade Payment Experience |
No Payment Activity reported |
|
|
|
|
Payment Behaviour: |
|
|
FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTS |
|
|
|
Description |
|
|
|
Required to file: |
No |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Comments |
Private
Companies are not required to Publish Financial Statements |
|
INVESTIGATIVE NOTES
|
|
|
|
|
|
Sources: |
Public Court Payment Exchange Data Bases Business Registries References & Vendors. |
Standard
& Poor’s
|
United
States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'AA+' Due To Political Risks,
Rising Debt Burden; Outlook Negative |
|
Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
·
We have also removed both the short- and long-term
ratings from CreditWatch negative.
·
The downgrade reflects our opinion that the fiscal
consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration recently agreed to
falls short of what, in our view, would be necessary to stabilize the
government's medium-term debt dynamics.
·
More broadly, the downgrade reflects our view that
the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of American policymaking and political
institutions have weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic challenges
to a degree more than we envisioned when we assigned a negative outlook to the
rating on April 18, 2011.
·
Since then, we have changed our view of the
difficulties in bridging the gulf between the political parties over fiscal
policy, which makes us pessimistic about the capacity of Congress and the
Administration to be able to leverage their agreement this week into a broader
fiscal consolidation plan that stabilizes the government's debt dynamics any
time soon.
·
The outlook on the long-term rating is negative. We
could lower the long-term rating to 'AA' within the next two years if we see
that less reduction in spending than agreed to, higher interest rates, or new
fiscal pressures during the period result in a higher general government debt
trajectory than we currently assume in our base case.
TORONTO (Standard &
Poor's) Aug. 5, 2011--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that it
lowered its long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of America
to 'AA+' from 'AAA'. Standard & Poor's also said that the outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. At the same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed
its 'A-1+' short-term rating on the U.S. In addition, Standard & Poor's
removed both ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed on July 14, 2011,
with negative implications.
The transfer
and convertibility (T&C) assessment of the U.S.--our assessment of the
likelihood of official interference in the ability of U.S.-based public- and
private-sector issuers to secure foreign exchange for
debt service--remains
'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term
rating on the U.S. because we believe that the prolonged controversy over
raising the statutory debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate
indicate that further near-term progress containing the growth in public
spending, especially on entitlements, or on reaching an agreement on raising
revenues is less likely than we previously assumed and will remain a
contentious and fitful process. We also believe that the fiscal consolidation
plan that Congress and the Administration agreed to this week falls short of
the amount that we believe is necessary to stabilize the general government
debt burden by the middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the
rating was prompted by our view on the rising public debt burden and our
perception of greater policymaking uncertainty, consistent with our criteria
(see "Sovereign
Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions ," June 30, 2011,
especially Paragraphs 36-41). Nevertheless, we view the U.S. federal
government's other economic, external, and monetary credit attributes, which
form the basis for the sovereign rating, as broadly unchanged.
We have taken the ratings
off CreditWatch because the Aug. 2 passage of the Budget Control Act Amendment
of 2011 has removed any perceived immediate threat of payment default posed by
delays to raising the government's debt ceiling. In addition, we believe that
the act provides sufficient clarity to allow us to evaluate the likely course
of U.S. fiscal policy for the next few years.
The political
brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as America's governance
and policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and less predictable
than what we previously believed. The statutory debt ceiling and the threat of
default have become political bargaining chips in the debate over fiscal
policy. Despite this year's wide-ranging debate, in our view, the differences
between political parties have proven to be extraordinarily difficult to
bridge, and, as we see it, the resulting agreement fell well short of the
comprehensive fiscal consolidation program that some proponents had envisaged
until quite recently. Republicans and Democrats have only been able to agree to
relatively modest savings on discretionary spending while delegating to the
Select Committee decisions on more comprehensive measures. It appears that for
now, new revenues have dropped down on the menu of policy options. In addition,
the plan envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare and little change in
other entitlements,
the containment of which
we and most other independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal
sustainability.
Our opinion is that
elected officials remain wary of tackling the structural issues required to
effectively address the rising U.S. public debt burden in a manner consistent
with a 'AAA' rating and with 'AAA' rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign
Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions," June 30, 2011,
especially Paragraphs 36-41). In our view, the difficulty in framing a
consensus on fiscal policy weakens the government's ability to manage public
finances and diverts attention from the debate over how to achieve more
balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era of fiscal stringency and
private-sector deleveraging (ibid). A new political consensus might (or might
not) emerge after the 2012 elections, but we believe that by then, the
government debt burden will likely be higher, the needed medium-term fiscal
adjustment potentially greater, and the inflection point on the U.S.
population's demographics and other age-related spending drivers closer at hand
(see "Global
Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Likely Cost Even More Green, Now,"
June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's
takes no position on the mix of spending and revenue measures that Congress and
the Administration might conclude is appropriate for putting the U.S.'s
finances on a sustainable footing.
The act calls for as much
as $2.4 trillion of reductions in expenditure growth over the 10 years through
2021. These cuts will be implemented in two steps: the $917 billion agreed to
initially, followed by an additional $1.5 trillion that the newly formed
Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction is supposed to
recommend by November 2011. The act contains no measures to raise taxes or
otherwise enhance revenues, though the committee could recommend them.
The act further provides that
if Congress does not enact the committee's recommendations, cuts of $1.2
trillion will be implemented over the same time period. The reductions would
mainly affect outlays for civilian discretionary spending, defense, and
Medicare. We understand that this fall-back mechanism is designed to encourage
Congress to embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure savings, as the
committee might recommend.
We note that in a letter
to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated
total budgetary savings under the act to be at least $2.1 trillion over the
next 10 years relative to its baseline assumptions. In updating our own fiscal
projections, with certain modifications outlined below, we have relied on the
CBO's latest "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" of June 2011, updated to
include the CBO assumptions contained in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In
general, the CBO's "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" assumes a continuation
of recent Congressional action overriding existing law.
We view the act's
measures as a step toward fiscal consolidation. However, this is within the
framework of a legislative mechanism that leaves open the details of what is
finally agreed to until the end of 2011, and Congress and the Administration
could modify any agreement in the future. Even assuming that at least $2.1
trillion of the spending reductions the act envisages are implemented, we
maintain our view that the U.S. net general government debt burden (all levels
of government combined, excluding liquid financial assets) will likely continue
to grow. Under our revised base case fiscal scenario--which we consider to be
consistent with a 'AA+' long-term rating and a negative outlook--we now project
that net general government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the
end of 2011 to 79% in 2015 and 85% by 2021. Even the projected 2015 ratio of
sovereign indebtedness is high in relation to those of peer credits and, as
noted, would continue to rise under the act's revised policy settings.
Compared with previous
projections, our revised base case scenario now assumes that the 2001 and 2003
tax cuts, due to expire by the end of 2012, remain in place. We have changed
our assumption on this because the majority of Republicans in Congress continue
to resist any measure that would raise revenues, a position we believe Congress
reinforced by passing the act. Key macroeconomic assumptions in the base case
scenario include trend real GDP growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near
2% annually over the decade.
Our revised upside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as consistent with the
outlook on the 'AA+' long-term rating being revised to stable--retains these
same macroeconomic assumptions. In addition, it incorporates $950 billion of new
revenues on the assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners
lapse from 2013 onwards, as the Administration is advocating. In this scenario,
we project that the net general government debt would rise from an estimated
74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as being consistent with a
possible further downgrade to a 'AA' long-term rating--features less-favorable
macroeconomic assumptions, as outlined below and also assumes that the second
round of spending cuts (at least $1.2 trillion) that the act calls for does not
occur. This scenario also assumes somewhat higher nominal interest rates for
U.S. Treasuries. We still believe that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key
reserve currency confers a government funding advantage, one that could change
only slowly over time, and that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose
monetary policy at a time of fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible
that interest rates could rise if investors re-price relative risks. As a
result, our alternate scenario factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in
10-year bond yields relative to the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In
this scenario, we project the net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP
in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to 101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios
also take into account the significant negative revisions to historical GDP
data that the Bureau of Economic Analysis announced on July 29. From our
perspective, the effect of these revisions underscores two related points when
evaluating the likely debt trajectory of the U.S. government. First, the
revisions show that the recent recession was deeper than previously assumed, so
the GDP this year is lower than previously thought in both nominal and real
terms. Consequently, the debt burden is slightly higher. Second, the revised
data highlight the sub-par path of the current economic recovery when compared
with rebounds following previous post-war recessions. We believe the sluggish
pace of the current economic recovery could be consistent with the experiences
of countries that have had financial crises in which the slow process of debt
deleveraging in the private sector leads to a persistent drag on demand. As a
result, our downside case scenario assumes relatively modest real trend GDP
growth of 2.5% and inflation of near 1.5% annually going forward.
When comparing the U.S.
to sovereigns with 'AAA' long-term ratings that we view as relevant
peers--Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K.--we also observe, based on our
base case scenarios for each, that the trajectory of the U.S.'s net public debt
is diverging from the others. Including the U.S., we estimate that these five
sovereigns will have net general government debt to GDP ratios this year
ranging from 34% (Canada) to 80% (the U.K.), with the U.S. debt burden at 74%.
By 2015, we project that their net public debt to GDP ratios will range between
30% (lowest, Canada) and 83% (highest, France), with the U.S. debt burden at
79%. However, in contrast with the U.S., we project that the net public debt
burdens of these other sovereigns will begin to decline, either before or by
2015.
Standard & Poor's
transfer T&C assessment of the U.S. remains 'AAA'. Our T&C assessment
reflects our view of the likelihood of the sovereign restricting other public
and private issuers' access to foreign exchange needed to meet debt service.
Although in our view the credit standing of the U.S. government has deteriorated
modestly, we see little indication that official interference of this kind is
entering onto the policy agenda of either Congress or the Administration.
Consequently, we continue to view this risk as being highly remote.
The outlook on the long-term
rating is negative. As our downside alternate fiscal scenario illustrates, a
higher public debt trajectory than we currently assume could lead us to lower
the long-term rating again. On the other hand, as our upside scenario
highlights, if the recommendations of the Congressional Joint Select Committee
on Deficit Reduction--independently or coupled with other initiatives, such as
the lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners--lead to fiscal
consolidation measures beyond the minimum mandated, and we believe they are
likely to slow the deterioration of the government's debt dynamics, the
long-term rating could stabilize at 'AA+'.
On Monday, we
will issue separate releases concerning affected ratings in the funds,
government-related entities, financial institutions, insurance, public finance,
and structured finance sectors.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian
Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.54.39 |
|
UK Pound |
1 |
Rs.82.32 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.69.54 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Report
Prepared by : |
PRL |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the
strongest capability for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for
credit transaction. It has above average (strong) capability for payment of
interest and principal sums |
Large |
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General
unfavourable factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for
payment of interest and principal sums |
Fairly
Large |
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet
normal commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems
comparatively below average. |
Small |
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and
principal sums in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited
with full security |
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be
exercised |
Credit
not recommended |
|
-- |
NB |
New
Business |
-- |
This score serves as a reference to
assess SC’s credit risk and to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is
calculated from a composite of weighted scores obtained from each of the major
sections of this report. The assessed factors and their relative weights (as
indicated through %) are as follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit
history (10%) Market
trend (10%) Operational
size (10%)
|
Report Date : |
29.03.2013 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
|
Name : |
EXIMP INTERNATIONAL INC |
|
|
|
|
Registered Office : |
8926 N Greenwood Ave # 221, Niles IL 60714 |
|
|
|
|
Country : |
United States Of America |
|
|
|
|
Date of Incorporation : |
13.11.2002 |
|
|
|
|
Com. Reg. No.: |
62683538 |
|
|
|
|
Legal Form : |
Corporation |
|
|
|
|
Line of Business : |
Business Management |
|
|
|
|
No. of Employees : |
2 Employees |
RATING & COMMENTS
|
MIRA’s Rating : |
Ca |
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and
principal sums in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited
with full security |
|
Status : |
Moderate |
|
Payment Behaviour : |
Unknown |
|
Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES
:
Any query related to this report
can be made on e-mail: infodept@mirainform.com while quoting report
number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – June 30th,
2012
|
Country Name |
Previous Rating (31.03.2012) |
Current Rating (30.06.2012) |
|
United States |
A1 |
A1 |
|
Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
|
Insignificant |
A1 |
|
Low |
A2 |
|
Moderate |
B1 |
|
High |
B2 |
|
Very High |
C1 |
|
Restricted |
C2 |
|
Off-credit |
D |
United States - ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
The US has the largest and most technologically powerful economy in the world, with a per capita GDP of $48,100. In this market-oriented economy, private individuals and business firms make most of the decisions, and the federal and state governments buy needed goods and services predominantly in the private marketplace. US business firms enjoy greater flexibility than their counterparts in Western Europe and Japan in decisions to expand capital plant, to lay off surplus workers, and to develop new products. At the same time, they face higher barriers to enter their rivals' home markets than foreign firms face entering US markets. US firms are at or near the forefront in technological advances, especially in computers and in medical, aerospace, and military equipment; their advantage has narrowed since the end of World War II. The onrush of technology largely explains the gradual development of a "two-tier labor market" in which those at the bottom lack the education and the professional/technical skills of those at the top and, more and more, fail to get comparable pay raises, health insurance coverage, and other benefits. Since 1975, practically all the gains in household income have gone to the top 20% of households. Since 1996, dividends and capital gains have grown faster than wages or any other category of after-tax income. Imported oil accounts for nearly 55% of US consumption. Oil prices doubled between 2001 and 2006, the year home prices peaked; higher gasoline prices ate into consumers' budgets and many individuals fell behind in their mortgage payments. Oil prices increased another 50% between 2006 and 2008. In 2008, soaring oil prices threatened inflation and caused a deterioration in the US merchandise trade deficit, which peaked at $840 billion. In 2009, with the global recession deepening, oil prices dropped 40% and the US trade deficit shrank, as US domestic demand declined, but in 2011 the trade deficit ramped back up to $803 billion, as oil prices climbed once more. The global economic downturn, the sub-prime mortgage crisis, investment bank failures, falling home prices, and tight credit pushed the United States into a recession by mid-2008. GDP contracted until the third quarter of 2009, making this the deepest and longest downturn since the Great Depression. To help stabilize financial markets, in October 2008 the US Congress established a $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The government used some of these funds to purchase equity in US banks and industrial corporations, much of which had been returned to the government by early 2011. In January 2009 the US Congress passed and President Barack OBAMA signed a bill providing an additional $787 billion fiscal stimulus to be used over 10 years - two-thirds on additional spending and one-third on tax cuts - to create jobs and to help the economy recover. In 2010 and 2011, the federal budget deficit reached nearly 9% of GDP; total government revenues from taxes and other sources are lower, as a percentage of GDP, than that of most other developed countries. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan required major shifts in national resources from civilian to military purposes and contributed to the growth of the US budget deficit and public debt - through 2011, the direct costs of the wars totaled nearly $900 billion, according to US government figures. In March 2010, President OBAMA signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, a health insurance reform bill that will extend coverage to an additional 32 million American citizens by 2016, through private health insurance for the general population and Medicaid for the impoverished. Total spending on health care - public plus private - rose from 9.0% of GDP in 1980 to 17.9% in 2010. In July 2010, the president signed the DODD-FRANK Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, a law designed to promote financial stability by protecting consumers from financial abuses, ending taxpayer bailouts of financial firms, dealing with troubled banks that are "too big to fail," and improving accountability and transparency in the financial system - in particular, by requiring certain financial derivatives to be traded in markets that are subject to government regulation and oversight. Long-term problems include inadequate investment in deteriorating infrastructure, rapidly rising medical and pension costs of an aging population, sizable current account and budget deficits - including significant budget shortages for state governments - energy shortages, and stagnation of wages for lower-income families.
|
Source
: CIA |
|
Verified |
|
|
Company Name: |
EXIMP INTERNATIONAL INC |
|
Address: |
8926 N Greenwood Ave # 221 |
|
City: |
Niles |
|
State/province: |
IL |
|
Zip/postal code: |
60714 |
|
Country: |
United States Of America |
|
Telephone: |
+1 847 779 4603 |
Current Credit
Observation:
Analysis
·
NO Payment Activity Reported
·
Registration is in NOT GOOD
STANDING STATUS
·
No Derogatory Items on Record
|
Capital Stock: |
100% by Officers |
|
Business
Structure: |
Corporation |
|
How Listed: Business Started: |
Private Company 2002 |
|
Management
Control: |
2002 |
|
Line of Business: |
Business Management |
|
Territory: Sales Terms: Premises: Branches: |
Local Net 30 Rents Premises |
|
Date Registered: |
November 13 2002 |
|
Legal form: |
|
|
Registration no: |
|
|
Jurisdiction |
|
|
Registry status: |
|
|
|
|
2 |
|
|
Name & Title: |
Kris Thakkar, President |
|
Trade Payment Experience |
No Payment Activity reported |
|
|
|
|
Payment Behaviour: |
|
|
FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTS |
|
|
|
Description |
|
|
|
Required to file: |
No |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Comments |
Private
Companies are not required to Publish Financial Statements |
|
INVESTIGATIVE NOTES
|
|
|
|
|
|
Sources: |
Court Payment Exchange Data Bases Business Registries References & Vendors. |
Standard
& Poor’s
|
United
States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'AA+' Due To Political Risks,
Rising Debt Burden; Outlook Negative |
|
Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
·
We have also removed both the short- and long-term
ratings from CreditWatch negative.
·
The downgrade reflects our opinion that the fiscal
consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration recently agreed to
falls short of what, in our view, would be necessary to stabilize the
government's medium-term debt dynamics.
·
More broadly, the downgrade reflects our view that
the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of American policymaking and
political institutions have weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic
challenges to a degree more than we envisioned when we assigned a negative
outlook to the rating on April 18, 2011.
·
Since then, we have changed our view of the
difficulties in bridging the gulf between the political parties over fiscal policy,
which makes us pessimistic about the capacity of Congress and the
Administration to be able to leverage their agreement this week into a broader
fiscal consolidation plan that stabilizes the government's debt dynamics any
time soon.
·
The outlook on the long-term rating is negative. We
could lower the long-term rating to 'AA' within the next two years if we see
that less reduction in spending than agreed to, higher interest rates, or new
fiscal pressures during the period result in a higher general government debt
trajectory than we currently assume in our base case.
TORONTO (Standard &
Poor's) Aug. 5, 2011--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that it
lowered its long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of America
to 'AA+' from 'AAA'. Standard & Poor's also said that the outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. At the same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed
its 'A-1+' short-term rating on the U.S. In addition, Standard & Poor's
removed both ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed on July 14, 2011,
with negative implications.
The transfer
and convertibility (T&C) assessment of the U.S.--our assessment of the
likelihood of official interference in the ability of U.S.-based public- and private-sector
issuers to secure foreign exchange for
debt service--remains
'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term
rating on the U.S. because we believe that the prolonged controversy over
raising the statutory debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate indicate
that further near-term progress containing the growth in public spending,
especially on entitlements, or on reaching an agreement on raising revenues is
less likely than we previously assumed and will remain a contentious and fitful
process. We also believe that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and
the Administration agreed to this week falls short of the amount that we
believe is necessary to stabilize the general government debt burden by the
middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the rating
was prompted by our view on the rising public debt burden and our perception of
greater policymaking uncertainty, consistent with our criteria (see "Sovereign
Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions ," June 30, 2011,
especially Paragraphs 36-41). Nevertheless, we view the U.S. federal
government's other economic, external, and monetary credit attributes, which
form the basis for the sovereign rating, as broadly unchanged.
We have taken the ratings
off CreditWatch because the Aug. 2 passage of the Budget Control Act Amendment
of 2011 has removed any perceived immediate threat of payment default posed by
delays to raising the government's debt ceiling. In addition, we believe that
the act provides sufficient clarity to allow us to evaluate the likely course
of U.S. fiscal policy for the next few years.
The political
brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as America's governance
and policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and less predictable
than what we previously believed. The statutory debt ceiling and the threat of
default have become political bargaining chips in the debate over fiscal
policy. Despite this year's wide-ranging debate, in our view, the differences
between political parties have proven to be extraordinarily difficult to
bridge, and, as we see it, the resulting agreement fell well short of the
comprehensive fiscal consolidation program that some proponents had envisaged
until quite recently. Republicans and Democrats have only been able to agree to
relatively modest savings on discretionary spending while delegating to the
Select Committee decisions on more comprehensive measures. It appears that for
now, new revenues have dropped down on the menu of policy options. In addition,
the plan envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare and little change in
other entitlements,
the containment of which
we and most other independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal
sustainability.
Our opinion is that
elected officials remain wary of tackling the structural issues required to
effectively address the rising U.S. public debt burden in a manner consistent
with a 'AAA' rating and with 'AAA' rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign
Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions," June 30, 2011,
especially Paragraphs 36-41). In our view, the difficulty in framing a
consensus on fiscal policy weakens the government's ability to manage public
finances and diverts attention from the debate over how to achieve more
balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era of fiscal stringency and
private-sector deleveraging (ibid). A new political consensus might (or might
not) emerge after the 2012 elections, but we believe that by then, the
government debt burden will likely be higher, the needed medium-term fiscal
adjustment potentially greater, and the inflection point on the U.S. population's
demographics and other age-related spending drivers closer at hand (see "Global
Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Likely Cost Even More Green, Now,"
June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's
takes no position on the mix of spending and revenue measures that Congress and
the Administration might conclude is appropriate for putting the U.S.'s
finances on a sustainable footing.
The act calls for as much
as $2.4 trillion of reductions in expenditure growth over the 10 years through
2021. These cuts will be implemented in two steps: the $917 billion agreed to
initially, followed by an additional $1.5 trillion that the newly formed
Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction is supposed to
recommend by November 2011. The act contains no measures to raise taxes or
otherwise enhance revenues, though the committee could recommend them.
The act further provides
that if Congress does not enact the committee's recommendations, cuts of $1.2
trillion will be implemented over the same time period. The reductions would
mainly affect outlays for civilian discretionary spending, defense, and
Medicare. We understand that this fall-back mechanism is designed to encourage
Congress to embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure savings, as the
committee might recommend.
We note that in a letter
to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated
total budgetary savings under the act to be at least $2.1 trillion over the
next 10 years relative to its baseline assumptions. In updating our own fiscal
projections, with certain modifications outlined below, we have relied on the
CBO's latest "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" of June 2011, updated to
include the CBO assumptions contained in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In
general, the CBO's "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" assumes a continuation
of recent Congressional action overriding existing law.
We view the act's measures
as a step toward fiscal consolidation. However, this is within the framework of
a legislative mechanism that leaves open the details of what is finally agreed
to until the end of 2011, and Congress and the Administration could modify any
agreement in the future. Even assuming that at least $2.1 trillion of the
spending reductions the act envisages are implemented, we maintain our view
that the U.S. net general government debt burden (all levels of government
combined, excluding liquid financial assets) will likely continue to grow.
Under our revised base case fiscal scenario--which we consider to be consistent
with a 'AA+' long-term rating and a negative outlook--we now project that net
general government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the end of
2011 to 79% in 2015 and 85% by 2021. Even the projected 2015 ratio of sovereign
indebtedness is high in relation to those of peer credits and, as noted, would
continue to rise under the act's revised policy settings.
Compared with previous projections,
our revised base case scenario now assumes that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, due
to expire by the end of 2012, remain in place. We have changed our assumption
on this because the majority of Republicans in Congress continue to resist any
measure that would raise revenues, a position we believe Congress reinforced by
passing the act. Key macroeconomic assumptions in the base case scenario
include trend real GDP growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near 2%
annually over the decade.
Our revised upside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as consistent with the
outlook on the 'AA+' long-term rating being revised to stable--retains these
same macroeconomic assumptions. In addition, it incorporates $950 billion of
new revenues on the assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners
lapse from 2013 onwards, as the Administration is advocating. In this scenario,
we project that the net general government debt would rise from an estimated
74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as being consistent with a
possible further downgrade to a 'AA' long-term rating--features less-favorable
macroeconomic assumptions, as outlined below and also assumes that the second
round of spending cuts (at least $1.2 trillion) that the act calls for does not
occur. This scenario also assumes somewhat higher nominal interest rates for
U.S. Treasuries. We still believe that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key
reserve currency confers a government funding advantage, one that could change
only slowly over time, and that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose
monetary policy at a time of fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible
that interest rates could rise if investors re-price relative risks. As a
result, our alternate scenario factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in
10-year bond yields relative to the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In
this scenario, we project the net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP
in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to 101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios
also take into account the significant negative revisions to historical GDP
data that the Bureau of Economic Analysis announced on July 29. From our
perspective, the effect of these revisions underscores two related points when
evaluating the likely debt trajectory of the U.S. government. First, the
revisions show that the recent recession was deeper than previously assumed, so
the GDP this year is lower than previously thought in both nominal and real
terms. Consequently, the debt burden is slightly higher. Second, the revised
data highlight the sub-par path of the current economic recovery when compared
with rebounds following previous post-war recessions. We believe the sluggish
pace of the current economic recovery could be consistent with the experiences
of countries that have had financial crises in which the slow process of debt
deleveraging in the private sector leads to a persistent drag on demand. As a
result, our downside case scenario assumes relatively modest real trend GDP
growth of 2.5% and inflation of near 1.5% annually going forward.
When comparing the U.S.
to sovereigns with 'AAA' long-term ratings that we view as relevant peers--Canada,
France, Germany, and the U.K.--we also observe, based on our base case
scenarios for each, that the trajectory of the U.S.'s net public debt is
diverging from the others. Including the U.S., we estimate that these five
sovereigns will have net general government debt to GDP ratios this year
ranging from 34% (Canada) to 80% (the U.K.), with the U.S. debt burden at 74%.
By 2015, we project that their net public debt to GDP ratios will range between
30% (lowest, Canada) and 83% (highest, France), with the U.S. debt burden at
79%. However, in contrast with the U.S., we project that the net public debt
burdens of these other sovereigns will begin to decline, either before or by
2015.
Standard & Poor's
transfer T&C assessment of the U.S. remains 'AAA'. Our T&C assessment
reflects our view of the likelihood of the sovereign restricting other public
and private issuers' access to foreign exchange needed to meet debt service.
Although in our view the credit standing of the U.S. government has deteriorated
modestly, we see little indication that official interference of this kind is
entering onto the policy agenda of either Congress or the Administration.
Consequently, we continue to view this risk as being highly remote.
The outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. As our downside alternate fiscal scenario
illustrates, a higher public debt trajectory than we currently assume could
lead us to lower the long-term rating again. On the other hand, as our upside
scenario highlights, if the recommendations of the Congressional Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction--independently or coupled with other
initiatives, such as the lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high
earners--lead to fiscal consolidation measures beyond the minimum mandated, and
we believe they are likely to slow the deterioration of the government's debt
dynamics, the long-term rating could stabilize at 'AA+'.
On Monday, we
will issue separate releases concerning affected ratings in the funds,
government-related entities, financial institutions, insurance, public finance,
and structured finance sectors.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian
Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.54.39 |
|
UK Pound |
1 |
Rs.82.32 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.69.54 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Report
Prepared by : |
PRL |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest
capability for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for
credit transaction. It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest
and principal sums |
Large |
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy.
General unfavourable factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory
capability for payment of interest and principal sums |
Fairly
Large |
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet
normal commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems
comparatively below average. |
Small |
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and
principal sums in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited
with full security |
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be
exercised |
Credit
not recommended |
|
-- |
NB |
New
Business |
-- |
This score serves as a reference
to assess SC’s credit risk and to set the amount of credit to be extended. It
is calculated from a composite of weighted scores obtained from each of the major
sections of this report. The assessed factors and their relative weights (as
indicated through %) are as follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit
history (10%) Market
trend (10%) Operational
size (10%)
|
Report Date : |
29.03.2013 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
|
Name : |
ERASLAN ITHALAT IHRACAT GIDA TEMIZLIK TEKSTIL OTOMOTIV ELEKTRONIK
ZUCCACIYE KIRTASIYE INSAAT INSAAT MALZEMELERI MUTEAHHITLIK TAAHHUT NAKLIYE SANAYI
TICARET LTD. STI. |
|
|
|
|
Formerly Known As : |
CESURLAR ITHALAT IHRACAT LTD. STI. |
|
|
|
|
Registered Office : |
Haraparasi Mah. Tabakhane Sok. Sidika Civelek Is Hani B Blok Kat : 1
No : 11 Antakya Hatay |
|
|
|
|
Country : |
Turkey |
|
|
|
|
Financials (as on) : |
31.12.2011 |
|
|
|
|
Date of Incorporation : |
1994 |
|
|
|
|
Com. Reg. No.: |
6027 |
|
|
|
|
Legal Form : |
Limited Company |
|
|
|
|
Line of Business : |
Wholesale trade of spices. |
|
|
|
|
No. of Employees : |
7 |
RATING & COMMENTS
|
MIRA’s Rating : |
B |
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
Status : |
Moderate |
|
Payment Behaviour : |
Unknown |
|
Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES :
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail: infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – June 30th, 2012
|
Country Name |
Previous Rating (31.03.2011) |
Current Rating (30.06.2012) |
|
Turkey |
B1 |
B1 |
|
Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
|
Insignificant |
A1 |
|
Low |
A2 |
|
Moderate |
B1 |
|
High |
B2 |
|
Very High |
C1 |
|
Restricted |
C2 |
|
Off-credit |
D |
TURKEY - ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
Turkey's largely free-market economy is increasingly driven by its industry and service sectors, although its traditional agriculture sector still accounts for about 25% of employment. An aggressive privatization program has reduced state involvement in basic industry, banking, transport, and communication, and an emerging cadre of middle-class entrepreneurs is adding dynamism to the economy and expanding production beyond the traditional textiles and clothing sectors. The automotive, construction, and electronics industries, are rising in importance and have surpassed textiles within Turkey's export mix. Oil began to flow through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline in May 2006, marking a major milestone that will bring up to 1 million barrels per day from the Caspian to market. Several gas pipelines projects also are moving forward to help transport Central Asian gas to Europe through Turkey, which over the long term will help address Turkey's dependence on imported oil and gas to meet 97% of its energy needs. After Turkey experienced a severe financial crisis in 2001, Ankara adopted financial and fiscal reforms as part of an IMF program. The reforms strengthened the country's economic fundamentals and ushered in an era of strong growth - averaging more than 6% annually until 2008. Global economic conditions and tighter fiscal policy caused GDP to contract in 2009, but Turkey's well-regulated financial markets and banking system helped the country weather the global financial crisis and GDP rebounded strongly to 8.2% in 2010, as exports returned to normal levels following the recession. Turkey's public sector debt to GDP ratio has fallen to roughly 40%. Continued strong growth has pushed inflation to the 8% level, however, and worsened an already high current account deficit. Turkey remains dependent on often volatile, short-term investment to finance its large trade deficit. The stock value of FDI stood at $99 billion at year-end 2011. Inflows have slowed considerably in light of continuing economic turmoil in Europe, the source of much of Turkey's FDI. Further economic and judicial reforms and prospective EU membership are expected to boost Turkey's attractiveness to foreign investors. However, Turkey's relatively high current account deficit, uncertainty related to monetary policy-making, and political turmoil within Turkey's neighborhood leave the economy vulnerable to destabilizing shifts in investor confidence.
Source
: CIA
|
REPORT ON |
: |
ERASLAN ITHALAT IHRACAT GIDA TEMIZLIK TEKSTIL OTOMOTIV ELEKTRONIK
ZUCCACIYE KIRTASIYE INSAAT INSAAT MALZEMELERI MUTEAHHITLIK TAAHHUT NAKLIYE
SANAYI TICARET LTD. STI. |
|
NOTES |
: |
Name at your inquiry is the former name. |
|
|
||
|
NAME |
: |
ERASLAN ITHALAT IHRACAT GIDA TEMIZLIK TEKSTIL OTOMOTIV ELEKTRONIK
ZUCCACIYE KIRTASIYE INSAAT INSAAT MALZEMELERI MUTEAHHITLIK TAAHHUT NAKLIYE
SANAYI TICARET LTD. STI. |
|
HEAD OFFICE ADDRESS |
: |
Haraparasi Mah. Tabakhane Sok. Sidika Civelek Is Hani B Blok Kat : 1
No : 11 Antakya Hatay / Turkey |
|
PHONE NUMBER |
: |
90-326-225 13 25 |
|
FAX NUMBER |
: |
90-326-225 13 26 |
|
WEB-ADDRESS |
: |
www.eraslanbaharat.com |
|
E-MAIL |
: |
info@eraslanbaharat.com |
|
|
||
|
TAX OFFICE |
: |
Sukru Kanatli |
|
TAX NO |
: |
2060075733 |
|
REGISTRATION NUMBER |
: |
6027 |
|
REGISTERED OFFICE |
: |
Antakya Chamber of Commerce and Industry |
|
DATE ESTABLISHED |
: |
1994 |
|
ESTABLISHMENT GAZETTE DATE/NO |
: |
10.02.1995/3723 |
|
LEGAL FORM |
: |
Limited Company |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
TYPE OF COMPANY |
: |
Private |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
REGISTERED CAPITAL |
: |
TL 2.000.000 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
PAID-IN CAPITAL |
: |
TL 2.000.000 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
HISTORY |
: |
|
|
|
||||||||
|
SHAREHOLDERS |
: |
|
||||||
|
SISTER COMPANIES |
: |
Declared to be:None |
||||||
|
SUBSIDIARIES |
: |
None |
||||||
|
DIRECTORS |
: |
|
||||||
|
|
||
|
BUSINESS ACTIVITIES |
: |
Wholesale trade of spices. |
|
NACE CODE |
: |
G .51.37 |
|
SECTOR |
: |
Commerce |
|
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES |
: |
7 |
|
NET SALES |
: |
|
||||||||||||||
|
CAPACITY |
: |
None |
||||||||||||||
|
PRODUCTION |
: |
None |
||||||||||||||
|
IMPORT VALUE |
: |
|
||||||||||||||
|
IMPORT COUNTRIES |
: |
Brazil Vietnam Singapore India Syria China Indonesia |
||||||||||||||
|
MERCHANDISE IMPORTED |
: |
Spices |
||||||||||||||
|
EXPORT VALUE |
: |
|
||||||||||||||
|
EXPORT COUNTRIES |
: |
Jordan Syria |
||||||||||||||
|
MERCHANDISE EXPORTED |
: |
Chickpeas Spices |
||||||||||||||
|
HEAD OFFICE ADDRESS |
: |
Haraparasi Mah. Tabakhane Sok. Sidika Civelek Is Hani B Blok Kat : 1
No : 11 Antakya Hatay / Turkey |
||||||||||||||
|
BRANCHES |
: |
Warehouse : Cay Mah. Nakliyeciler Sit. Arkasi Goldtat Depolari Mersin/Turkey (rented) |
||||||||||||||
|
INVESTMENTS |
: |
None |
|
TREND OF BUSINESS |
: |
There was an upwards trend in
2012. |
|
SIZE OF BUSINESS |
: |
Large |
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
MAIN DEALING BANKS |
: |
Anadolubank Antakya Branch Garanti Bankasi Antakya Branch T.Is Bankasi Antakya Branch Tekstil Bankasi Antakya Branch Turk Ekonomi Bankasi Antakya Branch Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi Sehit Pamir Branch |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
CREDIT FACILITIES |
: |
The subject company is making active use of credit facilities. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
KEY FINANCIAL ELEMENTS |
: |
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Capitalization |
Low As of 31.12.2011 |
|
Liquidity |
Insufficient As of 31.12.2011 |
|
Remarks On Liquidity |
The unfavorable gap between average collection and average payable
period has an adverse effect on liquidity.
The liquid assets consist mainly of receivables the amount of
cash&banks or marketable securities (which are more liquid) are low. |
|
Profitability |
Fair Operating Profitability in
2008 Low Net Profitability in 2008 In Order Operating Profitability
in 2009 Low Net Profitability in 2009 In Order Operating Profitability
in 2010 Low Net Profitability in 2010 In Order Operating Profitability
in 2011 Low Net Profitability in 2011 In Order Operating Profitability
in 2012 Low Net Profitability in 2012 |
|
Gap between average collection and payable periods |
Unfavorable in 2011 |
|
General Financial Position |
Unsatisfactory |
|
|
Incr. in producers’ price index |
Average USD/TL |
Average EUR/TL |
Average GBP/ TL |
|
( 2007 ) |
5,94 % |
1,3075 |
1,7901 |
2,6133 |
|
( 2008 ) |
8,11 % |
1,2858 |
1,8876 |
2,3708 |
|
( 2009 ) |
5,93 % |
1,5460 |
2,1529 |
2,4094 |
|
( 01.01-30.09.2010) |
6,52 % |
1,5178 |
2,0112 |
2,3426 |
|
( 2010 ) |
8,87 % |
1,5128 |
2,0096 |
2,3410 |
|
( 2011 ) |
13,33 % |
1,6797 |
2,3378 |
2,6863 |
|
( 2012 ) |
2,45 % |
1,7995 |
2,3265 |
2,8593 |
|
( 01.01-28.02.2013) |
-0,31 % |
1,7828 |
2,3690 |
2,8041 |
|
|
( 31.12.2008 ) TL |
|
( 31.12.2009 ) TL |
|
( 31.12.2010 ) TL |
|
( 31.12.2011 ) TL |
|
|
CURRENT
ASSETS |
1.736.681 |
0,92 |
2.593.789 |
0,95 |
11.632.101 |
0,99 |
16.783.549 |
0,96 |
|
Not
Detailed Current Assets |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
|
Cash
and Banks |
1.490.203 |
0,79 |
2.240.796 |
0,82 |
7.132.682 |
0,61 |
49.563 |
0,00 |
|
Marketable
Securities |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
|
Account
Receivable |
104.277 |
0,06 |
310.621 |
0,11 |
1.345.535 |
0,11 |
15.380.795 |
0,88 |
|
Other
Receivable |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
|
Inventories |
127.889 |
0,07 |
36.727 |
0,01 |
2.976.964 |
0,25 |
1.230.989 |
0,07 |
|
Advances
Given |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
152.208 |
0,01 |
0 |
0,00 |
|
Accumulated
Construction Expense |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
|
Other
Current Assets |
14.312 |
0,01 |
5.645 |
0,00 |
24.712 |
0,00 |
122.202 |
0,01 |
|
NON-CURRENT
ASSETS |
142.523 |
0,08 |
146.895 |
0,05 |
132.554 |
0,01 |
709.621 |
0,04 |
|
Not
Detailed Non-Current Assets |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
|
Long-term
Receivable |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
|
Financial
Assets |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
|
Tangible
Fixed Assets (net) |
141.753 |
0,08 |
146.895 |
0,05 |
132.383 |
0,01 |
577.670 |
0,03 |
|
Intangible
Assets |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
131.780 |
0,01 |
|
Deferred
Tax Assets |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
|
Other
Non-Current Assets |
770 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
171 |
0,00 |
171 |
0,00 |
|
TOTAL
ASSETS |
1.879.204 |
1,00 |
2.740.684 |
1,00 |
11.764.655 |
1,00 |
17.493.170 |
1,00 |
|
CURRENT
LIABILITIES |
1.761.696 |
0,94 |
2.574.450 |
0,94 |
9.599.502 |
0,82 |
14.725.568 |
0,84 |
|
Not
Detailed Current Liabilities |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
|
Financial
Loans |
922.727 |
0,49 |
2.419.663 |
0,88 |
6.736.162 |
0,57 |
7.819.628 |
0,45 |
|
Accounts
Payable |
828.167 |
0,44 |
138.041 |
0,05 |
2.841.080 |
0,24 |
6.892.147 |
0,39 |
|
Loans
from Shareholders |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
|
Other
Short-term Payable |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
|
Advances
from Customers |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
|
Accumulated
Construction Income |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
|
Taxes
Payable |
1.491 |
0,00 |
16.743 |
0,01 |
22.196 |
0,00 |
13.665 |
0,00 |
|
Provisions |
9.311 |
0,00 |
3 |
0,00 |
64 |
0,00 |
128 |
0,00 |
|
Other
Current Liabilities |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
|
LONG-TERM
LIABILITIES |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
442.503 |
0,03 |
|
Not
Detailed Long-term Liabilities |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
|
Financial
Loans |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
442.503 |
0,03 |
|
Securities
Issued |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
|
Long-term
Payable |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
|
Loans
from Shareholders |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
|
Other
Long-term Liabilities |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
|
Provisions |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
|
STOCKHOLDERS'
EQUITY |
117.508 |
0,06 |
166.234 |
0,06 |
2.165.153 |
0,18 |
2.325.099 |
0,13 |
|
Not
Detailed Stockholders' Equity |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
|
Paid-in
Capital |
50.000 |
0,03 |
50.000 |
0,02 |
1.963.060 |
0,17 |
2.000.000 |
0,11 |
|
Cross
Shareholding Adjustment of Capital |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
|
Inflation
Adjustment of Capital |
6.909 |
0,00 |
6.909 |
0,00 |
6.909 |
0,00 |
6.909 |
0,00 |
|
Equity
of Consolidated Firms |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
|
Reserves |
24.744 |
0,01 |
60.600 |
0,02 |
109.325 |
0,01 |
195.184 |
0,01 |
|
Revaluation
Fund |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
|
Accumulated
Losses(-) |
-1.390 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
|
Net
Profit (loss) |
37.245 |
0,02 |
48.725 |
0,02 |
85.859 |
0,01 |
123.006 |
0,01 |
|
TOTAL
LIABILITIES AND EQUITY |
1.879.204 |
1,00 |
2.740.684 |
1,00 |
11.764.655 |
1,00 |
17.493.170 |
1,00 |
|
REMARKS ON FINANCIAL STATEMENT |
: |
At the financial statements according to TAS, "Cheques
Received" and "Outstanding Cheques" figures are under
"Cash And Banks" figure.Beginning from the financial statements of 31.12.2011,
"Cheques Received" and "Outstanding Cheques" figures are
given under "Account Receivable" figure and "Account
Payable" figure respectively.
|
|
|
(2008) TL |
|
(2009) TL |
|
(2010) TL |
|
(2011) TL |
|
(2012) TL |
|
|
Net
Sales |
5.149.958 |
1,00 |
8.685.780 |
1,00 |
16.116.945 |
1,00 |
26.762.285 |
1,00 |
30.980.717 |
1,00 |
|
Cost
of Goods Sold |
4.991.854 |
0,97 |
8.250.563 |
0,95 |
15.240.322 |
0,95 |
25.114.757 |
0,94 |
28.396.625 |
0,92 |
|
Gross
Profit |
158.104 |
0,03 |
435.217 |
0,05 |
876.623 |
0,05 |
1.647.528 |
0,06 |
2.584.092 |
0,08 |
|
Operating
Expenses |
80.079 |
0,02 |
112.893 |
0,01 |
220.285 |
0,01 |
410.636 |
0,02 |
907.869 |
0,03 |
|
Operating
Profit |
78.025 |
0,02 |
322.324 |
0,04 |
656.338 |
0,04 |
1.236.892 |
0,05 |
1.676.223 |
0,05 |
|
Other
Income |
23.182 |
0,00 |
4.199 |
0,00 |
6.113 |
0,00 |
84.462 |
0,00 |
85.694 |
0,00 |
|
Other
Expenses |
19.665 |
0,00 |
1.366 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
13.826 |
0,00 |
120.989 |
0,00 |
|
Financial
Expenses |
34.986 |
0,01 |
263.189 |
0,03 |
554.448 |
0,03 |
1.150.477 |
0,04 |
1.504.228 |
0,05 |
|
Minority
Interests |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
|
Profit
(loss) of consolidated firms |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
|
Profit
(loss) Before Tax |
46.556 |
0,01 |
61.968 |
0,01 |
108.003 |
0,01 |
157.051 |
0,01 |
136.700 |
0,00 |
|
Tax
Payable |
9.311 |
0,00 |
13.243 |
0,00 |
22.144 |
0,00 |
34.045 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
|
Postponed
Tax Gain |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
0 |
0,00 |
|
Net
Profit (loss) |
37.245 |
0,01 |
48.725 |
0,01 |
85.859 |
0,01 |
123.006 |
0,00 |
136.700 |
0,00 |
|
|
(2008) |
(2009) |
(2010) |
(2011) |
|
LIQUIDITY RATIOS |
|
|
||
|
Current Ratio |
0,99 |
1,01 |
1,21 |
1,14 |
|
Acid-Test Ratio |
0,91 |
0,99 |
0,88 |
1,05 |
|
Cash Ratio |
0,85 |
0,87 |
0,74 |
0,00 |
|
ASSET STRUCTURE RATIOS |
|
|
||
|
Inventory/Total Assets |
0,07 |
0,01 |
0,25 |
0,07 |
|
Short-term Receivable/Total Assets |
0,06 |
0,11 |
0,11 |
0,88 |
|
Tangible Assets/Total Assets |
0,08 |
0,05 |
0,01 |
0,03 |
|
TURNOVER RATIOS |
|
|
||
|
Inventory Turnover |
39,03 |
224,65 |
5,12 |
20,40 |
|
Stockholders' Equity Turnover |
43,83 |
52,25 |
7,44 |
11,51 |
|
Asset Turnover |
2,74 |
3,17 |
1,37 |
1,53 |
|
FINANCIAL STRUCTURE |
|
|
||
|
Stockholders' Equity/Total Assets |
0,06 |
0,06 |
0,18 |
0,13 |
|
Current Liabilities/Total Assets |
0,94 |
0,94 |
0,82 |
0,84 |
|
Financial Leverage |
0,94 |
0,94 |
0,82 |
0,87 |
|
Gearing Percentage |
14,99 |
15,49 |
4,43 |
6,52 |
|
PROFITABILITY RATIOS |
|
|
||
|
Net Profit/Stockholders' Eq. |
0,32 |
0,29 |
0,04 |
0,05 |
|
Operating Profit Margin |
0,02 |
0,04 |
0,04 |
0,05 |
|
Net Profit Margin |
0,01 |
0,01 |
0,01 |
0,00 |
|
Interest Cover |
2,33 |
1,24 |
1,19 |
1,14 |
|
COLLECTION-PAYMENT |
|
|
||
|
Average Collection Period (days) |
7,29 |
12,87 |
30,05 |
206,90 |
|
Average Payable Period (days) |
59,73 |
6,02 |
67,11 |
98,79 |
|
WORKING CAPITAL |
-25015,00 |
19339,00 |
2032599,00 |
2057981,00 |
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.54.39 |
|
|
1 |
Rs.82.32 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.69.54 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Report
Prepared by : |
PRL |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest
capability for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit
transaction. It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest
and principal sums |
Large |
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General
unfavourable factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for
payment of interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with
full security |
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
-- |
NB |
New Business |
-- |
This score serves as a reference to assess
SC’s credit risk and to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is calculated
from a composite of weighted scores obtained from each of the major sections of
this report. The assessed factors and their relative weights (as indicated
through %) are as follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment record
(10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend (10%) Operational size
(10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL)
or its officials.