|
Report Date : |
14.11.2013 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
|
Name : |
CTC GLOBAL CORPORATION |
|
|
|
|
Registered Office : |
2026 McGraw Avenue, Irvine, CA 92614 |
|
|
|
|
Country : |
United States |
|
|
|
|
Date of Incorporation : |
18.07.2011 |
|
|
|
|
Legal Form : |
Corporation – Profit
|
|
|
|
|
Line of Business : |
Manufactures and supplies conductors for the power generation and
transmission industry worldwide. |
|
|
|
|
No. of Employees : |
95 |
RATING & COMMENTS
|
MIRA’s Rating : |
Ba |
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
Status : |
Satisfactory |
|
|
|
|
Payment Behaviour : |
No complaints |
|
|
|
|
Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES:
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail: infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – March 31st,
2013
|
Country Name |
Previous Rating (31.12.2012) |
Current Rating (31.03.2013) |
|
United
States |
A1 |
A1 |
|
Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
|
Insignificant |
A1 |
|
Low |
A2 |
|
Moderate |
B1 |
|
High |
B2 |
|
Very High |
C1 |
|
Restricted |
C2 |
|
Off-credit |
D |
United States - ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
The US has the largest and most technologically powerful economy in the
world, with a per capita GDP of $49,800. In this market-oriented economy, private
individuals and business firms make most of the decisions, and the federal and
state governments buy needed goods and services predominantly in the private
marketplace. US business firms enjoy greater flexibility than their
counterparts in Western Europe and Japan in decisions to expand capital plant,
to lay off surplus workers, and to develop new products. At the same time, they
face higher barriers to enter their rivals' home markets than foreign firms
face entering US markets. US firms are at or near the forefront in
technological advances, especially in computers and in medical, aerospace, and
military equipment; their advantage has narrowed since the end of World War II.
The onrush of technology largely explains the gradual development of a "two-tier
labor market" in which those at the bottom lack the education and the
professional/technical skills of those at the top and, more and more, fail to
get comparable pay raises, health insurance coverage, and other benefits. Since
1975, practically all the gains in household income have gone to the top 20% of
households. Since 1996, dividends and capital gains have grown faster than
wages or any other category of after-tax income. Imported oil accounts for
nearly 55% of US consumption. Crude oil prices doubled between 2001 and 2006,
the year home prices peaked; higher gasoline prices ate into consumers' budgets
and many individuals fell behind in their mortgage payments. Oil prices climbed
another 50% between 2006 and 2008, and bank foreclosures more than doubled in
the same period. Besides dampening the housing market, soaring oil prices
caused a drop in the value of the dollar and a deterioration in the US
merchandise trade deficit, which peaked at $840 billion in 2008. The sub-prime
mortgage crisis, falling home prices, investment bank failures, tight credit,
and the global economic downturn pushed the United States into a recession by
mid-2008. GDP contracted until the third quarter of 2009, making this the
deepest and longest downturn since the Great Depression. To help stabilize
financial markets, in October 2008 the US Congress established a $700 billion
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The government used some of these funds
to purchase equity in US banks and industrial corporations, much of which had
been returned to the government by early 2011. In January 2009 the US Congress
passed and President Barack OBAMA signed a bill providing an additional $787
billion fiscal stimulus to be used over 10 years - two-thirds on additional
spending and one-third on tax cuts - to create jobs and to help the economy
recover. In 2010 and 2011, the federal budget deficit reached nearly 9% of GDP.
In 2012 the federal government reduced the growth of spending and the deficit
shrank to 7.6% of GDP. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan required major shifts in
national resources from civilian to military purposes and contributed to the
growth of the budget deficit and public debt. Through 2011, the direct costs of
the wars totaled nearly $900 billion, according to US government figures. US
revenues from taxes and other sources are lower, as a percentage of GDP, than
those of most other countries. In March 2010, President OBAMA signed into law
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, a health insurance reform that
will extend coverage to an additional 32 million American citizens by 2016,
through private health insurance for the general population and Medicaid for
the impoverished. Total spending on health care - public plus private - rose
from 9.0% of GDP in 1980 to 17.9% in 2010. In July 2010, the president signed
the DODD-FRANK Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, a law designed
to promote financial stability by protecting consumers from financial abuses,
ending taxpayer bailouts of financial firms, dealing with troubled banks that
are "too big to fail," and improving accountability and transparency
in the financial system - in particular, by requiring certain financial
derivatives to be traded in markets that are subject to government regulation and
oversight. In December 2012, the Federal Reserve Board announced plans to
purchase $85 billion per month of mortgage-backed and Treasury securities in an
effort to hold down long-term interest rates, and to keep short term rates near
zero until unemployment drops to 6.5% from the December rate of 7.8%, or until
inflation rises above 2.5%. Long-term problems include stagnation of wages for
lower-income families, inadequate investment in deteriorating infrastructure,
rapidly rising medical and pension costs of an aging population, energy
shortages, and sizable current account and budget deficits - including
significant budget shortages for state governments.
|
Source : CIA |
Company name: CTC GLOBAL
CORPORATION
Address:
2026
McGraw Avenue, Irvine, CA 92614 - USA
Telephone: +1 949-428-8500
Fax:
+1
949-428-8515
Website:
www.ctccable.com
Corporate ID#:
5012124
State:
Delaware
Judicial form:
Corporation
– Profit
Date incorporated: 07-18-2011
Stock:
-
Value:
-
Name of manager: Jason HUANG
History:
CTC GLOBAL CORPORATION
purchased the patents of COMPOSITE TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION, which went in
bankruptcy Chapter 11.
Business:
CTC GLOBAL CORPORATION is
doing business as CTC CABLE CORPORATION.
CTC Global manufactures and supplies conductors for the power generation
and transmission industry worldwide.
It offers bare overhead transmission conductors and associated fittings.
The company’s products are used to upgrade the capacity of
existing lines; improve the performance and economics of new lines; accommodate
long spans and river crossings; and connect renewable resources.
It provides installation training and support.
CTC Global was formerly known as CTC Cable Corporation and changed its
name to CTC Global on April 18, 2012.
As of August 18, 2011, CTC Global operates as a joint venture between
Kaskol Group and RU-COM.
On August 14, 2013, CTC Global announced that it entered into a joint
venture with the NARI Group. The new company, Jiangsu NARI CTC Composite
Material Co, Ltd, will begin commercial operations in early 2014 and produce
high-capacity, energy-efficient, and highly-proven ACCC(R) conductor core in
China, exclusively for the Chinese market. Jiangsu NARI CTC Composite Material
Co Ltd. will produce ACCC core using CTC's internally built pultrusion machines
and specialized tooling. CTC will manage the new venture to ensure the quality,
while supplying all of its proprietary raw materials and expertise. The new
company will produce core exclusively for the Chinese market, though core could
be shipped globally should CTC's core production facility in Irvine, California
be overbooked.
On April 9, 2013, CTC Global announced it has entered into a formal
business relationship with General Cable to jointly manufacture high-capacity,
low-sag and energy-efficient ACCC conductor solutions for electric utilities in
the U.S. and Canada. The collaborative effort will allow CTC Global to utilize
General Cable's advanced manufacturing capabilities and expertise to produce
the ACCC conductor, which has been deployed at more than 250 project sites in
over 25 countries worldwide.
Suppliers include:
FAR EAST COMPOSITE TECHNOLOGY CO.LTD
NO.200 FANXING ROAD, GAOCHENG TOWN, YIXING CITY JIANGSU 214257 CHINA
EIN: -
Staff: 95
Operations & branches:
At the headquarters, we find
a factory, warehouse and office.
Shareholders:
As of August 18, 2011, CTC Global operates as a joint venture between
Kaskol Group and RU-COM.
Management:
Stewart M. RAMSAY is the President
Jason HUANG, Ph.D., P.E., is the Chief Executive Officer.
Mr. Huang has over twenty years of experience in the composites
industry.
He has extensive experience in composite materials, including fiberglass
and carbon fiber composites. He joined CTC from BAE Systems, where he served as
Vice President of Engineering.
Prior to BAE Systems, he served as the Director of Research and
Development for Americas and Pacific Rim at Cytec Engineered Materials, Senior
Manager at Goodrich for High Temperature Composites, and project manager at
Owens Corning. He has successfully managed the development and
commercialization of dozens of multi-million dollar technology programs,
including composite, alternative energy and fiber optic sensor technologies. He
serves on the Editorial Board of Acta Materiae Compositae Sinica (the Chinese
Composite Journal). Mr. Huang has an MBA from The Fisher College of Business
(OSU).
Mr. Huang received his B.S. degree in China (ceramic insulators for high
voltage power grid).
Upon graduation, he was awarded the prestigious National Fellowship for
Graduate Studies Aboard, and earned his M.S. (UCLA) and Ph.D. (The Ohio State
University) in Materials Science and Engineering.
Marvin W. SEPE serves as Chief Operating Officer of CTC Global.
Mr. Sepe served as President of CTC Cable Corporation since joining it
in February 2006 until December 2009. He served as President of DeWind, Inc.
He served as Vice President of Production at Composite Technology
Corporation since February 2006 and was responsible of ACCC composite core and
cable at CTC Cable Corporation in February 2006. Mr. Sepe has demonstrated
production expertise and experience, having spent years involved with high
technology manufacturing, including in the exacting semi-conductor operating
environment. He developed and installed manufacturing disciplines in many
facilities, as well as managing multiple foreign manufacturing plants. He has
over 25 years of management and leadership in technology related businesses. He
served as the President of JSI of JMAR Technologies Inc., since May 1997 and
also served as its Executive Vice President and General Manager since July
1996.
Mr. Sepe served as President at an Independent Management Consultant
since November 2002. From October 1997 to November 2002, Mr. Sepe served as
President, Executive Vice President, and General Manager of JMAR Semiconductor,
Inc., a division of JMAR Technologies, Inc. He served at TRW Components
International Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of TRW Inc., as Director of
Business Development and Director of Programs. From 1981 to 1997, he served at
TRW Inc. (now Northrop Grumman) and held other management positions within TRW
including Marketing, Programs and Engineering.
He served as Manager of Worldwide Assembly Operations at Silicon General
Inc., (now Microsemi) from 1980 to 1981 and was responsible for its
manufacturing operations throughout Southeast Asia, as well as the U.S. He
served as Manager of Worldwide Assembly Operations at Silicon Systems Inc.,
(now TDK) from 1976 to 1980. Mr. Sepe served as Director of JMAR Technologies
Inc., from July 1996 to December 1997. Mr. Sepe has published a number of
papers and taught numerous workshops on the economics and use of semiconductors
in space applications.
Mr. Sepe attended Don Bosco Technical Institute, California Polytechnic
State University SLO, and holds a Master's Degree in Business Administration
from Pepperdine University.
In United States, privately
held corporations are not required to publish any financials.
On a direct call, nobody
accepted to answer our questions.
We sent a fax but no answer
received.
Outside sources (bank) gave
estimate sales for year 2012 in the range of
USD 9,000,000=
The business is said to be
profitable.
Banks: GBC International Bank
5670 Wilshire Blvd. Suite 1780, Los Angeles, CA 90036
Ph: +1 310-826-4228
Legal filings & complaints:
As of today date, there is no legal filing pending with the Courts.
Secured debts summary (UCC):
Several
Standard
& Poor’s
|
United
States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'AA+' Due To Political Risks,
Rising Debt Burden; Outlook Negative |
|
Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
·
We have lowered our long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States
of America to 'AA+' from 'AAA' and affirmed the 'A-1+' short-term rating.
·
We have also removed both the short- and long-term ratings
from CreditWatch negative.
·
The downgrade reflects our opinion that
the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration recently
agreed to falls short of what, in our view, would be necessary to stabilize the
government's medium-term debt dynamics.
·
More broadly, the downgrade reflects
our view that the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of American
policymaking and political institutions have weakened at a time of ongoing
fiscal and economic challenges to a degree more than we envisioned when we
assigned a negative outlook to the rating on April 18, 2011.
·
Since then, we have changed our
view of the difficulties in bridging the gulf between the political parties
over fiscal policy, which makes us pessimistic about the capacity of Congress
and the Administration to be able to leverage their agreement this week into a
broader fiscal consolidation plan that stabilizes the government's debt
dynamics any time soon.
·
The outlook on the long-term rating
is negative. We could lower the long-term rating to 'AA' within the next two
years if we see that less reduction in spending than agreed to, higher interest
rates, or new fiscal pressures during the period result in a higher general
government debt trajectory than we currently assume in our base case.
TORONTO (Standard &
Poor's) Aug. 5, 2011--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that it
lowered its long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of America
to 'AA+' from 'AAA'. Standard & Poor's also said that the outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. At the same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed
its 'A-1+' short-term rating on the U.S. In addition, Standard & Poor's
removed both ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed on July 14, 2011,
with negative implications.
The
transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment of the U.S.--our assessment of
the likelihood of official interference in the ability of U.S.-based public-
and private-sector issuers to secure foreign exchange for
debt service--remains
'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term
rating on the U.S. because we believe that the prolonged controversy over
raising the statutory debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate
indicate that further near-term progress containing the growth in public
spending, especially on entitlements, or on reaching an agreement on raising
revenues is less likely than we previously assumed and will remain a
contentious and fitful process. We also believe that the fiscal consolidation
plan that Congress and the Administration agreed to this week falls short of
the amount that we believe is necessary to stabilize the general government
debt burden by the middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the
rating was prompted by our view on the rising public debt burden and our
perception of greater policymaking uncertainty, consistent with our criteria
(see "Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and
Assumptions ," June 30, 2011,
especially Paragraphs 36-41). Nevertheless, we view the U.S. federal
government's other economic, external, and monetary credit attributes, which
form the basis for the sovereign rating, as broadly unchanged.
We have taken the ratings
off CreditWatch because the Aug. 2 passage of the Budget Control Act Amendment
of 2011 has removed any perceived immediate threat of payment default posed by
delays to raising the government's debt ceiling. In addition, we believe that
the act provides sufficient clarity to allow us to evaluate the likely course
of U.S. fiscal policy for the next few years.
The
political brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as America's
governance and policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and less
predictable than what we previously believed. The statutory debt ceiling and the
threat of default have become political bargaining chips in the debate over
fiscal policy. Despite this year's wide-ranging debate, in our view, the
differences between political parties have proven to be extraordinarily
difficult to bridge, and, as we see it, the resulting agreement fell well short
of the comprehensive fiscal consolidation program that some proponents had
envisaged until quite recently. Republicans and Democrats have only been able
to agree to relatively modest savings on discretionary spending while
delegating to the Select Committee decisions on more comprehensive measures. It
appears that for now, new revenues have dropped down on the menu of policy
options. In addition, the plan envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare
and little change in other entitlements,
the containment of which
we and most other independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal
sustainability.
Our opinion is that
elected officials remain wary of tackling the structural issues required to
effectively address the rising U.S. public debt burden in a manner consistent
with a 'AAA' rating and with 'AAA' rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and
Assumptions," June 30, 2011,
especially Paragraphs 36-41). In our view, the difficulty in framing a
consensus on fiscal policy weakens the government's ability to manage public
finances and diverts attention from the debate over how to achieve more
balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era of fiscal stringency and
private-sector deleveraging (ibid). A new political consensus might (or might
not) emerge after the 2012 elections, but we believe that by then, the
government debt burden will likely be higher, the needed medium-term fiscal
adjustment potentially greater, and the inflection point on the U.S.
population's demographics and other age-related spending drivers closer at hand
(see "Global Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Likely
Cost Even More Green, Now,"
June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's
takes no position on the mix of spending and revenue measures that Congress and
the Administration might conclude is appropriate for putting the U.S.'s
finances on a sustainable footing.
The act calls for as much
as $2.4 trillion of reductions in expenditure growth over the 10 years through
2021. These cuts will be implemented in two steps: the $917 billion agreed to
initially, followed by an additional $1.5 trillion that the newly formed
Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction is supposed to
recommend by November 2011. The act contains no measures to raise taxes or
otherwise enhance revenues, though the committee could recommend them.
The act further provides
that if Congress does not enact the committee's recommendations, cuts of $1.2
trillion will be implemented over the same time period. The reductions would
mainly affect outlays for civilian discretionary spending, defense, and
Medicare. We understand that this fall-back mechanism is designed to encourage
Congress to embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure savings, as the
committee might recommend.
We note that in a letter
to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated
total budgetary savings under the act to be at least $2.1 trillion over the
next 10 years relative to its baseline assumptions. In updating our own fiscal
projections, with certain modifications outlined below, we have relied on the
CBO's latest "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" of June 2011, updated to
include the CBO assumptions contained in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In
general, the CBO's "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" assumes a continuation
of recent Congressional action overriding existing law.
We view the act's
measures as a step toward fiscal consolidation. However, this is within the
framework of a legislative mechanism that leaves open the details of what is
finally agreed to until the end of 2011, and Congress and the Administration
could modify any agreement in the future. Even assuming that at least $2.1
trillion of the spending reductions the act envisages are implemented, we
maintain our view that the U.S. net general government debt burden (all levels
of government combined, excluding liquid financial assets) will likely continue
to grow. Under our revised base case fiscal scenario--which we consider to be
consistent with a 'AA+' long-term rating and a negative outlook--we now project
that net general government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the
end of 2011 to 79% in 2015 and 85% by 2021. Even the projected 2015 ratio of
sovereign indebtedness is high in relation to those of peer credits and, as
noted, would continue to rise under the act's revised policy settings.
Compared with previous
projections, our revised base case scenario now assumes that the 2001 and 2003
tax cuts, due to expire by the end of 2012, remain in place. We have changed
our assumption on this because the majority of Republicans in Congress continue
to resist any measure that would raise revenues, a position we believe Congress
reinforced by passing the act. Key macroeconomic assumptions in the base case
scenario include trend real GDP growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near
2% annually over the decade.
Our revised upside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as consistent with the
outlook on the 'AA+' long-term rating being revised to stable--retains these
same macroeconomic assumptions. In addition, it incorporates $950 billion of
new revenues on the assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners
lapse from 2013 onwards, as the Administration is advocating. In this scenario,
we project that the net general government debt would rise from an estimated
74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as being consistent with a
possible further downgrade to a 'AA' long-term rating--features less-favorable
macroeconomic assumptions, as outlined below and also assumes that the second
round of spending cuts (at least $1.2 trillion) that the act calls for does not
occur. This scenario also assumes somewhat higher nominal interest rates for
U.S. Treasuries. We still believe that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key
reserve currency confers a government funding advantage, one that could change
only slowly over time, and that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose
monetary policy at a time of fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible
that interest rates could rise if investors re-price relative risks. As a
result, our alternate scenario factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in
10-year bond yields relative to the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In
this scenario, we project the net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP
in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to 101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios
also take into account the significant negative revisions to historical GDP
data that the Bureau of Economic Analysis announced on July 29. From our
perspective, the effect of these revisions underscores two related points when
evaluating the likely debt trajectory of the U.S. government. First, the revisions
show that the recent recession was deeper than previously assumed, so the GDP
this year is lower than previously thought in both nominal and real terms.
Consequently, the debt burden is slightly higher. Second, the revised data
highlight the sub-par path of the current economic recovery when compared with
rebounds following previous post-war recessions. We believe the sluggish pace
of the current economic recovery could be consistent with the experiences of
countries that have had financial crises in which the slow process of debt
deleveraging in the private sector leads to a persistent drag on demand. As a
result, our downside case scenario assumes relatively modest real trend GDP
growth of 2.5% and inflation of near 1.5% annually going forward.
When comparing the U.S.
to sovereigns with 'AAA' long-term ratings that we view as relevant
peers--Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K.--we also observe, based on our
base case scenarios for each, that the trajectory of the U.S.'s net public debt
is diverging from the others. Including the U.S., we estimate that these five
sovereigns will have net general government debt to GDP ratios this year
ranging from 34% (Canada) to 80% (the U.K.), with the U.S. debt burden at 74%.
By 2015, we project that their net public debt to GDP ratios will range between
30% (lowest, Canada) and 83% (highest, France), with the U.S. debt burden at
79%. However, in contrast with the U.S., we project that the net public debt
burdens of these other sovereigns will begin to decline, either before or by
2015.
Standard & Poor's
transfer T&C assessment of the U.S. remains 'AAA'. Our T&C assessment
reflects our view of the likelihood of the sovereign restricting other public
and private issuers' access to foreign exchange needed to meet debt service.
Although in our view the credit standing of the U.S. government has
deteriorated modestly, we see little indication that official interference of
this kind is entering onto the policy agenda of either Congress or the
Administration. Consequently, we continue to view this risk as being highly
remote.
The outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. As our downside alternate fiscal scenario
illustrates, a higher public debt trajectory than we currently assume could
lead us to lower the long-term rating again. On the other hand, as our upside
scenario highlights, if the recommendations of the Congressional Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction--independently or coupled with other
initiatives, such as the lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high
earners--lead to fiscal consolidation measures beyond the minimum mandated, and
we believe they are likely to slow the deterioration of the government's debt
dynamics, the long-term rating could stabilize at 'AA+'.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.63.65 |
|
UK Pound |
1 |
Rs.101.16 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.85.55 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Report Prepared
by : |
NLM |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest
capability for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit
transaction. It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest
and principal sums |
Large |
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General
unfavourable factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for
payment of interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall
operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with
full security |
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
---- |
NB |
New Business |
---- |
This score serves as a reference to assess SC’s credit
risk and to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is calculated from a composite
of weighted scores obtained from each of the major sections of this report. The
assessed factors and their relative weights (as indicated through %) are as
follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market
trend (10%) Operational
size (10%)