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Report Date : |
17.09.2014 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
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Name : |
TRACKING AND GLOBAL MONITORING GROUP INC. |
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Registered Office : |
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Country : |
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Date of Incorporation : |
21.08.2012 |
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Legal Form : |
Corporation – Profit |
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Line of Business : |
The Company offers a variety of products and services tailored to your
needs, including: * Satellite Trackers * GSM Trackers * Dual-mode Trackers * Simplex Data Telemetry Devices * GPS Telemetry |
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No of Employees : |
2 |
RATING & COMMENTS
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MIRA’s Rating : |
Ca |
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RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
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11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with
full security |
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Status : |
Moderate |
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Payment Behaviour : |
Unknown |
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Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES :
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail : infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – June 01, 2014
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Country Name |
Previous Rating (31.03.2014) |
Current Rating (01.06.2014) |
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A1 |
A1 |
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Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
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Insignificant |
A1 |
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Low Risk |
A2 |
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Moderate Low Risk |
B1 |
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Moderate Risk |
B2 |
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Moderate High Risk |
C1 |
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High Risk |
C2 |
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Very High Risk |
D |
UNITED STATES - ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
The
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Source
: CIA |
Your order on: TAGM
GROUP HOLDINGS
We find:
TRACKING AND
GLOBAL MONITORING GROUP INC.
Address:
Telephone: +1
561-901-8238 (cellular)
Fax: -
Website: www.tagmgroup.com
Reg. address: 109 SE 15th Terrace,
Corporate ID#: P12000071992
State:
Judicial form: Corporation – Profit
Date incorporated: 08-21-2012
Stock: 100,000,000
shares common
Value: No
par value
Name of manager: TIMOTHY
ALLEN
History
A former TRACKING AND
GLOBAL MONITORING LLC, with same managers, was incorporated in
Business:
The Company offers a variety of products and services tailored to your
needs, including:
* Satellite Trackers
* GSM Trackers
* Dual-mode Trackers
* Simplex Data Telemetry Devices
* GPS Telemetry
Office of the Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC):
The company is not listed on the OFAC list.
The Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List is a publication of OFAC
which lists individuals and organizations with whom
No name of foreign suppliers available.
EIN: 46-1094786
Staff: 2
Operations & branches:
At the headquarters, we
find a private home.
Shareholders:
- Timothy ALLEN: 5,000,000
shares (issued and outstanding)
- Robert WASSON: 5,000,000 shares (issued and outstanding)
Management:
Timothy ALLEN is Director.
Robert WASSON is the CEO
As far as we know, he is the President of:
STARDARA JEWELERS, INC.
Incorporated in
ID# P95000035161
Subsidiaries and partnership: None
In
We called and left a
message on the voicemail but nobody returned the call.
We sent 2 emails but no
answer received.
Banks: n/a
Legal filings
& complaints:
As of today date, there is no legal filing pending with the Courts.
Secured debts summary (UCC):
None
No trade references
available.
No domestic credit history.
OTHER COMMENTS:
The Company is NOT in good
standing.
This means that all local
and federal taxes were NOT paid on due date.
Last report was filed on
04-18-2013.
The risk is HIGH.
OUR OPINION:
We suggest you to be
careful.
Standard & Poor’s
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Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
·
We have lowered our long-term
sovereign credit rating on the United States of America to 'AA+' from 'AAA' and
affirmed the 'A-1+' short-term rating.
·
We have also removed both the short- and long-term ratings from
CreditWatch negative.
·
The downgrade reflects our opinion that the fiscal
consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration recently agreed to
falls short of what, in our view, would be necessary to stabilize the
government's medium-term debt dynamics.
·
More broadly, the downgrade reflects our view that
the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of American policymaking and
political institutions have weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic challenges
to a degree more than we envisioned when we assigned a negative outlook to the
rating on April 18, 2011.
·
Since then, we have changed our view of the
difficulties in bridging the gulf between the political parties over fiscal
policy, which makes us pessimistic about the capacity of Congress and the
Administration to be able to leverage their agreement this week into a broader
fiscal consolidation plan that stabilizes the government's debt dynamics any
time soon.
·
The outlook on the long-term rating is negative. We
could lower the long-term rating to 'AA' within the next two years if we see
that less reduction in spending than agreed to, higher interest rates, or new
fiscal pressures during the period result in a higher general government debt
trajectory than we currently assume in our base case.
The transfer and
convertibility (T&C) assessment of the
debt service--remains
'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term
rating on the U.S. because we believe that the prolonged controversy over
raising the statutory debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate
indicate that further near-term progress containing the growth in public
spending, especially on entitlements, or on reaching an agreement on raising
revenues is less likely than we previously assumed and will remain a
contentious and fitful process. We also believe that the fiscal consolidation
plan that Congress and the Administration agreed to this week falls short of
the amount that we believe is necessary to stabilize the general government
debt burden by the middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the
rating was prompted by our view on the rising public debt burden and our
perception of greater policymaking uncertainty, consistent with our criteria
(see "Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and
Assumptions ," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41).
Nevertheless, we view the
We have taken the ratings
off CreditWatch because the Aug. 2 passage of the Budget Control Act Amendment
of 2011 has removed any perceived immediate threat of payment default posed by
delays to raising the government's debt ceiling. In addition, we believe that
the act provides sufficient clarity to allow us to evaluate the likely course
of
The political
brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as
the containment of which
we and most other independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal
sustainability.
Our opinion is that
elected officials remain wary of tackling the structural issues required to
effectively address the rising U.S. public debt burden in a manner consistent
with a 'AAA' rating and with 'AAA' rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and
Assumptions," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41). In
our view, the difficulty in framing a consensus on fiscal policy weakens the
government's ability to manage public finances and diverts attention from the
debate over how to achieve more balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era
of fiscal stringency and private-sector deleveraging (ibid). A new political
consensus might (or might not) emerge after the 2012 elections, but we believe
that by then, the government debt burden will likely be higher, the needed
medium-term fiscal adjustment potentially greater, and the inflection point on
the U.S. population's demographics and other age-related spending drivers closer
at hand (see "Global Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Likely
Cost Even More Green, Now," June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's
takes no position on the mix of spending and revenue measures that Congress and
the Administration might conclude is appropriate for putting the
The act calls for as much
as $2.4 trillion of reductions in expenditure growth over the 10 years through
2021. These cuts will be implemented in two steps: the $917 billion agreed to
initially, followed by an additional $1.5 trillion that the newly formed
Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction is supposed to
recommend by November 2011. The act contains no measures to raise taxes or
otherwise enhance revenues, though the committee could recommend them.
The act further provides
that if Congress does not enact the committee's recommendations, cuts of $1.2 trillion
will be implemented over the same time period. The reductions would mainly
affect outlays for civilian discretionary spending, defense, and Medicare. We
understand that this fall-back mechanism is designed to encourage Congress to
embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure savings, as the committee might
recommend.
We note that in a letter
to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated
total budgetary savings under the act to be at least $2.1 trillion over the
next 10 years relative to its baseline assumptions. In updating our own fiscal
projections, with certain modifications outlined below, we have relied on the
CBO's latest "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" of June 2011, updated to
include the CBO assumptions contained in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In
general, the CBO's "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" assumes a continuation
of recent Congressional action overriding existing law.
We view the act's
measures as a step toward fiscal consolidation. However, this is within the framework
of a legislative mechanism that leaves open the details of what is finally
agreed to until the end of 2011, and Congress and the Administration could
modify any agreement in the future. Even assuming that at least $2.1 trillion
of the spending reductions the act envisages are implemented, we maintain our
view that the
Compared with previous
projections, our revised base case scenario now assumes that the 2001 and 2003
tax cuts, due to expire by the end of 2012, remain in place. We have changed
our assumption on this because the majority of Republicans in Congress continue
to resist any measure that would raise revenues, a position we believe Congress
reinforced by passing the act. Key macroeconomic assumptions in the base case
scenario include trend real GDP growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near
2% annually over the decade.
Our revised upside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as consistent with the
outlook on the 'AA+' long-term rating being revised to stable--retains these
same macroeconomic assumptions. In addition, it incorporates $950 billion of
new revenues on the assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners
lapse from 2013 onwards, as the Administration is advocating. In this scenario,
we project that the net general government debt would rise from an estimated
74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as being consistent with a
possible further downgrade to a 'AA' long-term rating--features less-favorable
macroeconomic assumptions, as outlined below and also assumes that the second
round of spending cuts (at least $1.2 trillion) that the act calls for does not
occur. This scenario also assumes somewhat higher nominal interest rates for
U.S. Treasuries. We still believe that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key
reserve currency confers a government funding advantage, one that could change
only slowly over time, and that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose
monetary policy at a time of fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible
that interest rates could rise if investors re-price relative risks. As a
result, our alternate scenario factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in
10-year bond yields relative to the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In
this scenario, we project the net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP
in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to 101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios
also take into account the significant negative revisions to historical GDP
data that the Bureau of Economic Analysis announced on July 29. From our
perspective, the effect of these revisions underscores two related points when
evaluating the likely debt trajectory of the
When comparing the U.S.
to sovereigns with 'AAA' long-term ratings that we view as relevant
peers--Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K.--we also observe, based on our
base case scenarios for each, that the trajectory of the U.S.'s net public debt
is diverging from the others. Including the
Standard & Poor's
transfer T&C assessment of the
The outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. As our downside alternate fiscal scenario
illustrates, a higher public debt trajectory than we currently assume could
lead us to lower the long-term rating again. On the other hand, as our upside
scenario highlights, if the recommendations of the Congressional Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction--independently or coupled with other
initiatives, such as the lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high
earners--lead to fiscal consolidation measures beyond the minimum mandated, and
we believe they are likely to slow the deterioration of the government's debt
dynamics, the long-term rating could stabilize at 'AA+'.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
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Currency |
Unit
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Indian Rupees |
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US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.61.10 |
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1 |
Rs.99.05 |
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Euro |
1 |
Rs.79.03 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
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Analysis Done by
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KAR |
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Report Prepared
by : |
TPT |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
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RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
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>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest
capability for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
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71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit
transaction. It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest
and principal sums |
Large |
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56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General unfavourable
factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for payment of
interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
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41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
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26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
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11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors
are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums in default or expected
to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with full security |
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<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
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-- |
NB |
New Business |
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This score serves as a reference to assess SC’s credit risk
and to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is calculated from a
composite of weighted scores obtained from each of the major sections of this
report. The assessed factors and their relative weights (as indicated through
%) are as follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend
(10%) Operational
size (10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL)
or its officials.