|
Report No. : |
338680 |
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Report Date : |
28.08.2015 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
|
Name : |
AMS SPECIALTY STEEL, LLC |
|
|
|
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Registered Office : |
3304 Collins Road, Waxham, NC 28173 |
|
|
|
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Country : |
United
States |
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|
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Date of Incorporation : |
02.12.2002 |
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Legal Form : |
LLC |
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|
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Line of Business : |
AMS Specialty Steel's main activity is the brokerage, importing and marketing
of specialty steel long products, including wire and wire rod, high nickel
alloys, special alloys |
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|
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No. of Employees : |
6 |
RATING & COMMENTS
|
MIRA’s Rating : |
Ba |
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
Status : |
Satisfactory |
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Payment Behaviour : |
No Complaints |
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Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES:
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail: infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – March 31, 2015
|
Country Name |
Previous Rating (31.12.2014) |
Current Rating (31.03.2015) |
|
United
States |
A1 |
A1 |
|
Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
|
Insignificant |
A1 |
|
Low |
A2 |
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Moderate |
B1 |
|
High |
B2 |
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Very High |
C1 |
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Restricted |
C2 |
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Off-credit |
D |
UNITED STATES - ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
The US has
the most technologically powerful economy in the world, with a per capita GDP
of $54,800. In 2014, however, US GDP ran second to China’s, when compared on a
Purchasing Power Parity basis; the US lost the top spot, where it had stood for
more than a century. In the US, private individuals and business firms make
most of the decisions, and the federal and state governments buy needed goods
and services predominantly in the private marketplace. US business firms enjoy
greater flexibility than their counterparts in Western Europe and Japan in
decisions to expand capital plant, to lay off surplus workers, and to develop
new products. At the same time, they face higher barriers to enter their
rivals' home markets than foreign firms face entering US markets. US firms are
at or near the forefront in technological advances, especially in computers and
in medical, aerospace, and military equipment; their advantage has narrowed
since the end of World War II. The onrush of technology has been a driving
factor in the gradual development of a "two-tier labor market" in
which those at the bottom lack the education and the professional/technical
skills of those at the top and, more and more, fail to get comparable pay
raises, health insurance coverage, and other benefits. But the globalization of
trade, and especially the rise of low-wage producers, has put additional
downward pressure on wages and upward pressure on the returns to capital. Since
1975, practically all the gains in household income have gone to the top 20% of
households. Since 1996, dividends and capital gains have grown faster than
wages or any other category of after-tax income. Imported oil accounts for
nearly 55% of US consumption. Crude oil prices doubled between 2001 and 2006,
the year home prices peaked; higher gasoline prices ate into consumers' budgets
and many individuals fell behind in their mortgage payments. Oil prices climbed
another 50% between 2006 and 2008, and bank foreclosures more than doubled in
the same period. Besides dampening the housing market, soaring oil prices
caused a drop in the value of the dollar and a deterioration in the US
merchandise trade deficit, which peaked at $840 billion in 2008. The sub-prime
mortgage crisis, falling home prices, investment bank failures, tight credit,
and the global economic downturn pushed the United States into a recession by
mid-2008. GDP contracted until the third quarter of 2009, making this the
deepest and longest downturn since the Great Depression.
To help
stabilize financial markets, in October 2008 the US Congress established a $700
billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The government used some of these
funds to purchase equity in US banks and industrial corporations, much of which
had been returned to the government by early 2011. In January 2009 the US
Congress passed and President Barack OBAMA signed a bill providing an
additional $787 billion fiscal stimulus to be used over 10 years - two-thirds
on additional spending and one-third on tax cuts - to create jobs and to help
the economy recover. In 2010 and 2011, the federal budget deficit reached
nearly 9% of GDP. In 2012, the federal government reduced the growth of
spending and the deficit shrank to 7.6% of GDP. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
required major shifts in national resources from civilian to military purposes
and contributed to the growth of the budget deficit and public debt. Through
2014, the direct costs of the wars totaled more than $1.5 trillion, according
to US Government figures. US revenues from taxes and other sources are lower,
as a percentage of GDP, than those of most other countries. In March 2010,
President OBAMA signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
a health insurance reform that was designed to extend coverage to an additional
32 million American citizens by 2016, through private health insurance for the
general population and Medicaid for the impoverished. Total spending on health
care - public plus private - rose from 9.0% of GDP in 1980 to 17.9% in 2010. In
July 2010, the president signed the DODD-FRANK Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, a law designed to promote financial stability by protecting
consumers from financial abuses, ending taxpayer bailouts of financial firms,
dealing with troubled banks that are "too big to fail," and improving
accountability and transparency in the financial system - in particular, by
requiring certain financial derivatives to be traded in markets that are
subject to government regulation and oversight. In December 2012, the Federal
Reserve Board (Fed) announced plans to purchase $85 billion per month of
mortgage-backed and Treasury securities in an effort to hold down long-term
interest rates, and to keep short term rates near zero until unemployment
dropped below 6.5% or inflation rose above 2.5%. In late 2013, the Fed
announced that it would begin scaling back long-term bond purchases to $75
billion per month in January 2014 and reduce them further as conditions
warranted; the Fed ended the purchases during the summer of 2014. Long-term problems
include stagnation of wages for lower-income families, inadequate investment in
deteriorating infrastructure, rapidly rising medical and pension costs of an
aging population, energy shortages, and sizable current account and budget
deficits.
|
Source
: CIA |
Company name: AMS SPECIALTY STEEL, LLC
Headquarters: 3304
Collins Road, Waxham, NC 28173 - USA
Telephone: +1
704-843-9350
Fax: +1 704-843-7172
Website: www.amsspecialtysteel.com
Corporate ID#: 0654511
State: North Carolina
Judicial form: LLC
Date founded: December 2nd, 2002
Stock: -
Value: -
Name of manager: Barbara L. ANDERSON
History:
A former AMS SPECIALTY
STEEL LLC was incorporated in North Carolina on May 9, 2000, under ID# 0552293
and dissolved.
Business:
AMS Specialty Steel's main activity is the brokerage, importing and
marketing of specialty steel long products, including wire and wire rod, high
nickel alloys, special alloys…
Office
of the Foreign Assets Control (OFAC):
The company is not listed on the OFAC list.
The Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List is a publication of OFAC
which lists individuals and organizations with whom United States citizens and
permanent residents are prohibited from doing business.
EIN: 33-0928396
Staff: 6
Operations & branches:
At the headquarters, we
find an office on lease.
The Company maintains a
branch located:
103 Carostone Court, Cary,
NC 27513
Ph: +1 919-469-2256
Fx: +1 919-469-2575
Shareholders:
- Barbara ANDERSON
- Raymond MARTIN
Management:

Barbara ANDERSON is the
President and CEO.
She has 37 years experience
in steel importing and commercial
Raymond L. MARTIN is the Sales Manager
Metallurgist, 34 years experience specialty steel production.
As far as we know, they are
not involved in other local business.
Subsidiaries &
Partnership: None
In United States, privately
held corporations are not required to publish any financials.
On a direct call, a sales
assistant controlled the present report but deferred any financials.
We sent a fax but no answer
received.
However, sales estimate for
year 2014 is in the range of USD 15,000,000
The business is said to be
profitable.
Banks: B B & T
520 N. Broome St,
Waxhaw, NC 28173
Ph: +1
704-843-2166
Legal filings & complaints:
As of today date, there is no legal filing pending with the District
Courts.
Secured debts summary (UCC):
File number: 20020130727F
Date filed: 12-16-2002
Lapse date: 12-16-2017
Secured party: RB INTERNATIONAL FINANCE (USA) LLC dba RZB FINANCE LLC
1133 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10036
Trade references:
Date reported: June 2015
High credit: USD 8,000
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: May 2015
Line of business: Office supply
Paying status: On terms
Date reported: June 2015
High credit: USD 12,000
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: May 2015
Line of business: Payroll
Paying status: As
agreed
Date reported: June 2015
High credit: USD 300
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: May 2015
Line of business: Telecommunications
Paying status: On terms
Domestic credit history:
National Credit Bureaus gave
a satisfying credit risk.
According to our credit analysts, during the last 6 months, domestic
payments were made on due date.
Other comments:
The bank and financial
institutions confirmed a correct credit history.
The Company is in good
standing.
This means that all local
and federal taxes were paid on due date.
Last report was filed on
03-16-2015.
The risk is low.
Our opinion:
A business connection may
be conducted.
Standard & Poor’s
|
United
States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'AA+' Due To Political Risks,
Rising Debt Burden; Outlook Negative |
|
Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
·
We
have also removed both the short- and long-term ratings from CreditWatch
negative.
·
The
downgrade reflects our opinion that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress
and the Administration recently agreed to falls short of what, in our view,
would be necessary to stabilize the government's medium-term debt dynamics.
·
More
broadly, the downgrade reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability, and
predictability of American policymaking and political institutions have
weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic challenges to a degree more
than we envisioned when we assigned a negative outlook to the rating on April
18, 2011.
·
Since
then, we have changed our view of the difficulties in bridging the gulf between
the political parties over fiscal policy, which makes us pessimistic about the
capacity of Congress and the Administration to be able to leverage their
agreement this week into a broader fiscal consolidation plan that stabilizes
the government's debt dynamics any time soon.
·
The
outlook on the long-term rating is negative. We could lower the long-term
rating to 'AA' within the next two years if we see that less reduction in spending
than agreed to, higher interest rates, or new fiscal pressures during the
period result in a higher general government debt trajectory than we currently
assume in our base case.
TORONTO (Standard & Poor's) Aug. 5,
2011--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that it lowered its
long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of America to 'AA+' from
'AAA'. Standard & Poor's also said that the outlook on the long-term rating
is negative. At the same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed its 'A-1+'
short-term rating on the U.S. In addition, Standard & Poor's removed both
ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed on July 14, 2011, with
negative implications.
The transfer and
convertibility (T&C) assessment of the U.S.--our assessment of the
likelihood of official interference in the ability of U.S.-based public- and
private-sector issuers to secure foreign exchange for
debt service--remains 'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term rating on the U.S.
because we believe that the prolonged controversy over raising the statutory
debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate indicate that further
near-term progress containing the growth in public spending, especially on
entitlements, or on reaching an agreement on raising revenues is less likely
than we previously assumed and will remain a contentious and fitful process. We
also believe that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the
Administration agreed to this week falls short of the amount that we believe is
necessary to stabilize the general government debt burden by the middle of the
decade.
Our lowering of the rating was prompted by
our view on the rising public debt burden and our perception of greater
policymaking uncertainty, consistent with our criteria (see "Sovereign Government Rating
Methodology and Assumptions ," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs
36-41). Nevertheless, we view the U.S. federal government's other economic,
external, and monetary credit attributes, which form the basis for the
sovereign rating, as broadly unchanged.
We have taken the ratings off CreditWatch
because the Aug. 2 passage of the Budget Control Act Amendment of 2011 has
removed any perceived immediate threat of payment default posed by delays to
raising the government's debt ceiling. In addition, we believe that the act
provides sufficient clarity to allow us to evaluate the likely course of U.S.
fiscal policy for the next few years.
The political brinksmanship
of recent months highlights what we see as America's governance and
policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and less predictable than
what we previously believed. The statutory debt ceiling and the threat of
default have become political bargaining chips in the debate over fiscal
policy. Despite this year's wide-ranging debate, in our view, the differences
between political parties have proven to be extraordinarily difficult to
bridge, and, as we see it, the resulting agreement fell well short of the
comprehensive fiscal consolidation program that some proponents had envisaged
until quite recently. Republicans and Democrats have only been able to agree to
relatively modest savings on discretionary spending while delegating to the
Select Committee decisions on more comprehensive measures. It appears that for
now, new revenues have dropped down on the menu of policy options. In addition,
the plan envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare and little change in
other entitlements,
the containment of which we and most other
independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal sustainability.
Our opinion is that elected officials remain
wary of tackling the structural issues required to effectively address the
rising U.S. public debt burden in a manner consistent with a 'AAA' rating and
with 'AAA' rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign Government Rating
Methodology and Assumptions," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs
36-41). In our view, the difficulty in framing a consensus on fiscal policy
weakens the government's ability to manage public finances and diverts
attention from the debate over how to achieve more balanced and dynamic
economic growth in an era of fiscal stringency and private-sector deleveraging
(ibid). A new political consensus might (or might not) emerge after the 2012
elections, but we believe that by then, the government debt burden will likely
be higher, the needed medium-term fiscal adjustment potentially greater, and
the inflection point on the U.S. population's demographics and other
age-related spending drivers closer at hand (see "Global Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going
Gray Will Likely Cost Even More Green, Now," June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's takes no position on
the mix of spending and revenue measures that Congress and the Administration
might conclude is appropriate for putting the U.S.'s finances on a sustainable
footing.
The act calls for as much as $2.4 trillion
of reductions in expenditure growth over the 10 years through 2021. These cuts
will be implemented in two steps: the $917 billion agreed to initially,
followed by an additional $1.5 trillion that the newly formed Congressional
Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction is supposed to recommend by
November 2011. The act contains no measures to raise taxes or otherwise enhance
revenues, though the committee could recommend them.
The act further provides that if Congress
does not enact the committee's recommendations, cuts of $1.2 trillion will be
implemented over the same time period. The reductions would mainly affect
outlays for civilian discretionary spending, defense, and Medicare. We
understand that this fall-back mechanism is designed to encourage Congress to
embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure savings, as the committee might
recommend.
We note that in a letter to Congress on Aug.
1, 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated total budgetary
savings under the act to be at least $2.1 trillion over the next 10 years
relative to its baseline assumptions. In updating our own fiscal projections,
with certain modifications outlined below, we have relied on the CBO's latest
"Alternate Fiscal Scenario" of June 2011, updated to include the CBO
assumptions contained in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In general, the CBO's
"Alternate Fiscal Scenario" assumes a continuation of recent Congressional
action overriding existing law.
We view the act's measures as a step toward
fiscal consolidation. However, this is within the framework of a legislative
mechanism that leaves open the details of what is finally agreed to until the
end of 2011, and Congress and the Administration could modify any agreement in
the future. Even assuming that at least $2.1 trillion of the spending
reductions the act envisages are implemented, we maintain our view that the
U.S. net general government debt burden (all levels of government combined,
excluding liquid financial assets) will likely continue to grow. Under our
revised base case fiscal scenario--which we consider to be consistent with a
'AA+' long-term rating and a negative outlook--we now project that net general
government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to
79% in 2015 and 85% by 2021. Even the projected 2015 ratio of sovereign
indebtedness is high in relation to those of peer credits and, as noted, would
continue to rise under the act's revised policy settings.
Compared with previous projections, our
revised base case scenario now assumes that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, due to
expire by the end of 2012, remain in place. We have changed our assumption on
this because the majority of Republicans in Congress continue to resist any
measure that would raise revenues, a position we believe Congress reinforced by
passing the act. Key macroeconomic assumptions in the base case scenario
include trend real GDP growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near 2%
annually over the decade.
Our revised upside scenario--which, other
things being equal, we view as consistent with the outlook on the 'AA+'
long-term rating being revised to stable--retains these same macroeconomic
assumptions. In addition, it incorporates $950 billion of new revenues on the
assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners lapse from 2013
onwards, as the Administration is advocating. In this scenario, we project that
the net general government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the
end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside scenario--which, other
things being equal, we view as being consistent with a possible further
downgrade to a 'AA' long-term rating--features less-favorable macroeconomic
assumptions, as outlined below and also assumes that the second round of
spending cuts (at least $1.2 trillion) that the act calls for does not occur.
This scenario also assumes somewhat higher nominal interest rates for U.S. Treasuries.
We still believe that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key reserve currency
confers a government funding advantage, one that could change only slowly over
time, and that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose monetary policy at
a time of fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible that interest rates
could rise if investors re-price relative risks. As a result, our alternate
scenario factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in 10-year bond yields
relative to the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In this scenario, we
project the net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP in 2011 to 90% in
2015 and to 101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios also take into account
the significant negative revisions to historical GDP data that the Bureau of
Economic Analysis announced on July 29. From our perspective, the effect of
these revisions underscores two related points when evaluating the likely debt
trajectory of the U.S. government. First, the revisions show that the recent
recession was deeper than previously assumed, so the GDP this year is lower
than previously thought in both nominal and real terms. Consequently, the debt
burden is slightly higher. Second, the revised data highlight the sub-par path
of the current economic recovery when compared with rebounds following previous
post-war recessions. We believe the sluggish pace of the current economic
recovery could be consistent with the experiences of countries that have had
financial crises in which the slow process of debt deleveraging in the private
sector leads to a persistent drag on demand. As a result, our downside case
scenario assumes relatively modest real trend GDP growth of 2.5% and inflation
of near 1.5% annually going forward.
When comparing the U.S. to sovereigns with
'AAA' long-term ratings that we view as relevant peers--Canada, France,
Germany, and the U.K.--we also observe, based on our base case scenarios for
each, that the trajectory of the U.S.'s net public debt is diverging from the
others. Including the U.S., we estimate that these five sovereigns will have
net general government debt to GDP ratios this year ranging from 34% (Canada)
to 80% (the U.K.), with the U.S. debt burden at 74%. By 2015, we project that
their net public debt to GDP ratios will range between 30% (lowest, Canada) and
83% (highest, France), with the U.S. debt burden at 79%. However, in contrast
with the U.S., we project that the net public debt burdens of these other
sovereigns will begin to decline, either before or by 2015.
Standard & Poor's transfer T&C
assessment of the U.S. remains 'AAA'. Our T&C assessment reflects our view
of the likelihood of the sovereign restricting other public and private
issuers' access to foreign exchange needed to meet debt service. Although in
our view the credit standing of the U.S. government has deteriorated modestly,
we see little indication that official interference of this kind is entering
onto the policy agenda of either Congress or the Administration. Consequently,
we continue to view this risk as being highly remote.
The outlook on the long-term rating is
negative. As our downside alternate fiscal scenario illustrates, a higher
public debt trajectory than we currently assume could lead us to lower the
long-term rating again. On the other hand, as our upside scenario highlights,
if the recommendations of the Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit
Reduction--independently or coupled with other initiatives, such as the lapsing
of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners--lead to fiscal consolidation
measures beyond the minimum mandated, and we believe they are likely to slow
the deterioration of the government's debt dynamics, the long-term rating could
stabilize at 'AA+'.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.66.06 |
|
|
1 |
Rs.102.35 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.74.97 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Analysis Done by
: |
KAR |
|
|
|
|
Report Prepared
by : |
TPT |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest
capability for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit transaction.
It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest and
principal sums |
Large |
|
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General
unfavourable factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for
payment of interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with full
security |
|
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
|
-- |
NB |
New Business |
-- |
|
This score serves as a reference to assess SC’s
credit risk and to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is calculated
from a composite of weighted scores obtained from each of the major sections of
this report. The assessed factors and their relative weights (as indicated
through %) are as follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend (10%) Operational size
(10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL) or
its officials.