|
Report Date : |
20.05.2014 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
|
Correct Name : |
PACIFIC AMERICAN
FISH CO., INC. |
|
|
|
|
Registered Office : |
5525 S. Santa Fe Avenue, Vernon, CA 10058 |
|
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|
|
Country : |
United States |
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Date of Incorporation : |
11.07.1980 |
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Legal Form : |
Corporation – Profit |
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Line of Business : |
· Subject is a seafood company which offers fresh and frozen fish products to retailers and food service clients in North America. Subject offers hand-breaded, battered, grilled, par-fried,
marinated, portioned steaks, sushi, and value-added products; frozen shrimp
and fish products; frozen cephalopods; seafood varieties for seafood managers
and restaurant chefs; and home replacement meals for the fresh and convenient
seafood meal solutions. |
|
|
|
|
No of Employees : |
120 + Part Time |
RATING & COMMENTS
|
MIRA’s Rating : |
B |
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
Status : |
Moderate |
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Payment Behaviour : |
Slow But Correct |
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Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES :
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail : infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – March 31, 2014
|
Country Name |
Previous Rating (31.12.2013) |
Current Rating (31.03.2014) |
|
United States |
A1 |
A1 |
|
Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
|
Insignificant |
A1 |
|
Low Risk |
A2 |
|
Moderate Low Risk |
B1 |
|
Moderate Risk |
B2 |
|
Moderate High Risk |
C1 |
|
High Risk |
C2 |
|
Very High Risk |
D |
United States ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
The US has the largest and most technologically powerful economy in the
world, with a per capita GDP of $49,800. In this market-oriented economy, private
individuals and business firms make most of the decisions, and the federal and
state governments buy needed goods and services predominantly in the private
marketplace. US business firms enjoy greater flexibility than their
counterparts in Western Europe and Japan in decisions to expand capital plant,
to lay off surplus workers, and to develop new products. At the same time, they
face higher barriers to enter their rivals' home markets than foreign firms
face entering US markets. US firms are at or near the forefront in
technological advances, especially in computers and in medical, aerospace, and
military equipment; their advantage has narrowed since the end of World War II.
The onrush of technology largely explains the gradual development of a "two-tier
labor market" in which those at the bottom lack the education and the
professional/technical skills of those at the top and, more and more, fail to
get comparable pay raises, health insurance coverage, and other benefits. Since
1975, practically all the gains in household income have gone to the top 20% of
households. Since 1996, dividends and capital gains have grown faster than
wages or any other category of after-tax income. Imported oil accounts for
nearly 55% of US consumption. Crude oil prices doubled between 2001 and 2006,
the year home prices peaked; higher gasoline prices ate into consumers' budgets
and many individuals fell behind in their mortgage payments. Oil prices climbed
another 50% between 2006 and 2008, and bank foreclosures more than doubled in
the same period. Besides dampening the housing market, soaring oil prices
caused a drop in the value of the dollar and a deterioration in the US
merchandise trade deficit, which peaked at $840 billion in 2008. The sub-prime
mortgage crisis, falling home prices, investment bank failures, tight credit,
and the global economic downturn pushed the United States into a recession by
mid-2008. GDP contracted until the third quarter of 2009, making this the
deepest and longest downturn since the Great Depression. To help stabilize
financial markets, in October 2008 the US Congress established a $700 billion
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The government used some of these funds
to purchase equity in US banks and industrial corporations, much of which had
been returned to the government by early 2011. In January 2009 the US Congress
passed and President Barack OBAMA signed a bill providing an additional $787
billion fiscal stimulus to be used over 10 years - two-thirds on additional
spending and one-third on tax cuts - to create jobs and to help the economy
recover. In 2010 and 2011, the federal budget deficit reached nearly 9% of GDP.
In 2012 the federal government reduced the growth of spending and the deficit
shrank to 7.6% of GDP. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan required major shifts in
national resources from civilian to military purposes and contributed to the
growth of the budget deficit and public debt. Through 2011, the direct costs of
the wars totaled nearly $900 billion, according to US government figures. US
revenues from taxes and other sources are lower, as a percentage of GDP, than
those of most other countries. In March 2010, President OBAMA signed into law
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, a health insurance reform that
was designed to extend coverage to an additional 32 million American citizens
by 2016, through private health insurance for the general population and
Medicaid for the impoverished. Total spending on health care - public plus
private - rose from 9.0% of GDP in 1980 to 17.9% in 2010. In July 2010, the
president signed the DODD-FRANK Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
a law designed to promote financial stability by protecting consumers from
financial abuses, ending taxpayer bailouts of financial firms, dealing with
troubled banks that are "too big to fail," and improving
accountability and transparency in the financial system - in particular, by
requiring certain financial derivatives to be traded in markets that are
subject to government regulation and oversight. In December 2012, the Federal
Reserve Board (Fed) announced plans to purchase $85 billion per month of
mortgage-backed and Treasury securities in an effort to hold down long-term
interest rates, and to keep short term rates near zero until unemployment drops
below 6.5% or inflation rises above 2.5%. In late 2013, the Fed announced that
it would begin scaling back long-term bond purchases to $75 billion per month
in January 2014 and reduce them further as conditions warranted; the Fed,
however, would keep short-term rates near zero so long as unemployment and
inflation had not crossed the previously stated thresholds. Long-term problems
include stagnation of wages for lower-income families, inadequate investment in
deteriorating infrastructure, rapidly rising medical and pension costs of an
aging population, energy shortages, and sizable current account and budget
deficits.
|
Source : CIA |
Company name: PACIFIC AMERICAN FISH CO., INC.
Address: 5525 S. Santa Fe Avenue, Vernon, CA
10058 - USA
Telephone: +1
323-319-1551
Fax: +1 323-319-1517
Website: www.pafco.net
Corporate ID#: C0992390
State: California
Judicial form: Corporation – Profit
Date incorporated: July
11, 1980
Name of manager: Peter
HUH
Business:
Pacific American Fish Company, Inc., a seafood company, offers fresh and
frozen fish products to retailers and food service clients in North America. It
offers hand-breaded, battered, grilled, par-fried, marinated, portioned steaks,
sushi, and value-added products; frozen shrimp and fish products; frozen
cephalopods; seafood varieties for seafood managers and restaurant chefs; and
home replacement meals for the fresh and convenient seafood meal solutions.
The company also owns and manages fishing vessels, harvest sites, and
processing plants around the world.
Pacific American Fish Company, Inc. was founded in 1977 and is based in
Vernon, California.
It has subsidiaries in North America, Latin America, and Asia.
It has sales offices in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Boston.
Brands include OCEANKIST, PACIFIC SURF, SNACK N’GO, PETE’S SEAFOOD…
Office of the Foreign Assets Control (OFAC):
· The company is not listed on the OFAC list.
The
Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List is a publication of OFAC which lists
individuals and organizations with whom United States citizens and permanent
residents are prohibited from doing business.
Suppliers include:
SEACHAMP INTERNATIONAL EXPORT CORPORATION
BLOCK A-9-6 ZAMBOANGA CITY, SPECIAL ECONOMIC
ZONE, SAN RAMON, ZAMBOANGA CITY, PHILIPPINES
ABAD FISHERIES PVT LTD
ABAD BUILDINGS 13/681, JEW TOWN ROAD, KOCHANGADI COCHIN 682002 COCHIN INDIA
NILS SPERRE AS
N-6057 ELLINGSOY, NORWAY
EIN: 95-3516082
Staff: 120 + part time
Operations & branches:
At the headquarters, we
find a store, warehouse and office, owned.
The Company maintains branches located:
Pier 45 Shed B-5
San Francisco, CA 94133
Unit 7 Marine Industrial
Park, 8 FID Kennedy Park
Boston, MA 02210
Shareholders:
This is a family owned and managed
company.
Management:
Peter HUH is the President, Director and CEO
He joined Pafco since inception and has Total of 23 years in the seafood
industry.
Mr. Huh has Bachelor of Science in Chemistry from Amherst College, 1985.
Paul HUH is Vice President.
He has 21 years of experience in the seafood industry.
Mr. Huh attended Vassar College in 1992 and university of Sevilla in
1983.
Subsidiaries
and partnership:
n/a
In United States, privately
held corporations are not required to publish any financials.
On a direct call, a
financial assistant controlled the present report.
Sales declared for year
2013 is in the range of USD 50,000,000=
The business is profitable.
Banks: US Bancorp
Wells Fargo Bank
Legal filings
& complaints:
The Company is creditor in the following case:
State: California
Case number: 8:13-bk-11634-SC
Bankrupt: Woori The Winners Inc
Case type: bk Chapter: 7 Asset: Yes Vol: i
Judge: Scott C Clarkson
Date filed: 02/22/2013
Date of last filing: 04/30/2014
Secured debts summary (UCC):
Several UCC files
Trade references:
Date reported: March 2014
High credit: USD 25,000
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: February 2014
Line of business: Office supply
Paying status: 10 days beyond terms
Date reported: March 2014
High credit: USD 200,000
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: February 2014
Line of business: Payroll
Paying status: As agreed
Date reported: March 2014
High credit: USD
1,000
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: February 2014
Line of business: Telecommunications
Paying status: 6 days beyond terms
Domestic credit history:
Domestic credit history appears as follow:
|
Monthly Payment Trends - Recent Activity
|
National Credit Bureaus
gave a medium credit rating.
According to our credit analysts, during the last 6 months, domestic
payments were made with an average of 5 to 10 days beyond terms.
International
credit history:
Payments of imports are currently made with an average of 2 to 5 days
beyond terms.
Other comments:
The Company maintains its
business.
The bank confirmed late
payments.
The Company is in good
standing.
This means that all local
and federal taxes were paid on due date.
The risk is medium.
Our opinion:
A business connection may be
conducted but we suggest you to check regularly the way of payments.
Standard
& Poor’s
|
United
States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'AA+' Due To Political Risks,
Rising Debt Burden; Outlook Negative |
|
Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
·
We have lowered our long-term sovereign credit rating on the United
States of America to 'AA+' from 'AAA' and affirmed the 'A-1+' short-term
rating.
·
We have also removed both the short- and long-term ratings from
CreditWatch negative.
·
The downgrade reflects our
opinion that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration
recently agreed to falls short of what, in our view, would be necessary to
stabilize the government's medium-term debt dynamics.
·
More broadly, the downgrade
reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of
American policymaking and political institutions have weakened at a time of
ongoing fiscal and economic challenges to a degree more than we envisioned when
we assigned a negative outlook to the rating on April 18, 2011.
·
Since then, we have changed our
view of the difficulties in bridging the gulf between the political parties
over fiscal policy, which makes us pessimistic about the capacity of Congress
and the Administration to be able to leverage their agreement this week into a
broader fiscal consolidation plan that stabilizes the government's debt
dynamics any time soon.
·
The outlook on the long-term
rating is negative. We could lower the long-term rating to 'AA' within the next
two years if we see that less reduction in spending than agreed to, higher
interest rates, or new fiscal pressures during the period result in a higher
general government debt trajectory than we currently assume in our base case.
TORONTO (Standard &
Poor's) Aug. 5, 2011--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that it
lowered its long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of America
to 'AA+' from 'AAA'. Standard & Poor's also said that the outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. At the same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed
its 'A-1+' short-term rating on the U.S. In addition, Standard & Poor's
removed both ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed on July 14, 2011,
with negative implications.
The transfer and
convertibility (T&C) assessment of the U.S.--our assessment of the
likelihood of official interference in the ability of U.S.-based public- and
private-sector issuers to secure foreign exchange for
debt service--remains
'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term
rating on the U.S. because we believe that the prolonged controversy over
raising the statutory debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate
indicate that further near-term progress containing the growth in public
spending, especially on entitlements, or on reaching an agreement on raising
revenues is less likely than we previously assumed and will remain a
contentious and fitful process. We also believe that the fiscal consolidation
plan that Congress and the Administration agreed to this week falls short of
the amount that we believe is necessary to stabilize the general government
debt burden by the middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the
rating was prompted by our view on the rising public debt burden and our
perception of greater policymaking uncertainty, consistent with our criteria
(see "Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions ," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs
36-41). Nevertheless, we view the U.S. federal government's other economic,
external, and monetary credit attributes, which form the basis for the
sovereign rating, as broadly unchanged.
We have taken the ratings
off CreditWatch because the Aug. 2 passage of the Budget Control Act Amendment
of 2011 has removed any perceived immediate threat of payment default posed by
delays to raising the government's debt ceiling. In addition, we believe that
the act provides sufficient clarity to allow us to evaluate the likely course
of U.S. fiscal policy for the next few years.
The political
brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as America's governance
and policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and less predictable
than what we previously believed. The statutory debt ceiling and the threat of
default have become political bargaining chips in the debate over fiscal
policy. Despite this year's wide-ranging debate, in our view, the differences
between political parties have proven to be extraordinarily difficult to
bridge, and, as we see it, the resulting agreement fell well short of the
comprehensive fiscal consolidation program that some proponents had envisaged
until quite recently. Republicans and Democrats have only been able to agree to
relatively modest savings on discretionary spending while delegating to the
Select Committee decisions on more comprehensive measures. It appears that for
now, new revenues have dropped down on the menu of policy options. In addition,
the plan envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare and little change in
other entitlements,
the containment of which
we and most other independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal
sustainability.
Our opinion is that
elected officials remain wary of tackling the structural issues required to
effectively address the rising U.S. public debt burden in a manner consistent
with a 'AAA' rating and with 'AAA' rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41).
In our view, the difficulty in framing a consensus on fiscal policy weakens the
government's ability to manage public finances and diverts attention from the
debate over how to achieve more balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era
of fiscal stringency and private-sector deleveraging (ibid). A new political
consensus might (or might not) emerge after the 2012 elections, but we believe
that by then, the government debt burden will likely be higher, the needed
medium-term fiscal adjustment potentially greater, and the inflection point on
the U.S. population's demographics and other age-related spending drivers closer
at hand (see "Global Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Likely Cost Even
More Green, Now," June 21,
2011).
Standard & Poor's
takes no position on the mix of spending and revenue measures that Congress and
the Administration might conclude is appropriate for putting the U.S.'s
finances on a sustainable footing.
The act calls for as much
as $2.4 trillion of reductions in expenditure growth over the 10 years through
2021. These cuts will be implemented in two steps: the $917 billion agreed to
initially, followed by an additional $1.5 trillion that the newly formed
Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction is supposed to
recommend by November 2011. The act contains no measures to raise taxes or
otherwise enhance revenues, though the committee could recommend them.
The act further provides
that if Congress does not enact the committee's recommendations, cuts of $1.2 trillion
will be implemented over the same time period. The reductions would mainly
affect outlays for civilian discretionary spending, defense, and Medicare. We
understand that this fall-back mechanism is designed to encourage Congress to
embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure savings, as the committee might
recommend.
We note that in a letter
to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated
total budgetary savings under the act to be at least $2.1 trillion over the
next 10 years relative to its baseline assumptions. In updating our own fiscal
projections, with certain modifications outlined below, we have relied on the
CBO's latest "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" of June 2011, updated to
include the CBO assumptions contained in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In
general, the CBO's "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" assumes a continuation
of recent Congressional action overriding existing law.
We view the act's
measures as a step toward fiscal consolidation. However, this is within the framework
of a legislative mechanism that leaves open the details of what is finally
agreed to until the end of 2011, and Congress and the Administration could
modify any agreement in the future. Even assuming that at least $2.1 trillion
of the spending reductions the act envisages are implemented, we maintain our
view that the U.S. net general government debt burden (all levels of government
combined, excluding liquid financial assets) will likely continue to grow.
Under our revised base case fiscal scenario--which we consider to be consistent
with a 'AA+' long-term rating and a negative outlook--we now project that net
general government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the end of
2011 to 79% in 2015 and 85% by 2021. Even the projected 2015 ratio of sovereign
indebtedness is high in relation to those of peer credits and, as noted, would
continue to rise under the act's revised policy settings.
Compared with previous
projections, our revised base case scenario now assumes that the 2001 and 2003
tax cuts, due to expire by the end of 2012, remain in place. We have changed
our assumption on this because the majority of Republicans in Congress continue
to resist any measure that would raise revenues, a position we believe Congress
reinforced by passing the act. Key macroeconomic assumptions in the base case
scenario include trend real GDP growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near
2% annually over the decade.
Our revised upside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as consistent with the
outlook on the 'AA+' long-term rating being revised to stable--retains these
same macroeconomic assumptions. In addition, it incorporates $950 billion of
new revenues on the assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners
lapse from 2013 onwards, as the Administration is advocating. In this scenario,
we project that the net general government debt would rise from an estimated
74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as being consistent with a
possible further downgrade to a 'AA' long-term rating--features less-favorable
macroeconomic assumptions, as outlined below and also assumes that the second
round of spending cuts (at least $1.2 trillion) that the act calls for does not
occur. This scenario also assumes somewhat higher nominal interest rates for
U.S. Treasuries. We still believe that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key
reserve currency confers a government funding advantage, one that could change
only slowly over time, and that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose
monetary policy at a time of fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible
that interest rates could rise if investors re-price relative risks. As a
result, our alternate scenario factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in
10-year bond yields relative to the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In
this scenario, we project the net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP
in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to 101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios
also take into account the significant negative revisions to historical GDP
data that the Bureau of Economic Analysis announced on July 29. From our
perspective, the effect of these revisions underscores two related points when
evaluating the likely debt trajectory of the U.S. government. First, the
revisions show that the recent recession was deeper than previously assumed, so
the GDP this year is lower than previously thought in both nominal and real
terms. Consequently, the debt burden is slightly higher. Second, the revised
data highlight the sub-par path of the current economic recovery when compared
with rebounds following previous post-war recessions. We believe the sluggish
pace of the current economic recovery could be consistent with the experiences
of countries that have had financial crises in which the slow process of debt
deleveraging in the private sector leads to a persistent drag on demand. As a
result, our downside case scenario assumes relatively modest real trend GDP
growth of 2.5% and inflation of near 1.5% annually going forward.
When comparing the U.S.
to sovereigns with 'AAA' long-term ratings that we view as relevant
peers--Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K.--we also observe, based on our
base case scenarios for each, that the trajectory of the U.S.'s net public debt
is diverging from the others. Including the U.S., we estimate that these five
sovereigns will have net general government debt to GDP ratios this year
ranging from 34% (Canada) to 80% (the U.K.), with the U.S. debt burden at 74%.
By 2015, we project that their net public debt to GDP ratios will range between
30% (lowest, Canada) and 83% (highest, France), with the U.S. debt burden at
79%. However, in contrast with the U.S., we project that the net public debt
burdens of these other sovereigns will begin to decline, either before or by
2015.
Standard & Poor's
transfer T&C assessment of the U.S. remains 'AAA'. Our T&C assessment reflects
our view of the likelihood of the sovereign restricting other public and
private issuers' access to foreign exchange needed to meet debt service.
Although in our view the credit standing of the U.S. government has
deteriorated modestly, we see little indication that official interference of
this kind is entering onto the policy agenda of either Congress or the
Administration. Consequently, we continue to view this risk as being highly
remote.
The outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. As our downside alternate fiscal scenario
illustrates, a higher public debt trajectory than we currently assume could
lead us to lower the long-term rating again. On the other hand, as our upside
scenario highlights, if the recommendations of the Congressional Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction--independently or coupled with other
initiatives, such as the lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high
earners--lead to fiscal consolidation measures beyond the minimum mandated, and
we believe they are likely to slow the deterioration of the government's debt
dynamics, the long-term rating could stabilize at 'AA+'.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.58.43 |
|
UK Pound |
1 |
Rs.98.28 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.80.12 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Analysis Done by
: |
KAR |
|
|
|
|
Report Prepared
by : |
MNL |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest capability
for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit
transaction. It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest
and principal sums |
Large |
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General
unfavourable factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for
payment of interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with
full security |
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
-- |
NB |
New Business |
-- |
This score serves as a reference to assess SC’s credit risk
and to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is calculated from a
composite of weighted scores obtained from each of the major sections of this
report. The assessed factors and their relative weights (as indicated through
%) are as follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment record
(10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend
(10%) Operational
size (10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL)
or its officials.