MIRA INFORM REPORT
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Report Date : |
12.04.2014 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
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Name : |
PRISTINE GEMS, INC |
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Registered Office : |
592 5th Avenue, 11th floor, New York, NY 10036 |
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Country : |
United States |
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Date of Incorporation : |
16.10.2002 |
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Legal Form : |
Corporation – Profit |
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Line of Business : |
Importer and wholesaler of fine diamonds. |
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No. of Employees : |
2 |
RATING & COMMENTS
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MIRA’s Rating : |
B |
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RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
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26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
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Status : |
Moderate |
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Payment Behaviour : |
No Complaints |
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Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES:
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail: infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – March, 31st, 2013
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Country Name |
Previous Rating (31.12.2012) |
Current Rating (31.03.2013) |
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United States |
A1 |
A1 |
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Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
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Insignificant |
A1 |
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Low |
A2 |
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Moderate |
B1 |
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High |
B2 |
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Very High |
C1 |
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Restricted |
C2 |
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Off-credit |
D |
united states - ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
The US has the largest and most technologically powerful
economy in the world, with a per capita GDP of $49,800. In this market-oriented
economy, private individuals and business firms make most of the decisions, and
the federal and state governments buy needed goods and services predominantly
in the private marketplace. US business firms enjoy greater flexibility than
their counterparts in Western Europe and Japan in decisions to expand capital
plant, to lay off surplus workers, and to develop new products. At the same
time, they face higher barriers to enter their rivals' home markets than
foreign firms face entering US markets. US firms are at or near the forefront
in technological advances, especially in computers and in medical, aerospace,
and military equipment; their advantage has narrowed since the end of World War
II. The onrush of technology largely explains the gradual development of a
"two-tier labor market" in which those at the bottom lack the education
and the professional/technical skills of those at the top and, more and more,
fail to get comparable pay raises, health insurance coverage, and other
benefits. Since 1975, practically all the gains in household income have gone
to the top 20% of households. Since 1996, dividends and capital gains have
grown faster than wages or any other category of after-tax income. Imported oil
accounts for nearly 55% of US consumption. Crude oil prices doubled between
2001 and 2006, the year home prices peaked; higher gasoline prices ate into
consumers' budgets and many individuals fell behind in their mortgage payments.
Oil prices climbed another 50% between 2006 and 2008, and bank foreclosures
more than doubled in the same period. Besides dampening the housing market,
soaring oil prices caused a drop in the value of the dollar and a deterioration
in the US merchandise trade deficit, which peaked at $840 billion in 2008. The
sub-prime mortgage crisis, falling home prices, investment bank failures, tight
credit, and the global economic downturn pushed the United States into a
recession by mid-2008. GDP contracted until the third quarter of 2009, making
this the deepest and longest downturn since the Great Depression. To help
stabilize financial markets, in October 2008 the US Congress established a $700
billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The government used some of these
funds to purchase equity in US banks and industrial corporations, much of which
had been returned to the government by early 2011. In January 2009 the US
Congress passed and President Barack OBAMA signed a bill providing an
additional $787 billion fiscal stimulus to be used over 10 years - two-thirds
on additional spending and one-third on tax cuts - to create jobs and to help
the economy recover. In 2010 and 2011, the federal budget deficit reached
nearly 9% of GDP. In 2012 the federal government reduced the growth of spending
and the deficit shrank to 7.6% of GDP. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan required
major shifts in national resources from civilian to military purposes and
contributed to the growth of the budget deficit and public debt. Through 2011,
the direct costs of the wars totaled nearly $900 billion, according to US
government figures. US revenues from taxes and other sources are lower, as a
percentage of GDP, than those of most other countries. In March 2010, President
OBAMA signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, a health
insurance reform that was designed to extend coverage to an additional 32
million American citizens by 2016, through private health insurance for the
general population and Medicaid for the impoverished. Total spending on health
care - public plus private - rose from 9.0% of GDP in 1980 to 17.9% in 2010. In
July 2010, the president signed the DODD-FRANK Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, a law designed to promote financial stability by protecting
consumers from financial abuses, ending taxpayer bailouts of financial firms,
dealing with troubled banks that are "too big to fail," and improving
accountability and transparency in the financial system - in particular, by
requiring certain financial derivatives to be traded in markets that are
subject to government regulation and oversight. In December 2012, the Federal
Reserve Board (Fed) announced plans to purchase $85 billion per month of
mortgage-backed and Treasury securities in an effort to hold down long-term
interest rates, and to keep short term rates near zero until unemployment drops
below 6.5% or inflation rises above 2.5%. In late 2013, the Fed announced that
it would begin scaling back long-term bond purchases to $75 billion per month
in January 2014 and reduce them further as conditions warranted; the Fed,
however, would keep short-term rates near zero so long as unemployment and
inflation had not crossed the previously stated thresholds. Long-term problems
include stagnation of wages for lower-income families, inadequate investment in
deteriorating infrastructure, rapidly rising medical and pension costs of an
aging population, energy shortages, and sizable current account and budget
deficits.
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Source
: CIA |
Company
name and address
Company name: PRISTINE GEMS, INC
Address: 592 5th
Avenue, 11th floor, New York, NY 10036 - USA
Telephone: +1
212-282-1132
Fax: +1
212-282-1131
Website: www.pristinegems.com
Company
summary
Corporate ID#: 2823463
State: New York State
Judicial form: Corporation –
Profit
Date incorporated: 10-16-2002
Stock: 200
shares common
Value: No
par value
Name of manager: Bela
S. MEHTA
ACTIVITIES & OPERATIONS
Business:
PRISTINE GEMS is importer and wholesaler of fine diamonds.
Imports mainly from India.
EIN: -
Staff: 2
Operations & branches:
At the headquarters, we
find the corporate office, on lease.
SHAREHOLDERS
& MANAGERS
Shareholders:
Bela S. MEHTA is a major
shareholder.
Management:
Bela S. MEHTA is the
President, Director and CEO
Kumar SHAH is a Manager
(no antecedents available)
As far as we know, they are not involved in other local corporations.
Subsidiaries
And partnership: None
FINANCIALS
In United States, privately
held corporations are not required to publish any financials.
On a direct call, nobody
accepted to answer our questions.
We sent an email but no
answer received.
Outside sources (bank) gave
estimate sales for year 2012 in the range of
USD 200,000=
The business is said to be
profitable.
Banks: Bank of India
277 Park Ave, New York, NY 10172
Ph: +1 212-753-6100
LEGAL
FILINGS
Legal filings
& complaints:
As of today date, there is no legal filing pending with the Courts.
Secured debts summary (UCC):
None
Haut du formulaire
COMPANY CREDIT HISTORY
Trade references:
Date reported: October 2013
High credit: USD 2,500+
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: September 2013
Line of business: Payroll
Paying status: As agreed
Date reported: October 2013
High credit: USD 300
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: September 2013
Line of business: Telecommunications
Paying status: On terms
Domestic credit history:
Domestic credit history
appears as follow:
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Monthly Payment Trends - Recent Activity |
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National Credit Bureaus
gave a satisfying credit rating.
International
credit history:
Payments of imports are currently made on terms.
Other comments:
The Company maintains a
regular business.
The bank confirmed a small
account and regular payments.
The Company is in good
standing.
This means that all local
and federal taxes were paid on due date.
The risk is low.
Our opinion:
A business connection may
be conducted.
DIAMOND INDUSTRY – INDIA
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From time immemorial, India is well known in the world
as the birthplace for diamonds. It is difficult to trace the origin of
diamonds but history says that in the remote past, diamonds were mined only in
India. Diamond production in India can be traced back to almost 8th
Century B.C. India, in fact, remained undisputed leader till 18th
Century when Brazilian fields were discovered in 1725 followed by emergence of
S. Africa, Russia and Australia.
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The achievement of the Indian diamond industry was
possible only due to combination of the manufacturing skills of the Indian workforce
and the untiring and unflagging efforts of the Indian diamantaires, supported
by progressive Government policies.
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The area of study of family owned diamond businesses
derives its importance from the huge conglomerate of family run organizations which
operate in the diamond industry since many generations.
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Some of the basic traits of family run business
enterprises include spirit of entrepreneurship, mutual trust lowers transaction
costs, small, nimble and quick to react, information as a source of advantage
and philanthropy.
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Family owned diamond businesses need to improve on
many fronts including higher standard of corporate governance, long-term
performance – focused strategies, modern management and technology.
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Utmost caution is to be exercised while dealing with
some medium and large diamond traders which are usually engaged in fictitious
import – export, inter-company transactions, financially assisted by banks. In
the process, several public sector banks lost several hundred million rupees. They
mostly diverted borrowed money for diamond business into real estate and
capital markets.
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Excerpts from Times of India dated 30th
October 2010 is as under –
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Gem & Jewellery Export Promotion Council in its
statistical data has shown the export of polished diamonds to have increase by
28 % in February 2013. Compared to $ 1.4 bn worth of polished diamond export in
February, 2012, India exported $ 1.84 billion worth of polished diamonds in
February 2013. A senior executive of GJEPC said, “Export of cut and polished
diamonds started falling month-wise after the imposition of 2 % of import duty
on the polished diamonds. But February, 2013 has given a new ray of hope to the
industry as the export of polished diamonds has actually increased by 28 %. It
means the industry is on the track of recovery and round tripping of
diamonds has stopped completely.” Demand has started coming from the US, the
UK, Japan and China. India’s polished diamond export is expected to cross $ 21
bn in 2013-14.
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The banking sector has started exercising restraint
while following prudent risk management norms when lending money to gems and
jewellery sector. This follows the implementation of Basel III accord – a
global voluntary regulatory standard on bank capital adequacy, stress testing
and market liquidity.
Standard & Poor’s
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United
States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'AA+' Due To Political Risks,
Rising Debt Burden; Outlook Negative |
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Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
- We have lowered our long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of America to 'AA+' from 'AAA' and affirmed the 'A-1+' short-term rating.
- We have also removed both the short- and long-term ratings from CreditWatch negative.
- The downgrade reflects our opinion that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration recently agreed to falls short of what, in our view, would be necessary to stabilize the government's medium-term debt dynamics.
- More broadly, the downgrade reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of American policymaking and political institutions have weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic challenges to a degree more than we envisioned when we assigned a negative outlook to the rating on April 18, 2011.
- Since then, we have changed our view of the difficulties in bridging the gulf between the political parties over fiscal policy, which makes us pessimistic about the capacity of Congress and the Administration to be able to leverage their agreement this week into a broader fiscal consolidation plan that stabilizes the government's debt dynamics any time soon.
- The outlook on the long-term rating is negative. We could lower the long-term rating to 'AA' within the next two years if we see that less reduction in spending than agreed to, higher interest rates, or new fiscal pressures during the period result in a higher general government debt trajectory than we currently assume in our base case.
TORONTO (Standard & Poor's) Aug. 5, 2011--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that it lowered its long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of America to 'AA+' from 'AAA'. Standard & Poor's also said that the outlook on the long-term rating is negative. At the same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed its 'A-1+' short-term rating on the U.S. In addition, Standard & Poor's removed both ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed on July 14, 2011, with negative implications.
The transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment of the U.S.--our assessment of the likelihood of official interference in the ability of U.S.-based public- and private-sector issuers to secure foreign exchange for
debt service--remains 'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term rating on the U.S. because we believe that the prolonged controversy over raising the statutory debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate indicate that further near-term progress containing the growth in public spending, especially on entitlements, or on reaching an agreement on raising revenues is less likely than we previously assumed and will remain a contentious and fitful process. We also believe that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration agreed to this week falls short of the amount that we believe is necessary to stabilize the general government debt burden by the middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the rating was prompted by our view on the rising public debt burden and our perception of greater policymaking uncertainty, consistent with our criteria (see "Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions ," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41). Nevertheless, we view the U.S. federal government's other economic, external, and monetary credit attributes, which form the basis for the sovereign rating, as broadly unchanged.
We have taken the ratings off CreditWatch because the Aug. 2 passage of the Budget Control Act Amendment of 2011 has removed any perceived immediate threat of payment default posed by delays to raising the government's debt ceiling. In addition, we believe that the act provides sufficient clarity to allow us to evaluate the likely course of U.S. fiscal policy for the next few years.
The political brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as America's governance and policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and less predictable than what we previously believed. The statutory debt ceiling and the threat of default have become political bargaining chips in the debate over fiscal policy. Despite this year's wide-ranging debate, in our view, the differences between political parties have proven to be extraordinarily difficult to bridge, and, as we see it, the resulting agreement fell well short of the comprehensive fiscal consolidation program that some proponents had envisaged until quite recently. Republicans and Democrats have only been able to agree to relatively modest savings on discretionary spending while delegating to the Select Committee decisions on more comprehensive measures. It appears that for now, new revenues have dropped down on the menu of policy options. In addition, the plan envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare and little change in other entitlements,
the containment of which we and most other independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal sustainability.
Our opinion is that elected officials remain wary of tackling the structural issues required to effectively address the rising U.S. public debt burden in a manner consistent with a 'AAA' rating and with 'AAA' rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41). In our view, the difficulty in framing a consensus on fiscal policy weakens the government's ability to manage public finances and diverts attention from the debate over how to achieve more balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era of fiscal stringency and private-sector deleveraging (ibid). A new political consensus might (or might not) emerge after the 2012 elections, but we believe that by then, the government debt burden will likely be higher, the needed medium-term fiscal adjustment potentially greater, and the inflection point on the U.S. population's demographics and other age-related spending drivers closer at hand (see "Global Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Likely Cost Even More Green, Now," June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's takes no position on the mix of spending and revenue measures that Congress and the Administration might conclude is appropriate for putting the U.S.'s finances on a sustainable footing.
The act calls for as much as $2.4 trillion of reductions in expenditure growth over the 10 years through 2021. These cuts will be implemented in two steps: the $917 billion agreed to initially, followed by an additional $1.5 trillion that the newly formed Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction is supposed to recommend by November 2011. The act contains no measures to raise taxes or otherwise enhance revenues, though the committee could recommend them.
The act further provides that if Congress does not enact the committee's recommendations, cuts of $1.2 trillion will be implemented over the same time period. The reductions would mainly affect outlays for civilian discretionary spending, defense, and Medicare. We understand that this fall-back mechanism is designed to encourage Congress to embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure savings, as the committee might recommend.
We note that in a letter to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated total budgetary savings under the act to be at least $2.1 trillion over the next 10 years relative to its baseline assumptions. In updating our own fiscal projections, with certain modifications outlined below, we have relied on the CBO's latest "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" of June 2011, updated to include the CBO assumptions contained in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In general, the CBO's "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" assumes a continuation of recent Congressional action overriding existing law.
We view the act's measures as a step toward fiscal consolidation. However, this is within the framework of a legislative mechanism that leaves open the details of what is finally agreed to until the end of 2011, and Congress and the Administration could modify any agreement in the future. Even assuming that at least $2.1 trillion of the spending reductions the act envisages are implemented, we maintain our view that the U.S. net general government debt burden (all levels of government combined, excluding liquid financial assets) will likely continue to grow. Under our revised base case fiscal scenario--which we consider to be consistent with a 'AA+' long-term rating and a negative outlook--we now project that net general government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 79% in 2015 and 85% by 2021. Even the projected 2015 ratio of sovereign indebtedness is high in relation to those of peer credits and, as noted, would continue to rise under the act's revised policy settings.
Compared with previous projections, our revised base case scenario now assumes that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, due to expire by the end of 2012, remain in place. We have changed our assumption on this because the majority of Republicans in Congress continue to resist any measure that would raise revenues, a position we believe Congress reinforced by passing the act. Key macroeconomic assumptions in the base case scenario include trend real GDP growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near 2% annually over the decade.
Our revised upside scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as consistent with the outlook on the 'AA+' long-term rating being revised to stable--retains these same macroeconomic assumptions. In addition, it incorporates $950 billion of new revenues on the assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners lapse from 2013 onwards, as the Administration is advocating. In this scenario, we project that the net general government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as being consistent with a possible further downgrade to a 'AA' long-term rating--features less-favorable macroeconomic assumptions, as outlined below and also assumes that the second round of spending cuts (at least $1.2 trillion) that the act calls for does not occur. This scenario also assumes somewhat higher nominal interest rates for U.S. Treasuries. We still believe that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key reserve currency confers a government funding advantage, one that could change only slowly over time, and that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose monetary policy at a time of fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible that interest rates could rise if investors re-price relative risks. As a result, our alternate scenario factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in 10-year bond yields relative to the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In this scenario, we project the net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to 101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios also take into account the significant negative revisions to historical GDP data that the Bureau of Economic Analysis announced on July 29. From our perspective, the effect of these revisions underscores two related points when evaluating the likely debt trajectory of the U.S. government. First, the revisions show that the recent recession was deeper than previously assumed, so the GDP this year is lower than previously thought in both nominal and real terms. Consequently, the debt burden is slightly higher. Second, the revised data highlight the sub-par path of the current economic recovery when compared with rebounds following previous post-war recessions. We believe the sluggish pace of the current economic recovery could be consistent with the experiences of countries that have had financial crises in which the slow process of debt deleveraging in the private sector leads to a persistent drag on demand. As a result, our downside case scenario assumes relatively modest real trend GDP growth of 2.5% and inflation of near 1.5% annually going forward.
When comparing the U.S. to sovereigns with 'AAA' long-term ratings that we view as relevant peers--Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K.--we also observe, based on our base case scenarios for each, that the trajectory of the U.S.'s net public debt is diverging from the others. Including the U.S., we estimate that these five sovereigns will have net general government debt to GDP ratios this year ranging from 34% (Canada) to 80% (the U.K.), with the U.S. debt burden at 74%. By 2015, we project that their net public debt to GDP ratios will range between 30% (lowest, Canada) and 83% (highest, France), with the U.S. debt burden at 79%. However, in contrast with the U.S., we project that the net public debt burdens of these other sovereigns will begin to decline, either before or by 2015.
Standard & Poor's transfer T&C assessment of the U.S. remains 'AAA'. Our T&C assessment reflects our view of the likelihood of the sovereign restricting other public and private issuers' access to foreign exchange needed to meet debt service. Although in our view the credit standing of the U.S. government has deteriorated modestly, we see little indication that official interference of this kind is entering onto the policy agenda of either Congress or the Administration. Consequently, we continue to view this risk as being highly remote.
The outlook on the long-term rating is negative. As our downside alternate fiscal scenario illustrates, a higher public debt trajectory than we currently assume could lead us to lower the long-term rating again. On the other hand, as our upside scenario highlights, if the recommendations of the Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction--independently or coupled with other initiatives, such as the lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners--lead to fiscal consolidation measures beyond the minimum mandated, and we believe they are likely to slow the deterioration of the government's debt dynamics, the long-term rating could stabilize at 'AA+'.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.60.26 |
|
|
1 |
Rs.101.09 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.83.73 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Report Prepared
by : |
DPT |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest
capability for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit
transaction. It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest
and principal sums |
Large |
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General unfavourable
factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for payment of
interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to
overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively below average. |
Small |
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with full
security |
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
---- |
NB |
New Business |
---- |
This score serves as a reference to assess SC’s
credit risk and to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is calculated
from a composite of weighted scores obtained from each of the major sections of
this report. The assessed factors and their relative weights (as indicated
through %) are as follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend (10%) Operational size
(10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL) or
its officials.