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Report Date : |
26.10.2013 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
|
Name : |
ELEMENTIS SPECIALTIES, INC. |
|
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Formerly Known As : |
DANIEL PRODUCTS, INC. |
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Registered Office : |
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Country : |
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Year of Establishment : |
1957 |
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Legal Form : |
Corporation – Profit |
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Line of Business : |
Develops, manufactures, transports, and markets functional additives. It offers a range of specialty additives, including organic
thixotropes, rheological additives, organoclays, dispersants, defoamers,
wetting agents, surface tension modifiers, and various specialty products for
latex, solvent borne, and pressure sensitive applications; and specialty
rheology modifiers and surfactants for sealers, mastics, roofing and
waterproofing products, and patches. |
|
|
|
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No. of Employees : |
600+ |
RATING & COMMENTS
|
MIRA’s Rating : |
B |
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RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
Status : |
Moderate |
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Payment Behaviour : |
Slow |
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Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES:
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail: infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – March 31st, 2013
|
Country Name |
Previous Rating (31.12.2012) |
Current Rating (31.03.2013) |
|
|
A1 |
A1 |
|
Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
|
Insignificant |
A1 |
|
Low |
A2 |
|
Moderate |
B1 |
|
High |
B2 |
|
Very High |
C1 |
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Restricted |
C2 |
|
Off-credit |
D |
UNITED STATES - ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
The
Source
: CIA
Company name: ELEMENTIS SPECIALTIES, INC.
Address: 469 Old Trenton Road, East Windsor,
NJ 08512 - USA
Telephone: +1
609-443-2000
Fax: +1 609-443-2422
Website: www.elementis-specialties.com
Corporate ID#: 2834088
State:
Judicial form: Corporation – Profit
Date incorporated: 12-16-1997
Date founded: 1957
Stock: -
Value: -
Name of manager: Gregory
C. McCLATCHY
Business:
Elementis Specialties, Inc. develops, manufactures, transports, and
markets functional additives.
It offers a range of specialty additives, including organic thixotropes,
rheological additives, organoclays, dispersants, defoamers, wetting agents,
surface tension modifiers, and various specialty products for latex, solvent
borne, and pressure sensitive applications; and specialty rheology modifiers
and surfactants for sealers, mastics, roofing and waterproofing products, and
patches.
The company also provides a range of thickeners, specialty clays, dry
defoamers, and color dispersions to control flow, cure, application, and
stability; natural, bio-functional, and active ingredients for hair care, skin
care, and anti-aging formulations; lanolin and lanolin derivatives; and oils
for hair and skin care.
In addition, it offers products for decorative and industrial paints and
coatings; additives for the lubricant market; organoclays for greases that are
used in automotive, aerospace, steel mill, food grade, and general industrial
applications; and organoclay and polymer based additives that are used to
thicken and suspend solids in drilling formulations, and to stabilize
stimulation packages. Further, the company provides BENATHIX rheological
additives for unsaturated polyester resins for marine and tub, showers, and spa
markets; NANOX 200 UV blockers for polyolefin films and parts; and a range of
BENTONE hectorite clays for paint flocculation.
Furthermore, it offers organoclays, rheology modifiers, and suspension
agents that are used in bodies, glazes, slips, rams, and mastics worldwide.
The company’s products are distributed in the
Elementis Specialties, Inc. was formerly known as Daniel Products, Inc.
The company was founded in 1957 and is based in
Elementis Specialties, Inc. operates as a subsidiary of Elementis plc.
Suppliers include:
ELEMENTIS SPECIALTIES CHANGXING
SIAN TOWNCHANGXING
EIN: 51-0259017
Staff: 600+
Operations & branches:
At the headquarters, we
find a factory, warehouse and office.
The Company maintains
manufacturing facilities located:
Charleston
Tel: +1 304 342 8103
Fax: +1 304 342 7308
31763
Mountain View Rd.
Tel: +1 760 257 3301
Fax: +1 760 257 3181
Tel: +1 201 432 0800
Fax: +1 201 432 0266
5548
Manchester Ave.
St. Louis, MO 63110
Tel: +1 314 644 9840
Fax: +1 314 644 9896
Shareholders:
ELEMENTIS PLC
The Company is listed with the London Stock Exchange under symbol ELM.
Management:
Gregory McClatchy is the President and Director.
He has been President of Elementis Specialty Products and Elementis
Surfactants of Elementis Plc. since January 26, 2007. Mr. McClatchy served as a
Managing Director of Elementis Chromium of Elementis Plc. since February 2005.
He served as Managing Director of Specialty Rubber of Elementis Plc since July
2002. He has 20 years of industry experience. Mr. McClatchy also served as
Managing Director of Linatex, a subsidiary of Elementis PLC
since July 2002. Mr. McClatchy joined Elementis Pigments in 1999 and
served as Managing Director at Elementis Pigments Durham. He was previously
with Sensient Technologies Corp. (formerly Universal Foods’ Dairy and Food
Ingredients business) and ICI’s Polymers Additives business.
David DUTRO is Director group CEO.
He has been Group Chief Executive of Elementis plc since January 16,
2007.
Mr. Dutro has been Chief Operating Officer and President of Elementis
plc, since March 28, 2006. He has been Group Chief Executive Officer of
Elementis Specialties, Inc., a subsidiary of Elementis plc since January 17,
2007. Mr. Dutro serves as President of Elementis Pigments Inc., a subsidiary of
Elementis plc. Mr. Dutro has been Managing Director of Elementis Pigments, a
subsidiary of Elementis plc since November 1998. He has been President and
Chief Operating Officer of Elementis Worldwide, since October 2005.
He served as a Vice President and General Manager of Universal Foods’
Dairy and Food Ingredients business (now Sensient Technologies Corp), prior to
which he served at ICI in the colours, polymer additives and surfactants
businesses. He has been Director of Elementis plc since January 2007.
Mr. Dutro educated in the US and holds a Bachelor of Science degree in
Marketing.
Joseph BUDD is Vice President and Treasurer.
Walker ALLEN is Vice President and Secretary.
Subsidiaries and
partnership:
HI-MAR SPECIALTY CHELICALS, LLC
Milwaukee, WI 53208
In United States, privately
held corporations are not required to publish any financials.
On a direct call, a
financial assistant controlled the present report but deferred any financials.
We sent a fax but no answer
received.
However, sales estimate for
year 2012 is in the range of USD 95,000,000=
The business is profitable.
Banks: JPMorgan Chase Bank
Legal filings
& complaints:
As of today date, there is no legal filing pending with the Courts.
Secured debts summary (UCC):
Several
Standard & Poor’s
|
United
States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'AA+' Due To Political Risks,
Rising Debt Burden; Outlook Negative |
|
Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
·
We have also removed both the short- and long-term ratings
from CreditWatch negative.
·
The downgrade reflects our opinion that the fiscal consolidation
plan that Congress and the Administration recently agreed to falls short of
what, in our view, would be necessary to stabilize the government's medium-term
debt dynamics.
·
More broadly, the downgrade reflects our view that the
effectiveness, stability, and predictability of American policymaking and
political institutions have weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic
challenges to a degree more than we envisioned when we assigned a negative
outlook to the rating on April 18, 2011.
·
Since then, we have changed our view of the difficulties in
bridging the gulf between the political parties over fiscal policy, which makes
us pessimistic about the capacity of Congress and the Administration to be able
to leverage their agreement this week into a broader fiscal consolidation plan
that stabilizes the government's debt dynamics any time soon.
·
The outlook on the long-term rating is negative. We could
lower the long-term rating to 'AA' within the next two years if we see that
less reduction in spending than agreed to, higher interest rates, or new fiscal
pressures during the period result in a higher general government debt
trajectory than we currently assume in our base case.
TORONTO (Standard &
Poor's) Aug. 5, 2011--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that it
lowered its long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of America
to 'AA+' from 'AAA'. Standard & Poor's also said that the outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. At the same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed
its 'A-1+' short-term rating on the U.S. In addition, Standard & Poor's
removed both ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed on July 14, 2011,
with negative implications.
The
transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment of the U.S.--our assessment of
the likelihood of official interference in the ability of U.S.-based public-
and private-sector issuers to secure foreign exchange for
debt service--remains
'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term
rating on the U.S. because we believe that the prolonged controversy over
raising the statutory debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate
indicate that further near-term progress containing the growth in public
spending, especially on entitlements, or on reaching an agreement on raising
revenues is less likely than we previously assumed and will remain a
contentious and fitful process. We also believe that the fiscal consolidation
plan that Congress and the Administration agreed to this week falls short of
the amount that we believe is necessary to stabilize the general government
debt burden by the middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the
rating was prompted by our view on the rising public debt burden and our
perception of greater policymaking uncertainty, consistent with our criteria
(see "Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and
Assumptions ," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41).
Nevertheless, we view the U.S. federal government's other economic, external,
and monetary credit attributes, which form the basis for the sovereign rating,
as broadly unchanged.
We have taken the ratings
off CreditWatch because the Aug. 2 passage of the Budget Control Act Amendment
of 2011 has removed any perceived immediate threat of payment default posed by
delays to raising the government's debt ceiling. In addition, we believe that
the act provides sufficient clarity to allow us to evaluate the likely course
of U.S. fiscal policy for the next few years.
The
political brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as America's
governance and policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and less
predictable than what we previously believed. The statutory debt ceiling and
the threat of default have become political bargaining chips in the debate over
fiscal policy. Despite this year's wide-ranging debate, in our view, the
differences between political parties have proven to be extraordinarily
difficult to bridge, and, as we see it, the resulting agreement fell well short
of the comprehensive fiscal consolidation program that some proponents had
envisaged until quite recently. Republicans and Democrats have only been able
to agree to relatively modest savings on discretionary spending while
delegating to the Select Committee decisions on more comprehensive measures. It
appears that for now, new revenues have dropped down on the menu of policy
options. In addition, the plan envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare
and little change in other entitlements,
the containment of which
we and most other independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal
sustainability.
Our opinion is that
elected officials remain wary of tackling the structural issues required to
effectively address the rising U.S. public debt burden in a manner consistent
with a 'AAA' rating and with 'AAA' rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and
Assumptions," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41). In
our view, the difficulty in framing a consensus on fiscal policy weakens the
government's ability to manage public finances and diverts attention from the
debate over how to achieve more balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era
of fiscal stringency and private-sector deleveraging (ibid). A new political
consensus might (or might not) emerge after the 2012 elections, but we believe
that by then, the government debt burden will likely be higher, the needed
medium-term fiscal adjustment potentially greater, and the inflection point on
the U.S. population's demographics and other age-related spending drivers
closer at hand (see "Global Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Likely
Cost Even More Green, Now," June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's
takes no position on the mix of spending and revenue measures that Congress and
the Administration might conclude is appropriate for putting the U.S.'s
finances on a sustainable footing.
The act calls for as much
as $2.4 trillion of reductions in expenditure growth over the 10 years through
2021. These cuts will be implemented in two steps: the $917 billion agreed to initially,
followed by an additional $1.5 trillion that the newly formed Congressional
Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction is supposed to recommend by
November 2011. The act contains no measures to raise taxes or otherwise enhance
revenues, though the committee could recommend them.
The act further provides
that if Congress does not enact the committee's recommendations, cuts of $1.2
trillion will be implemented over the same time period. The reductions would
mainly affect outlays for civilian discretionary spending, defense, and
Medicare. We understand that this fall-back mechanism is designed to encourage
Congress to embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure savings, as the
committee might recommend.
We note that in a letter
to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated
total budgetary savings under the act to be at least $2.1 trillion over the
next 10 years relative to its baseline assumptions. In updating our own fiscal
projections, with certain modifications outlined below, we have relied on the
CBO's latest "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" of June 2011, updated to
include the CBO assumptions contained in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In
general, the CBO's "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" assumes a continuation
of recent Congressional action overriding existing law.
We view the act's
measures as a step toward fiscal consolidation. However, this is within the
framework of a legislative mechanism that leaves open the details of what is
finally agreed to until the end of 2011, and Congress and the Administration
could modify any agreement in the future. Even assuming that at least $2.1
trillion of the spending reductions the act envisages are implemented, we
maintain our view that the U.S. net general government debt burden (all levels
of government combined, excluding liquid financial assets) will likely continue
to grow. Under our revised base case fiscal scenario--which we consider to be
consistent with a 'AA+' long-term rating and a negative outlook--we now project
that net general government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the
end of 2011 to 79% in 2015 and 85% by 2021. Even the projected 2015 ratio of
sovereign indebtedness is high in relation to those of peer credits and, as
noted, would continue to rise under the act's revised policy settings.
Compared with previous
projections, our revised base case scenario now assumes that the 2001 and 2003
tax cuts, due to expire by the end of 2012, remain in place. We have changed
our assumption on this because the majority of Republicans in Congress continue
to resist any measure that would raise revenues, a position we believe Congress
reinforced by passing the act. Key macroeconomic assumptions in the base case
scenario include trend real GDP growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near
2% annually over the decade.
Our revised upside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as consistent with the
outlook on the 'AA+' long-term rating being revised to stable--retains these
same macroeconomic assumptions. In addition, it incorporates $950 billion of
new revenues on the assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners
lapse from 2013 onwards, as the Administration is advocating. In this scenario,
we project that the net general government debt would rise from an estimated
74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as being consistent with a
possible further downgrade to a 'AA' long-term rating--features less-favorable
macroeconomic assumptions, as outlined below and also assumes that the second
round of spending cuts (at least $1.2 trillion) that the act calls for does not
occur. This scenario also assumes somewhat higher nominal interest rates for
U.S. Treasuries. We still believe that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key
reserve currency confers a government funding advantage, one that could change
only slowly over time, and that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose
monetary policy at a time of fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible
that interest rates could rise if investors re-price relative risks. As a
result, our alternate scenario factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in
10-year bond yields relative to the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In
this scenario, we project the net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP
in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to 101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios
also take into account the significant negative revisions to historical GDP
data that the Bureau of Economic Analysis announced on July 29. From our
perspective, the effect of these revisions underscores two related points when
evaluating the likely debt trajectory of the U.S. government. First, the
revisions show that the recent recession was deeper than previously assumed, so
the GDP this year is lower than previously thought in both nominal and real
terms. Consequently, the debt burden is slightly higher. Second, the revised
data highlight the sub-par path of the current economic recovery when compared
with rebounds following previous post-war recessions. We believe the sluggish
pace of the current economic recovery could be consistent with the experiences
of countries that have had financial crises in which the slow process of debt
deleveraging in the private sector leads to a persistent drag on demand. As a
result, our downside case scenario assumes relatively modest real trend GDP
growth of 2.5% and inflation of near 1.5% annually going forward.
When comparing the U.S.
to sovereigns with 'AAA' long-term ratings that we view as relevant
peers--Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K.--we also observe, based on our
base case scenarios for each, that the trajectory of the U.S.'s net public debt
is diverging from the others. Including the U.S., we estimate that these five
sovereigns will have net general government debt to GDP ratios this year
ranging from 34% (Canada) to 80% (the U.K.), with the U.S. debt burden at 74%.
By 2015, we project that their net public debt to GDP ratios will range between
30% (lowest, Canada) and 83% (highest, France), with the U.S. debt burden at
79%. However, in contrast with the U.S., we project that the net public debt
burdens of these other sovereigns will begin to decline, either before or by
2015.
Standard & Poor's
transfer T&C assessment of the U.S. remains 'AAA'. Our T&C assessment
reflects our view of the likelihood of the sovereign restricting other public
and private issuers' access to foreign exchange needed to meet debt service.
Although in our view the credit standing of the U.S. government has
deteriorated modestly, we see little indication that official interference of
this kind is entering onto the policy agenda of either Congress or the
Administration. Consequently, we continue to view this risk as being highly
remote.
The outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. As our downside alternate fiscal scenario
illustrates, a higher public debt trajectory than we currently assume could
lead us to lower the long-term rating again. On the other hand, as our upside
scenario highlights, if the recommendations of the Congressional Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction--independently or coupled with other
initiatives, such as the lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high
earners--lead to fiscal consolidation measures beyond the minimum mandated, and
we believe they are likely to slow the deterioration of the government's debt
dynamics, the long-term rating could stabilize at 'AA+'.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.61.63 |
|
|
1 |
Rs.99.94 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.84.14 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Report
Prepared by : |
NIT |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest
capability for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit transaction.
It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest and
principal sums |
Large |
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General
unfavourable factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for
payment of interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively below
average. |
Small |
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with
full security |
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
-- |
NB |
New Business |
-- |
This score serves as a reference to assess
SC’s credit risk and to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is
calculated from a composite of weighted scores obtained from each of the major
sections of this report. The assessed factors and their relative weights (as
indicated through %) are as follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend (10%) Operational size
(10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL)
or its officials.