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Report Date : |
12.05.2014 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
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Name : |
ASPECT SOFTWARE INC. |
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Registered Office : |
300 Apollo Drive, Ste 9, Chelmsford, MA 01824 |
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Country : |
United States |
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Date of Incorporation : |
15.06.1982 |
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Legal Form : |
Corporation – Profit |
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Line of Business : |
Aspect Software, Inc. provides customer contact and enterprise workforce
optimization solutions for customers in the United States and
internationally. It offers Seamless Customer Service, a unified
communications solution for contact centers; Blended Interaction that unites
inbound routing, Internet contact, voice portal, outbound dialing, and
workforce management; Unified Outreach, which automates proactive contact
strategies for customer service and sales; Optimized Collections, a unified
communications application for the contact center; Advanced Quality Analysis
that improves customer interactions through analytics; and Inbound Automatic
Call Distribution System for inbound automatic call distribution. |
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No. of Employees |
2,000+ |
RATING & COMMENTS
|
MIRA’s Rating : |
B |
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RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
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26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
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Status : |
Moderate |
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Payment Behaviour : |
Slow but correct |
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Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES :
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail : infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – March 31, 2014
|
Country Name |
Previous Rating (31.12.2013) |
Current Rating (31.03.2014) |
|
United States |
A1 |
A1 |
|
Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
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Insignificant |
A1 |
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Low Risk |
A2 |
|
Moderately Low Risk |
B1 |
|
Moderate Risk |
B2 |
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Moderately High Risk |
C1 |
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High Risk |
C2 |
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Very High Risk |
D |
UNITED STATES - ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
The US has the largest and
most technologically powerful economy in the world, with a per capita GDP of $49,800.
In this market-oriented economy, private individuals and business firms make
most of the decisions, and the federal and state governments buy needed goods
and services predominantly in the private marketplace. US business firms enjoy
greater flexibility than their counterparts in Western Europe and Japan in
decisions to expand capital plant, to lay off surplus workers, and to develop
new products. At the same time, they face higher barriers to enter their
rivals' home markets than foreign firms face entering US markets. US firms are
at or near the forefront in technological advances, especially in computers and
in medical, aerospace, and military equipment; their advantage has narrowed
since the end of World War II. The onrush of technology largely explains the
gradual development of a "two-tier labor market" in which those at
the bottom lack the education and the professional/technical skills of those at
the top and, more and more, fail to get comparable pay raises, health insurance
coverage, and other benefits. Since 1975, practically all the gains in
household income have gone to the top 20% of households. Since 1996, dividends
and capital gains have grown faster than wages or any other category of
after-tax income. Imported oil accounts for nearly 55% of US consumption. Crude
oil prices doubled between 2001 and 2006, the year home prices peaked; higher
gasoline prices ate into consumers' budgets and many individuals fell behind in
their mortgage payments. Oil prices climbed another 50% between 2006 and 2008,
and bank foreclosures more than doubled in the same period. Besides dampening
the housing market, soaring oil prices caused a drop in the value of the dollar
and a deterioration in the US merchandise trade deficit, which peaked at $840
billion in 2008. The sub-prime mortgage crisis, falling home prices, investment
bank failures, tight credit, and the global economic downturn pushed the United
States into a recession by mid-2008. GDP contracted until the third quarter of
2009, making this the deepest and longest downturn since the Great Depression.
To help stabilize financial markets, in October 2008 the US Congress
established a $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The government
used some of these funds to purchase equity in US banks and industrial
corporations, much of which had been returned to the government by early 2011.
In January 2009 the US Congress passed and President Barack OBAMA signed a bill
providing an additional $787 billion fiscal stimulus to be used over 10 years -
two-thirds on additional spending and one-third on tax cuts - to create jobs
and to help the economy recover. In 2010 and 2011, the federal budget deficit
reached nearly 9% of GDP. In 2012 the federal government reduced the growth of
spending and the deficit shrank to 7.6% of GDP. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
required major shifts in national resources from civilian to military purposes
and contributed to the growth of the budget deficit and public debt. Through
2011, the direct costs of the wars totaled nearly $900 billion, according to US
government figures. US revenues from taxes and other sources are lower, as a
percentage of GDP, than those of most other countries. In March 2010, President
OBAMA signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, a health
insurance reform that was designed to extend coverage to an additional 32
million American citizens by 2016, through private health insurance for the
general population and Medicaid for the impoverished. Total spending on health
care - public plus private - rose from 9.0% of GDP in 1980 to 17.9% in 2010. In
July 2010, the president signed the DODD-FRANK Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, a law designed to promote financial stability by protecting
consumers from financial abuses, ending taxpayer bailouts of financial firms,
dealing with troubled banks that are "too big to fail," and improving
accountability and transparency in the financial system - in particular, by
requiring certain financial derivatives to be traded in markets that are
subject to government regulation and oversight. In December 2012, the Federal
Reserve Board (Fed) announced plans to purchase $85 billion per month of
mortgage-backed and Treasury securities in an effort to hold down long-term
interest rates, and to keep short term rates near zero until unemployment drops
below 6.5% or inflation rises above 2.5%. In late 2013, the Fed announced that
it would begin scaling back long-term bond purchases to $75 billion per month
in January 2014 and reduce them further as conditions warranted; the Fed,
however, would keep short-term rates near zero so long as unemployment and
inflation had not crossed the previously stated thresholds. Long-term problems
include stagnation of wages for lower-income families, inadequate investment in
deteriorating infrastructure, rapidly rising medical and pension costs of an
aging population, energy shortages, and sizable current account and budget
deficits
|
Source
: CIA |
ASPECT SOFTWARE INC.
Address: 300 Apollo Drive, Ste 9,
Chelmsford, MA 01824 - USA
Telephone: +1
978-250-7900
Fax: +1 978-244-7410
Website: www.aspect.com
Corporate ID#: 0939326
State: Massachusetts
Judicial form: Corporation – Profit
Date incorporated: 06-15-1982
Stock: 1,000
shares common (none issued)
Value: USD
0.01= par value
Name of manager: Stewart
BLOOM
Business:
Aspect Software, Inc. provides customer contact and enterprise workforce
optimization solutions for customers in the United States and internationally.
It offers Seamless Customer Service, a unified communications solution for
contact centers; Blended Interaction that unites inbound routing, Internet
contact, voice portal, outbound dialing, and workforce management; Unified
Outreach, which automates proactive contact strategies for customer service and
sales; Optimized Collections, a unified communications application for the contact
center; Advanced Quality Analysis that improves customer interactions through
analytics; and Inbound Automatic Call Distribution System for inbound automatic
call distribution.
The company also provides Outbound Predictive Dialer, an outbound
predictive dialer product; Voice Portal/IVR, a voice portal/interactive voice
response product; Internet Contact/Email/Web that enables users to contact
their business through their preferred channel; Aspect Unified IP, a campaign
optimization product; and Aspect Unified IP, a unified contact center software.
Further, it offers Aspect Workforce Management system, which provides
planning and tracking across customer service, collections, and back office
organizations; Aspect Quality Management Software for voice and screen
recording; and Aspect Performance Management Software for front-line personnel.
The company also offers training, support, consulting, implementation,
optimization, education, and technical services.
It serves commercial banks, general merchandisers, health insurance
companies, pharmaceutical companies, telecoms, airlines, and computer software
companies. It has a strategic alliance
with LiveVox.
The company was formerly known as Concerto Software, Inc. and changed
its name to Aspect Software, Inc. in May 2007.
The company was founded in 1973 and is based in Chelmsford,
Massachusetts. Aspect Software, Inc. operates as a subsidiary of Aspect
Software Parent, Inc.
Office
of the Foreign Assets Control (OFAC):
The company is not listed on the OFAC list.
The Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List is a publication of OFAC
which lists individuals and organizations with whom United States citizens and
permanent residents are prohibited from doing business.
No name of foreign suppliers available.
EIN: 02-0364368
Staff: 2,000+
Operations & branches:
At the headquarters, we
find the corporate office, on lease.
The Company maintains
several branches in the U.S.
Shareholders:
ASPECT SOFTWARE PARENT,
INC.
Incorporated in Delaware on
09-22-2005
ID# 4028008
The ultimate parent is:
ASPECT SOFTWARE GROUP
HOLDINGS LTD
2325 East Camelback Road, Suite 700
Phoenix, Arizona 85016 – USA
Incorporated in Cayman Islands
Management:
Stewart M. BLOOM serves as the Director at LiveVox TopCo, LLC.
He also has been the Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of Aspect
Software Group Holdings Ltd. since August 2012 and is its Director since August
1, 2012. He served as its President since August 1, 2012. Mr. Bloom has been
Chief Executive Officer and Director of Aspect Software, Inc. since August 1,
2012 and served as its President. He has been an Operating Executive at Golden
Gate Capital since July 2011. He focuses on software investments at the firm.
Mr. Bloom served as Chief Executive Officer of Escalate Retail from August 2006
to February 2011. He served as Chief Executive Officer of the Escalate Retail
division of RedPrairie Corp. from February 2011 to July 2011. He served as the
Chief Executive Officer of Escalate Inc. He serves as a Director of Escalate,
Inc. Prior to joining Escalate in 2005, he held positions as Chief Executive
Officer at GERS Retail Systems, Vice President at Americas Technology Services
for Capgemini where he led the practice, and Senior Vice President for Strategy
Consultancy at Mainspring, prior to its IPO and subsequent acquisition by IBM.
He was a Partner at Ernst & Young Management Consulting and a leader of its
Center for Technology Enablement, following E&Y's acquisition of DSSI,
where he was the Co-Founder and Vice President.
He was a Partner at the e-Business transformation in the
management-consulting unit of Ernst & Young LLP. Mr. Bloom served as the
Chief Executive Officer and President of GERS, Inc., since May 10, 2005. Mr.
Bloom held positions in retail store operations including Radio Shack/Tandy
Corp. Mr. Bloom advised enterprise clients such as American Express, Ford
Motors, Nissan, Kaiser-Permanente, Time Warner, Sony Pictures Entertainment,
Universal Pictures, and Xerox on eCommerce and information technology strategy
and governance in a growth economy. Mr. Bloom serves as Executive Chairman of
Symon Communications since April 2012. He has been a Director at Infor Inc.
since April 2012.
He serves as a Board Member of Lawson Software. Mr. Bloom is a Member of
the Business Advisory Council for the College of Business Administration at
Loyola Marymount University in Los Angeles. Mr. Bloom has 28 years of
experience in the technology, software, and retail worlds. He has a rich
background in profitably managing the delivery of innovative technology
solutions to both Fortune 500 firms and the mid-market.
James D.M. FOY served as the Chief Executive Officer of Talend SA from
April 2013 to October 10, 2013. Mr. Foy served as the Chief Executive Officer
of Aspect Software Group Holdings Ltd. since 2001 and served as its President
from 2001 to August 2008. Mr. Foy served as the President and Chief Executive
Officer at Aspect Software Inc. at AIM Technology, Inc. since 2001 until 2004.
He was employed at Golden Gate Capital and Riverside Health Care System, Inc.
Prior to his current role at Aspect, he served as the President of Informix
Software (Ireland) Ltd from July 2000 to August 2001 and as an Executive Vice
President of the Transaction Business Group from April 1999 to June 2000.
He served as Senior Vice President of Ascential Software Corp. Mr. Foy
served as the President and Chief Executive Officer of Concerto Software Inc.
at Cellit, Inc. since September 2001. He joined Concerto Software in 2001 and
was responsible for achieving its bold mission to become the dominant global
supplier of customer interaction management (CIM) solutions. Mr. Foy served as
an Executive Vice President of Engineering at ARDENT Software, Inc. from April
1995 to March 1999 and served as its Vice President of Engineering. He founded
Constellation Software Inc. in 1991 and served as its Chief Executive Officer
and President. He served as the President, Chief Executive Officer, and Director
of Cellit Technologies.
He served as a Director of Research and Development at Prime Computer.
He was employed at International Computers Limited (ICL). He has been
Executive Chairman of Aspect Software, Inc since June 2012. He served as the Executive
Chairman of Talend SA since February 2013. He has been a Director at Tangoe,
Inc. since March 2014, Dealertrack Technologies, Inc. (DealerTrack Holdings,
Inc). since September 2008 and Continuum LLC since October 22, 2013. He has
been a Non-Executive Director of Kalido, Ltd. since October 20, 2004. He serves
as a Director at LiveLOOK, Altio Limited, Kalido, Inc., Aspect Software, Inc.
He served as a Director of Aspect Software Group Holdings Ltd. since 2001. Mr.
Foy served as a Director at Cellit Technologies, X/Open and Unix International.
He served as a Director of Concerto Software Inc. since September 2001.
Robert J. KRAKAUER is the Chief Financial Officer.
They are also involved in other corporations including:
- ASPECT SOFTWARE GROUP, INC.
- ASPECT SOFTWARE INTERMEDIATE HOLDINGS LLC
- ASPECT SOFTWARE PARENT, INC.
In United States, privately
held corporations are not required to publish any financials.
On a direct call, a
financial assistant controlled the present report.
All financials are
consolidated in the ultimate parent company.
(10K 2013 on attachment)
Banks: JPMorgan Chase Bank
Legal filings & complaints:
State: Texas
Case number: 3:13-cv-05040-M
Plaintiff: John Roberts
Defendant: Aspect Software Inc
Barbara M.G. Lynn, presiding
Date filed: 12/30/2013
Date of last filing: 03/19/2014
Cause: Employment discrimination
State: Delaware
Case number: 1:14-cv-00359-RGA
Plaintiff: Pragmatus Telecom LLC
Defendant: Aspect Software Inc.
Richard G. Andrews, presiding
Date filed: 03/20/2014
Date of last filing: 04/11/2014
Cause: Patent infringement
State: Puerto Rico
Case number: 3:13-cv-01703-DRD
Plaintiff: TCG Innovations Corporation, Inc.
Defendant: Aspect Software, Inc.
Daniel R. Dominguez, presiding
Date filed: 09/17/2013
Date of last filing: 04/23/2014
Cause: Breach of contract
Secured debts summary (UCC):
None
Haut du formulaire
Trade references:
Date reported: March 2014
High credit: USD 100,000+
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: February 2014
Line of business: Office supply
Paying status: On terms
Date reported: March 2014
High credit: USD 3,500,000+
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: February 2014
Line of business: Payroll
Paying status: As agreed
Date reported: March 2014
High credit: USD 4,000
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: February 2014
Line of business: Telecommunications
Paying status: On terms
Domestic credit history:
Domestic credit history
appears as follow:
|
Monthly Payment Trends - Recent
Activity
|
National Credit Bureaus
gave a medium credit rating.
According to our credit analysts, during the last 6 months, domestic
payments were made with an average of 7 days beyond terms.
Other comments:
The bank confirmed some
late payments.
The Company is in good
standing.
This means that all local
and federal taxes were paid on due date.
Last report was filed on
03-14-2013.
The risk is medium.
Our opinion:
A business connection may
be conducted.
Standard & Poor’s
|
United
States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'AA+' Due To Political Risks, Rising
Debt Burden; Outlook Negative |
|
Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
·
We have lowered our long-term sovereign credit rating on the United
States of America to 'AA+' from 'AAA' and affirmed the 'A-1+' short-term
rating.
·
We have also removed both the short- and long-term ratings
from CreditWatch negative.
·
The downgrade reflects our opinion
that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration
recently agreed to falls short of what, in our view, would be necessary to
stabilize the government's medium-term debt dynamics.
·
More broadly, the downgrade
reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of
American policymaking and political institutions have weakened at a time of
ongoing fiscal and economic challenges to a degree more than we envisioned when
we assigned a negative outlook to the rating on April 18, 2011.
·
Since then, we have changed our
view of the difficulties in bridging the gulf between the political parties
over fiscal policy, which makes us pessimistic about the capacity of Congress
and the Administration to be able to leverage their agreement this week into a
broader fiscal consolidation plan that stabilizes the government's debt
dynamics any time soon.
·
The outlook on the long-term rating
is negative. We could lower the long-term rating to 'AA' within the next two
years if we see that less reduction in spending than agreed to, higher interest
rates, or new fiscal pressures during the period result in a higher general government
debt trajectory than we currently assume in our base case.
TORONTO (Standard &
Poor's) Aug. 5, 2011--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that it
lowered its long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of America
to 'AA+' from 'AAA'. Standard & Poor's also said that the outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. At the same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed
its 'A-1+' short-term rating on the U.S. In addition, Standard & Poor's
removed both ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed on July 14, 2011,
with negative implications.
The
transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment of the U.S.--our assessment of
the likelihood of official interference in the ability of U.S.-based public-
and private-sector issuers to secure foreign exchange for
debt service--remains
'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term
rating on the U.S. because we believe that the prolonged controversy over
raising the statutory debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate
indicate that further near-term progress containing the growth in public
spending, especially on entitlements, or on reaching an agreement on raising
revenues is less likely than we previously assumed and will remain a
contentious and fitful process. We also believe that the fiscal consolidation
plan that Congress and the Administration agreed to this week falls short of
the amount that we believe is necessary to stabilize the general government
debt burden by the middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the
rating was prompted by our view on the rising public debt burden and our
perception of greater policymaking uncertainty, consistent with our criteria
(see "Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions
," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41). Nevertheless, we view the
U.S. federal government's other economic, external, and monetary credit
attributes, which form the basis for the sovereign rating, as broadly
unchanged.
We have taken the ratings
off CreditWatch because the Aug. 2 passage of the Budget Control Act Amendment
of 2011 has removed any perceived immediate threat of payment default posed by
delays to raising the government's debt ceiling. In addition, we believe that
the act provides sufficient clarity to allow us to evaluate the likely course
of U.S. fiscal policy for the next few years.
The
political brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as America's
governance and policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and less
predictable than what we previously believed. The statutory debt ceiling and
the threat of default have become political bargaining chips in the debate over
fiscal policy. Despite this year's wide-ranging debate, in our view, the differences
between political parties have proven to be extraordinarily difficult to
bridge, and, as we see it, the resulting agreement fell well short of the
comprehensive fiscal consolidation program that some proponents had envisaged
until quite recently. Republicans and Democrats have only been able to agree to
relatively modest savings on discretionary spending while delegating to the
Select Committee decisions on more comprehensive measures. It appears that for
now, new revenues have dropped down on the menu of policy options. In addition,
the plan envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare and little change in
other entitlements,
the containment of which
we and most other independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal
sustainability.
Our opinion is that
elected officials remain wary of tackling the structural issues required to
effectively address the rising U.S. public debt burden in a manner consistent
with a 'AAA' rating and with 'AAA' rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions,"
June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41). In our view, the difficulty in
framing a consensus on fiscal policy weakens the government's ability to manage
public finances and diverts attention from the debate over how to achieve more
balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era of fiscal stringency and
private-sector deleveraging (ibid). A new political consensus might (or might not)
emerge after the 2012 elections, but we believe that by then, the government
debt burden will likely be higher, the needed medium-term fiscal adjustment
potentially greater, and the inflection point on the U.S. population's
demographics and other age-related spending drivers closer at hand (see "Global Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Likely Cost Even
More Green, Now," June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's takes
no position on the mix of spending and revenue measures that Congress and the
Administration might conclude is appropriate for putting the U.S.'s finances on
a sustainable footing.
The act calls for as much
as $2.4 trillion of reductions in expenditure growth over the 10 years through
2021. These cuts will be implemented in two steps: the $917 billion agreed to
initially, followed by an additional $1.5 trillion that the newly formed
Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction is supposed to
recommend by November 2011. The act contains no measures to raise taxes or
otherwise enhance revenues, though the committee could recommend them.
The act further provides
that if Congress does not enact the committee's recommendations, cuts of $1.2
trillion will be implemented over the same time period. The reductions would
mainly affect outlays for civilian discretionary spending, defense, and
Medicare. We understand that this fall-back mechanism is designed to encourage
Congress to embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure savings, as the
committee might recommend.
We note that in a letter
to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated
total budgetary savings under the act to be at least $2.1 trillion over the
next 10 years relative to its baseline assumptions. In updating our own fiscal
projections, with certain modifications outlined below, we have relied on the
CBO's latest "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" of June 2011, updated to
include the CBO assumptions contained in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In
general, the CBO's "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" assumes a continuation
of recent Congressional action overriding existing law.
We view the act's
measures as a step toward fiscal consolidation. However, this is within the framework
of a legislative mechanism that leaves open the details of what is finally
agreed to until the end of 2011, and Congress and the Administration could
modify any agreement in the future. Even assuming that at least $2.1 trillion
of the spending reductions the act envisages are implemented, we maintain our
view that the U.S. net general government debt burden (all levels of government
combined, excluding liquid financial assets) will likely continue to grow.
Under our revised base case fiscal scenario--which we consider to be consistent
with a 'AA+' long-term rating and a negative outlook--we now project that net
general government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the end of
2011 to 79% in 2015 and 85% by 2021. Even the projected 2015 ratio of sovereign
indebtedness is high in relation to those of peer credits and, as noted, would
continue to rise under the act's revised policy settings.
Compared with previous
projections, our revised base case scenario now assumes that the 2001 and 2003
tax cuts, due to expire by the end of 2012, remain in place. We have changed
our assumption on this because the majority of Republicans in Congress continue
to resist any measure that would raise revenues, a position we believe Congress
reinforced by passing the act. Key macroeconomic assumptions in the base case
scenario include trend real GDP growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near
2% annually over the decade.
Our revised upside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as consistent with the
outlook on the 'AA+' long-term rating being revised to stable--retains these
same macroeconomic assumptions. In addition, it incorporates $950 billion of
new revenues on the assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners
lapse from 2013 onwards, as the Administration is advocating. In this scenario,
we project that the net general government debt would rise from an estimated
74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as being consistent with a
possible further downgrade to a 'AA' long-term rating--features less-favorable
macroeconomic assumptions, as outlined below and also assumes that the second
round of spending cuts (at least $1.2 trillion) that the act calls for does not
occur. This scenario also assumes somewhat higher nominal interest rates for
U.S. Treasuries. We still believe that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key
reserve currency confers a government funding advantage, one that could change
only slowly over time, and that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose
monetary policy at a time of fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible
that interest rates could rise if investors re-price relative risks. As a
result, our alternate scenario factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in
10-year bond yields relative to the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In
this scenario, we project the net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP
in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to 101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios
also take into account the significant negative revisions to historical GDP
data that the Bureau of Economic Analysis announced on July 29. From our
perspective, the effect of these revisions underscores two related points when
evaluating the likely debt trajectory of the U.S. government. First, the
revisions show that the recent recession was deeper than previously assumed, so
the GDP this year is lower than previously thought in both nominal and real
terms. Consequently, the debt burden is slightly higher. Second, the revised
data highlight the sub-par path of the current economic recovery when compared
with rebounds following previous post-war recessions. We believe the sluggish
pace of the current economic recovery could be consistent with the experiences
of countries that have had financial crises in which the slow process of debt
deleveraging in the private sector leads to a persistent drag on demand. As a
result, our downside case scenario assumes relatively modest real trend GDP
growth of 2.5% and inflation of near 1.5% annually going forward.
When comparing the U.S.
to sovereigns with 'AAA' long-term ratings that we view as relevant
peers--Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K.--we also observe, based on our
base case scenarios for each, that the trajectory of the U.S.'s net public debt
is diverging from the others. Including the U.S., we estimate that these five
sovereigns will have net general government debt to GDP ratios this year
ranging from 34% (Canada) to 80% (the U.K.), with the U.S. debt burden at 74%.
By 2015, we project that their net public debt to GDP ratios will range between
30% (lowest, Canada) and 83% (highest, France), with the U.S. debt burden at
79%. However, in contrast with the U.S., we project that the net public debt
burdens of these other sovereigns will begin to decline, either before or by
2015.
Standard & Poor's
transfer T&C assessment of the U.S. remains 'AAA'. Our T&C assessment
reflects our view of the likelihood of the sovereign restricting other public
and private issuers' access to foreign exchange needed to meet debt service.
Although in our view the credit standing of the U.S. government has
deteriorated modestly, we see little indication that official interference of
this kind is entering onto the policy agenda of either Congress or the
Administration. Consequently, we continue to view this risk as being highly
remote.
The outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. As our downside alternate fiscal scenario
illustrates, a higher public debt trajectory than we currently assume could
lead us to lower the long-term rating again. On the other hand, as our upside
scenario highlights, if the recommendations of the Congressional Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction--independently or coupled with other
initiatives, such as the lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high
earners--lead to fiscal consolidation measures beyond the minimum mandated, and
we believe they are likely to slow the deterioration of the government's debt
dynamics, the long-term rating could stabilize at 'AA+'.
On Monday,
we will issue separate releases concerning affected ratings in the funds,
government-related entities, financial institutions, insurance, public finance,
and structured finance sectors.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.60.05 |
|
|
1 |
Rs.101.65 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.83.07 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Analysis Done by
: |
DIV |
|
|
|
|
Report Prepared
by : |
PDT |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest
capability for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit
transaction. It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest
and principal sums |
Large |
|
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General unfavourable
factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for payment of
interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with
full security |
|
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
|
-- |
NB |
New Business |
-- |
|
This score serves as a reference to assess SC’s credit risk
and to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is calculated from a
composite of weighted scores obtained from each of the major sections of this
report. The assessed factors and their relative weights (as indicated through
%) are as follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend
(10%) Operational
size (10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL)
or its officials.