MIRA
INFORM REPORT

Report Date :

18.04.2014

IDENTIFICATION DETAILS

Name :

SANGHAVI DIAMONDS INC.

Registered Office :

1212 Avenue of The Americas, 11th floor, New York, NY 10036

Country :

United States

Date of Incorporation :

17.05.1995

Legal Form :

Corporation – Profit

Line of Business :

·
Importer, Wholesaler & Retailer of fine
jewelry, diamonds & precious stones.

·
Subject offer large stones certified by GIA, IGL and HRD.

No. of Employees :

30

RATING & COMMENTS

MIRA’s Rating :

B

RATING

STATUS

PROPOSED CREDIT LINE

26-40

B

Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average.

Small

Status :

Moderate

Payment Behaviour :

Slow but Correct

Litigation :

Clear

NOTES :

Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail : [email-masked]
while quoting report number, name and date.

ECGC Country Risk Classification List – december 01, 2013

Country Name

Previous Rating

(30.09.2013)

Current Rating

(01.12.2013)

United
States

A1

A1

Risk Category

ECGC
Classification

Insignificant

A1

Low

A2

Moderate

B1

High

B2

Very High

C1

Restricted

C2

Off-credit

D

united StaTes ECONOMIC OVERVIEW

The US has the largest and most
technologically powerful economy in the world, with a per capita GDP of
$49,800. In this market-oriented economy, private individuals and business
firms make most of the decisions, and the federal and state governments buy
needed goods and services predominantly in the private marketplace. US business
firms enjoy greater flexibility than their counterparts in Western Europe and
Japan in decisions to expand capital plant, to lay off surplus workers, and to
develop new products. At the same time, they face higher barriers to enter
their rivals' home markets than foreign firms face entering US markets. US
firms are at or near the forefront in technological advances, especially in
computers and in medical, aerospace, and military equipment; their advantage
has narrowed since the end of World War II. The onrush of technology largely
explains the gradual development of a "two-tier labor market" in
which those at the bottom lack the education and the professional/technical
skills of those at the top and, more and more, fail to get comparable pay
raises, health insurance coverage, and other benefits. Since 1975, practically
all the gains in household income have gone to the top 20% of households. Since
1996, dividends and capital gains have grown faster than wages or any other
category of after-tax income. Imported oil accounts for nearly 55% of US
consumption. Crude oil prices doubled between 2001 and 2006, the year home
prices peaked; higher gasoline prices ate into consumers' budgets and many individuals
fell behind in their mortgage payments. Oil prices climbed another 50% between
2006 and 2008, and bank foreclosures more than doubled in the same period.
Besides dampening the housing market, soaring oil prices caused a drop in the
value of the dollar and a deterioration in the US merchandise trade deficit,
which peaked at $840 billion in 2008. The sub-prime mortgage crisis, falling
home prices, investment bank failures, tight credit, and the global economic
downturn pushed the United States into a recession by mid-2008. GDP contracted
until the third quarter of 2009, making this the deepest and longest downturn
since the Great Depression. To help stabilize financial markets, in October
2008 the US Congress established a $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP). The government used some of these funds to purchase equity in US banks
and industrial corporations, much of which had been returned to the government
by early 2011. In January 2009 the US Congress passed and President Barack
OBAMA signed a bill providing an additional $787 billion fiscal stimulus to be
used over 10 years - two-thirds on additional spending and one-third on tax
cuts - to create jobs and to help the economy recover. In 2010 and 2011, the
federal budget deficit reached nearly 9% of GDP. In 2012 the federal government
reduced the growth of spending and the deficit shrank to 7.6% of GDP. Wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan required major shifts in national resources from civilian
to military purposes and contributed to the growth of the budget deficit and
public debt. Through 2011, the direct costs of the wars totaled nearly $900
billion, according to US government figures. US revenues from taxes and other
sources are lower, as a percentage of GDP, than those of most other countries.
In March 2010, President OBAMA signed into law the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, a health insurance reform that will extend coverage to an
additional 32 million American citizens by 2016, through private health
insurance for the general population and Medicaid for the impoverished. Total
spending on health care - public plus private - rose from 9.0% of GDP in 1980
to 17.9% in 2010. In July 2010, the president signed the DODD-FRANK Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, a law designed to promote financial
stability by protecting consumers from financial abuses, ending taxpayer
bailouts of financial firms, dealing with troubled banks that are "too big
to fail," and improving accountability and transparency in the financial system
- in particular, by requiring certain financial derivatives to be traded in
markets that are subject to government regulation and oversight. In December
2012, the Federal Reserve Board announced plans to purchase $85 billion per
month of mortgage-backed and Treasury securities in an effort to hold down
long-term interest rates, and to keep short term rates near zero until
unemployment drops to 6.5% from the December rate of 7.8%, or until inflation
rises above 2.5%. Long-term problems include stagnation of wages for
lower-income families, inadequate investment in deteriorating infrastructure,
rapidly rising medical and pension costs of an aging population, energy
shortages, and sizable current account and budget deficits - including
significant budget shortages for state governments.

Source : CIA

Company name & address

Company name:            SANGHAVI DIAMONDS
INC.

Address:
1212
Avenue of The Americas, 11th floor, New York, NY 10036, USA

Telephone:                    +1 212-764-7841

Fax:
+1
212-719-4186

Website:
www.sanghavidiamonds.com

Company summary

Corporate ID#:
1922864

State:
New
York State

Judicial form:                            Corporation
– Profit

Date incorporated:        05-17-1995

Stock:
200
shares common

Value:
No
par value

Name of manager:         Nitin
JOBANPUTRA

ACTIVITIES
& OPERATIONS

IST

Business:

·
Importer, Wholesaler & Retailer of fine
jewelry, diamonds & precious stones.

·
Subject offer large stones certified by GIA, IGL and HRD.

Suppliers include:

Sanghavi Jewel Pvt. Ltd.

Plot No.- 01, SEEPZ++, SEEPZ, Andheri (East), Mumbai - 400 096, INDIA.

EIN:                  13-3835165

Staff:                30

Operations & branches:

At the headquarters, we
find the corporate office, on 2,000 sq. ft., on lease.

The Company maintains a branch located:

6222 Richmond Avenue

Houston, TX 77057

Ph: +1 713-784-7884

SHAREHOLDERS & MANAGERS

Shareholders:

SANGHAVI JEWEL PVT. LTD.

Plot No.- 01, SEEPZ++, SEEPZ,

Andheri (East), Mumbai - 400 096, INDIA.

Ph: +91-22-5648 7000

Fx: +91-22-2829 1956

Management:

Nitin JOBANPUTRA is the
President and CEO

As far as we know,
he is involved in other corporations, including:

SANGHAVI DIAMONDS INC.

550 S. Hill Street, Ste 1141

Los Angeles, CA 90013

Incorporated in California on January 10, 1992

ID# C1805361

SANGHAVI JEWELS INC.

1212 Avenue of The Americas, 11th floor

New York, NY 10036

Incorporated in New York on
August 17, 2005

ID# 3244516

SANGHAVI SOLITAIRE INC.

1212 Avenue of The Americas, 11th floor

New York, NY 10036

Incorporated in New York on
March 23, 2012

ID# 4221442

FINANCIALS

In United States, privately
held corporations are not required to publish any financials.

On a direct call, a
financial assistant controlled the present report.

Sales declared for year
2011 is in the range of USD 4,000,000=

(USD 3,500,000= in 2008)

The business is profitable.

Banks:              Bank
of America

1133
Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10036

Ph:
+1 212-938-2080

LEGAL FILINGS

Legal
filings & complaints:

As of today date, there is no legal filing pending with the Courts.

Secured debts
summary (UCC):

Debtor Names:

SANGHAVI DIAMONDS INC.

1212 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS, NEW YORK, NY 10036-0000, USA

Secured Party Names:

ANTWERPSE DIAMANTBANK N.V.

PELIKAANSTRATT 54, ANTWERPEN 00000-0000, BEL

File no.

File Date

Lapse Date

Filing Type

201101120024141

01/12/2011

01/16/2016

Continuation

2.

Debtor Names:

SANGHAVI DIAMONDS INC.

1212 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS, 11TH FLOOR, NEW YORK, NY 10036, USA

Secured Party Names:

CTBC BANK CORP. (USA)

801 S. FLGUEROA STREET SUITE #2300, LOS ANGELES, NY 90017, USA

File no.

File Date

Lapse Date

Filing Type

201403045217388

03/04/2014

03/04/2019

Financing Statement

COMPANY CREDIT HISTORY

Trade references:

Date reported:               February
2014

High credit:                   USD
3,000

Now owing:                   0

Past due:                      0

Last purchase:             January
2014

Line of business:           Office
supply

Paying status:               12
days beyond terms

Date reported:               February
2014

High credit:                   USD
40,000+

Now owing:                   0

Past due:                      0

Last purchase:             January
2014

Line of business:           Payroll

Paying status:               As
agreed

Date reported:               February
2014

High credit:                   USD
600

Now owing:                   0

Past due:                      0

Last purchase:             January
2014

Line of business:           Telecommunications

Paying status:               15
days beyond terms

Domestic credit history:

Domestic credit history appears as follow:

Monthly Payment Trends - Recent Activity

Date

Balance

Current

Up to 30 DBT

31-60 DBT

61-90 DBT

>90 DBT

10/13

$3,700

19%

61%

1%

7%

12%

11/13

$2,800

23%

50%

1%

10%

16%

12/13

$3,300

24%

47%

29%

0%

0%

01/14

$1,700

79%

21%

0%

0%

0%

02/14

$1,500

87%

13%

0%

0%

0%

03/14

$3,100

45%

49%

6%

0%

0%

National Credit Bureaus
gave a bad rating.

According to our credit analysts, during the last 6 months, payments are
made with an average of 15+ days beyond terms.

International
credit history:

Payments of imports are currently made with an average 5+ days beyond
terms.

The Company is improving
its payments, but the cash is low.

Other comments:

The bank confirmed late
payments.

The Company is in good
standing.

This means that all local
and federal taxes were paid on due date.

The risk is medium/high.

Our opinion:

We suggest you to be
careful.

DIAMOND INDUSTRY – INDIA

-
From time immemorial, India is well known in the world
as the birthplace for diamonds.  It is difficult to trace the origin of
diamonds but history says that in the remote past, diamonds were mined only in
India. Diamond production in India can be traced back to almost 8th
Century B.C.  India, in fact, remained undisputed leader till 18th
Century when Brazilian fields were discovered in 1725 followed by emergence of
S. Africa, Russia and Australia.

-
The achievement of the Indian diamond industry was
possible only due to combination of the manufacturing skills of the Indian
workforce and the untiring and unflagging efforts of the Indian diamantaires,
supported by progressive Government policies.

-
The area of study of family owned diamond businesses
derives its importance from the huge conglomerate of family run organizations
which operate in the diamond industry since many generations.

-
Some of the basic traits of family run business
enterprises include spirit of entrepreneurship, mutual trust lowers transaction
costs, small, nimble and quick to react, information as a source of advantage
and philanthropy.

-
Family owned diamond businesses need to improve on
many fronts including higher standard of corporate governance, long-term
performance – focused strategies, modern management and technology.

-
Utmost caution is to be exercised while dealing with
some medium and large diamond traders which are usually engaged in fictitious
import – export, inter-company transactions, financially assisted by
banks. In the process, several public sector banks lost several hundred million
rupees. They mostly diverted borrowed money for diamond business into real
estate and capital markets.

-
Excerpts from Times of India dated 30th
October 2010 is as under –

-
Gem & Jewellery Export Promotion Council in its
statistical data has shown the export of polished diamonds to have increase by
28 % in February 2013. Compared to $ 1.4 bn worth of polished diamond export in
February, 2012, India exported $ 1.84 billion worth of polished diamonds in
February 2013. A senior executive of GJEPC said, “Export of cut and
polished diamonds started falling month-wise after the imposition of 2 % of
import duty on the polished diamonds. But February, 2013 has given a new ray of
hope to the industry as the export of polished diamonds has actually increased
by 28 %. It means the industry  is on the track of recovery and round
tripping of diamonds has stopped completely.” Demand has started coming
from the US, the UK, Japan and China. India’s polished diamond export is
expected to cross $ 21 bn in 2013-14.

-
The banking sector has started exercising restraint
while following prudent risk management norms when lending money to gems and
jewellery sector. This follows the implementation of Basel III accord – a
global voluntary regulatory standard on bank capital adequacy, stress testing
and market liquidity.

Standard
& Poor’s

United
States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'AA+' Due To Political Risks,
Rising Debt Burden; Outlook Negative

Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST

We have lowered our
long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of America to 'AA+'
from 'AAA' and affirmed the 'A-1+' short-term rating.

We have also removed both
the short- and long-term ratings from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrade reflects our
opinion that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the
Administration recently agreed to falls short of what, in our view, would
be necessary to stabilize the government's medium-term debt dynamics.

More broadly, the
downgrade reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability, and
predictability of American policymaking and political institutions have
weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic challenges to a degree
more than we envisioned when we assigned a negative outlook to the rating
on April 18, 2011.

Since then, we have
changed our view of the difficulties in bridging the gulf between the
political parties over fiscal policy, which makes us pessimistic about the
capacity of Congress and the Administration to be able to leverage their
agreement this week into a broader fiscal consolidation plan that
stabilizes the government's debt dynamics any time soon.

The outlook on the long-term
rating is negative. We could lower the long-term rating to 'AA' within the
next two years if we see that less reduction in spending than agreed to,
higher interest rates, or new fiscal pressures during the period result in
a higher general government debt trajectory than we currently assume in
our base case.

TORONTO (Standard & Poor's) Aug. 5, 2011--Standard &
Poor's Ratings Services said today that it lowered its long-term sovereign
credit rating on the United States of America to 'AA+' from 'AAA'. Standard
& Poor's also said that the outlook on the long-term rating is negative. At
the same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed its 'A-1+' short-term rating on
the U.S. In addition, Standard & Poor's removed both ratings from
CreditWatch, where they were placed on July 14, 2011, with negative
implications.

The transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment of the
U.S.--our assessment of the likelihood of official interference in the ability
of U.S.-based public- and private-sector issuers to secure foreign exchange for

debt service--remains 'AAA'.

We lowered our long-term rating on the U.S. because we
believe that the prolonged controversy over raising the statutory debt ceiling
and the related fiscal policy debate indicate that further near-term progress
containing the growth in public spending, especially on entitlements, or on
reaching an agreement on raising revenues is less likely than we previously
assumed and will remain a contentious and fitful process. We also believe that
the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration agreed to
this week falls short of the amount that we believe is necessary to stabilize
the general government debt burden by the middle of the decade.

Our lowering of the rating was prompted by our view on the rising
public debt burden and our perception of greater policymaking uncertainty,
consistent with our criteria (see "Sovereign
Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions ," June 30, 2011,
especially Paragraphs 36-41). Nevertheless, we view the U.S. federal
government's other economic, external, and monetary credit attributes, which
form the basis for the sovereign rating, as broadly unchanged.

We have taken the ratings off CreditWatch because the Aug. 2
passage of the Budget Control Act Amendment of 2011 has removed any perceived
immediate threat of payment default posed by delays to raising the government's
debt ceiling. In addition, we believe that the act provides sufficient clarity
to allow us to evaluate the likely course of U.S. fiscal policy for the next
few years.

The political brinksmanship of recent months highlights what
we see as America's governance and policymaking becoming less stable, less
effective, and less predictable than what we previously believed. The statutory
debt ceiling and the threat of default have become political bargaining chips
in the debate over fiscal policy. Despite this year's wide-ranging debate, in
our view, the differences between political parties have proven to be
extraordinarily difficult to bridge, and, as we see it, the resulting agreement
fell well short of the comprehensive fiscal consolidation program that some
proponents had envisaged until quite recently. Republicans and Democrats have
only been able to agree to relatively modest savings on discretionary spending
while delegating to the Select Committee decisions on more comprehensive
measures. It appears that for now, new revenues have dropped down on the menu
of policy options. In addition, the plan envisions only minor policy changes on
Medicare and little change in other entitlements,

the containment of which we and most other independent
observers regard as key to long-term fiscal sustainability.

Our opinion is that elected officials remain wary of
tackling the structural issues required to effectively address the rising U.S.
public debt burden in a manner consistent with a 'AAA' rating and with 'AAA'
rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign
Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions," June 30, 2011,
especially Paragraphs 36-41). In our view, the difficulty in framing a
consensus on fiscal policy weakens the government's ability to manage public
finances and diverts attention from the debate over how to achieve more
balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era of fiscal stringency and
private-sector deleveraging (ibid). A new political consensus might (or might
not) emerge after the 2012 elections, but we believe that by then, the
government debt burden will likely be higher, the needed medium-term fiscal
adjustment potentially greater, and the inflection point on the U.S.
population's demographics and other age-related spending drivers closer at hand
(see "Global
Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Likely Cost Even More Green, Now,"
June 21, 2011).

Standard & Poor's takes no position on the mix of
spending and revenue measures that Congress and the Administration might
conclude is appropriate for putting the U.S.'s finances on a sustainable
footing.

The act calls for as much as $2.4 trillion of reductions in
expenditure growth over the 10 years through 2021. These cuts will be
implemented in two steps: the $917 billion agreed to initially, followed by an
additional $1.5 trillion that the newly formed Congressional Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction is supposed to recommend by November 2011. The
act contains no measures to raise taxes or otherwise enhance revenues, though
the committee could recommend them.

The act further provides that if Congress does not enact the
committee's recommendations, cuts of $1.2 trillion will be implemented over the
same time period. The reductions would mainly affect outlays for civilian
discretionary spending, defense, and Medicare. We understand that this
fall-back mechanism is designed to encourage Congress to embrace a more balanced
mix of expenditure savings, as the committee might recommend.

We note that in a letter to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011, the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated total budgetary savings under the
act to be at least $2.1 trillion over the next 10 years relative to its
baseline assumptions. In updating our own fiscal projections, with certain
modifications outlined below, we have relied on the CBO's latest
"Alternate Fiscal Scenario" of June 2011, updated to include the CBO
assumptions contained in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In general, the CBO's
"Alternate Fiscal Scenario" assumes a continuation of recent
Congressional action overriding existing law.

We view the act's measures as a step toward fiscal
consolidation. However, this is within the framework of a legislative mechanism
that leaves open the details of what is finally agreed to until the end of
2011, and Congress and the Administration could modify any agreement in the
future. Even assuming that at least $2.1 trillion of the spending reductions
the act envisages are implemented, we maintain our view that the U.S. net
general government debt burden (all levels of government combined, excluding
liquid financial assets) will likely continue to grow. Under our revised base
case fiscal scenario--which we consider to be consistent with a 'AA+' long-term
rating and a negative outlook--we now project that net general government debt
would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 79% in 2015 and
85% by 2021. Even the projected 2015 ratio of sovereign indebtedness is high in
relation to those of peer credits and, as noted, would continue to rise under
the act's revised policy settings.

Compared with previous projections, our revised base case
scenario now assumes that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, due to expire by the end
of 2012, remain in place. We have changed our assumption on this because the
majority of Republicans in Congress continue to resist any measure that would
raise revenues, a position we believe Congress reinforced by passing the act.
Key macroeconomic assumptions in the base case scenario include trend real GDP
growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near 2% annually over the decade.

Our revised upside scenario--which, other things being
equal, we view as consistent with the outlook on the 'AA+' long-term rating
being revised to stable--retains these same macroeconomic assumptions. In
addition, it incorporates $950 billion of new revenues on the assumption that
the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners lapse from 2013 onwards, as the
Administration is advocating. In this scenario, we project that the net general
government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to
77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.

Our revised downside scenario--which, other things being
equal, we view as being consistent with a possible further downgrade to a 'AA'
long-term rating--features less-favorable macroeconomic assumptions, as
outlined below and also assumes that the second round of spending cuts (at
least $1.2 trillion) that the act calls for does not occur. This scenario also
assumes somewhat higher nominal interest rates for U.S. Treasuries. We still
believe that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key reserve currency confers a
government funding advantage, one that could change only slowly over time, and
that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose monetary policy at a time of
fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible that interest rates could rise
if investors re-price relative risks. As a result, our alternate scenario
factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in 10-year bond yields relative to
the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In this scenario, we project the
net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to
101% by 2021.

Our revised scenarios also take into account the significant
negative revisions to historical GDP data that the Bureau of Economic Analysis
announced on July 29. From our perspective, the effect of these revisions
underscores two related points when evaluating the likely debt trajectory of
the U.S. government. First, the revisions show that the recent recession was
deeper than previously assumed, so the GDP this year is lower than previously
thought in both nominal and real terms. Consequently, the debt burden is
slightly higher. Second, the revised data highlight the sub-par path of the
current economic recovery when compared with rebounds following previous
post-war recessions. We believe the sluggish pace of the current economic
recovery could be consistent with the experiences of countries that have had
financial crises in which the slow process of debt deleveraging in the private
sector leads to a persistent drag on demand. As a result, our downside case
scenario assumes relatively modest real trend GDP growth of 2.5% and inflation
of near 1.5% annually going forward.

When comparing the U.S. to sovereigns with 'AAA' long-term
ratings that we view as relevant peers--Canada, France, Germany, and the
U.K.--we also observe, based on our base case scenarios for each, that the
trajectory of the U.S.'s net public debt is diverging from the others.
Including the U.S., we estimate that these five sovereigns will have net
general government debt to GDP ratios this year ranging from 34% (Canada) to
80% (the U.K.), with the U.S. debt burden at 74%. By 2015, we project that
their net public debt to GDP ratios will range between 30% (lowest, Canada) and
83% (highest, France), with the U.S. debt burden at 79%. However, in contrast
with the U.S., we project that the net public debt burdens of these other
sovereigns will begin to decline, either before or by 2015.

Standard & Poor's transfer T&C assessment of the
U.S. remains 'AAA'. Our T&C assessment reflects our view of the likelihood
of the sovereign restricting other public and private issuers' access to
foreign exchange needed to meet debt service. Although in our view the credit
standing of the U.S. government has deteriorated modestly, we see little
indication that official interference of this kind is entering onto the policy
agenda of either Congress or the Administration. Consequently, we continue to
view this risk as being highly remote.

The outlook on the long-term rating is negative. As our
downside alternate fiscal scenario illustrates, a higher public debt trajectory
than we currently assume could lead us to lower the long-term rating again. On
the other hand, as our upside scenario highlights, if the recommendations of
the Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction--independently or
coupled with other initiatives, such as the lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax
cuts for high earners--lead to fiscal consolidation measures beyond the minimum
mandated, and we believe they are likely to slow the deterioration of the
government's debt dynamics, the long-term rating could stabilize at 'AA+'.

FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES

Currency

Unit

Indian Rupees

US Dollar

1

Rs.60.38

UK Pound

1

Rs.101.63

Euro

1

Rs.83.57

INFORMATION DETAILS

Report Prepared
by :

DPT

RATING EXPLANATIONS

RATING

STATUS

PROPOSED CREDIT LINE

>86

Aaa

Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest
capability for timely payment of interest and principal sums

Unlimited

71-85

Aa

Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit
transaction. It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest
and principal sums

Large

56-70

A

Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General
unfavourable factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for
payment of interest and principal sums

Fairly Large

41-55

Ba

Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments.

Satisfactory

26-40

B

Capability to
overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively below average.

Small

11-25

Ca

Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity

Limited with
full security

<10

C

Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised

Credit not
recommended

----

NB

New Business

----

This score serves as a reference to assess
SC’s credit risk and to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is
calculated from a composite of weighted scores obtained from each of the major
sections of this report. The assessed factors and their relative weights (as indicated
through %) are as follows:

Financial
condition (40%)            Ownership
background (20%)                  Payment
record (10%)

Credit history
(10%)                   Market
trend (10%)                                Operational
size (10%)