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Report Date : |
27.09.2014 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
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Name : |
G-III APPAREL GROUP, LTD. |
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Registered Office : |
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Country : |
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Financials (as on) : |
31.07.2014 |
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Date of Incorporation : |
17.10.1989 |
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Legal Form : |
Public Company |
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Line of Business : |
Designs, Manufactures, and Markets Women’s and Men’s Apparel. |
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No of Employees : |
6,631 |
RATING & COMMENTS
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MIRA’s Rating : |
Ba |
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RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
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41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
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Status : |
Satisfactory |
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Payment Behaviour : |
No Company |
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Litigation : |
Exist |
NOTES :
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail : infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – June 1, 2014
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Country Name |
Previous Rating (31.03.2014) |
Current Rating (01.06.2014) |
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A1 |
A1 |
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Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
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Insignificant |
A1 |
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Low |
A2 |
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Moderate |
B1 |
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High |
B2 |
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Very High |
C1 |
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Restricted |
C2 |
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Off-credit |
D |
UNITED STATES - ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
The
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Source
: CIA |
G-III APPAREL GROUP,
INC.
Address:
Telephone: +1
212-403-0500
Fax: +1 212-403-0551
Website: www.g-iii.com
Corporate ID#: 2210754
State:
Judicial form: Public Company (Nasdaq = GIII)
Date founded: 10-17-1989
Stock: 22,385,233 shares
of issuer’s common stock
(as of September 2, 2014)
Value: USD 0.01= par value
Name of manager: MORRIS
GOLDFARB
Business:
G-III Apparel Group, Ltd. designs, manufactures, and markets women’s and
men’s apparel.
The company’s products include outerwear, dresses, sportswear, swimwear,
women’s suits, and women’s performance wear. It also markets footwear and
accessories, such as luggage, women’s handbags, small leather goods, and cold
weather accessories.
The company markets its apparel and other products under proprietary brands,
including the Bass, G.H. Bass, Vilebrequin, Andrew Marc, Marc New York, Jessica
Howard, Eliza J, Black Rivet, Wilsons G-III Sports by Carl Banks, and G-III for
Her, as well as under various licensed and private label brands. G-III Apparel
Group, Ltd. offers its products to department, specialty, and mass merchant
retail stores, as well as upper tier stores and catalogs primarily in the
As of January 31, 2014, it operated 426 retail stores, including 165
Wilsons Leather stores, 156 G.H. Bass stores, 5 Andrew Marc stores, and 70
Vilebrequin retail stores, as well as licensed Calvin Klein retail stores
comprising 3 stores in the United States and 27 in China.
In addition, the company sells its products through
G-III Apparel Group, Ltd. was founded in 1956 and is based in
Office of the Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC):
The company is not listed on the OFAC list.
The Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List is a publication of OFAC
which lists individuals and organizations with whom
EIN: 41-1590959
Staff: 6,631
Operations & branches:
At above address, we find
the corporate office, on lease.
The Company maintains
several branches/manufactures in the U.S
Shareholders:
The Company is quoted with the Nasdaq under symbol GIII.
As of 06-30-2014, 72% of
the stock was held by institutional and mutual fund owners, including:
|
FMR, LLC |
10.63% |
|
Vanguard Group, Inc. (The) |
5.46% |
|
Royce & Associates, LLC |
4.80% |
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BlackRock Fund Advisors |
4.06% |
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3.90% |
Management:
Morris Goldfarb is Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer
Born in 1951
Mr. Morris Goldfarb serves as the Chairman of the Board and Chief
Executive Officer of G-III Apparel Group. Mr. Goldfarb served as a Co-Chairman
and President or Vice President of G-III Apparel Group. and its predecessors,
since its formation since 1974 until April 1997, which he formed in 1974. He
has grown G-III, publicly traded on the NASDAQ stock exchange under symbol GIII
into a formidable force in the apparel marketplace with a $500 million market
cap and net sales over $800 million in Fiscal 2010.
Mr. Goldfarb was a Partner of Hamilton House Private, Ltd. He co-founded
Rainforest Café.
Mr. Goldfarb also owned and operated a garment factory in
He has been an Outside Director at ante5, Inc. since November 12, 2010.
He serves on a number of Boards, both public and private, including Fashion
Delivers Charitable Foundation, Inc. He serves on the Board of Park Place
Entertainment and Panasia Bank.
He serves on the Board of Directors of CIT Consumer Products Advisory
Board.
Mr. Goldfarb served as a Director of Lakes Entertainment Inc. from June
1998 to March 2010. He served on the board of Grand Casinos. He serves on the
board of Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. He is the President and a Director
of The Leather Apparel Association. Among his many honors and accomplishments,
in 2002, Mr. Goldfarb was recipient of the Business Man of the Year Award presented
by the Government of South Korea and more recently was chosen and honored by
the UJA-Federation of New York Menswear Division as one of three outstanding
business leaders in
Wayne S. MILLER is COO.
Neal S. NACKMAN is the Chief Financial Officer.
Subsidiaries & Partnership:
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NAME OF
SUBSIDIARY |
JURISDICTION OF
ORGANIZATION |
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G-III Leather Fashions, Inc. |
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AM Retail Group, Inc. |
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CK Outerwear, LLC |
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Andrew & Suzanne Company Inc. |
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AM Apparel Holdings, Inc. |
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G-III Apparel |
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G-III Hong Kong Limited |
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Kostroma Limited |
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G-III Asia, Limited |
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G-III License Company, LLC |
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Vilebrequin International SA |
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T.R.B. International SA |
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Tropezina S.L. |
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Lobst SAS |
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TRB Belgique SPRL |
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Riley SA |
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Sole SRL |
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La Plage Ltd. |
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T.R.B. Hong Kong Ltd. |
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TRB Macao Ltd. |
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Riley & Cie S.C.S. |
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TRB Portugal, Comercio de Vestuario Unipessoal LDA |
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G-T (International) Fashion Company Limited |
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On attachment:
- 10K fiscal year ending January
31st, 2014
- 2nd 10Q 204
On September 3, 2014, G-III Apparel
Group, Ltd. announced unaudited consolidated earnings results for the second
quarter and six months ended July 31, 2014.
For the quarter, the company announced net sales of $424,010,000
compared to $304,158,000 for the same period a year ago. Operating profit was
$11,495,000 compared to $7,133,000 for the same period a year ago.
Income before taxes was $9,530,000 compared to $5,383,000 for the same
period a year ago. Net income was $5,908,000 compared to $3,338,000 for the
same period a year ago. Income attributable to the company was $6,236,000
compared to $3,592,000 for the same period a year ago. Net income per common
share, diluted was $0.29 compared to $0.17 for the same period a year ago. For
the quarter ended July 31, 2014, the company reported that net sales, driven by
a strong wholesale performance across several categories, increased by 39%.
For the six months, the company announced net sales of $790,202,000
compared to $576,773,000 for the same period a year ago. Operating profit was
$15,005,000 compared to $10,577,000 for the same period a year ago. Income
before taxes was $11,287,000 compared to $7,049,000 for the same period a year
ago. Net income was $6,998,000 compared to $4,371,000 for the same period a
year ago. Income attributable to the company was $7,526,000 compared to
$4,710,000 for the same period a year ago. Net income per common share, diluted
was $0.35 compared to $0.23 for the same period a year ago. The company spent
approximately $21 million on capital expenditures. The company revised its
prior guidance for the full fiscal year ending January 31, 2015. The company is
now forecasting net sales of approximately $2.11 billion and net income between
$90.6 million and $93.9 million, or a range between $4.00 and $4.15 per diluted
share, compared to its previous guidance of net sales of approximately $2.06
billion and net income between $87.9 million and $91.2 million, or a range
between $4.05 and $4.20 per diluted share. The revised guidance includes $0.16
of dilution from the impact of the company’s recent sale of 1,725,000 shares in
a public offering completed in June of this year. The company is now projecting
adjusted EBITDA for fiscal 2015 to increase between 18% and 22% to between
$174.0 million and $179.4 million compared to its previous guidance of adjusted
EBITDA between approximately $170.2 million and $175.5 million. Depreciation
and amortization expected to be $19,300,000, interest and financing charges, net
expected to be $9,000,000, income tax expense expected to be between $55,100
and $57,200,000. capital expenditures expected to be between $30 million and
$32 million. For its third fiscal quarter ending October 31, 2014, the company
is forecasting net sales of approximately $805 million compared to $668.7
million in the comparable quarter last year. The company is also forecasting
net income for the third fiscal quarter between $63.9 million and $67.3
million, or between $2.75 and $2.90 per diluted share, compared to net income
of $59.6 million, or $2.85 per diluted share, in last year's third quarter. The
revised third quarter guidance includes $0.21 of dilution from the impact of
the company’s recent sale of 1,725,000 shares in a public offering completed in
June of this year.
Banks: JPMorgan Chase Bank
Legal
filings & complaints:
State:
Case number: 2:14-cv-00371-JDL
Plaintiff: Zachary GRANT
Defendant: G-III APPAREL GROUP LTD et al
JON D. LEVY, presiding
JOHN H. RICH III, referral
Date filed: 09/19/2014
Date of last filing: 09/19/2014
Cause: Right to re-employment of inducted
persons
Secured debts
summary (UCC): Several
TRADE REFERENCES:
Date reported: September 2014
High credit: USD 60,000+
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: August 2014
Line of business: Office supply
Paying status: On terms
Date reported: September 2014
High credit: USD 10,000,000
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: August 2014
Line of business: Payroll
Paying status: As agreed
Date reported: September 2014
High credit: USD 50,000
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: August 2014
Line of business: Telecommunications
Paying status: On terms
DOMESTIC CREDIT HISTORY:
National Credit Bureaus gave
a satisfying credit rating.
According to our credit analysts, during the last 6 months, domestic
payments were prompt and regular.
INTERNATIONAL
CREDIT HISTORY:
Payments of imports are currently made on beyond terms.
OTHER COMMENTS:
The Company is developing a
strong business.
The Company is in good
standing.
This means that all local
and federal taxes were paid on due date.
The risk is low.
OUR OPINION:
A business connection may
be conducted.
Standard & Poor’s
|
United
States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'AA+' Due To Political Risks,
Rising Debt Burden; Outlook Negative |
|
Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
·
We have lowered our long-term sovereign
credit rating on the United States of America to 'AA+' from 'AAA' and affirmed
the 'A-1+' short-term rating.
·
We have also removed both the short- and long-term ratings
from CreditWatch negative.
·
The downgrade reflects our
opinion that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration
recently agreed to falls short of what, in our view, would be necessary to
stabilize the government's medium-term debt dynamics.
·
More broadly, the downgrade
reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of
American policymaking and political institutions have weakened at a time of
ongoing fiscal and economic challenges to a degree more than we envisioned when
we assigned a negative outlook to the rating on April 18, 2011.
·
Since then, we have changed our
view of the difficulties in bridging the gulf between the political parties
over fiscal policy, which makes us pessimistic about the capacity of Congress
and the Administration to be able to leverage their agreement this week into a
broader fiscal consolidation plan that stabilizes the government's debt
dynamics any time soon.
·
The outlook on the long-term
rating is negative. We could lower the long-term rating to 'AA' within the next
two years if we see that less reduction in spending than agreed to, higher
interest rates, or new fiscal pressures during the period result in a higher
general government debt trajectory than we currently assume in our base case.
TORONTO (Standard &
Poor's) Aug. 5, 2011--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that it
lowered its long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of America
to 'AA+' from 'AAA'. Standard & Poor's also said that the outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. At the same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed
its 'A-1+' short-term rating on the U.S. In addition, Standard & Poor's
removed both ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed on July 14, 2011,
with negative implications.
The transfer and
convertibility (T&C) assessment of the U.S.--our assessment of the
likelihood of official interference in the ability of U.S.-based public- and
private-sector issuers to secure foreign exchange for
debt service--remains
'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term
rating on the U.S. because we believe that the prolonged controversy over
raising the statutory debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate
indicate that further near-term progress containing the growth in public
spending, especially on entitlements, or on reaching an agreement on raising
revenues is less likely than we previously assumed and will remain a
contentious and fitful process. We also believe that the fiscal consolidation
plan that Congress and the Administration agreed to this week falls short of
the amount that we believe is necessary to stabilize the general government
debt burden by the middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the
rating was prompted by our view on the rising public debt burden and our
perception of greater policymaking uncertainty, consistent with our criteria
(see "Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and
Assumptions ," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41).
Nevertheless, we view the U.S. federal government's other economic, external,
and monetary credit attributes, which form the basis for the sovereign rating,
as broadly unchanged.
We have taken the ratings
off CreditWatch because the Aug. 2 passage of the Budget Control Act Amendment
of 2011 has removed any perceived immediate threat of payment default posed by
delays to raising the government's debt ceiling. In addition, we believe that
the act provides sufficient clarity to allow us to evaluate the likely course
of U.S. fiscal policy for the next few years.
The political
brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as America's governance
and policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and less predictable
than what we previously believed. The statutory debt ceiling and the threat of
default have become political bargaining chips in the debate over fiscal
policy. Despite this year's wide-ranging debate, in our view, the differences
between political parties have proven to be extraordinarily difficult to
bridge, and, as we see it, the resulting agreement fell well short of the
comprehensive fiscal consolidation program that some proponents had envisaged
until quite recently. Republicans and Democrats have only been able to agree to
relatively modest savings on discretionary spending while delegating to the
Select Committee decisions on more comprehensive measures. It appears that for
now, new revenues have dropped down on the menu of policy options. In addition,
the plan envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare and little change in
other entitlements,
the containment of which
we and most other independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal
sustainability.
Our opinion is that
elected officials remain wary of tackling the structural issues required to
effectively address the rising U.S. public debt burden in a manner consistent
with a 'AAA' rating and with 'AAA' rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions,"
June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41). In our view, the difficulty in
framing a consensus on fiscal policy weakens the government's ability to manage
public finances and diverts attention from the debate over how to achieve more
balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era of fiscal stringency and
private-sector deleveraging (ibid). A new political consensus might (or might
not) emerge after the 2012 elections, but we believe that by then, the
government debt burden will likely be higher, the needed medium-term fiscal
adjustment potentially greater, and the inflection point on the U.S.
population's demographics and other age-related spending drivers closer at hand
(see "Global Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Likely
Cost Even More Green, Now," June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's
takes no position on the mix of spending and revenue measures that Congress and
the Administration might conclude is appropriate for putting the U.S.'s
finances on a sustainable footing.
The act calls for as much
as $2.4 trillion of reductions in expenditure growth over the 10 years through
2021. These cuts will be implemented in two steps: the $917 billion agreed to
initially, followed by an additional $1.5 trillion that the newly formed
Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction is supposed to
recommend by November 2011. The act contains no measures to raise taxes or otherwise
enhance revenues, though the committee could recommend them.
The act further provides
that if Congress does not enact the committee's recommendations, cuts of $1.2
trillion will be implemented over the same time period. The reductions would
mainly affect outlays for civilian discretionary spending, defense, and
Medicare. We understand that this fall-back mechanism is designed to encourage
Congress to embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure savings, as the
committee might recommend.
We note that in a letter
to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated
total budgetary savings under the act to be at least $2.1 trillion over the
next 10 years relative to its baseline assumptions. In updating our own fiscal
projections, with certain modifications outlined below, we have relied on the
CBO's latest "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" of June 2011, updated to
include the CBO assumptions contained in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In
general, the CBO's "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" assumes a continuation
of recent Congressional action overriding existing law.
We view the act's
measures as a step toward fiscal consolidation. However, this is within the
framework of a legislative mechanism that leaves open the details of what is
finally agreed to until the end of 2011, and Congress and the Administration
could modify any agreement in the future. Even assuming that at least $2.1
trillion of the spending reductions the act envisages are implemented, we
maintain our view that the U.S. net general government debt burden (all levels
of government combined, excluding liquid financial assets) will likely continue
to grow. Under our revised base case fiscal scenario--which we consider to be
consistent with a 'AA+' long-term rating and a negative outlook--we now project
that net general government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the
end of 2011 to 79% in 2015 and 85% by 2021. Even the projected 2015 ratio of
sovereign indebtedness is high in relation to those of peer credits and, as
noted, would continue to rise under the act's revised policy settings.
Compared with previous
projections, our revised base case scenario now assumes that the 2001 and 2003
tax cuts, due to expire by the end of 2012, remain in place. We have changed our
assumption on this because the majority of Republicans in Congress continue to
resist any measure that would raise revenues, a position we believe Congress
reinforced by passing the act. Key macroeconomic assumptions in the base case
scenario include trend real GDP growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near
2% annually over the decade.
Our revised upside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as consistent with the
outlook on the 'AA+' long-term rating being revised to stable--retains these
same macroeconomic assumptions. In addition, it incorporates $950 billion of
new revenues on the assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners
lapse from 2013 onwards, as the Administration is advocating. In this scenario,
we project that the net general government debt would rise from an estimated
74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as being consistent with a
possible further downgrade to a 'AA' long-term rating--features less-favorable
macroeconomic assumptions, as outlined below and also assumes that the second
round of spending cuts (at least $1.2 trillion) that the act calls for does not
occur. This scenario also assumes somewhat higher nominal interest rates for
U.S. Treasuries. We still believe that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key
reserve currency confers a government funding advantage, one that could change
only slowly over time, and that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose
monetary policy at a time of fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible
that interest rates could rise if investors re-price relative risks. As a
result, our alternate scenario factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in
10-year bond yields relative to the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In
this scenario, we project the net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP
in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to 101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios
also take into account the significant negative revisions to historical GDP
data that the Bureau of Economic Analysis announced on July 29. From our
perspective, the effect of these revisions underscores two related points when
evaluating the likely debt trajectory of the U.S. government. First, the revisions
show that the recent recession was deeper than previously assumed, so the GDP
this year is lower than previously thought in both nominal and real terms.
Consequently, the debt burden is slightly higher. Second, the revised data
highlight the sub-par path of the current economic recovery when compared with
rebounds following previous post-war recessions. We believe the sluggish pace
of the current economic recovery could be consistent with the experiences of
countries that have had financial crises in which the slow process of debt
deleveraging in the private sector leads to a persistent drag on demand. As a
result, our downside case scenario assumes relatively modest real trend GDP
growth of 2.5% and inflation of near 1.5% annually going forward.
When comparing the U.S.
to sovereigns with 'AAA' long-term ratings that we view as relevant
peers--Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K.--we also observe, based on our
base case scenarios for each, that the trajectory of the U.S.'s net public debt
is diverging from the others. Including the U.S., we estimate that these five
sovereigns will have net general government debt to GDP ratios this year
ranging from 34% (Canada) to 80% (the U.K.), with the U.S. debt burden at 74%.
By 2015, we project that their net public debt to GDP ratios will range between
30% (lowest, Canada) and 83% (highest, France), with the U.S. debt burden at
79%. However, in contrast with the U.S., we project that the net public debt
burdens of these other sovereigns will begin to decline, either before or by
2015.
Standard & Poor's
transfer T&C assessment of the U.S. remains 'AAA'. Our T&C assessment
reflects our view of the likelihood of the sovereign restricting other public
and private issuers' access to foreign exchange needed to meet debt service.
Although in our view the credit standing of the U.S. government has
deteriorated modestly, we see little indication that official interference of
this kind is entering onto the policy agenda of either Congress or the
Administration. Consequently, we continue to view this risk as being highly
remote.
The outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. As our downside alternate fiscal scenario
illustrates, a higher public debt trajectory than we currently assume could lead
us to lower the long-term rating again. On the other hand, as our upside
scenario highlights, if the recommendations of the Congressional Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction--independently or coupled with other
initiatives, such as the lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high
earners--lead to fiscal consolidation measures beyond the minimum mandated, and
we believe they are likely to slow the deterioration of the government's debt
dynamics, the long-term rating could stabilize at 'AA+'.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.61.57 |
|
|
1 |
Rs.100.42 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.78.45 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Analysis Done by
: |
DIV |
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Report Prepared
by : |
TPT |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest
capability for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit
transaction. It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest
and principal sums |
Large |
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General unfavourable
factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for payment of
interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall
operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with full
security |
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
-- |
NB |
New Business |
-- |
This score serves as a reference to assess SC’s credit risk and
to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is calculated from a composite
of weighted scores obtained from each of the major sections of this report. The
assessed factors and their relative weights (as indicated through %) are as
follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend
(10%) Operational
size (10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL)
or its officials.