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Report Date : |
01.08.2014 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
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Name : |
H.D. BUTTERCUP L.P. |
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Registered Office : |
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Country : |
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Date of Incorporation : |
27.02.2004 |
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Legal Form : |
LP |
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Line of Business : |
Subject is engaged in retail furniture |
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No of Employees : |
65 |
RATING & COMMENTS
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MIRA’s Rating : |
B |
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RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
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26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
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Status : |
Moderate |
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Payment Behaviour : |
Slow But Correct |
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Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES :
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail : infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – June 01, 2014
|
Country Name |
Previous Rating (31.03.2014) |
Current Rating (01.06.2014) |
|
|
A1 |
A1 |
|
Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
|
Insignificant |
A1 |
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Low Risk |
A2 |
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Moderate Low Risk |
B1 |
|
Moderate Risk |
B2 |
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Moderate High Risk |
C1 |
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High Risk |
C2 |
|
Very High Risk |
D |
UNITED STATES ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
The
|
Source
: CIA |
Company name: H.D. BUTTERCUP L.P.
Headquarters:
Telephone: +1
310-558-8900 – 310-945-5431
Fax: +1 310-558-8903
Website: www.hdbuttercup.com
Corporate ID#: 0800310512
State:
Judicial form: LP
Date incorporated: 02-27-2004
Stock: -
Value: -
Name of manager: Evan
COLE
Business:
Retail furniture
Office of the Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC):
The company is not listed on the OFAC list.
The Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List is a publication of OFAC
which lists individuals and organizations with whom
Suppliers include:
ABITEX DESIGNS SHANGHAI CO LTD
NO 1239 SONGYING ROAD QINGPU DISTRICT SHANGHAI 201706
NAVKAR WOOLLENS PVT LTD
67 A INDUSTRIAL AREA RANI BAZAR BIKANER 334001
EIN: 20-0942068
Staff: 65
Operations & branches:
At above address, we find a large store, warehouse and office,
on 150,000 sq. feet, on lease.
The Company
maintains stores located:
Ph: +1 415-820-4788
Ph: +1 415-321-2474
Ph: +1 310-558-8900
Ph: +1 310-945-5425
The Company maintains a warehouse located:
Ph: +1 310-329-3463
Shareholders:
EC Properties, Inc.
Management:
Evan COLE is the CEO and Director.
As far as we know, he is also the President of:
EC Properties, Inc.
Incorporated IN
ID# 0800310235
WE VENTURES, INC.
Incorporated IN
ID# C2729414
In
On a direct call, a
financial assistant controlled the present report but
We sent a fax but no answer
received.
Outside sources (bank) gave
estimate sales for year 2013 in the range of
USD 15,000,000=
The business is said to be
profitable.
Banks: JPMorgan Chase Bank
…
Legal filings
& complaints:
State:
Case number: 2:14-cv-05020-ABC-SS
Plaintiff: HD Buttercup LP
Defendant: One Kings Lane Inc et al.
Audrey B. Collins, presiding
Suzanne H. Segal, referral
Date filed: 06/27/2014
Date of last filing: 07/03/2014
Secured debts summary (UCC):
Several
Trade references:
Date reported: July 2014
High credit: USD 2,000
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: June 2014
Line of business: Office supply
Paying status: 2 days beyond terms
Date reported: July 2014
High credit: USD 100,000+
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: June 2014
Line of business: Payroll
Paying status: As agreed
Date reported: July 2014
High credit: USD 450
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: June 2014
Line of business: Telecommunications
Paying status: 1 day beyond terms
Domestic credit history:
Domestic credit history
appears as follow:
|
Monthly Payment Trends - Recent Activity |
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|
According to our credit analysts, during the last 6 months, domestic
payments were made with an average of 0 to 3 days beyond terms.
International credit
history:
Payments of imports are currently made on terms.
Other comments:
The bank confirmed a low
cash-flow.
The Company is in good
standing.
This means that all local
and federal taxes were paid on due date.
The risk is medium/low.
Our opinion:
A business connection may
be conducted.
Standard &
Poor’s
|
|
|
Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
We have lowered our long-term sovereign credit rating on the United
States of America to 'AA+' from 'AAA' and affirmed the 'A-1+' short-term
rating.
We have also removed both the short- and long-term ratings from
CreditWatch negative.
The downgrade reflects our opinion that the fiscal consolidation plan
that Congress and the Administration recently agreed to falls short of what, in
our view, would be necessary to stabilize the government's medium-term debt
dynamics.
More broadly, the downgrade reflects our view that the effectiveness,
stability, and predictability of American policymaking and political
institutions have weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic challenges
to a degree more than we envisioned when we assigned a negative outlook to the
rating on April 18, 2011.
Since then, we have changed our view of the difficulties in bridging the
gulf between the political parties over fiscal policy, which makes us
pessimistic about the capacity of Congress and the Administration to be able to
leverage their agreement this week into a broader fiscal consolidation plan
that stabilizes the government's debt dynamics any time soon.
The outlook on the long-term rating is negative. We could lower the
long-term rating to 'AA' within the next two years if we see that less
reduction in spending than agreed to, higher interest rates, or new fiscal
pressures during the period result in a higher general government debt
trajectory than we currently assume in our base case.
The transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment of the
debt service--remains 'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term rating on the U.S. because we believe that the
prolonged controversy over raising the statutory debt ceiling and the related
fiscal policy debate indicate that further near-term progress containing the
growth in public spending, especially on entitlements, or on reaching an
agreement on raising revenues is less likely than we previously assumed and
will remain a contentious and fitful process. We also believe that the fiscal
consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration agreed to this week
falls short of the amount that we believe is necessary to stabilize the general
government debt burden by the middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the rating was prompted by our view on the rising public
debt burden and our perception of greater policymaking uncertainty, consistent
with our criteria (see "Sovereign
Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions ," June 30, 2011,
especially Paragraphs 36-41). Nevertheless, we view the
We have taken the ratings off CreditWatch because the Aug. 2 passage of
the Budget Control Act Amendment of 2011 has removed any perceived immediate
threat of payment default posed by delays to raising the government's debt
ceiling. In addition, we believe that the act provides sufficient clarity to
allow us to evaluate the likely course of
The political brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as
Our opinion is that elected officials remain wary of tackling the structural
issues required to effectively address the rising U.S. public debt burden in a
manner consistent with a 'AAA' rating and with 'AAA' rated sovereign peers (see
Sovereign
Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions," June 30, 2011,
especially Paragraphs 36-41). In our view, the difficulty in framing a
consensus on fiscal policy weakens the government's ability to manage public finances
and diverts attention from the debate over how to achieve more balanced and
dynamic economic growth in an era of fiscal stringency and private-sector
deleveraging (ibid). A new political consensus might (or might not) emerge
after the 2012 elections, but we believe that by then, the government debt
burden will likely be higher, the needed medium-term fiscal adjustment
potentially greater, and the inflection point on the U.S. population's
demographics and other age-related spending drivers closer at hand (see "Global
Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Likely Cost Even More Green, Now,"
June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's takes no position on the mix of spending and
revenue measures that Congress and the Administration might conclude is
appropriate for putting the
The act calls for as much as $2.4 trillion of reductions in expenditure
growth over the 10 years through 2021. These cuts will be implemented in two
steps: the $917 billion agreed to initially, followed by an additional $1.5
trillion that the newly formed Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit
Reduction is supposed to recommend by November 2011. The act contains no
measures to raise taxes or otherwise enhance revenues, though the committee
could recommend them.
The act further provides that if Congress does not enact the committee's
recommendations, cuts of $1.2 trillion will be implemented over the same time
period. The reductions would mainly affect outlays for civilian discretionary
spending, defense, and Medicare. We understand that this fall-back mechanism is
designed to encourage Congress to embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure
savings, as the committee might recommend.
We note that in a letter to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011, the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) estimated total budgetary savings under the act to be at
least $2.1 trillion over the next 10 years relative to its baseline assumptions.
In updating our own fiscal projections, with certain modifications outlined
below, we have relied on the CBO's latest "Alternate Fiscal Scenario"
of June 2011, updated to include the CBO assumptions contained in its Aug. 1
letter to Congress. In general, the CBO's "Alternate Fiscal Scenario"
assumes a continuation of recent Congressional action overriding existing law.
We view the act's measures as a step toward fiscal consolidation.
However, this is within the framework of a legislative mechanism that leaves
open the details of what is finally agreed to until the end of 2011, and
Congress and the Administration could modify any agreement in the future. Even
assuming that at least $2.1 trillion of the spending reductions the act
envisages are implemented, we maintain our view that the
Compared with previous projections, our revised base case scenario now
assumes that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, due to expire by the end of 2012,
remain in place. We have changed our assumption on this because the majority of
Republicans in Congress continue to resist any measure that would raise
revenues, a position we believe Congress reinforced by passing the act. Key
macroeconomic assumptions in the base case scenario include trend real GDP
growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near 2% annually over the decade.
Our revised upside scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as
consistent with the outlook on the 'AA+' long-term rating being revised to
stable--retains these same macroeconomic assumptions. In addition, it
incorporates $950 billion of new revenues on the assumption that the 2001 and
2003 tax cuts for high earners lapse from 2013 onwards, as the Administration is
advocating. In this scenario, we project that the net general government debt
would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and
to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside scenario--which, other things being equal, we view
as being consistent with a possible further downgrade to a 'AA' long-term
rating--features less-favorable macroeconomic assumptions, as outlined below
and also assumes that the second round of spending cuts (at least $1.2
trillion) that the act calls for does not occur. This scenario also assumes
somewhat higher nominal interest rates for U.S. Treasuries. We still believe
that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key reserve currency confers a
government funding advantage, one that could change only slowly over time, and
that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose monetary policy at a time of
fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible that interest rates could rise
if investors re-price relative risks. As a result, our alternate scenario
factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in 10-year bond yields relative to
the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In this scenario, we project the
net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to
101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios also take into account the significant negative
revisions to historical GDP data that the Bureau of Economic Analysis announced
on July 29. From our perspective, the effect of these revisions underscores two
related points when evaluating the likely debt trajectory of the
When comparing the U.S. to sovereigns with 'AAA' long-term ratings that
we view as relevant peers--Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K.--we also
observe, based on our base case scenarios for each, that the trajectory of the
U.S.'s net public debt is diverging from the others. Including the
Standard & Poor's transfer T&C assessment of the
The outlook on the long-term rating is negative. As our downside
alternate fiscal scenario illustrates, a higher public debt trajectory than we
currently assume could lead us to lower the long-term rating again. On the
other hand, as our upside scenario highlights, if the recommendations of the
Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction--independently or
coupled with other initiatives, such as the lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax
cuts for high earners--lead to fiscal consolidation measures beyond the minimum
mandated, and we believe they are likely to slow the deterioration of the
government's debt dynamics, the long-term rating could stabilize at 'AA+'.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs. 60.24 |
|
|
1 |
Rs. 101.92 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs. 80.69 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Analysis Done by
: |
KRN |
|
|
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|
Report Prepared
by : |
DPT |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest
capability for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit
transaction. It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest
and principal sums |
Large |
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General unfavourable
factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for payment of
interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to
overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively below average. |
Small |
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with full
security |
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
-- |
NB |
New Business |
-- |
This score serves as a reference to assess SC’s credit risk and
to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is calculated from a composite
of weighted scores obtained from each of the major sections of this report. The
assessed factors and their relative weights (as indicated through %) are as
follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend
(10%) Operational
size (10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL)
or its officials.