|
Report Date : |
30.10.2013 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
|
Name : |
ELOQUENCE CORPORATION |
|
|
|
|
Registered Office : |
|
|
|
|
|
Country : |
|
|
|
|
|
Date of Incorporation : |
28.09.1973 |
|
|
|
|
Legal Form : |
Corporation – Profit |
|
|
|
|
Line of Business : |
Import, wholesale, retail of jewelry, watches and precious stones. |
|
|
|
|
No. of Employees : |
45 |
RATING & COMMENTS
|
MIRA’s Rating : |
B |
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
Status : |
Moderate |
|
|
|
|
Payment Behaviour : |
Slow |
|
|
|
|
Litigation : |
Exist |
NOTES :
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail: infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – March 31st, 2013
|
Country Name |
Previous Rating (31.12.2012) |
Current Rating (31.03.2013) |
|
|
A1 |
A1 |
|
Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
|
Insignificant |
A1 |
|
Low |
A2 |
|
Moderate |
B1 |
|
High |
B2 |
|
Very High |
C1 |
|
Restricted |
C2 |
|
Off-credit |
D |
UNITED STATES - ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
The
Source
: CIA
MWI ELOQUENCE
This is a business name (not registered) used by:
Company name: ELOQUENCE CORPORATION
Address:
Telephone: +1
212-869-5160
Fax: -
Website: www.mwny.com
Corporate ID#: 235261
State:
Judicial form: Corporation – Profit
Date incorporated: 09-28-1973
Stock: 35,000
shares common
Value: USD
0.01= par value
Name of manager: Alan
F. KLEINBERG
Business:
Import, wholesale, retail of jewelry, watches and precious stones.
The Company is also doing business as ADAMAS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION
and
MWI ELOQUENCE.
EIN: 13-2759956
Staff: 45
Operations & branches:
At above address, we find the corporate office, on lease.
Shareholders:
This is a private Company.
Management:
Alan F. KLEINBERG, President, Director and CEO
As far as we know, he is also involved in
CRYSTAL ABRASIVES CORPORATION
GEM MINE CORP
In
On a direct call, nobody was
available to answer our questions.
We sent a mail but no
answer received.
However, sales estimate for
year 2012 is in the range of USD 7,000,000=
The business is said to be
profitable.
Banks: ABN Amro Bank
Legal filings
& complaints:
State:
Case number: 10-04131-rdd
Plaintiff: Ian Gazes
Defendant: Eloquence Corporation
Case type: appellate Related
bankruptcy: 09-10497-rdd
Judge: Robert D. Drain
Date filed: 10/29/2010
Date of last
filing:
08/08/2013
State:
09-10497-rdd
Bankrupt: Fortunoff Holdings, LLC
Case type: bk Chapter: 7 Asset: Yes Vol: v
Judge: Robert D. Drain
Date filed: 02/05/2009
Date of last filing: 10/09/2013
Secured debts
summary (UCC):
|
|
|
|
Trade references:
Date reported: October 2013
High credit: USD 1,100
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: September 2013
Line of business: Office supply
Paying status: On terms
Date reported: October 2013
High credit: USD 60,000+
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: September 2013
Line of business: Payroll
Paying status: As agreed
Date reported: October 2013
High credit: USD 280
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: September 2013
Line of business: Telecommunications
Paying status: On terms
Domestic credit history:
Domestic credit history
appears as follow:
|
Monthly Payment Trends - Recent Activity |
|
National Credit Bureaus
gave a satisfying credit rating.
International
credit history:
Payments of imports are currently made on terms.
Other comments:
The Company maintains a
regular business.
The Company is in good
standing.
This means that all local
and federal taxes were paid on due date.
The risk is low.
Our opinion:
A business connection may
be conducted.
Standard & Poor’s
|
|
|
Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
·
We have lowered our long-term
sovereign credit rating on the United States of America to 'AA+' from 'AAA' and
affirmed the 'A-1+' short-term rating.
·
We have also removed both the short- and long-term ratings
from CreditWatch negative.
·
The downgrade reflects our
opinion that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration
recently agreed to falls short of what, in our view, would be necessary to
stabilize the government's medium-term debt dynamics.
·
More broadly, the downgrade
reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of
American policymaking and political institutions have weakened at a time of
ongoing fiscal and economic challenges to a degree more than we envisioned when
we assigned a negative outlook to the rating on April 18, 2011.
·
Since then, we have changed our
view of the difficulties in bridging the gulf between the political parties
over fiscal policy, which makes us pessimistic about the capacity of Congress
and the Administration to be able to leverage their agreement this week into a
broader fiscal consolidation plan that stabilizes the government's debt
dynamics any time soon.
·
The outlook on the long-term
rating is negative. We could lower the long-term rating to 'AA' within the next
two years if we see that less reduction in spending than agreed to, higher
interest rates, or new fiscal pressures during the period result in a higher
general government debt trajectory than we currently assume in our base case.
The transfer and
convertibility (T&C) assessment of the
debt service--remains
'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term
rating on the U.S. because we believe that the prolonged controversy over
raising the statutory debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate
indicate that further near-term progress containing the growth in public
spending, especially on entitlements, or on reaching an agreement on raising
revenues is less likely than we previously assumed and will remain a
contentious and fitful process. We also believe that the fiscal consolidation
plan that Congress and the Administration agreed to this week falls short of
the amount that we believe is necessary to stabilize the general government
debt burden by the middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the
rating was prompted by our view on the rising public debt burden and our
perception of greater policymaking uncertainty, consistent with our criteria
(see "Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and
Assumptions ," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41).
Nevertheless, we view the
We have taken the ratings
off CreditWatch because the Aug. 2 passage of the Budget Control Act Amendment
of 2011 has removed any perceived immediate threat of payment default posed by
delays to raising the government's debt ceiling. In addition, we believe that
the act provides sufficient clarity to allow us to evaluate the likely course
of
The political
brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as
the containment of which
we and most other independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal
sustainability.
Our opinion is that
elected officials remain wary of tackling the structural issues required to
effectively address the rising U.S. public debt burden in a manner consistent
with a 'AAA' rating and with 'AAA' rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and
Assumptions," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41). In
our view, the difficulty in framing a consensus on fiscal policy weakens the
government's ability to manage public finances and diverts attention from the
debate over how to achieve more balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era
of fiscal stringency and private-sector deleveraging (ibid). A new political
consensus might (or might not) emerge after the 2012 elections, but we believe
that by then, the government debt burden will likely be higher, the needed
medium-term fiscal adjustment potentially greater, and the inflection point on
the U.S. population's demographics and other age-related spending drivers
closer at hand (see "Global Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Likely
Cost Even More Green, Now," June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's
takes no position on the mix of spending and revenue measures that Congress and
the Administration might conclude is appropriate for putting the
The act calls for as much
as $2.4 trillion of reductions in expenditure growth over the 10 years through
2021. These cuts will be implemented in two steps: the $917 billion agreed to
initially, followed by an additional $1.5 trillion that the newly formed
Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction is supposed to
recommend by November 2011. The act contains no measures to raise taxes or
otherwise enhance revenues, though the committee could recommend them.
The act further provides
that if Congress does not enact the committee's recommendations, cuts of $1.2
trillion will be implemented over the same time period. The reductions would
mainly affect outlays for civilian discretionary spending, defense, and
Medicare. We understand that this fall-back mechanism is designed to encourage
Congress to embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure savings, as the
committee might recommend.
We note that in a letter
to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated
total budgetary savings under the act to be at least $2.1 trillion over the
next 10 years relative to its baseline assumptions. In updating our own fiscal
projections, with certain modifications outlined below, we have relied on the
CBO's latest "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" of June 2011, updated to
include the CBO assumptions contained in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In
general, the CBO's "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" assumes a continuation
of recent Congressional action overriding existing law.
We view the act's
measures as a step toward fiscal consolidation. However, this is within the
framework of a legislative mechanism that leaves open the details of what is
finally agreed to until the end of 2011, and Congress and the Administration
could modify any agreement in the future. Even assuming that at least $2.1
trillion of the spending reductions the act envisages are implemented, we
maintain our view that the
Compared with previous
projections, our revised base case scenario now assumes that the 2001 and 2003
tax cuts, due to expire by the end of 2012, remain in place. We have changed
our assumption on this because the majority of Republicans in Congress continue
to resist any measure that would raise revenues, a position we believe Congress
reinforced by passing the act. Key macroeconomic assumptions in the base case
scenario include trend real GDP growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near
2% annually over the decade.
Our revised upside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as consistent with the
outlook on the 'AA+' long-term rating being revised to stable--retains these
same macroeconomic assumptions. In addition, it incorporates $950 billion of
new revenues on the assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners
lapse from 2013 onwards, as the Administration is advocating. In this scenario,
we project that the net general government debt would rise from an estimated
74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as being consistent with a
possible further downgrade to a 'AA' long-term rating--features less-favorable
macroeconomic assumptions, as outlined below and also assumes that the second
round of spending cuts (at least $1.2 trillion) that the act calls for does not
occur. This scenario also assumes somewhat higher nominal interest rates for
U.S. Treasuries. We still believe that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key
reserve currency confers a government funding advantage, one that could change
only slowly over time, and that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose
monetary policy at a time of fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible
that interest rates could rise if investors re-price relative risks. As a
result, our alternate scenario factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in
10-year bond yields relative to the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In
this scenario, we project the net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP
in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to 101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios
also take into account the significant negative revisions to historical GDP
data that the Bureau of Economic Analysis announced on July 29. From our
perspective, the effect of these revisions underscores two related points when
evaluating the likely debt trajectory of the
When comparing the U.S.
to sovereigns with 'AAA' long-term ratings that we view as relevant
peers--Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K.--we also observe, based on our
base case scenarios for each, that the trajectory of the U.S.'s net public debt
is diverging from the others. Including the
Standard & Poor's
transfer T&C assessment of the
The outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. As our downside alternate fiscal scenario
illustrates, a higher public debt trajectory than we currently assume could
lead us to lower the long-term rating again. On the other hand, as our upside
scenario highlights, if the recommendations of the Congressional Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction--independently or coupled with other
initiatives, such as the lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high
earners--lead to fiscal consolidation measures beyond the minimum mandated, and
we believe they are likely to slow the deterioration of the government's debt
dynamics, the long-term rating could stabilize at 'AA+'.
DIAMOND INDUSTRY –
-
From time
immemorial,
-
The achievement
of the Indian diamond industry was possible only due to combination of the
manufacturing skills of the Indian workforce and the untiring and unflagging
efforts of the Indian diamantaires, supported by progressive Government
policies.
-
The area of
study of family owned diamond businesses derives its importance from the huge
conglomerate of family run organizations which operate in the diamond industry
since many generations.
-
Some of the
basic traits of family run business enterprises include spirit of
entrepreneurship, mutual trust lowers transaction costs, small, nimble and
quick to react, information as a source of advantage and philanthropy.
-
Family owned
diamond businesses need to improve on many fronts including higher standard of
corporate governance, long-term performance – focused strategies, modern
management and technology.
-
Utmost caution
is to be exercised while dealing with some medium and large diamond traders
which are usually engaged in fictitious import – export, inter-company
transactions, financially assisted by banks. In the process, several public
sector banks lost several hundred million rupees. They mostly diverted borrowed
money for diamond business into real estate and capital markets.
-
Excerpts from
Times of India dated 30th October 2010 is as under –
-
Gem &
Jewellery Export Promotion Council in its statistical data has shown the export
of polished diamonds to have increase by 28 % in February 2013. Compared to $
1.4 bn worth of polished diamond export in February, 2012,
-
The banking
sector has started exercising restraint while following prudent risk management
norms when lending money to gems and jewellery sector. This follows the
implementation of Basel III accord – a global voluntary regulatory standard on
bank capital adequacy, stress testing and market liquidity.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.61.46 |
|
|
1 |
Rs.98.99 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.84.72 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Report
Prepared by : |
NIT |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest
capability for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit transaction.
It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest and
principal sums |
Large |
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General unfavourable
factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for payment of
interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with full
security |
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
-- |
NB |
New Business |
-- |
This score serves as a reference to assess SC’s credit risk and
to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is calculated from a composite
of weighted scores obtained from each of the major sections of this report. The
assessed factors and their relative weights (as indicated through %) are as
follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend
(10%) Operational
size (10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL)
or its officials.