|
Report Date : |
10.07.2014 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
|
Name : |
LAXMI DIAMOND |
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Registered Office : |
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Country : |
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|
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Date of Incorporation : |
16.12.1994 |
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Com. Reg. No.: |
-- |
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Legal Form : |
-- |
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Line of Business : |
-- |
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No of Employees : |
-- |
RATING & COMMENTS
|
MIRA’s Rating : |
C |
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
Status : |
Dissolved |
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Payment Behaviour : |
-- |
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Litigation : |
-- |
NOTES :
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail : infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – March 31, 2014
|
Country Name |
Previous Rating (31.12.2013) |
Current Rating (31.03.2014) |
|
|
A1 |
A1 |
|
Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
|
Insignificant |
A1 |
|
Low Risk |
A2 |
|
Moderate Low Risk |
B1 |
|
Moderate Risk |
B2 |
|
Moderate High Risk |
C1 |
|
High Risk |
C2 |
|
Very High Risk |
D |
UNITED STATES ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
The
|
Source
: CIA |
Company name: LAXMI DIAMOND
Address:
A Corporation named LAXMI DIAMOND INC. was incorporated in New York State on December 16, 1994, under ID# 1876443, was dissolved on September 23, 1998.
Its CEO was Nikunj PAREKH.
The Company is unknown at the address given on your order.
At that location, we find the Emporis Building with its 11 stories and several offices mainly rented by diamonds traders.
We called several of them but no one accepted to comment about LAXMI DIAMOND.
In our database, we found LAXMI DIAMOND as a name used by:
ANERI JEWELS, LLC
15 West 47th Street, New York, NT 10036
Ph: + 1 212-840-4506
CEO: Nikunj PAREKH (former CEO of Laxmi Diamond Inc.)
We called several times and left a message on the voicemail but nobody returned the call.
When calling, the voicemail answered as Laxmi Diamond.
We suggest you to be extremely careful.
Standard &
Poor’s
|
United States of
America Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'AA+' Due To Political Risks, Rising Debt
Burden; Outlook Negative |
|
Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
We have lowered our long-term sovereign credit rating on the United
States of America to 'AA+' from 'AAA' and affirmed the 'A-1+' short-term
rating.
We have also removed both the short- and long-term ratings from
CreditWatch negative.
The downgrade reflects our opinion that the fiscal consolidation plan
that Congress and the Administration recently agreed to falls short of what, in
our view, would be necessary to stabilize the government's medium-term debt
dynamics.
More broadly, the downgrade reflects our view that the effectiveness,
stability, and predictability of American policymaking and political
institutions have weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic challenges to
a degree more than we envisioned when we assigned a negative outlook to the
rating on April 18, 2011.
Since then, we have changed our view of the difficulties in bridging the
gulf between the political parties over fiscal policy, which makes us pessimistic
about the capacity of Congress and the Administration to be able to leverage
their agreement this week into a broader fiscal consolidation plan that
stabilizes the government's debt dynamics any time soon.
The outlook on the long-term rating is negative. We could lower the
long-term rating to 'AA' within the next two years if we see that less
reduction in spending than agreed to, higher interest rates, or new fiscal
pressures during the period result in a higher general government debt
trajectory than we currently assume in our base case.
TORONTO (Standard & Poor's)
Aug. 5, 2011--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that it lowered
its long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of America to 'AA+'
from 'AAA'. Standard & Poor's also said that the outlook on the long-term
rating is negative. At the same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed its 'A-1+'
short-term rating on the U.S. In addition, Standard & Poor's removed both
ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed on July 14, 2011, with
negative implications.
The transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment of the U.S.--our
assessment of the likelihood of official interference in the ability of
U.S.-based public- and private-sector issuers to secure foreign exchange for
debt service--remains 'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term rating on the U.S. because we believe that the
prolonged controversy over raising the statutory debt ceiling and the related
fiscal policy debate indicate that further near-term progress containing the
growth in public spending, especially on entitlements, or on reaching an
agreement on raising revenues is less likely than we previously assumed and
will remain a contentious and fitful process. We also believe that the fiscal
consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration agreed to this week
falls short of the amount that we believe is necessary to stabilize the general
government debt burden by the middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the rating was prompted by our view on the rising public
debt burden and our perception of greater policymaking uncertainty, consistent
with our criteria (see "Sovereign
Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions ," June 30, 2011,
especially Paragraphs 36-41). Nevertheless, we view the U.S. federal
government's other economic, external, and monetary credit attributes, which
form the basis for the sovereign rating, as broadly unchanged.
We have taken the ratings off CreditWatch because the Aug. 2 passage of
the Budget Control Act Amendment of 2011 has removed any perceived immediate
threat of payment default posed by delays to raising the government's debt
ceiling. In addition, we believe that the act provides sufficient clarity to
allow us to evaluate the likely course of U.S. fiscal policy for the next few
years.
The political brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as
America's governance and policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and
less predictable than what we previously believed. The statutory debt ceiling
and the threat of default have become political bargaining chips in the debate
over fiscal policy. Despite this year's wide-ranging debate, in our view, the
differences between political parties have proven to be extraordinarily
difficult to bridge, and, as we see it, the resulting agreement fell well short
of the comprehensive fiscal consolidation program that some proponents had
envisaged until quite recently. Republicans and Democrats have only been able
to agree to relatively modest savings on discretionary spending while
delegating to the Select Committee decisions on more comprehensive measures. It
appears that for now, new revenues have dropped down on the menu of policy
options. In addition, the plan envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare
and little change in other entitlements, the containment of which we and most
other independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal sustainability.
Our opinion is that elected officials remain wary of tackling the
structural issues required to effectively address the rising U.S. public debt
burden in a manner consistent with a 'AAA' rating and with 'AAA' rated
sovereign peers (see Sovereign
Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions," June 30, 2011,
especially Paragraphs 36-41). In our view, the difficulty in framing a
consensus on fiscal policy weakens the government's ability to manage public finances
and diverts attention from the debate over how to achieve more balanced and
dynamic economic growth in an era of fiscal stringency and private-sector
deleveraging (ibid). A new political consensus might (or might not) emerge
after the 2012 elections, but we believe that by then, the government debt
burden will likely be higher, the needed medium-term fiscal adjustment
potentially greater, and the inflection point on the U.S. population's
demographics and other age-related spending drivers closer at hand (see "Global
Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Likely Cost Even More Green, Now,"
June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's takes no position on the mix of spending and
revenue measures that Congress and the Administration might conclude is
appropriate for putting the U.S.'s finances on a sustainable footing.
The act calls for as much as $2.4 trillion of reductions in expenditure
growth over the 10 years through 2021. These cuts will be implemented in two
steps: the $917 billion agreed to initially, followed by an additional $1.5
trillion that the newly formed Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit
Reduction is supposed to recommend by November 2011. The act contains no
measures to raise taxes or otherwise enhance revenues, though the committee
could recommend them.
The act further provides that if Congress does not enact the committee's
recommendations, cuts of $1.2 trillion will be implemented over the same time
period. The reductions would mainly affect outlays for civilian discretionary
spending, defense, and Medicare. We understand that this fall-back mechanism is
designed to encourage Congress to embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure
savings, as the committee might recommend.
We note that in a letter to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011, the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) estimated total budgetary savings under the act to be at
least $2.1 trillion over the next 10 years relative to its baseline assumptions.
In updating our own fiscal projections, with certain modifications outlined
below, we have relied on the CBO's latest "Alternate Fiscal Scenario"
of June 2011, updated to include the CBO assumptions contained in its Aug. 1
letter to Congress. In general, the CBO's "Alternate Fiscal Scenario"
assumes a continuation of recent Congressional action overriding existing law.
We view the act's measures as a step toward fiscal consolidation.
However, this is within the framework of a legislative mechanism that leaves
open the details of what is finally agreed to until the end of 2011, and
Congress and the Administration could modify any agreement in the future. Even
assuming that at least $2.1 trillion of the spending reductions the act
envisages are implemented, we maintain our view that the U.S. net general
government debt burden (all levels of government combined, excluding liquid
financial assets) will likely continue to grow. Under our revised base case
fiscal scenario--which we consider to be consistent with a 'AA+' long-term
rating and a negative outlook--we now project that net general government debt
would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 79% in 2015 and
85% by 2021. Even the projected 2015 ratio of sovereign indebtedness is high in
relation to those of peer credits and, as noted, would continue to rise under
the act's revised policy settings.
Compared with previous projections, our revised base case scenario now assumes
that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, due to expire by the end of 2012, remain in
place. We have changed our assumption on this because the majority of
Republicans in Congress continue to resist any measure that would raise
revenues, a position we believe Congress reinforced by passing the act. Key
macroeconomic assumptions in the base case scenario include trend real GDP
growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near 2% annually over the decade.
Our revised upside scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as
consistent with the outlook on the 'AA+' long-term rating being revised to
stable--retains these same macroeconomic assumptions. In addition, it
incorporates $950 billion of new revenues on the assumption that the 2001 and
2003 tax cuts for high earners lapse from 2013 onwards, as the Administration
is advocating. In this scenario, we project that the net general government
debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 77% in 2015
and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside scenario--which, other things being equal, we view
as being consistent with a possible further downgrade to a 'AA' long-term
rating--features less-favorable macroeconomic assumptions, as outlined below
and also assumes that the second round of spending cuts (at least $1.2
trillion) that the act calls for does not occur. This scenario also assumes
somewhat higher nominal interest rates for U.S. Treasuries. We still believe
that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key reserve currency confers a
government funding advantage, one that could change only slowly over time, and
that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose monetary policy at a time of
fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible that interest rates could rise
if investors re-price relative risks. As a result, our alternate scenario
factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in 10-year bond yields relative to
the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In this scenario, we project the
net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to
101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios also take into account the significant negative
revisions to historical GDP data that the Bureau of Economic Analysis announced
on July 29. From our perspective, the effect of these revisions underscores two
related points when evaluating the likely debt trajectory of the U.S.
government. First, the revisions show that the recent recession was deeper than
previously assumed, so the GDP this year is lower than previously thought in
both nominal and real terms. Consequently, the debt burden is slightly higher.
Second, the revised data highlight the sub-par path of the current economic
recovery when compared with rebounds following previous post-war recessions. We
believe the sluggish pace of the current economic recovery could be consistent
with the experiences of countries that have had financial crises in which the
slow process of debt deleveraging in the private sector leads to a persistent
drag on demand. As a result, our downside case scenario assumes relatively
modest real trend GDP growth of 2.5% and inflation of near 1.5% annually going
forward.
When comparing the U.S. to sovereigns with 'AAA' long-term ratings that
we view as relevant peers--Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K.--we also
observe, based on our base case scenarios for each, that the trajectory of the
U.S.'s net public debt is diverging from the others. Including the U.S., we
estimate that these five sovereigns will have net general government debt to
GDP ratios this year ranging from 34% (Canada) to 80% (the U.K.), with the U.S.
debt burden at 74%. By 2015, we project that their net public debt to GDP
ratios will range between 30% (lowest, Canada) and 83% (highest, France), with
the U.S. debt burden at 79%. However, in contrast with the U.S., we project
that the net public debt burdens of these other sovereigns will begin to
decline, either before or by 2015.
Standard & Poor's transfer T&C assessment of the U.S. remains
'AAA'. Our T&C assessment reflects our view of the likelihood of the
sovereign restricting other public and private issuers' access to foreign
exchange needed to meet debt service. Although in our view the credit standing
of the U.S. government has deteriorated modestly, we see little indication that
official interference of this kind is entering onto the policy agenda of either
Congress or the Administration. Consequently, we continue to view this risk as
being highly remote.
The outlook on the long-term rating is negative. As our downside
alternate fiscal scenario illustrates, a higher public debt trajectory than we
currently assume could lead us to lower the long-term rating again. On the
other hand, as our upside scenario highlights, if the recommendations of the
Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction--independently or
coupled with other initiatives, such as the lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax
cuts for high earners--lead to fiscal consolidation measures beyond the minimum
mandated, and we believe they are likely to slow the deterioration of the government's
debt dynamics, the long-term rating could stabilize at 'AA+'.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs. 59.72 |
|
|
1 |
Rs. 102.35 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs. 81.38 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Analysis Done by
: |
SMT |
|
|
|
|
Report Prepared
by : |
DPT |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest capability
for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit
transaction. It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest
and principal sums |
Large |
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General
unfavourable factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for
payment of interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with
full security |
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit
risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not recommended |
|
-- |
NB |
New Business |
-- |
This score serves as a reference to assess SC’s credit risk
and to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is calculated from a composite
of weighted scores obtained from each of the major sections of this report. The
assessed factors and their relative weights (as indicated through %) are as
follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend
(10%) Operational
size (10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL)
or its officials.