![]()
|
Report Date : |
16.09.2014 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
|
Name : |
STULLER, INC. |
|
|
|
|
Registered Office : |
302 Rue Louis XIV, |
|
|
|
|
Country : |
|
|
|
|
|
Date of Incorporation : |
12.11.1970 |
|
|
|
|
Legal Form : |
Corporation – Profit |
|
|
|
|
Line of Business : |
Subject is a just-in-time manufacturer and distributor of jewelry and
jewelry-related products to jewelry professionals worldwide. |
|
|
|
|
No. of Employees : |
1,400 |
RATING & COMMENTS
|
MIRA’s Rating : |
Ba |
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
Status : |
Satisfactory |
|
Payment Behaviour : |
No complaints |
|
Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES :
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail : infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – June 01, 2014
|
Country Name |
Previous Rating (31.03.2014) |
Current Rating (01.06.2014) |
|
|
A1 |
A1 |
|
Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
|
Insignificant |
A1 |
|
Low Risk |
A2 |
|
Moderate Low Risk |
B1 |
|
Moderate Risk |
B2 |
|
Moderate High Risk |
C1 |
|
High Risk |
C2 |
|
Very High Risk |
D |
UNITED STATES - ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
The
|
Source
: CIA |
STULLER, INC.
Address: 302 Rue Louis XIV,
Telephone: +1 337-262-7700
Fax: +1 337-981-1655
Website: www.stuller.com
Corporate ID#: 29211090D
State:
Judicial form: Corporation – Profit
Date incorporated:
November 12, 1970
Stock: -
Value: -
Name of manager: Matthew
G. STULLER Sr.
Business:
Stuller, Inc. is a just-in-time manufacturer and distributor of jewelry
and jewelry-related products to jewelry professionals worldwide.
It offers products in the categories of bridal and finished jewelry,
mountings, findings, diamonds, gemstones, metals, tools, supplies, and
packaging. The company also distributes/wholesales jewelry products.
It offers its products online. Stuller, Inc. was formerly known as
Stuller Settings, Inc. and changed its name to Stuller, Inc. in July 2001.
The company was founded in 1970 and is based in
Stuller has locations in
Matthew Stuller, the founder of Stuller, has been recognized
individually with the Inc. Magazine Entrepreneur of the Year award for
wholesale distribution in the state of
Stuller is one of the leading manufacturers and distributors of jewelry
and jewelry-related products. From nearly 600,000 square feet of manufacturing
and administrative facilities in
The company received the United States Senate Productivity Award for
Suppliers include:
SHAFA TOOLS
Amin Building 65, Ebrahim Rahimtulla road, Mumbai MH 400003 –
EIN: 72-0694251
Staff: 1,400
Operations & branches:
At the headquarters, we
find a factory, warehouse and office, owned.
Stuller has locations in
Shareholders:
Matthew G. STULLER Sr. is a
major shareholder.
Management:
Mr. Matthew Gordy Stuller, Sr., founded Stuller Inc. in 1972 and served
as its Chief Executive Officer.
Mr. Stuller also serves as Director New Orleans Branch at Federal
Reserve Bank of
He attended
Mr. Stuller is a member of the Young President Organization, the Sons of
the American Revolution, and the 24 Karat Club of the Southeastern United
States; Member of the Board of Directors, The Jewelers Vigilance Committee;
Member of the Board, Jewelry Information Center; Member of the Board of
Directors of the University of Southwestern Louisiana Foundation; Board Member,
U.S. Senate Productivity and Innovation Award; and Member, GIA Vision 2000. His
past memberships include Member of the Board of Directors, Jewelers Board of
Trade; and Member of the Board, Greater Lafayette Chamber of Commerce. Awards
and honors he has received include the 1995 Entrepreneur Of The Year award in
the Wholesale/Distribution category in the state of
George Daniel CLARK is the President and Director.
He has been an Executive Vice President of manufacturer's supply chain
division of Stuller, Inc. since October 2009.
Mr. Clark served as Vice President at
As far as we know, they are not involved in other local corporations.
Subsidiaries
And partnership: None
In
On a direct call, a
financial assistant controlled the present report.
Sales declared for year
2013 is in the range of USD 115,000,000=
(verse USD 76,500,000= in
2011)
The business is profitable.
Banks: JPMorgan Chase Bank
HSBC Bank
Legal filings
& complaints:
As of today date, there is no legal filing pending with the Courts.
Secured debts summary (UCC):
There are several UCC files, including:
|
UCC Filed Date: |
01/10/2008 |
|
|
|
|
Filing Number: |
432949 |
|
Jurisdiction: |
SEC of State LA |
|
Secured Party: |
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA 600 |
|
|
|
|
UCC Filed Date: |
01/14/2008 |
|
Expiration Date: |
N/A |
|
|
|
|
Jurisdiction: |
SEC of State LA |
|
Secured Party: |
HSBC BANK NEW |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
UCC Filed Date: |
01/14/2008 |
|
|
|
|
Filing Number: |
432981 |
|
Jurisdiction: |
SEC of State LA |
|
Secured Party: |
HSBC BANK |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
UCC Filed Date: |
01/14/2008 |
|
|
|
|
Filing Number: |
432982 |
|
Jurisdiction: |
SEC of State LA |
|
Secured Party: |
HSBC BANK |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
UCC Filed Date: |
01/17/2008 |
|
|
|
|
Filing Number: |
433012 |
|
Jurisdiction: |
SEC of State LA |
|
Secured Party: |
MITSUI & CO PRECIOUS METALS INC |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
UCC Filed Date: |
01/17/2008 |
|
Expiration Date: |
N/A |
|
Filing Number: |
433013 |
|
Jurisdiction: |
SEC of State LA |
|
Secured Party: |
MITSUI & CO PRECIOUS METALS INC |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
UCC Filed Date: |
01/17/2008 |
|
|
|
|
Filing Number: |
433014 |
|
Jurisdiction: |
SEC of State LA |
|
Secured Party: |
MITSUI & CO PRECIOUS METALS INC |
Trade references:
Date reported: March 2014
High credit: USD 20,000+
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: February 2014
Line of business: Office supply
Paying status: 1 day beyond terms
Date reported: March 2014
High credit: USD 2,000,000+
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: February 2014
Line of business: Payroll
Paying status: As agreed
Date reported: March 2014
High credit: USD 12,000
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: February 2014
Line of business: Telecommunications
Paying status: 1 day beyond terms
Domestic credit history:
Domestic credit history
appears as follow:
Monthly Payment Trends - Recent Activity
|
Date |
Up to 30 DBT |
31-60 DBT |
61-90 DBT |
>90 DBT |
||
|
11/13 |
$420,700 |
94% |
6% |
0% |
0% |
0% |
|
12/13 |
$449,300 |
96% |
4% |
0% |
0% |
0% |
|
01/14 |
$720,600 |
97% |
3% |
0% |
0% |
0% |
|
02/14 |
$721,200 |
97% |
3% |
0% |
0% |
0% |
|
03/14 |
$537,800 |
86% |
14% |
0% |
0% |
0% |
|
04/14 |
$466,300 |
95% |
5% |
0% |
0% |
0% |
National Credit Bureaus
gave a correct credit rating.
According to our credit analysts, during the last 6 months, domestic payments
were made with an average of 1 to 2 days beyond terms.
International
credit history:
Payments of imports are currently made on terms.
Other comments:
The Company maintains a
regular business.
The bank confirmed a
regular account.
The Company is in good
standing.
This means that all local
and federal taxes were paid on due date.
Last report was filed on
01-22-2014.
The risk is low.
Our opinion:
A business connection may
be conducted.
DIAMOND INDUSTRY –
-
From time immemorial,
-
The achievement of the Indian diamond industry was possible only due to
combination of the manufacturing skills of the Indian workforce and the
untiring and unflagging efforts of the Indian diamantaires, supported by
progressive Government policies.
-
The area of study of family owned diamond businesses derives its
importance from the huge conglomerate of family run organizations which operate
in the diamond industry since many generations.
-
Some of the basic traits of family run business enterprises include
spirit of entrepreneurship, mutual trust lowers transaction costs, small,
nimble and quick to react, information as a source of advantage and
philanthropy.
-
Family owned diamond businesses need to improve on many fronts including
higher standard of corporate governance, long-term performance – focused
strategies, modern management and technology.
-
Utmost caution is to be exercised while dealing with some medium and
large diamond traders which are usually engaged in fictitious import – export,
inter-company transactions, financially assisted by banks. In the process,
several public sector banks lost several hundred million rupees. They mostly
diverted borrowed money for diamond business into real estate and capital
markets.
-
Excerpts from Times of India dated 30th October 2010 is as
under –
-
Gem & Jewellery Export Promotion Council in its statistical data has
shown the export of polished diamonds to have increase by 28 % in February
2013. Compared to $ 1.4 bn worth of polished diamond export in February, 2012,
-
The banking sector has started exercising restraint while following
prudent risk management norms when lending money to gems and jewellery sector.
This follows the implementation of Basel III accord – a global voluntary
regulatory standard on bank capital adequacy, stress testing and market
liquidity.
Standard & Poor’s
|
|
|
Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
·
We have lowered our long-term
sovereign credit rating on the United States of America to 'AA+' from 'AAA' and
affirmed the 'A-1+' short-term rating.
·
We have also removed both the short- and long-term ratings
from CreditWatch negative.
·
The downgrade reflects our opinion
that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration
recently agreed to falls short of what, in our view, would be necessary to
stabilize the government's medium-term debt dynamics.
·
More broadly, the downgrade
reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of
American policymaking and political institutions have weakened at a time of
ongoing fiscal and economic challenges to a degree more than we envisioned when
we assigned a negative outlook to the rating on April 18, 2011.
·
Since then, we have changed our
view of the difficulties in bridging the gulf between the political parties
over fiscal policy, which makes us pessimistic about the capacity of Congress
and the Administration to be able to leverage their agreement this week into a
broader fiscal consolidation plan that stabilizes the government's debt
dynamics any time soon.
·
The outlook on the long-term rating
is negative. We could lower the long-term rating to 'AA' within the next two
years if we see that less reduction in spending than agreed to, higher interest
rates, or new fiscal pressures during the period result in a higher general
government debt trajectory than we currently assume in our base case.
The
transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment of the
debt service--remains
'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term
rating on the U.S. because we believe that the prolonged controversy over
raising the statutory debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate
indicate that further near-term progress containing the growth in public
spending, especially on entitlements, or on reaching an agreement on raising
revenues is less likely than we previously assumed and will remain a
contentious and fitful process. We also believe that the fiscal consolidation
plan that Congress and the Administration agreed to this week falls short of
the amount that we believe is necessary to stabilize the general government
debt burden by the middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the
rating was prompted by our view on the rising public debt burden and our
perception of greater policymaking uncertainty, consistent with our criteria
(see "Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and
Assumptions ," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41).
Nevertheless, we view the
We have taken the ratings
off CreditWatch because the Aug. 2 passage of the Budget Control Act Amendment
of 2011 has removed any perceived immediate threat of payment default posed by
delays to raising the government's debt ceiling. In addition, we believe that
the act provides sufficient clarity to allow us to evaluate the likely course
of
The
political brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as
the containment of which
we and most other independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal
sustainability.
Our opinion is that
elected officials remain wary of tackling the structural issues required to
effectively address the rising U.S. public debt burden in a manner consistent
with a 'AAA' rating and with 'AAA' rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and
Assumptions," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41). In
our view, the difficulty in framing a consensus on fiscal policy weakens the
government's ability to manage public finances and diverts attention from the
debate over how to achieve more balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era
of fiscal stringency and private-sector deleveraging (ibid). A new political
consensus might (or might not) emerge after the 2012 elections, but we believe
that by then, the government debt burden will likely be higher, the needed
medium-term fiscal adjustment potentially greater, and the inflection point on
the U.S. population's demographics and other age-related spending drivers
closer at hand (see "Global Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Likely
Cost Even More Green, Now," June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's
takes no position on the mix of spending and revenue measures that Congress and
the Administration might conclude is appropriate for putting the
The act calls for as much
as $2.4 trillion of reductions in expenditure growth over the 10 years through
2021. These cuts will be implemented in two steps: the $917 billion agreed to
initially, followed by an additional $1.5 trillion that the newly formed
Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction is supposed to
recommend by November 2011. The act contains no measures to raise taxes or
otherwise enhance revenues, though the committee could recommend them.
The act further provides
that if Congress does not enact the committee's recommendations, cuts of $1.2
trillion will be implemented over the same time period. The reductions would
mainly affect outlays for civilian discretionary spending, defense, and
Medicare. We understand that this fall-back mechanism is designed to encourage
Congress to embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure savings, as the
committee might recommend.
We note that in a letter
to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated
total budgetary savings under the act to be at least $2.1 trillion over the
next 10 years relative to its baseline assumptions. In updating our own fiscal
projections, with certain modifications outlined below, we have relied on the
CBO's latest "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" of June 2011, updated to
include the CBO assumptions contained in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In
general, the CBO's "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" assumes a continuation
of recent Congressional action overriding existing law.
We view the act's
measures as a step toward fiscal consolidation. However, this is within the
framework of a legislative mechanism that leaves open the details of what is
finally agreed to until the end of 2011, and Congress and the Administration
could modify any agreement in the future. Even assuming that at least $2.1
trillion of the spending reductions the act envisages are implemented, we
maintain our view that the
Compared with previous
projections, our revised base case scenario now assumes that the 2001 and 2003
tax cuts, due to expire by the end of 2012, remain in place. We have changed
our assumption on this because the majority of Republicans in Congress continue
to resist any measure that would raise revenues, a position we believe Congress
reinforced by passing the act. Key macroeconomic assumptions in the base case
scenario include trend real GDP growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near
2% annually over the decade.
Our revised upside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as consistent with the
outlook on the 'AA+' long-term rating being revised to stable--retains these
same macroeconomic assumptions. In addition, it incorporates $950 billion of
new revenues on the assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners
lapse from 2013 onwards, as the Administration is advocating. In this scenario,
we project that the net general government debt would rise from an estimated
74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as being consistent with a
possible further downgrade to a 'AA' long-term rating--features less-favorable
macroeconomic assumptions, as outlined below and also assumes that the second
round of spending cuts (at least $1.2 trillion) that the act calls for does not
occur. This scenario also assumes somewhat higher nominal interest rates for
U.S. Treasuries. We still believe that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key
reserve currency confers a government funding advantage, one that could change
only slowly over time, and that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose
monetary policy at a time of fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible
that interest rates could rise if investors re-price relative risks. As a
result, our alternate scenario factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in
10-year bond yields relative to the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In
this scenario, we project the net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP
in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to 101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios
also take into account the significant negative revisions to historical GDP
data that the Bureau of Economic Analysis announced on July 29. From our
perspective, the effect of these revisions underscores two related points when
evaluating the likely debt trajectory of the
When comparing the U.S.
to sovereigns with 'AAA' long-term ratings that we view as relevant
peers--Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K.--we also observe, based on our
base case scenarios for each, that the trajectory of the U.S.'s net public debt
is diverging from the others. Including the
Standard & Poor's
transfer T&C assessment of the
The outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. As our downside alternate fiscal scenario
illustrates, a higher public debt trajectory than we currently assume could
lead us to lower the long-term rating again. On the other hand, as our upside
scenario highlights, if the recommendations of the Congressional Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction--independently or coupled with other
initiatives, such as the lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high
earners--lead to fiscal consolidation measures beyond the minimum mandated, and
we believe they are likely to slow the deterioration of the government's debt
dynamics, the long-term rating could stabilize at 'AA+'.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.60.99 |
|
|
1 |
Rs.99.10 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.79.03 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Report Prepared
by : |
TPT |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest
capability for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit
transaction. It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest
and principal sums |
Large |
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General unfavourable
factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for payment of
interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall
operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with full
security |
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
-- |
NB |
New Business |
-- |
This score serves as a reference to assess SC’s credit risk and
to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is calculated from a composite
of weighted scores obtained from each of the major sections of this report. The
assessed factors and their relative weights (as indicated through %) are as
follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend
(10%) Operational
size (10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL)
or its officials.