|
Report Date : |
11.11.2013 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
|
Name : |
LORD & TAYLOR LLC |
|
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Registered Office : |
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Country : |
|
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Date of Incorporation : |
1826 |
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Legal Form : |
LLC |
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Line of Business : |
Subject operates specialty department stores in the |
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No. of Employees : |
9,000 |
RATING & COMMENTS
|
MIRA’s Rating : |
Ba |
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
Status : |
Satisfactory |
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Payment Behaviour : |
Regular |
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Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES:
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail: infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – March, 31st, 2013
|
Country Name |
Previous Rating (31.12.2012) |
Current Rating (31.03.2013) |
|
|
A1 |
A1 |
|
Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
|
Insignificant |
A1 |
|
Low |
A2 |
|
Moderate |
B1 |
|
High |
B2 |
|
Very High |
C1 |
|
Restricted |
C2 |
|
Off-credit |
D |
united states - ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
The
|
Source
: CIA |
Company name: LORD & TAYLOR LLC
Headquarters:
Telephone: +1
212-391-3344
Fax: +1 212-391-3162
Website: www.lordantaylor.com
Corporate ID#: 4195799
State:
Judicial form: LLC
Date incorporated: 07-27-2006
Date founded: 1826
Stock: -
Value: -
Name of manager: Bonnie
BROOKS
History:
On June 2006, NRDC Equity Partners, a partnership of shopping-center
owner/developer National Realty and Development and two principals of Apollo
Real Estate Advisors, a USD5 billion investment manager, is buying the Lord
& Taylor department store chain from Federated Department Stores for USD
1.2 billion in cash.
The deal brought 48 stores across the Northeast and
Among the stores is the Lord & Taylor crown jewel, its flagship
store at
Business:
Lord & Taylor, L.L.C. operates specialty department stores in the
The company offers women’s apparel, shoes, belts, watches, handbags,
jewelry and accessories, beauty and fragrance products, and sweaters; shoes,
underwear and socks, outerwear,
jackets and sport coats, contemporary sportswear, tailored clothing,
and watches for men; apparel and toys
for girls and boys.
Its stores are located in Connecticut, District of Columbia, Illinois,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania.
The company was founded in 1826 and is headquartered in New York, New
York. Lord & Taylor, L.L.C. is a former subsidiary of Lord & Taylor
Holdings LLC, a subsidiary of NRDC Equity Partners.
EIN: 20-5344961
Staff: 9,000
Operations & branches:
At above address, we find a
major store, warehouse and office, on 600,000 sq. feet, owned.
The Company maintains stores located in Connecticut, District of
Columbia, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York,
and Pennsylvania.
On May 6, 2013, Lord & Taylor opened a 50,000-square-foot outlet
store at the Source Mall, replacing Nordstrom Rack, which recently relocated to
the nearby Gallery at Westbury. Lord & Taylor already has three full-line
stores in Garden City, Bay Shore and Huntington Station, but the Westbury
location will be its first outlet store on Long Island.
Shareholders:
LORD & TAYLOR HOLDINGS LLC
424 5th Avenue
New York, NY 10018
Incorporated in
ID#4196647
A wholly owned subsidiary of:
NRDC Equity Partners
3 Manhattanville Rd # 202
Purchase, NY 10577
Management:
Richard BAKER is the Chairman.
Mr. Richard A. Baker serves as Executive Chairman of the Board of Retail
Opportunity Investments Corp. He was Chief Executive Officer, Director of
Retail Opportunity Investments Corp. Mr. Baker is a founder and President and
Chief Executive Officer of NRDC Real Estate Advisors LLC and NRDC Equity
Partners LLC.
Mr. Baker is also vice chairman of National Realty & Development
Corporation, a privately owned real estate development company owned by himself
and Mr. Robert Baker. Mr. Baker is CEO of Hudson’s Bay Trading Company, a
diversified North American retail organization, which owns and operates Lord
& Taylor, Creative Design Studios and HBC (Bay, Zellers, Home Outfitters
and Fields). Mr. Baker also became the 39th Governor of Hudson’s Bay Company in
July 2008 where he also currently serves as a director.
Mr. Baker is Chairman of Lord & Taylor Holdings, LLC, and a director
of Fortunoff Holdings, LLC as well as the Brunswick School. Mr. Baker is also
the president of Fortunoff Card Company, LLC which filed a voluntary petition
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in February 2009.
Mr. Baker is a graduate of Cornell University and serves on the Dean’s
Advisory Board of the hotel and real estate program. Mr. Richard Baker is the
son of Mr. Robert Baker, Vice-Chairman.
Bonnie BROOKS replaced Brendan HOFFMAN in early January 2012.
Bonnie Brooks, the retail executive who is spearheading the turnaround
efforts at the Bay, is being promoted to yet another top job: to head Lord
& Taylor. Ms. Brooks, chief executive officer at the Bay, has been credited
with bolstering the Bay's performance as it begins to enjoy signs of a revival
since she arrived in 2008, soon after parent Hudson's Bay Co. was taken over by
U.S. real estate magnate Richard Baker. The company announced that Ms. Brooks
will replace Brendan Hoffman as head of Lord & Taylor.
Mark WEIKEL is the COO.
Mark Weikel has been Chief Operating Officer of Lord & Taylor since
April 9, 2007. Mr. Weikel served as President and Chief Operating Officer of
Victoria''s Secret Stores. Before joining Victoria''s Secret Stores in 2003,
Mr. Weikel was Chairman of the Foley''s Division of the May Department Stores
from 2000 to 2003. Prior to that, Mr. Weikel held several key executive
positions at Foley''s, Famous Barr and at the Corporate Headquarters of May
Company in St. Louis. He began his career at George Olive & Co., CPA''s in
Evansville, Indiana. He received his CPA certificate in the state of Indiana.
Mark graduated with a Bachelor of Science degree from Indiana State University
in Evansville and obtained an Executive MBA from the University of Michigan at
Ann Arbor.
Subsidiaries &
Partnership: None
In United States, privately
held corporations are not required to publish any financials.
On a direct call, a
financial assistant controlled the present report but deferred any financials.
We sent a fax but no answer
received.
Outside sources (bank) gave
estimate sales for year 2012 in excess of USD 1 billion.
The business is said to be
profitable.
Banks: JP Morgan Chase Bank
Legal filings & complaints: Several
August 13, 2013
The owners of the White Flint Mall counter-sued Lord & Taylor in
federal court for more than $1 billion in damages, alleging its anchor retailer
sued to block the planned 5.2 million-square-foot redevelopment in order to
extract a settlement fee from its landlord after work had already started.
White Flint filed its countersuit with U.S. District Court in Greenbelt
claiming Lord & Taylor has known about the proposed project since 2009 and
had more than enough opportunity to object while the plan worked its way
through Montgomery County's approval process. Lord & Tayor sued White Flint
July 1, 2013 alleging that the mall's owners violated the terms of a 1975
agreement that required them to maintain the mall as a 'first class high
fashion regional shopping center.' The retailer argued that the mall owner has
already let several tenants go, including co-anchor Bloomingdale's, which has
reduced foot traffic and, in turn, hurt its own business.
In its response, White Flint claims it has already spent more than $7
million in pre-development work, has signed or is close to signing contracts
for more than $24 million, and is in active negotiations with several key
anchor tenants to lease space in the redevelopment.
White Flint alleged that Lord &Taylor sued to block the project now,
when the mall's owners are most vulnerable. Lord & Taylor argued the mall
needs to be maintained in its current form. White Flint, in its counter suit,
says the days of large, enclosed shopping malls have come and gone since White
Flint opened in 1977 and are being replaced by open-air town center concepts.
White Flint claims its redevelopment is the only way the shopping destination
can survive. The redevelopment is expected to cost about $4 billion over the
next two decades and generate about $1 billion in new county taxes. Lord &
Taylor hasn't asked the court to derail the project, only to hold off until its
lease rights expire in 2055. White Flint claims that much of a delay would be
tantamount to killing the project.
White Flint has filed two counts against Lord & Taylor, both seeking
in excess of $1 billion. The first is for breach of contract, in which White
Flint alleged that Lord & Taylor broke a covenant requiring it to deal in
good faith by filing the lawsuit. The second is for tortious interference with
prospective economic advantage, through which White Flint claims Lord &
Taylor is trying to extract a large settlement fee in exchange for dropping the
case.
Secured debts summary (UCC):
None (in the New York State)
According to our credit analysts, during the last 6 months, 92% of trade
experience indicates a regular payment.
Payments of imports are currently made with an average of 2 to 5 days
beyond terms.
The Company maintains a regular
business.
The banks and financial
institutions confirmed a correct credit history.
The Company is in good
standing.
This means that all local
and federal taxes were paid on due date.
The risk is low.
Our opinion:
A business connection may be
conducted.
Standard & Poor’s
|
United
States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'AA+' Due To Political Risks,
Rising Debt Burden; Outlook Negative |
|
Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
·
We have also removed both the short- and long-term ratings
from CreditWatch negative.
·
The downgrade reflects our opinion that the fiscal
consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration recently agreed to
falls short of what, in our view, would be necessary to stabilize the
government's medium-term debt dynamics.
·
More broadly, the downgrade reflects our view that the
effectiveness, stability, and predictability of American policymaking and
political institutions have weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic
challenges to a degree more than we envisioned when we assigned a negative
outlook to the rating on April 18, 2011.
·
Since then, we have changed our view of the difficulties in
bridging the gulf between the political parties over fiscal policy, which makes
us pessimistic about the capacity of Congress and the Administration to be able
to leverage their agreement this week into a broader fiscal consolidation plan
that stabilizes the government's debt dynamics any time soon.
·
The outlook on the long-term rating is negative. We could
lower the long-term rating to 'AA' within the next two years if we see that
less reduction in spending than agreed to, higher interest rates, or new fiscal
pressures during the period result in a higher general government debt
trajectory than we currently assume in our base case.
TORONTO (Standard &
Poor's) Aug. 5, 2011--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that it
lowered its long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of America
to 'AA+' from 'AAA'. Standard & Poor's also said that the outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. At the same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed
its 'A-1+' short-term rating on the U.S. In addition, Standard & Poor's
removed both ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed on July 14, 2011,
with negative implications.
The transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment of the U.S.--our
assessment of the likelihood of official interference in the ability of
U.S.-based public- and private-sector issuers to secure foreign exchange for
debt service--remains
'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term
rating on the U.S. because we believe that the prolonged controversy over
raising the statutory debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate
indicate that further near-term progress containing the growth in public
spending, especially on entitlements, or on reaching an agreement on raising
revenues is less likely than we previously assumed and will remain a
contentious and fitful process. We also believe that the fiscal consolidation
plan that Congress and the Administration agreed to this week falls short of
the amount that we believe is necessary to stabilize the general government
debt burden by the middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the
rating was prompted by our view on the rising public debt burden and our
perception of greater policymaking uncertainty, consistent with our criteria
(see "Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and
Assumptions ," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41).
Nevertheless, we view the U.S. federal government's other economic, external,
and monetary credit attributes, which form the basis for the sovereign rating,
as broadly unchanged.
We have taken the ratings
off CreditWatch because the Aug. 2 passage of the Budget Control Act Amendment
of 2011 has removed any perceived immediate threat of payment default posed by
delays to raising the government's debt ceiling. In addition, we believe that
the act provides sufficient clarity to allow us to evaluate the likely course
of U.S. fiscal policy for the next few years.
The political brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as
America's governance and policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and
less predictable than what we previously believed. The statutory debt ceiling
and the threat of default have become political bargaining chips in the debate
over fiscal policy. Despite this year's wide-ranging debate, in our view, the
differences between political parties have proven to be extraordinarily
difficult to bridge, and, as we see it, the resulting agreement fell well short
of the comprehensive fiscal consolidation program that some proponents had
envisaged until quite recently. Republicans and Democrats have only been able
to agree to relatively modest savings on discretionary spending while
delegating to the Select Committee decisions on more comprehensive measures. It
appears that for now, new revenues have dropped down on the menu of policy
options. In addition, the plan envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare
and little change in other entitlements,
the containment of which
we and most other independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal
sustainability.
Our opinion is that
elected officials remain wary of tackling the structural issues required to
effectively address the rising U.S. public debt burden in a manner consistent
with a 'AAA' rating and with 'AAA' rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and
Assumptions," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41). In
our view, the difficulty in framing a consensus on fiscal policy weakens the
government's ability to manage public finances and diverts attention from the
debate over how to achieve more balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era
of fiscal stringency and private-sector deleveraging (ibid). A new political
consensus might (or might not) emerge after the 2012 elections, but we believe
that by then, the government debt burden will likely be higher, the needed
medium-term fiscal adjustment potentially greater, and the inflection point on
the U.S. population's demographics and other age-related spending drivers
closer at hand (see "Global Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Likely
Cost Even More Green, Now," June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's
takes no position on the mix of spending and revenue measures that Congress and
the Administration might conclude is appropriate for putting the U.S.'s
finances on a sustainable footing.
The act calls for as much
as $2.4 trillion of reductions in expenditure growth over the 10 years through
2021. These cuts will be implemented in two steps: the $917 billion agreed to
initially, followed by an additional $1.5 trillion that the newly formed
Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction is supposed to
recommend by November 2011. The act contains no measures to raise taxes or
otherwise enhance revenues, though the committee could recommend them.
The act further provides
that if Congress does not enact the committee's recommendations, cuts of $1.2
trillion will be implemented over the same time period. The reductions would
mainly affect outlays for civilian discretionary spending, defense, and
Medicare. We understand that this fall-back mechanism is designed to encourage
Congress to embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure savings, as the
committee might recommend.
We note that in a letter
to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated
total budgetary savings under the act to be at least $2.1 trillion over the
next 10 years relative to its baseline assumptions. In updating our own fiscal
projections, with certain modifications outlined below, we have relied on the
CBO's latest "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" of June 2011, updated to
include the CBO assumptions contained in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In
general, the CBO's "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" assumes a continuation
of recent Congressional action overriding existing law.
We view the act's
measures as a step toward fiscal consolidation. However, this is within the
framework of a legislative mechanism that leaves open the details of what is
finally agreed to until the end of 2011, and Congress and the Administration
could modify any agreement in the future. Even assuming that at least $2.1
trillion of the spending reductions the act envisages are implemented, we
maintain our view that the U.S. net general government debt burden (all levels
of government combined, excluding liquid financial assets) will likely continue
to grow. Under our revised base case fiscal scenario--which we consider to be
consistent with a 'AA+' long-term rating and a negative outlook--we now project
that net general government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the
end of 2011 to 79% in 2015 and 85% by 2021. Even the projected 2015 ratio of
sovereign indebtedness is high in relation to those of peer credits and, as
noted, would continue to rise under the act's revised policy settings.
Compared with previous
projections, our revised base case scenario now assumes that the 2001 and 2003
tax cuts, due to expire by the end of 2012, remain in place. We have changed
our assumption on this because the majority of Republicans in Congress continue
to resist any measure that would raise revenues, a position we believe Congress
reinforced by passing the act. Key macroeconomic assumptions in the base case
scenario include trend real GDP growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near
2% annually over the decade.
Our revised upside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as consistent with the
outlook on the 'AA+' long-term rating being revised to stable--retains these
same macroeconomic assumptions. In addition, it incorporates $950 billion of
new revenues on the assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners
lapse from 2013 onwards, as the Administration is advocating. In this scenario,
we project that the net general government debt would rise from an estimated
74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as being consistent with a possible
further downgrade to a 'AA' long-term rating--features less-favorable
macroeconomic assumptions, as outlined below and also assumes that the second
round of spending cuts (at least $1.2 trillion) that the act calls for does not
occur. This scenario also assumes somewhat higher nominal interest rates for
U.S. Treasuries. We still believe that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key
reserve currency confers a government funding advantage, one that could change
only slowly over time, and that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose
monetary policy at a time of fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible
that interest rates could rise if investors re-price relative risks. As a
result, our alternate scenario factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in
10-year bond yields relative to the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In
this scenario, we project the net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP
in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to 101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios
also take into account the significant negative revisions to historical GDP
data that the Bureau of Economic Analysis announced on July 29. From our
perspective, the effect of these revisions underscores two related points when
evaluating the likely debt trajectory of the U.S. government. First, the
revisions show that the recent recession was deeper than previously assumed, so
the GDP this year is lower than previously thought in both nominal and real
terms. Consequently, the debt burden is slightly higher. Second, the revised
data highlight the sub-par path of the current economic recovery when compared
with rebounds following previous post-war recessions. We believe the sluggish
pace of the current economic recovery could be consistent with the experiences
of countries that have had financial crises in which the slow process of debt
deleveraging in the private sector leads to a persistent drag on demand. As a
result, our downside case scenario assumes relatively modest real trend GDP
growth of 2.5% and inflation of near 1.5% annually going forward.
When comparing the U.S.
to sovereigns with 'AAA' long-term ratings that we view as relevant
peers--Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K.--we also observe, based on our
base case scenarios for each, that the trajectory of the U.S.'s net public debt
is diverging from the others. Including the U.S., we estimate that these five
sovereigns will have net general government debt to GDP ratios this year
ranging from 34% (Canada) to 80% (the U.K.), with the U.S. debt burden at 74%.
By 2015, we project that their net public debt to GDP ratios will range between
30% (lowest, Canada) and 83% (highest, France), with the U.S. debt burden at
79%. However, in contrast with the U.S., we project that the net public debt
burdens of these other sovereigns will begin to decline, either before or by
2015.
Standard & Poor's
transfer T&C assessment of the U.S. remains 'AAA'. Our T&C assessment
reflects our view of the likelihood of the sovereign restricting other public
and private issuers' access to foreign exchange needed to meet debt service.
Although in our view the credit standing of the U.S. government has
deteriorated modestly, we see little indication that official interference of
this kind is entering onto the policy agenda of either Congress or the Administration.
Consequently, we continue to view this risk as being highly remote.
The outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. As our downside alternate fiscal scenario
illustrates, a higher public debt trajectory than we currently assume could
lead us to lower the long-term rating again. On the other hand, as our upside
scenario highlights, if the recommendations of the Congressional Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction--independently or coupled with other
initiatives, such as the lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high
earners--lead to fiscal consolidation measures beyond the minimum mandated, and
we believe they are likely to slow the deterioration of the government's debt
dynamics, the long-term rating could stabilize at 'AA+'.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.62.73 |
|
|
1 |
Rs.100.92 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.84.06 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Report Prepared
by : |
SDA |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest
capability for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit transaction.
It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest and
principal sums |
Large |
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General unfavourable
factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for payment of
interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall
operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with full
security |
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
---- |
NB |
New Business |
---- |
This score serves as a reference to assess
SC’s credit risk and to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is
calculated from a composite of weighted scores obtained from each of the major
sections of this report. The assessed factors and their relative weights (as
indicated through %) are as follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend (10%) Operational size
(10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL)
or its officials.