|
Report Date : |
02.04.2014 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
|
Name : |
STERLING JEWELERS, INC. |
|
|
|
|
Registered Office : |
375 Ghent Road, Fairlawn, OH 44333 |
|
|
|
|
Country : |
United States |
|
|
|
|
Date of Incorporation : |
01.03.1955 |
|
|
|
|
Legal Form : |
Corporation - Profit |
|
|
|
|
Line of Business : |
Specialty in retail of jewelers in Ohio |
|
|
|
|
No of Employees : |
18,179 (for the group) |
RATING & COMMENTS
|
MIRA’s Rating : |
Ba |
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
Status : |
Satisfactory |
|
|
|
|
Payment Behaviour : |
Slow But Correct |
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|
|
|
Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES :
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail : infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – december 01, 2013
|
Country Name |
Previous Rating (30.09.2013) |
Current Rating (01.12.2013) |
|
United States |
A1 |
A1 |
|
Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
|
Insignificant |
A1 |
|
Low |
A2 |
|
Moderate |
B1 |
|
High |
B2 |
|
Very High |
C1 |
|
Restricted |
C2 |
|
Off-credit |
D |
UNITED STATES - ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
The US has the largest and most technologically powerful economy in the world, with a per capita GDP of $49,800. In this market-oriented economy, private individuals and business firms make most of the decisions, and the federal and state governments buy needed goods and services predominantly in the private marketplace. US business firms enjoy greater flexibility than their counterparts in Western Europe and Japan in decisions to expand capital plant, to lay off surplus workers, and to develop new products. At the same time, they face higher barriers to enter their rivals' home markets than foreign firms face entering US markets. US firms are at or near the forefront in technological advances, especially in computers and in medical, aerospace, and military equipment; their advantage has narrowed since the end of World War II. The onrush of technology largely explains the gradual development of a "two-tier labor market" in which those at the bottom lack the education and the professional/technical skills of those at the top and, more and more, fail to get comparable pay raises, health insurance coverage, and other benefits. Since 1975, practically all the gains in household income have gone to the top 20% of households. Since 1996, dividends and capital gains have grown faster than wages or any other category of after-tax income. Imported oil accounts for nearly 55% of US consumption. Crude oil prices doubled between 2001 and 2006, the year home prices peaked; higher gasoline prices ate into consumers' budgets and many individuals fell behind in their mortgage payments. Oil prices climbed another 50% between 2006 and 2008, and bank foreclosures more than doubled in the same period. Besides dampening the housing market, soaring oil prices caused a drop in the value of the dollar and a deterioration in the US merchandise trade deficit, which peaked at $840 billion in 2008. The sub-prime mortgage crisis, falling home prices, investment bank failures, tight credit, and the global economic downturn pushed the United States into a recession by mid-2008. GDP contracted until the third quarter of 2009, making this the deepest and longest downturn since the Great Depression. To help stabilize financial markets, in October 2008 the US Congress established a $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The government used some of these funds to purchase equity in US banks and industrial corporations, much of which had been returned to the government by early 2011. In January 2009 the US Congress passed and President Barack OBAMA signed a bill providing an additional $787 billion fiscal stimulus to be used over 10 years - two-thirds on additional spending and one-third on tax cuts - to create jobs and to help the economy recover. In 2010 and 2011, the federal budget deficit reached nearly 9% of GDP. In 2012 the federal government reduced the growth of spending and the deficit shrank to 7.6% of GDP. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan required major shifts in national resources from civilian to military purposes and contributed to the growth of the budget deficit and public debt. Through 2011, the direct costs of the wars totaled nearly $900 billion, according to US government figures. US revenues from taxes and other sources are lower, as a percentage of GDP, than those of most other countries. In March 2010, President OBAMA signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, a health insurance reform that was designed to extend coverage to an additional 32 million American citizens by 2016, through private health insurance for the general population and Medicaid for the impoverished. Total spending on health care - public plus private - rose from 9.0% of GDP in 1980 to 17.9% in 2010. In July 2010, the president signed the DODD-FRANK Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, a law designed to promote financial stability by protecting consumers from financial abuses, ending taxpayer bailouts of financial firms, dealing with troubled banks that are "too big to fail," and improving accountability and transparency in the financial system - in particular, by requiring certain financial derivatives to be traded in markets that are subject to government regulation and oversight. In December 2012, the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) announced plans to purchase $85 billion per month of mortgage-backed and Treasury securities in an effort to hold down long-term interest rates, and to keep short term rates near zero until unemployment drops below 6.5% or inflation rises above 2.5%. In late 2013, the Fed announced that it would begin scaling back long-term bond purchases to $75 billion per month in January 2014 and reduce them further as conditions warranted; the Fed, however, would keep short-term rates near zero so long as unemployment and inflation had not crossed the previously stated thresholds. Long-term problems include stagnation of wages for lower-income families, inadequate investment in deteriorating infrastructure, rapidly rising medical and pension costs of an aging population, energy shortages, and sizable current account and budget deficits.
|
Source
: CIA |
Company name: STERLING JEWELERS, INC.
Address: 375 Ghent Road, Fairlawn, OH 44333 -
USA
Telephone: +1
330-668-5000
Fax: +1
330-668-5062
Website: www.sterlingjewelers.com
245363
Ohio
Corporation - Profit
March 1, 1955
100 shares common
No par value
Mark LIGHT
Business:
Sterling Jewelers is a wholly owned subsidiary of Signet Jewelers
Limited.
Sterling Jewelers is one of the largest specialty retail jewelers in
Ohio.
As of February 1, 2014, the Company operated a network of 1,471 stores
in 50 states, including stores that trade nationally in malls and off-mall
locations under the Kay Jewelers brand, and regionally under the mall-based
brands; and destination superstores under the Jared The Galleria Of Jewelry
brand, as well as Ultra stores.
EIN: 34-0630873
Staff: 18,179 (for the group)
Operations & branches:
At the headquarters, we find
the corporate office, store and warehouse.
As of February 1, 2014, the Company operated a network of 1,471 stores.
Shareholders:
Signet Jewelers Limited
Clarendon House
2 Church Street
Hamilton, HM11
Bermuda
Phone: 441-296-5872
Signet Jewelers Limited engages in the retail sale of jewelry and
watches in the United States, the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland, and
the Channel Islands. The company operates through US and UK divisions.
As of February 2, 2013, the US division operated a network of 1,443
stores in 50 states, including stores that trade nationally in malls and
off-mall locations as ‘Kay Jewelers’, and regionally under the mall-based
brands; and destination superstores under the ‘Jared The Galleria Of Jewelry’
brand, as well as Ultra stores. The UK division operated a network of 511
stores, including 14 stores in the Republic of Ireland and 3 in the Channel
Islands under the ‘H.Samuel’, ‘Ernest Jones’, and ‘Leslie Davis’ trade names in
regional shopping malls and high street locations.
Signet Jewelers Limited was founded in 1950 and is based in Hamilton,
Bermuda.
Signet Jewelers Limited is
listed with the NYSE under symbol SIG.
Sales 2013-2014: USD
4,209,200,000= (fiscal year ending February 2nd)
Net profit:
USD 368,000,000=
Management:
Mark LIGHT is the President and CEO.
Mark S. Light has been the Chief Executive Officer of Signet Jewelers
Inc. since 2002. Mr. Light serves as the
Chief Executive Officer and President of Sterling Jewelers, Inc. He served as
Chief Operating Officer of U.S. Division at Signet Jewelers Limited since 2002.
Mr. Light joined Signet Jewelers Limited in 1978.
He serves as an Independent Director of Regis Corp.
He served as an Executive Director of Signet Jewelers Limited from
January 12, 2006 to October 2008.
Gary CIOLLI is the Controller.
Mr. Ciolli was working for Limited Brands for nearly 15 years prior to
joining Sterling Jewelers.
Edward HRABAK is Executive Vice President and COO.
Mr. Hrabak has been the Chief Operating Officer and Executive Vice
President of Sterling Jewelers, Inc. since June 30, 2012.
He served as Senior Vice President of Merchandising and General
Merchandise Manager of Sterling Jewelers, Inc.
He joined Sterling in 1987 as a Merchandise Buyer.
Sister Companies:
|
Sterling
Inc. |
United States |
|
|
Sterling
Jewelers Reinsurance Ltd |
United States |
|
|
Signet US
Holdings Inc. |
United States |
|
|
Signet
Group Treasury Services Inc. |
United
States |
|
|
Checkbury
Limited |
England |
|
|
Ernest
Jones Limited |
England |
|
|
H. Samuel
Limited |
England |
|
|
Leslie
Davis Limited |
England |
|
|
Signet
Group Limited |
England |
|
|
Signet
Group Services Limited |
England |
|
|
Signet
Holdings Limited |
England |
|
|
Signet
Trading Limited |
England |
|
|
Signet
Bermuda Finance Limited |
Bermuda |
|
|
Signet
Malta Finance Limited |
Malta |
|
|
Signet
Luxembourg Holdings Sarl |
Luxembourg |
|
|
Signet
Luxembourg Finance Sarl |
Luxembourg |
|
|
Signet
Luxembourg Sarl |
Luxembourg |
|
In United States, privately
held corporations are not required to publish any financials.
On a direct call, a financial
assistant controlled the present report and confirmed that all financials are
consolidated into the parent company.
Banks: Huntington National Bank
...
Legal filings & complaints:
There company is creditor in numerous bankruptcies
in several courts and there are several legal cases pending.
Secured debts summary (UCC): 33 UCC listed in Ohio
Trade references:
Date reported: February
2014
High credit: USD
6,000
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: January
2014
Line of business: Office
supply
Paying status: 10
days beyond terms
Date reported: February
2014
High credit: USD
2,000
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: January
2014
Line of business: Telecommunications
Paying status: 5 days
beyond terms
Domestic credit history:
Domestic credit history appears as follow:
|
Monthly Payment Trends - Recent Activity |
||||||||
|
Date |
Up
to 30 DBT |
31-60
DBT |
61-90
DBT |
>90
DBT |
||||
|
10/13 |
$1,228,800 |
75% |
12% |
4% |
1% |
8% |
||
|
11/13 |
$1,705,700 |
83% |
8% |
4% |
3% |
2% |
||
|
12/13 |
$2,367,800 |
85% |
11% |
2% |
1% |
1% |
||
|
01/14 |
$2,809,400 |
84% |
10% |
3% |
2% |
1% |
||
|
02/14 |
$2,172,200 |
84% |
7% |
5% |
2% |
2% |
||
|
03/14 |
$1,781,600 |
83% |
8% |
3% |
4% |
2% |
||
According to our credit analysts, during the last 6 months, payments
were currently made with an average of 10 to 15 days beyond terms.
International credit history:
Payments of imports are currently made with an average of 5+ days beyond
terms.
The banks and financial
institutions confirmed late payments.
The Company is in good
standing.
This means that all local
and federal taxes were paid on due date.
The risk is medium.
Our opinion:
A business connection may
be conducted but we suggest you to check regularly the way of payments.
Standard &
Poor’s
|
United States of
America Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'AA+' Due To Political Risks, Rising Debt
Burden; Outlook Negative |
|
Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
We have lowered our long-term sovereign credit rating on the United
States of America to 'AA+' from 'AAA' and affirmed the 'A-1+' short-term
rating.
We have also removed both the short- and long-term ratings from
CreditWatch negative.
The downgrade reflects our opinion that the fiscal consolidation plan
that Congress and the Administration recently agreed to falls short of what, in
our view, would be necessary to stabilize the government's medium-term debt
dynamics.
More broadly, the downgrade reflects our view that the effectiveness,
stability, and predictability of American policymaking and political
institutions have weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic challenges
to a degree more than we envisioned when we assigned a negative outlook to the
rating on April 18, 2011.
Since then, we have changed our view of the difficulties in bridging the
gulf between the political parties over fiscal policy, which makes us
pessimistic about the capacity of Congress and the Administration to be able to
leverage their agreement this week into a broader fiscal consolidation plan
that stabilizes the government's debt dynamics any time soon.
The outlook on the long-term rating is negative. We could lower the
long-term rating to 'AA' within the next two years if we see that less
reduction in spending than agreed to, higher interest rates, or new fiscal
pressures during the period result in a higher general government debt
trajectory than we currently assume in our base case.
TORONTO (Standard & Poor's)
Aug. 5, 2011--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that it lowered
its long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of America to 'AA+'
from 'AAA'. Standard & Poor's also said that the outlook on the long-term
rating is negative. At the same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed its 'A-1+'
short-term rating on the U.S. In addition, Standard & Poor's removed both
ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed on July 14, 2011, with
negative implications.
The transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment of the U.S.--our
assessment of the likelihood of official interference in the ability of
U.S.-based public- and private-sector issuers to secure foreign exchange for
debt service--remains 'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term rating on the U.S. because we believe that the
prolonged controversy over raising the statutory debt ceiling and the related
fiscal policy debate indicate that further near-term progress containing the
growth in public spending, especially on entitlements, or on reaching an
agreement on raising revenues is less likely than we previously assumed and
will remain a contentious and fitful process. We also believe that the fiscal
consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration agreed to this week
falls short of the amount that we believe is necessary to stabilize the general
government debt burden by the middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the rating was prompted by our view on the rising public
debt burden and our perception of greater policymaking uncertainty, consistent
with our criteria (see "Sovereign
Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions ," June 30, 2011,
especially Paragraphs 36-41). Nevertheless, we view the U.S. federal
government's other economic, external, and monetary credit attributes, which
form the basis for the sovereign rating, as broadly unchanged.
We have taken the ratings off CreditWatch because the Aug. 2 passage of
the Budget Control Act Amendment of 2011 has removed any perceived immediate
threat of payment default posed by delays to raising the government's debt
ceiling. In addition, we believe that the act provides sufficient clarity to
allow us to evaluate the likely course of U.S. fiscal policy for the next few
years.
The political brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as
America's governance and policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and
less predictable than what we previously believed. The statutory debt ceiling
and the threat of default have become political bargaining chips in the debate
over fiscal policy. Despite this year's wide-ranging debate, in our view, the
differences between political parties have proven to be extraordinarily
difficult to bridge, and, as we see it, the resulting agreement fell well short
of the comprehensive fiscal consolidation program that some proponents had
envisaged until quite recently. Republicans and Democrats have only been able
to agree to relatively modest savings on discretionary spending while
delegating to the Select Committee decisions on more comprehensive measures. It
appears that for now, new revenues have dropped down on the menu of policy
options. In addition, the plan envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare
and little change in other entitlements, the containment of which we and most
other independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal sustainability.
Our opinion is that elected officials remain wary of tackling the
structural issues required to effectively address the rising U.S. public debt
burden in a manner consistent with a 'AAA' rating and with 'AAA' rated
sovereign peers (see Sovereign
Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions," June 30, 2011,
especially Paragraphs 36-41). In our view, the difficulty in framing a
consensus on fiscal policy weakens the government's ability to manage public
finances and diverts attention from the debate over how to achieve more
balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era of fiscal stringency and
private-sector deleveraging (ibid). A new political consensus might (or might
not) emerge after the 2012 elections, but we believe that by then, the
government debt burden will likely be higher, the needed medium-term fiscal
adjustment potentially greater, and the inflection point on the U.S.
population's demographics and other age-related spending drivers closer at hand
(see "Global
Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Likely Cost Even More Green, Now,"
June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's takes no position on the mix of spending and
revenue measures that Congress and the Administration might conclude is
appropriate for putting the U.S.'s finances on a sustainable footing.
The act calls for as much as $2.4 trillion of reductions in expenditure
growth over the 10 years through 2021. These cuts will be implemented in two
steps: the $917 billion agreed to initially, followed by an additional $1.5
trillion that the newly formed Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit
Reduction is supposed to recommend by November 2011. The act contains no
measures to raise taxes or otherwise enhance revenues, though the committee
could recommend them.
The act further provides that if Congress does not enact the committee's
recommendations, cuts of $1.2 trillion will be implemented over the same time
period. The reductions would mainly affect outlays for civilian discretionary
spending, defense, and Medicare. We understand that this fall-back mechanism is
designed to encourage Congress to embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure
savings, as the committee might recommend.
We note that in a letter to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011, the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) estimated total budgetary savings under the act to be at
least $2.1 trillion over the next 10 years relative to its baseline
assumptions. In updating our own fiscal projections, with certain modifications
outlined below, we have relied on the CBO's latest "Alternate Fiscal
Scenario" of June 2011, updated to include the CBO assumptions contained
in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In general, the CBO's "Alternate Fiscal
Scenario" assumes a continuation of recent Congressional action overriding
existing law.
We view the act's measures as a step toward fiscal consolidation.
However, this is within the framework of a legislative mechanism that leaves
open the details of what is finally agreed to until the end of 2011, and
Congress and the Administration could modify any agreement in the future. Even
assuming that at least $2.1 trillion of the spending reductions the act
envisages are implemented, we maintain our view that the U.S. net general
government debt burden (all levels of government combined, excluding liquid
financial assets) will likely continue to grow. Under our revised base case
fiscal scenario--which we consider to be consistent with a 'AA+' long-term
rating and a negative outlook--we now project that net general government debt
would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 79% in 2015 and
85% by 2021. Even the projected 2015 ratio of sovereign indebtedness is high in
relation to those of peer credits and, as noted, would continue to rise under
the act's revised policy settings.
Compared with previous projections, our revised base case scenario now
assumes that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, due to expire by the end of 2012,
remain in place. We have changed our assumption on this because the majority of
Republicans in Congress continue to resist any measure that would raise
revenues, a position we believe Congress reinforced by passing the act. Key
macroeconomic assumptions in the base case scenario include trend real GDP
growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near 2% annually over the decade.
Our revised upside scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as
consistent with the outlook on the 'AA+' long-term rating being revised to
stable--retains these same macroeconomic assumptions. In addition, it
incorporates $950 billion of new revenues on the assumption that the 2001 and
2003 tax cuts for high earners lapse from 2013 onwards, as the Administration
is advocating. In this scenario, we project that the net general government
debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 77% in 2015
and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside scenario--which, other things being equal, we view
as being consistent with a possible further downgrade to a 'AA' long-term
rating--features less-favorable macroeconomic assumptions, as outlined below
and also assumes that the second round of spending cuts (at least $1.2 trillion)
that the act calls for does not occur. This scenario also assumes somewhat
higher nominal interest rates for U.S. Treasuries. We still believe that the
role of the U.S. dollar as the key reserve currency confers a government
funding advantage, one that could change only slowly over time, and that Fed
policy might lean toward continued loose monetary policy at a time of fiscal
tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible that interest rates could rise if
investors re-price relative risks. As a result, our alternate scenario factors
in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in 10-year bond yields relative to the base
and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In this scenario, we project the net public
debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to 101% by
2021.
Our revised scenarios also take into account the significant negative
revisions to historical GDP data that the Bureau of Economic Analysis announced
on July 29. From our perspective, the effect of these revisions underscores two
related points when evaluating the likely debt trajectory of the U.S.
government. First, the revisions show that the recent recession was deeper than
previously assumed, so the GDP this year is lower than previously thought in
both nominal and real terms. Consequently, the debt burden is slightly higher.
Second, the revised data highlight the sub-par path of the current economic
recovery when compared with rebounds following previous post-war recessions. We
believe the sluggish pace of the current economic recovery could be consistent
with the experiences of countries that have had financial crises in which the
slow process of debt deleveraging in the private sector leads to a persistent
drag on demand. As a result, our downside case scenario assumes relatively
modest real trend GDP growth of 2.5% and inflation of near 1.5% annually going
forward.
When comparing the U.S. to sovereigns with 'AAA' long-term ratings that
we view as relevant peers--Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K.--we also
observe, based on our base case scenarios for each, that the trajectory of the
U.S.'s net public debt is diverging from the others. Including the U.S., we
estimate that these five sovereigns will have net general government debt to
GDP ratios this year ranging from 34% (Canada) to 80% (the U.K.), with the U.S.
debt burden at 74%. By 2015, we project that their net public debt to GDP
ratios will range between 30% (lowest, Canada) and 83% (highest, France), with
the U.S. debt burden at 79%. However, in contrast with the U.S., we project that
the net public debt burdens of these other sovereigns will begin to decline,
either before or by 2015.
Standard & Poor's transfer T&C assessment of the U.S. remains
'AAA'. Our T&C assessment reflects our view of the likelihood of the
sovereign restricting other public and private issuers' access to foreign
exchange needed to meet debt service. Although in our view the credit standing
of the U.S. government has deteriorated modestly, we see little indication that
official interference of this kind is entering onto the policy agenda of either
Congress or the Administration. Consequently, we continue to view this risk as
being highly remote.
The outlook on the long-term rating is negative. As our downside
alternate fiscal scenario illustrates, a higher public debt trajectory than we
currently assume could lead us to lower the long-term rating again. On the
other hand, as our upside scenario highlights, if the recommendations of the
Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction--independently or
coupled with other initiatives, such as the lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax
cuts for high earners--lead to fiscal consolidation measures beyond the minimum
mandated, and we believe they are likely to slow the deterioration of the
government's debt dynamics, the long-term rating could stabilize at 'AA+'.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs. 60.09 |
|
|
1 |
Rs. 99.84 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs. 82.57 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Analysis Done by
: |
SUB |
|
|
|
|
Report Prepared
by : |
DPT |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest
capability for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit
transaction. It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest
and principal sums |
Large |
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General unfavourable
factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for payment of
interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall
operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with full
security |
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
-- |
NB |
New Business |
-- |
This score serves as a reference to assess SC’s
credit risk and to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is calculated
from a composite of weighted scores obtained from each of the major sections of
this report. The assessed factors and their relative weights (as indicated
through %) are as follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend (10%) Operational size
(10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL)
or its officials.