|
Report Date : |
13.05.2014 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
|
Name : |
TIFFANY & CO. |
|
|
|
|
Registered Office : |
727 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10022 |
|
|
|
|
Country : |
United States |
|
|
|
|
Date of Incorporation : |
16.08.1984 |
|
|
|
|
Legal Form : |
Public Company |
|
|
|
|
Line of Business : |
Engages in the design, manufacture, and retail of fine jewelry. Its jewelry products include gemstone jewelry and gemstone band rings,
diamond rings and wedding bands for brides and grooms, and non-gemstone,
gold, or platinum jewelry, as well as sterling silver jewelry. |
|
|
|
|
No. of Employees |
10,600 |
RATING & COMMENTS
|
MIRA’s Rating : |
Ba |
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
Status : |
Satisfactory |
|
|
|
|
Payment Behaviour : |
No complaints |
|
|
|
|
Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES :
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail : infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
UNITED STATES - ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
The US has the largest and most
technologically powerful economy in the world, with a per capita GDP of
$49,800. In this market-oriented economy, private individuals and business
firms make most of the decisions, and the federal and state governments buy
needed goods and services predominantly in the private marketplace. US business
firms enjoy greater flexibility than their counterparts in Western Europe and
Japan in decisions to expand capital plant, to lay off surplus workers, and to
develop new products. At the same time, they face higher barriers to enter
their rivals' home markets than foreign firms face entering US markets. US
firms are at or near the forefront in technological advances, especially in
computers and in medical, aerospace, and military equipment; their advantage has
narrowed since the end of World War II. The onrush of technology largely
explains the gradual development of a "two-tier labor market" in
which those at the bottom lack the education and the professional/technical
skills of those at the top and, more and more, fail to get comparable pay
raises, health insurance coverage, and other benefits. Since 1975, practically
all the gains in household income have gone to the top 20% of households. Since
1996, dividends and capital gains have grown faster than wages or any other
category of after-tax income. Imported oil accounts for nearly 55% of US
consumption. Crude oil prices doubled between 2001 and 2006, the year home
prices peaked; higher gasoline prices ate into consumers' budgets and many
individuals fell behind in their mortgage payments. Oil prices climbed another
50% between 2006 and 2008, and bank foreclosures more than doubled in the same
period. Besides dampening the housing market, soaring oil prices caused a drop
in the value of the dollar and a deterioration in the US merchandise trade
deficit, which peaked at $840 billion in 2008. The sub-prime mortgage crisis,
falling home prices, investment bank failures, tight credit, and the global
economic downturn pushed the United States into a recession by mid-2008. GDP
contracted until the third quarter of 2009, making this the deepest and longest
downturn since the Great Depression. To help stabilize financial markets, in
October 2008 the US Congress established a $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP). The government used some of these funds to purchase equity in
US banks and industrial corporations, much of which had been returned to the
government by early 2011. In January 2009 the US Congress passed and President
Barack OBAMA signed a bill providing an additional $787 billion fiscal stimulus
to be used over 10 years - two-thirds on additional spending and one-third on
tax cuts - to create jobs and to help the economy recover. In 2010 and 2011,
the federal budget deficit reached nearly 9% of GDP. In 2012 the federal
government reduced the growth of spending and the deficit shrank to 7.6% of
GDP. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan required major shifts in national resources
from civilian to military purposes and contributed to the growth of the budget
deficit and public debt. Through 2011, the direct costs of the wars totaled
nearly $900 billion, according to US government figures. US revenues from taxes
and other sources are lower, as a percentage of GDP, than those of most other
countries. In March 2010, President OBAMA signed into law the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, a health insurance reform that was designed
to extend coverage to an additional 32 million American citizens by 2016,
through private health insurance for the general population and Medicaid for
the impoverished. Total spending on health care - public plus private - rose
from 9.0% of GDP in 1980 to 17.9% in 2010. In July 2010, the president signed
the DODD-FRANK Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, a law designed to
promote financial stability by protecting consumers from financial abuses,
ending taxpayer bailouts of financial firms, dealing with troubled banks that
are "too big to fail," and improving accountability and transparency
in the financial system - in particular, by requiring certain financial
derivatives to be traded in markets that are subject to government regulation
and oversight. In December 2012, the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) announced
plans to purchase $85 billion per month of mortgage-backed and Treasury
securities in an effort to hold down long-term interest rates, and to keep
short term rates near zero until unemployment drops below 6.5% or inflation
rises above 2.5%. In late 2013, the Fed announced that it would begin scaling
back long-term bond purchases to $75 billion per month in January 2014 and
reduce them further as conditions warranted; the Fed, however, would keep
short-term rates near zero so long as unemployment and inflation had not
crossed the previously stated thresholds. Long-term problems include stagnation
of wages for lower-income families, inadequate investment in deteriorating
infrastructure, rapidly rising medical and pension costs of an aging
population, energy shortages, and sizable current account and budget deficits
|
Source
: CIA |
TIFFANY & CO.
Address: 727 Fifth Avenue, New
York, NY 10022 - United States
Telephone: +1
212-755-8000
Fax: +1 212-605-4465
Website: www.tiffany.com
Corporate ID#: 2042197
State: Delaware
Judicial form: Public
Company (NYSE = TIF)
Date founded: 08-16-1984
Stock value: Common Stock, $.01 par value,
128,845,017 shares
outstanding as of March 24, 2014.
Name of manager: Michael
J. KOWALSKI
Business:
Tiffany & Co., through its subsidiaries, engages in the design,
manufacture, and retail of fine jewelry.
Its jewelry products include gemstone jewelry and gemstone band rings,
diamond rings and wedding bands for brides and grooms, and non-gemstone, gold,
or platinum jewelry, as well as sterling silver jewelry.
The company also offers TIFFANY & CO. brand merchandise, including
timepieces and clocks; sterling silver merchandise, such as flatware, hollowware,
trophies, key holders, picture frames, and desk accessories; stainless steel
flatware; crystal, glass, china, and other table ware; custom engraved
stationery; writing instruments; and eyewear and fashion accessories. In
addition, it offers fragrance products under TIFFANY, PURE TIFFANY, and TIFFANY
FOR MEN brands.
The company serves customers through catalogs, retail sales,
business-to-business direct selling operations, and wholesale distribution in
the United States and internationally. The company also sells its products
through TIFFANY & CO. stores, as well as through department store boutiques
in Japan.
As of January 31, 2014, Tiffany & Co. operated approximately 289
retail stores worldwide.
It plans to close 4 and open 14 stores in 2014.
The company was founded in 1837 and is based in New York, New York.
Office
of the Foreign Assets Control (OFAC):
The company is not listed on the OFAC list.
The Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List is a publication of OFAC
which lists individuals and organizations with whom United States citizens and
permanent residents are prohibited from doing business.
EIN: 13-3228013
Staff: 10,600
Operations & branches:
At above address, we find
the corporate headquarters and major store, owned.
The Company maintains
offices located:
600 Madison Avenue, Floor 4
New York, NY 10022
Tiffany & Co. operated approximately 289 retail stores worldwide.
Shareholders:
The Company is quoted with the NYSE under symbol TIF.
As of 03-31-2013, 86% of the stock is held by institutional and mutual
fund owners, including:
|
Vanguard Group, Inc. (The) |
6.39% |
|
Capital World Investors |
6.00% |
|
State Street Corporation |
3.68% |
|
Oppenheimer Funds, Inc. |
3.43% |
|
Harris Associates L.P. |
3.35% |
Management:
Michael J. KOWALSKI is the Chairman, Director and CEO.
Michael J. Kowalski has been the Chairman of Tiffany & Co., since
January 2003 and as its Chief Executive Officer since February 1999.
Mr. Kowalski serves as Member of the Management Board at of Tiffany
& Co. He served as the President of Tiffany & Co., from January 1996 to
January 2003, Executive Vice President from March 1992 to January 1996 and also
its Chief Operating Officer from January 1997 to February 1999.
Mr. Kowalski has been a Director of Bank of New York Co. Inc. since
2003, Tiffany & Co. since January 1995 and Fairmont Hotels & Resorts
Inc. since June 2002.
He has been a Director of The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation since July
1, 2007.
He serves as a Director of Jewelers of America and PSB Group Inc.
Mr. Kowalski serves as a Trustee of the Wildlife Conservation Society
and the Nature Conservancy of New Jersey. He served as a Director of The Bank
of New York Company, Inc. from 2003 to 2007.
Mr. Kowalski holds a B.S. from the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton
School and an M.B.A. from the Harvard Business School.
Frederic CUMENAL is the President.
He has been President of Tiffany &
Co., since September 24, 2013 and is responsible for the businesses in Asia,
Japan, Europe and Emerging Markets at Tiffany & Co. Mr. Cumenal served as
Executive Vice President at Tiffany & Co. from March 10, 2011 to September
24, 2013. He served as Chief Executive Officer & President of Champagne
Moet & Chandon SA.
He has been Director of Tiffany &
Co., since September 24, 2013
James n. FERNANDEZ is Vice President, COO and CFO.
Subsidiaries &
Partnership: On attachment
10K (12 months ending
01-31-2014)
|
Currency in |
As of: |
Jan 31 |
Jan 31 |
Jan 31 |
Jan 31 |
|
TOTAL REVENUES |
3,085.3 |
3,642.9 |
3,794.2 |
4,031.1 |
|
|
NET INCOME |
368.4 |
439.2 |
416.2 |
181.4 |
|
Banks: The Bank of New York
JP Morgan Chase Bank
Legal filings & complaints:
State: Texas
Case number: 2:14-cv-00279-JRG
Plaintiff: eDekka LLC
Defendant: Tiffany & Co.
Rodney Gilstrap, presiding
Date filed: 03/28/2014
Date of last filing: 04/26/2014
Cause: Patent infringement
State: New Jersey
Case number: 2:14-cv-01255-JLL-JAD
Plaintiff: Melissa DARRABIE
Defendant: TIFFANY & CO.
Jose L. Linares, presiding
Joseph A. Dickson, referral
Date filed: 02/26/2014
Date of last filing: 04/17/2014
Cause: Family Medical Leave
State: Kentucky
Case number: 5:13-cv-00388-KKC
Plaintiff: Stella Jimenez Castro
Defendant: Tiffany & Co.
Karen K. Caldwell, presiding
Date filed: 11/12/2013
Date of last filing: 04/01/2014
Secured debts summary (UCC):
Numerous
According to our credit analysts, during the last 6 months, 89% of trade
experience indicates a regular payment.
Payments of imports were currently made with an average of 5 days beyond
terms.
The Company maintains its
business.
The banks and financial institutions
confirmed a correct credit history.
The Company is in good
standing.
This means that all local
and federal taxes were paid on due date.
The risk is low.
Our opinion:
A business connection may
be conducted.
Standard & Poor’s
|
United
States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'AA+' Due To Political Risks,
Rising Debt Burden; Outlook Negative |
|
Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
·
We have lowered our long-term sovereign credit rating on the United
States of America to 'AA+' from 'AAA' and affirmed the 'A-1+' short-term
rating.
·
We have also removed both the short- and long-term ratings
from CreditWatch negative.
·
The downgrade reflects our opinion
that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration
recently agreed to falls short of what, in our view, would be necessary to
stabilize the government's medium-term debt dynamics.
·
More broadly, the downgrade
reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of
American policymaking and political institutions have weakened at a time of
ongoing fiscal and economic challenges to a degree more than we envisioned when
we assigned a negative outlook to the rating on April 18, 2011.
·
Since then, we have changed our
view of the difficulties in bridging the gulf between the political parties
over fiscal policy, which makes us pessimistic about the capacity of Congress
and the Administration to be able to leverage their agreement this week into a
broader fiscal consolidation plan that stabilizes the government's debt
dynamics any time soon.
·
The outlook on the long-term rating
is negative. We could lower the long-term rating to 'AA' within the next two
years if we see that less reduction in spending than agreed to, higher interest
rates, or new fiscal pressures during the period result in a higher general
government debt trajectory than we currently assume in our base case.
TORONTO (Standard &
Poor's) Aug. 5, 2011--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that it
lowered its long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of America
to 'AA+' from 'AAA'. Standard & Poor's also said that the outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. At the same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed
its 'A-1+' short-term rating on the U.S. In addition, Standard & Poor's
removed both ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed on July 14, 2011,
with negative implications.
The
transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment of the U.S.--our assessment of
the likelihood of official interference in the ability of U.S.-based public-
and private-sector issuers to secure foreign exchange for
debt service--remains
'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term
rating on the U.S. because we believe that the prolonged controversy over
raising the statutory debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate
indicate that further near-term progress containing the growth in public
spending, especially on entitlements, or on reaching an agreement on raising
revenues is less likely than we previously assumed and will remain a
contentious and fitful process. We also believe that the fiscal consolidation
plan that Congress and the Administration agreed to this week falls short of
the amount that we believe is necessary to stabilize the general government
debt burden by the middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the
rating was prompted by our view on the rising public debt burden and our
perception of greater policymaking uncertainty, consistent with our criteria
(see "Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions
," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41). Nevertheless, we view the
U.S. federal government's other economic, external, and monetary credit
attributes, which form the basis for the sovereign rating, as broadly
unchanged.
We have taken the ratings
off CreditWatch because the Aug. 2 passage of the Budget Control Act Amendment
of 2011 has removed any perceived immediate threat of payment default posed by
delays to raising the government's debt ceiling. In addition, we believe that
the act provides sufficient clarity to allow us to evaluate the likely course
of U.S. fiscal policy for the next few years.
The political
brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as America's governance
and policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and less predictable
than what we previously believed. The statutory debt ceiling and the threat of
default have become political bargaining chips in the debate over fiscal
policy. Despite this year's wide-ranging debate, in our view, the differences
between political parties have proven to be extraordinarily difficult to
bridge, and, as we see it, the resulting agreement fell well short of the
comprehensive fiscal consolidation program that some proponents had envisaged
until quite recently. Republicans and Democrats have only been able to agree to
relatively modest savings on discretionary spending while delegating to the
Select Committee decisions on more comprehensive measures. It appears that for
now, new revenues have dropped down on the menu of policy options. In addition,
the plan envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare and little change in
other entitlements,
the containment of which
we and most other independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal
sustainability.
Our opinion is that
elected officials remain wary of tackling the structural issues required to
effectively address the rising U.S. public debt burden in a manner consistent
with a 'AAA' rating and with 'AAA' rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions,"
June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41). In our view, the difficulty in
framing a consensus on fiscal policy weakens the government's ability to manage
public finances and diverts attention from the debate over how to achieve more
balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era of fiscal stringency and
private-sector deleveraging (ibid). A new political consensus might (or might
not) emerge after the 2012 elections, but we believe that by then, the
government debt burden will likely be higher, the needed medium-term fiscal
adjustment potentially greater, and the inflection point on the U.S.
population's demographics and other age-related spending drivers closer at hand
(see "Global Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Likely Cost Even
More Green, Now," June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's
takes no position on the mix of spending and revenue measures that Congress and
the Administration might conclude is appropriate for putting the U.S.'s
finances on a sustainable footing.
The act calls for as much
as $2.4 trillion of reductions in expenditure growth over the 10 years through
2021. These cuts will be implemented in two steps: the $917 billion agreed to
initially, followed by an additional $1.5 trillion that the newly formed
Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction is supposed to
recommend by November 2011. The act contains no measures to raise taxes or
otherwise enhance revenues, though the committee could recommend them.
The act further provides
that if Congress does not enact the committee's recommendations, cuts of $1.2
trillion will be implemented over the same time period. The reductions would mainly
affect outlays for civilian discretionary spending, defense, and Medicare. We
understand that this fall-back mechanism is designed to encourage Congress to
embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure savings, as the committee might
recommend.
We note that in a letter
to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated
total budgetary savings under the act to be at least $2.1 trillion over the
next 10 years relative to its baseline assumptions. In updating our own fiscal
projections, with certain modifications outlined below, we have relied on the
CBO's latest "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" of June 2011, updated to
include the CBO assumptions contained in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In
general, the CBO's "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" assumes a continuation
of recent Congressional action overriding existing law.
We view the act's
measures as a step toward fiscal consolidation. However, this is within the
framework of a legislative mechanism that leaves open the details of what is finally
agreed to until the end of 2011, and Congress and the Administration could
modify any agreement in the future. Even assuming that at least $2.1 trillion
of the spending reductions the act envisages are implemented, we maintain our
view that the U.S. net general government debt burden (all levels of government
combined, excluding liquid financial assets) will likely continue to grow.
Under our revised base case fiscal scenario--which we consider to be consistent
with a 'AA+' long-term rating and a negative outlook--we now project that net
general government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the end of
2011 to 79% in 2015 and 85% by 2021. Even the projected 2015 ratio of sovereign
indebtedness is high in relation to those of peer credits and, as noted, would
continue to rise under the act's revised policy settings.
Compared with previous
projections, our revised base case scenario now assumes that the 2001 and 2003
tax cuts, due to expire by the end of 2012, remain in place. We have changed
our assumption on this because the majority of Republicans in Congress continue
to resist any measure that would raise revenues, a position we believe Congress
reinforced by passing the act. Key macroeconomic assumptions in the base case
scenario include trend real GDP growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near
2% annually over the decade.
Our revised upside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as consistent with the
outlook on the 'AA+' long-term rating being revised to stable--retains these
same macroeconomic assumptions. In addition, it incorporates $950 billion of
new revenues on the assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners
lapse from 2013 onwards, as the Administration is advocating. In this scenario,
we project that the net general government debt would rise from an estimated
74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as being consistent with a
possible further downgrade to a 'AA' long-term rating--features less-favorable
macroeconomic assumptions, as outlined below and also assumes that the second
round of spending cuts (at least $1.2 trillion) that the act calls for does not
occur. This scenario also assumes somewhat higher nominal interest rates for
U.S. Treasuries. We still believe that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key
reserve currency confers a government funding advantage, one that could change
only slowly over time, and that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose
monetary policy at a time of fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible
that interest rates could rise if investors re-price relative risks. As a
result, our alternate scenario factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in
10-year bond yields relative to the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In
this scenario, we project the net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP
in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to 101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios
also take into account the significant negative revisions to historical GDP
data that the Bureau of Economic Analysis announced on July 29. From our
perspective, the effect of these revisions underscores two related points when
evaluating the likely debt trajectory of the U.S. government. First, the revisions
show that the recent recession was deeper than previously assumed, so the GDP
this year is lower than previously thought in both nominal and real terms.
Consequently, the debt burden is slightly higher. Second, the revised data
highlight the sub-par path of the current economic recovery when compared with
rebounds following previous post-war recessions. We believe the sluggish pace
of the current economic recovery could be consistent with the experiences of
countries that have had financial crises in which the slow process of debt
deleveraging in the private sector leads to a persistent drag on demand. As a
result, our downside case scenario assumes relatively modest real trend GDP
growth of 2.5% and inflation of near 1.5% annually going forward.
When comparing the U.S.
to sovereigns with 'AAA' long-term ratings that we view as relevant
peers--Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K.--we also observe, based on our
base case scenarios for each, that the trajectory of the U.S.'s net public debt
is diverging from the others. Including the U.S., we estimate that these five
sovereigns will have net general government debt to GDP ratios this year
ranging from 34% (Canada) to 80% (the U.K.), with the U.S. debt burden at 74%.
By 2015, we project that their net public debt to GDP ratios will range between
30% (lowest, Canada) and 83% (highest, France), with the U.S. debt burden at
79%. However, in contrast with the U.S., we project that the net public debt
burdens of these other sovereigns will begin to decline, either before or by
2015.
Standard & Poor's
transfer T&C assessment of the U.S. remains 'AAA'. Our T&C assessment
reflects our view of the likelihood of the sovereign restricting other public
and private issuers' access to foreign exchange needed to meet debt service.
Although in our view the credit standing of the U.S. government has
deteriorated modestly, we see little indication that official interference of
this kind is entering onto the policy agenda of either Congress or the
Administration. Consequently, we continue to view this risk as being highly
remote.
The outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. As our downside alternate fiscal scenario
illustrates, a higher public debt trajectory than we currently assume could
lead us to lower the long-term rating again. On the other hand, as our upside
scenario highlights, if the recommendations of the Congressional Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction--independently or coupled with other
initiatives, such as the lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high
earners--lead to fiscal consolidation measures beyond the minimum mandated, and
we believe they are likely to slow the deterioration of the government's debt
dynamics, the long-term rating could stabilize at 'AA+'.
On Monday,
we will issue separate releases concerning affected ratings in the funds,
government-related entities, financial institutions, insurance, public finance,
and structured finance sectors.
DIAMOND INDUSTRY – INDIA
-
From time immemorial, India is well known in the world as the birthplace
for diamonds. It is difficult to trace the origin of diamonds but history
says that in the remote past, diamonds were mined only in India. Diamond
production in India can be traced back to almost 8th Century B.C.
India, in fact, remained undisputed leader till 18th Century
when Brazilian fields were discovered in 1725 followed by emergence of S.
Africa, Russia and Australia.
-
The achievement of the Indian diamond industry was possible only due to
combination of the manufacturing skills of the Indian workforce and the
untiring and unflagging efforts of the Indian diamantaires, supported by
progressive Government policies.
-
The area of study of family owned diamond businesses derives its
importance from the huge conglomerate of family run organizations which operate
in the diamond industry since many generations.
-
Some of the basic traits of family run business enterprises include
spirit of entrepreneurship, mutual trust lowers transaction costs, small,
nimble and quick to react, information as a source of advantage and
philanthropy.
-
Family owned diamond businesses need to improve on many fronts including
higher standard of corporate governance, long-term performance – focused strategies,
modern management and technology.
-
Utmost caution is to be exercised while dealing with some medium and
large diamond traders which are usually engaged in fictitious import – export,
inter-company transactions, financially assisted by banks. In the process,
several public sector banks lost several hundred million rupees. They mostly
diverted borrowed money for diamond business into real estate and capital
markets.
-
Excerpts from Times of India dated 30th October 2010 is as
under –
-
Gem & Jewellery Export Promotion Council in its statistical data has
shown the export of polished diamonds to have increase by 28 % in February
2013. Compared to $ 1.4 bn worth of polished diamond export in February, 2012,
India exported $ 1.84 billion worth of polished diamonds in February 2013. A
senior executive of GJEPC said, “Export of cut and polished diamonds started
falling month-wise after the imposition of 2 % of import duty on the polished
diamonds. But February, 2013 has given a new ray of hope to the industry as the
export of polished diamonds has actually increased by 28 %. It means the
industry is on the track of recovery and round tripping of diamonds has
stopped completely.” Demand has started coming from the US, the UK, Japan and
China. India’s polished diamond export is expected to cross $ 21 bn in 2013-14.
-
The banking sector has started exercising restraint while following
prudent risk management norms when lending money to gems and jewellery sector.
This follows the implementation of Basel III accord – a global voluntary
regulatory standard on bank capital adequacy, stress testing and market
liquidity.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.59.72 |
|
|
1 |
Rs.100.81 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.82.22 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Analysis Done by
: |
KAR |
|
|
|
|
Report Prepared
by : |
PDT |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest capability
for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit
transaction. It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest
and principal sums |
Large |
|
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General
unfavourable factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for
payment of interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with
full security |
|
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
|
-- |
NB |
New Business |
-- |
|
This score serves as a reference to assess SC’s credit risk
and to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is calculated from a
composite of weighted scores obtained from each of the major sections of this
report. The assessed factors and their relative weights (as indicated through
%) are as follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend
(10%) Operational
size (10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL)
or its officials.