|
Report Date : |
07.11.2013 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
|
Name : |
ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS INC |
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Registered Office : |
|
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Country : |
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Financials (as on) : |
31.12.2012 |
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Date of Incorporation : |
19.06.1961 |
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Legal Form : |
Public Company |
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Line of Business : |
Manufactures a range of industrial products and equipment |
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No. of Employees : |
60,000 |
RATING & COMMENTS
|
MIRA’s Rating : |
Ba |
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
Status : |
Good |
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Payment Behaviour : |
Regular |
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Litigation : |
-- |
NOTES :
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail: infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – March 31st, 2013
|
Country Name |
Previous Rating (31.12.2012) |
Current Rating (31.03.2013) |
|
|
A1 |
A1 |
|
Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
|
Insignificant |
A1 |
|
Low |
A2 |
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Moderate |
B1 |
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High |
B2 |
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Very High |
C1 |
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Restricted |
C2 |
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Off-credit |
D |
UNITED STATES - ECONOMIC
OVERVIEW
The
Source
: CIA
Company name: ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS INC.
Headquarters: 3600 W. Lake Avenue, Glenview, IL 60025 - USA
Telephone: +1 847-724-7500
Fax: +1 847-657-4261
Website: www.itwinc.com
Corporate ID#: 0568702
State: Delaware
Judicial form: Public Company (NYSE = ITW)
Date incorporated: 06-19-1961
Date founded: 1912
Stock: 447,880,450 shares issued and outstanding
(as of 06-30-2013)
Value: USD
0.01= par value
Name of
manager: Scott SANTI
Business:
Illinois Tool Works Inc. manufactures a range of industrial products and equipment worldwide.
The company’s Transportation segment offers metal and plastic components, fasteners, and assemblies; fluids and polymers; fillers and putties; polyester coatings, and patch and repair products; and truck remanufacturing and related parts and service.
The Industrial Packaging segment offers steel and plastic strapping and related tools and equipment; plastic stretch film and related equipment; paper and plastic products that protect goods in transit; and metal jacketing products.
The company’s Food Equipment segment provides warewashing, cooking, refrigeration, and food processing equipment; and kitchen exhaust, ventilation, and pollution control systems.
The Power Systems & Electronics segment provides arc welding equipment; metal arc welding consumables; metal solder materials for PC board fabrication; equipment and services for microelectronics assembly; electronic components and component packaging; and airport ground support equipment.
The company’s Construction Products segment offers anchors, fasteners, and related fastening tools for wood, metal, and concrete applications; metal plate truss components, and related equipment and software; and packaged hardware and other products for retail.
The Polymers & Fluids segment provides adhesives, chemical fluids, epoxy and resin-based coating products, hand wipes and cleaners, and pressure-sensitive adhesives and components.
The company’s Decorative Surfaces segment offers laminate for furniture, office and retail space, and countertops; and laminate flooring and worktops.
In addition, the company offers plastic reclosable packages and bags, and consumables; plastic andmetal fasteners, and components; foil and film products; product coding and marking, paint spray, and static and contamination control equipment; and swabs and mats.
The company was founded in 1912 and is based in Glenview, Illinois.
EIN: 36-1258310
Staff: 60,000
Operations & branches:
At the
headquarters, we find a large factory, warehouse and office, owned.
The Company
maintains numerous branches in the U.S. including the one located:
825
University Avenue
Norwood, MA
02062
Ph:
781-575-5684
Shareholders:
The Company is listed with the NYSE under symbol ITW.
As of 06-30-2013, 80% of the stock was held by institutional and mutual fund owners, including:
|
Northern
Trust Corporation |
8.60% |
|
State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co |
5.17% |
|
Vanguard
Group, Inc. (The) |
5.07% |
|
State
Street Corporation |
4.25% |
|
Harris
Associates L.P. |
3.75% |
Management:
Mr. E. Scott Santi has been the Chief Executive Officer at Illinois Tool Works Inc. since November 2012 and as its President since October 2012.
Mr. Santi served as the Chief Operating Officer of Illinois Tool Works Inc. from October 12, 2012 to November 18, 2012. Mr. Santi served as the
President of J & B Aviation Services Inc. He joined Illinois Tool Works Inc. in 1983 and also served as its has been an Executive Vice President since 2004 and held various sales, marketing and general management positions with the construction products, machined components, and welding businesses during his 22 years with Illinois Tool Works Inc. Mr. Santi has spent his entire career with Illinois Tool Works Inc., he joined it in 1983 as a Sales Representative for Illinois Tool Works Inc.'s Buildex division which manufactures fasteners for the commercial construction market.
From 1985 to 1994, Mr. Santi progressed through a series of sales and marketing management assignments at Buildex and at ITW's Paslode division. Since 1995, he served as General Manager of ITW's Vortec division.
He served as Vice President and General Manager of ITW's Hobart Ground Power business since 1997, and also served as its Vice President and General Manager for all of the Hobart Brothers businesses since 1998.
In 2002, he was promoted to Group Vice President for the Welding Products Group, adding responsibility for ITW's welding businesses in Europe and Asia. He served as President of the Welding Products Focus Markets Group since 2003, and was responsible for a number of welding power source and welding accessory divisions in North America. He served as Executive Vice President of Power Systems & Electronics. Mr. Santi served as Vice Chairman of Illinois Tool Works Inc. from December 2008 to October 12, 2012.
He has been a Director of W.W. Grainger, Inc. since April 2010 and Illinois Tool Works Inc. since November 2012. He serves as a Trustee of Manufacturers Alliance/MAPI, Inc.
Mr. Santi graduated from University of Illinois in 1983 with a B.S. degree in Accounting and received a Masters of Management degree from The Kellogg School of Business, Northwestern University in 1992.
Ronald D. KROPP is Vice President and CFO.
He will step down on August 9, 2013.
James H. WOOTEN is the Secretary.
Subsidiaries
&
Partnership: Numerous subsidiaries
On
attachment
- 10K 2012
- 2nd
10Q 2013
On September 24, 2013, Illinois Tool Works Inc. revised earnings guidance for the third quarter and full year of 2013.
For the third quarter of 2013, the company now expected EPS to be in the range of $0.84 to $0.92 compared to the previous guidance of $1.06 to $1.16.
For the full year of 2013, the company now expected EPS to be in the range of $3.50 to $3.66 compared to the previous guidance of $4.10 to $4.30.
|
Millions of US Dollars |
As of: |
Dec 31 |
Dec 31 |
Dec 31 |
Dec 31 |
|
TOTAL REVENUES |
13,573.0 |
15,416.0 |
17,787.0 |
17,924.0 |
|
|
NET INCOME |
972.7 |
1,503.0 |
2,071.0 |
2,870.0 |
|
Banks: First National Bank of Chicago
…
Legal filings & complaints: Several
Secured debts summary (UCC): Numerous
Trade
references:
Date
reported: August 2013
High
credit: USD 100,000+
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last
purchase: July 2013
Line of
business: Office supply
Paying
status: 6 days beyond terms
Date
reported: August 2013
High credit: USD 70,000,000+
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last
purchase: July 2013
Line of
business: Payroll
Paying
status: As agreed
Date
reported: August 2013
High
credit: USD 16,000
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last
purchase: July 2013
Line of
business: Telecommunications
Paying
status: 5 days beyond terms
Domestic
credit history:
National
Credit Bureaus gave a correct medium credit rating.
According to our credit analysts, during the last 6 months, domestic payments were made with an average of 5 days beyond terms.
International credit history:
Payments of imports are currently made with an average of 2 to 5 days beyond terms.
Other
comments:
The Company
maintains its business.
The Company
is in good standing.
This means
that all local and federal taxes were paid on due date.
The risk
remains low.
Our
opinion:
A business
connection may be conducted.
Standard & Poor’s
|
United
States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'AA+' Due To Political Risks,
Rising Debt Burden; Outlook Negative |
|
Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
·
We have also removed both the short- and long-term ratings
from CreditWatch negative.
·
The downgrade reflects our opinion that the fiscal
consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration recently agreed to
falls short of what, in our view, would be necessary to stabilize the government's
medium-term debt dynamics.
·
More broadly, the downgrade reflects our view that the
effectiveness, stability, and predictability of American policymaking and
political institutions have weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic
challenges to a degree more than we envisioned when we assigned a negative
outlook to the rating on April 18, 2011.
·
Since then, we have changed our view of the difficulties in
bridging the gulf between the political parties over fiscal policy, which makes
us pessimistic about the capacity of Congress and the Administration to be able
to leverage their agreement this week into a broader fiscal consolidation plan
that stabilizes the government's debt dynamics any time soon.
·
The outlook on the long-term rating is negative. We could
lower the long-term rating to 'AA' within the next two years if we see that
less reduction in spending than agreed to, higher interest rates, or new fiscal
pressures during the period result in a higher general government debt
trajectory than we currently assume in our base case.
TORONTO (Standard &
Poor's) Aug. 5, 2011--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that it
lowered its long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of America
to 'AA+' from 'AAA'. Standard & Poor's also said that the outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. At the same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed
its 'A-1+' short-term rating on the U.S. In addition, Standard & Poor's
removed both ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed on July 14, 2011,
with negative implications.
The
transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment of the U.S.--our assessment of
the likelihood of official interference in the ability of U.S.-based public-
and private-sector issuers to secure foreign exchange for
debt service--remains
'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term
rating on the U.S. because we believe that the prolonged controversy over
raising the statutory debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate
indicate that further near-term progress containing the growth in public
spending, especially on entitlements, or on reaching an agreement on raising
revenues is less likely than we previously assumed and will remain a
contentious and fitful process. We also believe that the fiscal consolidation
plan that Congress and the Administration agreed to this week falls short of
the amount that we believe is necessary to stabilize the general government
debt burden by the middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the
rating was prompted by our view on the rising public debt burden and our
perception of greater policymaking uncertainty, consistent with our criteria
(see "Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and
Assumptions ," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41).
Nevertheless, we view the U.S. federal government's other economic, external,
and monetary credit attributes, which form the basis for the sovereign rating,
as broadly unchanged.
We have taken the ratings
off CreditWatch because the Aug. 2 passage of the Budget Control Act Amendment
of 2011 has removed any perceived immediate threat of payment default posed by
delays to raising the government's debt ceiling. In addition, we believe that
the act provides sufficient clarity to allow us to evaluate the likely course
of U.S. fiscal policy for the next few years.
The
political brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as America's
governance and policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and less
predictable than what we previously believed. The statutory debt ceiling and
the threat of default have become political bargaining chips in the debate over
fiscal policy. Despite this year's wide-ranging debate, in our view, the
differences between political parties have proven to be extraordinarily
difficult to bridge, and, as we see it, the resulting agreement fell well short
of the comprehensive fiscal consolidation program that some proponents had
envisaged until quite recently. Republicans and Democrats have only been able
to agree to relatively modest savings on discretionary spending while
delegating to the Select Committee decisions on more comprehensive measures. It
appears that for now, new revenues have dropped down on the menu of policy
options. In addition, the plan envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare
and little change in other entitlements,
the containment of which
we and most other independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal
sustainability.
Our opinion is that
elected officials remain wary of tackling the structural issues required to
effectively address the rising U.S. public debt burden in a manner consistent
with a 'AAA' rating and with 'AAA' rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and
Assumptions," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41). In
our view, the difficulty in framing a consensus on fiscal policy weakens the
government's ability to manage public finances and diverts attention from the
debate over how to achieve more balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era
of fiscal stringency and private-sector deleveraging (ibid). A new political
consensus might (or might not) emerge after the 2012 elections, but we believe
that by then, the government debt burden will likely be higher, the needed
medium-term fiscal adjustment potentially greater, and the inflection point on
the U.S. population's demographics and other age-related spending drivers
closer at hand (see "Global Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Likely
Cost Even More Green, Now," June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's
takes no position on the mix of spending and revenue measures that Congress and
the Administration might conclude is appropriate for putting the U.S.'s
finances on a sustainable footing.
The act calls for as much
as $2.4 trillion of reductions in expenditure growth over the 10 years through
2021. These cuts will be implemented in two steps: the $917 billion agreed to
initially, followed by an additional $1.5 trillion that the newly formed
Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction is supposed to
recommend by November 2011. The act contains no measures to raise taxes or
otherwise enhance revenues, though the committee could recommend them.
The act further provides
that if Congress does not enact the committee's recommendations, cuts of $1.2
trillion will be implemented over the same time period. The reductions would
mainly affect outlays for civilian discretionary spending, defense, and
Medicare. We understand that this fall-back mechanism is designed to encourage
Congress to embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure savings, as the
committee might recommend.
We note that in a letter
to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated
total budgetary savings under the act to be at least $2.1 trillion over the
next 10 years relative to its baseline assumptions. In updating our own fiscal
projections, with certain modifications outlined below, we have relied on the
CBO's latest "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" of June 2011, updated to
include the CBO assumptions contained in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In
general, the CBO's "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" assumes a continuation
of recent Congressional action overriding existing law.
We view the act's measures
as a step toward fiscal consolidation. However, this is within the framework of
a legislative mechanism that leaves open the details of what is finally agreed
to until the end of 2011, and Congress and the Administration could modify any
agreement in the future. Even assuming that at least $2.1 trillion of the
spending reductions the act envisages are implemented, we maintain our view
that the U.S. net general government debt burden (all levels of government
combined, excluding liquid financial assets) will likely continue to grow.
Under our revised base case fiscal scenario--which we consider to be consistent
with a 'AA+' long-term rating and a negative outlook--we now project that net
general government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the end of
2011 to 79% in 2015 and 85% by 2021. Even the projected 2015 ratio of sovereign
indebtedness is high in relation to those of peer credits and, as noted, would
continue to rise under the act's revised policy settings.
Compared with previous projections,
our revised base case scenario now assumes that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, due
to expire by the end of 2012, remain in place. We have changed our assumption
on this because the majority of Republicans in Congress continue to resist any
measure that would raise revenues, a position we believe Congress reinforced by
passing the act. Key macroeconomic assumptions in the base case scenario
include trend real GDP growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near 2%
annually over the decade.
Our revised upside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as consistent with the
outlook on the 'AA+' long-term rating being revised to stable--retains these
same macroeconomic assumptions. In addition, it incorporates $950 billion of
new revenues on the assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners
lapse from 2013 onwards, as the Administration is advocating. In this scenario,
we project that the net general government debt would rise from an estimated
74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as being consistent with a
possible further downgrade to a 'AA' long-term rating--features less-favorable
macroeconomic assumptions, as outlined below and also assumes that the second
round of spending cuts (at least $1.2 trillion) that the act calls for does not
occur. This scenario also assumes somewhat higher nominal interest rates for
U.S. Treasuries. We still believe that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key
reserve currency confers a government funding advantage, one that could change
only slowly over time, and that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose
monetary policy at a time of fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible
that interest rates could rise if investors re-price relative risks. As a
result, our alternate scenario factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in
10-year bond yields relative to the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In
this scenario, we project the net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP
in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to 101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios
also take into account the significant negative revisions to historical GDP
data that the Bureau of Economic Analysis announced on July 29. From our perspective,
the effect of these revisions underscores two related points when evaluating
the likely debt trajectory of the U.S. government. First, the revisions show
that the recent recession was deeper than previously assumed, so the GDP this
year is lower than previously thought in both nominal and real terms.
Consequently, the debt burden is slightly higher. Second, the revised data
highlight the sub-par path of the current economic recovery when compared with
rebounds following previous post-war recessions. We believe the sluggish pace
of the current economic recovery could be consistent with the experiences of
countries that have had financial crises in which the slow process of debt
deleveraging in the private sector leads to a persistent drag on demand. As a
result, our downside case scenario assumes relatively modest real trend GDP
growth of 2.5% and inflation of near 1.5% annually going forward.
When comparing the U.S.
to sovereigns with 'AAA' long-term ratings that we view as relevant
peers--Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K.--we also observe, based on our
base case scenarios for each, that the trajectory of the U.S.'s net public debt
is diverging from the others. Including the U.S., we estimate that these five
sovereigns will have net general government debt to GDP ratios this year
ranging from 34% (Canada) to 80% (the U.K.), with the U.S. debt burden at 74%.
By 2015, we project that their net public debt to GDP ratios will range between
30% (lowest, Canada) and 83% (highest, France), with the U.S. debt burden at
79%. However, in contrast with the U.S., we project that the net public debt
burdens of these other sovereigns will begin to decline, either before or by
2015.
Standard & Poor's
transfer T&C assessment of the U.S. remains 'AAA'. Our T&C assessment
reflects our view of the likelihood of the sovereign restricting other public
and private issuers' access to foreign exchange needed to meet debt service.
Although in our view the credit standing of the U.S. government has
deteriorated modestly, we see little indication that official interference of
this kind is entering onto the policy agenda of either Congress or the
Administration. Consequently, we continue to view this risk as being highly
remote.
The outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. As our downside alternate fiscal scenario
illustrates, a higher public debt trajectory than we currently assume could
lead us to lower the long-term rating again. On the other hand, as our upside
scenario highlights, if the recommendations of the Congressional Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction--independently or coupled with other
initiatives, such as the lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high
earners--lead to fiscal consolidation measures beyond the minimum mandated, and
we believe they are likely to slow the deterioration of the government's debt
dynamics, the long-term rating could stabilize at 'AA+'.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.61.92 |
|
|
1 |
Rs.99.60 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.83.64 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Report
Prepared by : |
NIS |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest capability
for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit
transaction. It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest
and principal sums |
Large |
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General
unfavourable factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for
payment of interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation
is considered normal. Capable to meet normal commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with
full security |
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
-- |
NB |
New Business |
-- |
This score serves as a reference to assess
SC’s credit risk and to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is
calculated from a composite of weighted scores obtained from each of the major
sections of this report. The assessed factors and their relative weights (as
indicated through %) are as follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend (10%) Operational size
(10%)
This report is issued at your request without any risk
and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL) or its
officials.