MIRA
INFORM REPORT
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Report Date : |
06.05.2014 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
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Name : |
H & N FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC. |
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Registered Office : |
5580 S. Alameda Street, Vernon, CA 90058 |
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Country : |
United States |
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Date of Incorporation : |
1981 |
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Legal Form : |
Corporation – Profit |
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Line of Business : |
Importer, wholesaler, distributor, and
processor of seafood products in the United States. |
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No. of Employees |
170 |
RATING & COMMENTS
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MIRA’s Rating : |
B |
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RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
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26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
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Status : |
Moderate |
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Payment Behaviour : |
Slow |
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Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES :
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail : infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – March 31, 2014
|
Country Name |
Previous Rating (31.12.2013) |
Current Rating (31.03.2014) |
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United States |
A1 |
A1 |
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Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
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Insignificant |
A1 |
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Low Risk |
A2 |
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Moderately Low Risk |
B1 |
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Moderate Risk |
B2 |
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Moderately High Risk |
C1 |
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High Risk |
C2 |
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Very High Risk |
D |
UNITED STATES - ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
The US has the largest and
most technologically powerful economy in the world, with a per capita GDP of
$49,800. In this market-oriented economy, private individuals and business
firms make most of the decisions, and the federal and state governments buy
needed goods and services predominantly in the private marketplace. US business
firms enjoy greater flexibility than their counterparts in Western Europe and
Japan in decisions to expand capital plant, to lay off surplus workers, and to
develop new products. At the same time, they face higher barriers to enter their
rivals' home markets than foreign firms face entering US markets. US firms are
at or near the forefront in technological advances, especially in computers and
in medical, aerospace, and military equipment; their advantage has narrowed
since the end of World War II. The onrush of technology largely explains the
gradual development of a "two-tier labor market" in which those at
the bottom lack the education and the professional/technical skills of those at
the top and, more and more, fail to get comparable pay raises, health insurance
coverage, and other benefits. Since 1975, practically all the gains in
household income have gone to the top 20% of households. Since 1996, dividends
and capital gains have grown faster than wages or any other category of after-tax
income. Imported oil accounts for nearly 55% of US consumption. Crude oil
prices doubled between 2001 and 2006, the year home prices peaked; higher
gasoline prices ate into consumers' budgets and many individuals fell behind in
their mortgage payments. Oil prices climbed another 50% between 2006 and 2008,
and bank foreclosures more than doubled in the same period. Besides dampening
the housing market, soaring oil prices caused a drop in the value of the dollar
and a deterioration in the US merchandise trade deficit, which peaked at $840
billion in 2008. The sub-prime mortgage crisis, falling home prices, investment
bank failures, tight credit, and the global economic downturn pushed the United
States into a recession by mid-2008. GDP contracted until the third quarter of
2009, making this the deepest and longest downturn since the Great Depression.
To help stabilize financial markets, in October 2008 the US Congress
established a $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The government
used some of these funds to purchase equity in US banks and industrial
corporations, much of which had been returned to the government by early 2011.
In January 2009 the US Congress passed and President Barack OBAMA signed a bill
providing an additional $787 billion fiscal stimulus to be used over 10 years -
two-thirds on additional spending and one-third on tax cuts - to create jobs
and to help the economy recover. In 2010 and 2011, the federal budget deficit
reached nearly 9% of GDP. In 2012 the federal government reduced the growth of
spending and the deficit shrank to 7.6% of GDP. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
required major shifts in national resources from civilian to military purposes
and contributed to the growth of the budget deficit and public debt. Through
2011, the direct costs of the wars totaled nearly $900 billion, according to US
government figures. US revenues from taxes and other sources are lower, as a
percentage of GDP, than those of most other countries. In March 2010, President
OBAMA signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, a health
insurance reform that was designed to extend coverage to an additional 32
million American citizens by 2016, through private health insurance for the
general population and Medicaid for the impoverished. Total spending on health
care - public plus private - rose from 9.0% of GDP in 1980 to 17.9% in 2010. In
July 2010, the president signed the DODD-FRANK Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, a law designed to promote financial stability by protecting
consumers from financial abuses, ending taxpayer bailouts of financial firms,
dealing with troubled banks that are "too big to fail," and improving
accountability and transparency in the financial system - in particular, by
requiring certain financial derivatives to be traded in markets that are
subject to government regulation and oversight. In December 2012, the Federal
Reserve Board (Fed) announced plans to purchase $85 billion per month of
mortgage-backed and Treasury securities in an effort to hold down long-term
interest rates, and to keep short term rates near zero until unemployment drops
below 6.5% or inflation rises above 2.5%. In late 2013, the Fed announced that
it would begin scaling back long-term bond purchases to $75 billion per month
in January 2014 and reduce them further as conditions warranted; the Fed,
however, would keep short-term rates near zero so long as unemployment and
inflation had not crossed the previously stated thresholds. Long-term problems
include stagnation of wages for lower-income families, inadequate investment in
deteriorating infrastructure, rapidly rising medical and pension costs of an
aging population, energy shortages, and sizable current account and budget
deficits
|
Source
: CIA |
Company name
H & N FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Address: 5580
S. Alameda Street, Vernon, CA 90058 - USA
Telephone: +1
323-586-9388
Fax: +1
323-586-9333
Website: www.hnfoods.com
Corporate ID#: C1176154
State:
California
Judicial form: Corporation
– Profit
Date incorporated: 03-28-1983
Date founded: 1981
Stock: -
Value: -
Name of manager: Hua Thanh NGO
ACTIVITIES
& OPERATIONS
Business:
H & N Foods International, Inc. operates
as an importer, wholesaler, distributor, and processor of seafood products in
the United States.
It supplies fresh fish, live fish, and
frozen seafood, as well as packaged products. The company’s products also
include mussels, squid, and shrimp products; and fillets, crustaceans,
cephalopods, and chunk fish.
It serves customers and producers primarily
in North America, Central America, South America, the Pacific Rim, Europe,
Asia, and Australia.
It operates in Los Angeles, San Francisco
and 24-hour operational centers.
The company’s brands include Blue River,
Pacific Delight, Pacific Light and H&N Fish Company.
It is a member of National Fisheries
Institute and California Fisheries Institute and receives financial support
from Ocean Trust and the California Academy of Sciences.
Office of the Foreign Assets Control (OFAC):
The company is not listed on the OFAC list.
The Specially Designated Nationals (SDN)
List is a publication of OFAC which lists individuals and organizations with whom
United States citizens and permanent residents are prohibited from doing
business.
Suppliers include:
THONG SIEK FOOD INDUSTRY PTE LTD
14 Senoko Way Singapore
KADER EXPORTS P LTD.,KADER EXPORTS P LTD.
16 Madame Cama Road, Coloba, Mumbai - 400 001 India
EIN: 94-2938398
Staff: 170
Operations & branches:
At the headquarters, we find the corporate office and warehouse, owned.
The Company maintains branches located:
Pier 45, Shed-D
San Francisco, CA 94133
Phone: 415-931-1853
Fax: 415-931-8454
819 Cowan Rd. Suite B
Burlingame, CA 94010
Phone: 650-689-8055
Fax: 650-697-3148
SHAREHOLDERS & MANAGERS
Shareholders:
This is a NGO family owned and management Company.
Management:
Mr. Hua Thanh NGO is the President, Director
and CEO
He served as material handler of Ampoc,
Berkeley, Califonia from 1979 to 1980 and Partner of SAIGON, Vietnam, from 1972
to 1979.
Christine NGO is Executive Vice President
Bobby NGO is Vice President of Sales
Dean TOWNSEND is the Controller.
As far as we know, they are involved in
other local corporations, including:
H & N GROUP, INC.
Incorporated in California on 09-09-2008
ID# C3160995
H.N.F.I., L.P.
Incorporated in California on 12-08-1988
ID# 198834400044
FINANCIALS
In United States and Canada, privately held corporations are not
required to publish any financials.
On a direct call, a financial assistant controlled the present report.
Sales declared for year 2013 is in the range of USD 40,000,000=
Net profit is in the range of USD 1,000,000+
Banks: Wells Fargo Bank
LEGAL FILINGS
Legal filings & complaints:
As of today date, there is no legal filing
pending with the Courts.
Secured debts summary (UCC): Several
Haut du formulaire
COMPANY
CREDIT HISTORY
Trade references:
Date reported: March 2014
High credit: USD 15,000
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: February 2014
Line of business: Office
supply
Paying status: 5 days beyond
terms
Date reported: March 2014
High credit: USD 250,000+
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: February 2014
Line of business: Payroll
Paying status: As agreed
Date reported: March 2014
High credit: USD 800
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: February 2014
Line of business: Telecommunications
Paying status: 5 days beyond
terms
Domestic credit history:
Domestic credit history appears as follow:
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Monthly
Payment Trends - Recent Activity
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National Credit Bureaus gave a medium credit rating.
According to our credit analysts, during the
last 6 months, domestic payments were made with an average of 5 to 10 days
beyond terms.
International
credit history:
Payments of imports are currently made with
an average of 2 to 5 days beyond terms.
Other comments:
The Company maintains a regular business.
The bank confirmed late payments.
The Company is in good standing.
This means that all local and federal taxes were paid on due date.
The risk is medium.
Our opinion:
A business connection may be conducted but we suggest you to check
regularly the way of payments.
Standard & Poor’s
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United
States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'AA+' Due To Political Risks,
Rising Debt Burden; Outlook Negative |
|
Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
- We have lowered our long-term sovereign credit rating on the
United States of America to 'AA+' from 'AAA' and affirmed the 'A-1+'
short-term rating.
·
We have also removed both the short- and long-term ratings
from CreditWatch negative.
·
The downgrade reflects our opinion that the fiscal
consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration recently agreed to
falls short of what, in our view, would be necessary to stabilize the
government's medium-term debt dynamics.
·
More broadly, the downgrade reflects our view that the
effectiveness, stability, and predictability of American policymaking and
political institutions have weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic
challenges to a degree more than we envisioned when we assigned a negative
outlook to the rating on April 18, 2011.
·
Since then, we have changed our view of the difficulties in
bridging the gulf between the political parties over fiscal policy, which makes
us pessimistic about the capacity of Congress and the Administration to be able
to leverage their agreement this week into a broader fiscal consolidation plan
that stabilizes the government's debt dynamics any time soon.
·
The outlook on the long-term rating is negative. We could
lower the long-term rating to 'AA' within the next two years if we see that
less reduction in spending than agreed to, higher interest rates, or new fiscal
pressures during the period result in a higher general government debt
trajectory than we currently assume in our base case.
TORONTO (Standard &
Poor's) Aug. 5, 2011--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that it
lowered its long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of America
to 'AA+' from 'AAA'. Standard & Poor's also said that the outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. At the same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed
its 'A-1+' short-term rating on the U.S. In addition, Standard & Poor's
removed both ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed on July 14, 2011,
with negative implications.
The transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment of the U.S.--our
assessment of the likelihood of official interference in the ability of
U.S.-based public- and private-sector issuers to secure foreign exchange for
debt service--remains
'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term
rating on the U.S. because we believe that the prolonged controversy over
raising the statutory debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate
indicate that further near-term progress containing the growth in public
spending, especially on entitlements, or on reaching an agreement on raising
revenues is less likely than we previously assumed and will remain a
contentious and fitful process. We also believe that the fiscal consolidation
plan that Congress and the Administration agreed to this week falls short of
the amount that we believe is necessary to stabilize the general government
debt burden by the middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the
rating was prompted by our view on the rising public debt burden and our
perception of greater policymaking uncertainty, consistent with our criteria
(see "Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions
," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41). Nevertheless, we view the
U.S. federal government's other economic, external, and monetary credit
attributes, which form the basis for the sovereign rating, as broadly
unchanged.
We have taken the ratings
off CreditWatch because the Aug. 2 passage of the Budget Control Act Amendment
of 2011 has removed any perceived immediate threat of payment default posed by
delays to raising the government's debt ceiling. In addition, we believe that
the act provides sufficient clarity to allow us to evaluate the likely course
of U.S. fiscal policy for the next few years.
The political brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as
America's governance and policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and
less predictable than what we previously believed. The statutory debt ceiling
and the threat of default have become political bargaining chips in the debate
over fiscal policy. Despite this year's wide-ranging debate, in our view, the
differences between political parties have proven to be extraordinarily
difficult to bridge, and, as we see it, the resulting agreement fell well short
of the comprehensive fiscal consolidation program that some proponents had
envisaged until quite recently. Republicans and Democrats have only been able
to agree to relatively modest savings on discretionary spending while
delegating to the Select Committee decisions on more comprehensive measures. It
appears that for now, new revenues have dropped down on the menu of policy
options. In addition, the plan envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare
and little change in other entitlements,
the containment of which
we and most other independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal
sustainability.
Our opinion is that
elected officials remain wary of tackling the structural issues required to
effectively address the rising U.S. public debt burden in a manner consistent
with a 'AAA' rating and with 'AAA' rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions,"
June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41). In our view, the difficulty in
framing a consensus on fiscal policy weakens the government's ability to manage
public finances and diverts attention from the debate over how to achieve more
balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era of fiscal stringency and
private-sector deleveraging (ibid). A new political consensus might (or might
not) emerge after the 2012 elections, but we believe that by then, the
government debt burden will likely be higher, the needed medium-term fiscal
adjustment potentially greater, and the inflection point on the U.S.
population's demographics and other age-related spending drivers closer at hand
(see "Global Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Likely Cost Even
More Green, Now," June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's
takes no position on the mix of spending and revenue measures that Congress and
the Administration might conclude is appropriate for putting the U.S.'s
finances on a sustainable footing.
The act calls for as much
as $2.4 trillion of reductions in expenditure growth over the 10 years through
2021. These cuts will be implemented in two steps: the $917 billion agreed to
initially, followed by an additional $1.5 trillion that the newly formed
Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction is supposed to
recommend by November 2011. The act contains no measures to raise taxes or
otherwise enhance revenues, though the committee could recommend them.
The act further provides
that if Congress does not enact the committee's recommendations, cuts of $1.2
trillion will be implemented over the same time period. The reductions would
mainly affect outlays for civilian discretionary spending, defense, and
Medicare. We understand that this fall-back mechanism is designed to encourage
Congress to embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure savings, as the
committee might recommend.
We note that in a letter
to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated
total budgetary savings under the act to be at least $2.1 trillion over the
next 10 years relative to its baseline assumptions. In updating our own fiscal
projections, with certain modifications outlined below, we have relied on the
CBO's latest "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" of June 2011, updated to
include the CBO assumptions contained in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In
general, the CBO's "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" assumes a continuation
of recent Congressional action overriding existing law.
We view the act's
measures as a step toward fiscal consolidation. However, this is within the
framework of a legislative mechanism that leaves open the details of what is
finally agreed to until the end of 2011, and Congress and the Administration
could modify any agreement in the future. Even assuming that at least $2.1
trillion of the spending reductions the act envisages are implemented, we
maintain our view that the U.S. net general government debt burden (all levels
of government combined, excluding liquid financial assets) will likely continue
to grow. Under our revised base case fiscal scenario--which we consider to be
consistent with a 'AA+' long-term rating and a negative outlook--we now project
that net general government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the
end of 2011 to 79% in 2015 and 85% by 2021. Even the projected 2015 ratio of
sovereign indebtedness is high in relation to those of peer credits and, as
noted, would continue to rise under the act's revised policy settings.
Compared with previous
projections, our revised base case scenario now assumes that the 2001 and 2003
tax cuts, due to expire by the end of 2012, remain in place. We have changed
our assumption on this because the majority of Republicans in Congress continue
to resist any measure that would raise revenues, a position we believe Congress
reinforced by passing the act. Key macroeconomic assumptions in the base case
scenario include trend real GDP growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near
2% annually over the decade.
Our revised upside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as consistent with the
outlook on the 'AA+' long-term rating being revised to stable--retains these
same macroeconomic assumptions. In addition, it incorporates $950 billion of
new revenues on the assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners
lapse from 2013 onwards, as the Administration is advocating. In this scenario,
we project that the net general government debt would rise from an estimated
74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as being consistent with a
possible further downgrade to a 'AA' long-term rating--features less-favorable
macroeconomic assumptions, as outlined below and also assumes that the second
round of spending cuts (at least $1.2 trillion) that the act calls for does not
occur. This scenario also assumes somewhat higher nominal interest rates for U.S.
Treasuries. We still believe that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key
reserve currency confers a government funding advantage, one that could change
only slowly over time, and that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose
monetary policy at a time of fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible
that interest rates could rise if investors re-price relative risks. As a
result, our alternate scenario factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in
10-year bond yields relative to the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In
this scenario, we project the net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP
in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to 101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios
also take into account the significant negative revisions to historical GDP
data that the Bureau of Economic Analysis announced on July 29. From our
perspective, the effect of these revisions underscores two related points when
evaluating the likely debt trajectory of the U.S. government. First, the
revisions show that the recent recession was deeper than previously assumed, so
the GDP this year is lower than previously thought in both nominal and real
terms. Consequently, the debt burden is slightly higher. Second, the revised
data highlight the sub-par path of the current economic recovery when compared
with rebounds following previous post-war recessions. We believe the sluggish
pace of the current economic recovery could be consistent with the experiences
of countries that have had financial crises in which the slow process of debt deleveraging
in the private sector leads to a persistent drag on demand. As a result, our
downside case scenario assumes relatively modest real trend GDP growth of 2.5%
and inflation of near 1.5% annually going forward.
When comparing the U.S.
to sovereigns with 'AAA' long-term ratings that we view as relevant
peers--Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K.--we also observe, based on our
base case scenarios for each, that the trajectory of the U.S.'s net public debt
is diverging from the others. Including the U.S., we estimate that these five
sovereigns will have net general government debt to GDP ratios this year
ranging from 34% (Canada) to 80% (the U.K.), with the U.S. debt burden at 74%.
By 2015, we project that their net public debt to GDP ratios will range between
30% (lowest, Canada) and 83% (highest, France), with the U.S. debt burden at
79%. However, in contrast with the U.S., we project that the net public debt
burdens of these other sovereigns will begin to decline, either before or by
2015.
Standard & Poor's
transfer T&C assessment of the U.S. remains 'AAA'. Our T&C assessment
reflects our view of the likelihood of the sovereign restricting other public
and private issuers' access to foreign exchange needed to meet debt service.
Although in our view the credit standing of the U.S. government has
deteriorated modestly, we see little indication that official interference of
this kind is entering onto the policy agenda of either Congress or the
Administration. Consequently, we continue to view this risk as being highly
remote.
The outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. As our downside alternate fiscal scenario
illustrates, a higher public debt trajectory than we currently assume could
lead us to lower the long-term rating again. On the other hand, as our upside
scenario highlights, if the recommendations of the Congressional Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction--independently or coupled with other
initiatives, such as the lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high
earners--lead to fiscal consolidation measures beyond the minimum mandated, and
we believe they are likely to slow the deterioration of the government's debt
dynamics, the long-term rating could stabilize at 'AA+'.
On Monday, we will issue separate releases concerning affected ratings
in the funds, government-related entities, financial institutions, insurance,
public finance, and structured finance sectors.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.60.04 |
|
|
1 |
Rs.101.31 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.83.34 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
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Analysis Done by
: |
DIV |
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Report Prepared
by : |
PDT |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest
capability for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit
transaction. It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest
and principal sums |
Large |
|
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General
unfavourable factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for
payment of interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with
full security |
|
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
|
-- |
NB |
New Business |
-- |
|
This score serves as a reference to assess
SC’s credit risk and to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is
calculated from a composite of weighted scores obtained from each of the major
sections of this report. The assessed factors and their relative weights (as
indicated through %) are as follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend (10%) Operational size
(10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL)
or its officials.