MIRA INFORM REPORT
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Report No. : |
322705 |
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Report Date : |
18.05.2015 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
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Name : |
TRICON DRY CHEMICALS, LLC |
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Registered Office : |
777 Post Oak Blvd, Ste 550, Houston, TX 77056 - USA |
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Country : |
United
States |
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Date of Incorporation : |
12.08.2008 |
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Legal Form : |
Limited Liability Company |
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Line of Business : |
Importer, Exporter and Distributor of Chemical Products. |
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No. of Employees : |
12 |
RATING & COMMENTS
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MIRA’s Rating : |
Ba |
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RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
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41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
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Status : |
Satisfactory |
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Payment Behaviour : |
Slow but correct |
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Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES:
Any query related to this report can be made on
e-mail: infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – December 31, 2014
|
Country Name |
Previous Rating (30.09.2014) |
Current Rating (31.12.2014) |
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United States |
A1 |
A1 |
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Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
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Insignificant |
A1 |
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Low |
A2 |
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Moderate |
B1 |
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High |
B2 |
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Very High |
C1 |
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Restricted |
C2 |
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Off-credit |
D |
UNITED STATES - ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
The US has the most technologically powerful economy in the
world, with a per capita GDP of $54,800. In 2014, however, US GDP ran second to
China’s, when compared on a Purchasing Power Parity basis; the US lost the top
spot, where it had stood for more than a century. In the US, private
individuals and business firms make most of the decisions, and the federal and
state governments buy needed goods and services predominantly in the private
marketplace. US business firms enjoy greater flexibility than their counterparts
in Western Europe and Japan in decisions to expand capital plant, to lay off
surplus workers, and to develop new products. At the same time, they face
higher barriers to enter their rivals' home markets than foreign firms face
entering US markets. US firms are at or near the forefront in technological
advances, especially in computers and in medical, aerospace, and military
equipment; their advantage has narrowed since the end of World War II. The
onrush of technology has been a driving factor in the gradual development of a
"two-tier labor market" in which those at the bottom lack the
education and the professional/technical skills of those at the top and, more
and more, fail to get comparable pay raises, health insurance coverage, and
other benefits. But the globalization of trade, and especially the rise of
low-wage producers, has put additional downward pressure on wages and upward
pressure on the returns to capital. Since 1975, practically all the gains in
household income have gone to the top 20% of households. Since 1996, dividends
and capital gains have grown faster than wages or any other category of
after-tax income. Imported oil accounts for nearly 55% of US consumption. Crude
oil prices doubled between 2001 and 2006, the year home prices peaked; higher
gasoline prices ate into consumers' budgets and many individuals fell behind in
their mortgage payments. Oil prices climbed another 50% between 2006 and 2008,
and bank foreclosures more than doubled in the same period. Besides dampening the
housing market, soaring oil prices caused a drop in the value of the dollar and
a deterioration in the US merchandise trade deficit, which peaked at $840
billion in 2008. The sub-prime mortgage crisis, falling home prices, investment
bank failures, tight credit, and the global economic downturn pushed the United
States into a recession by mid-2008. GDP contracted until the third quarter of
2009, making this the deepest and longest downturn since the Great Depression.
|
Source
: CIA |
Company
Name & address
Company name: TRICON DRY CHEMICALS, LLC
Address: 777 Post Oak Blvd, Ste
550, Houston, TX 77056 - USA
Telephone: +1
713-963-0066
Fax: +1 713-985-6190
Website: -
Corporate ID#: 801016251
State: Texas
Judicial form: LLC
Date incorporated: August
12, 2008
Stock: -
Value: -
Name of manager: IGNACIO TORRAS
ACTIVITIES & OPERATIONS
Business:
Importer, exporter and distributor of chemical products.
Imports from Asia
Exports to South and Central America.
Office
of the Foreign Assets Control (OFAC):
The company is not listed on the OFAC list.
The Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List is a publication of OFAC which
lists individuals and organizations with whom United States citizens and
permanent residents are prohibited from doing business.
Suppliers include:
GUANGXI MINGLI CHEMICALS CO.,LTD.
RM 302,3/F,MINGLI PLAZA, NO.213-1, XINGGUANG AV., JIANGNAN DISTRICT 530031,
NANNING GUANGXI CHINA
KADILLAC CHEMICALS PVT LTD
BLOCK NO: 853 854 VILLAGE:-CHOKAR PADRA DIST, VADODARA 390015 INDIA
UNID CO., LTD.
17TH FL.FERRUM TOWER,19 EULJI-R0 5G IL (SUHA-DONG),JUNG-GU, SEOUL, KOREA
Texas taxpayer ID: 32037718171
Staff: 12
Operations & branches:
At the headquarters, we
find the corporate office of the group.
SHAREHOLDERS
& MANAGERS
Shareholders:
TRICON INTERNATIONAL, LTD
777 Post Oak Blvd, Ste 550, Houston, TX 77056
Incorporated in Texas on
April 11, 1997
ID# 9744810
Management:
Ignacio TORRES is the President
Bryan ELWOOD is Vice President and Secretary
Brian MORRIS is Vice President.
Brad LOCKWOOD and Serra KUCUGOKLU are the Managers.
As far as we know, they are involved in other corporations, including:
TRICON ENERGY, INC.
777 Post Oak Blvd, Houston, TX 77056
Incorporated in Texas on
04-30-1996
ID# 0139761200
TRICON INTERNATIONAL, LTD
777 Post Oak Blvd, Ste 550, Houston, TX 77056
Incorporated in Texas on
April 11, 1997
ID# 9744810
FINANCIALS
In United States, privately
held corporations are not required to publish any financials.
On a direct call, a
financial assistant controlled the present report.
Sales declared for year
2014 is in the range of USD 10,000,000=
The business is said to be
profitable.
Banks: Mercantil CommerceBank
717 Texas Avenue, Suite #100, Houston, TX 77002
Ph: +1 713-571-8010
LEGAL
FILINGS
Legal filings & complaints:
As of today date, there is no legal filing pending with the Courts.
Secured debts summary (UCC):
File number: 11-0019934876
Date filed: 07-07-2011
Lapse date: 07-07-2016
Secured Party: Rabobank International
Thames Court, One Queenhithe, London, EC4V 3RL, UK
File number: 13-0021466912
Date filed: 07-08-2013
Lapse date: 07-08-2018
Secured Party: Rabobank International
Thames Court, One Queenhithe, London, EC4V 3RL, UK
COMPANY CREDIT HISTORY
Trade references:
Date reported: April 2015
High credit: USD 3,000
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: March 2015
Line of business: Office supply
Paying status: 5 days beyond terms
Date reported: April 2015
High credit: USD 15,000
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: March 2015
Line of business: Payroll
Paying status: As agreed
Date reported: April 2015
High credit: USD 800
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: March 2015
Line of business: Telecommunications
Paying status: 6 days beyond terms
Domestic credit history:
Domestic credit history
appears as follow:
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National Credit Bureaus
gave a medium credit rating.
According to our credit analysts, during the last 6 months, domestic
payments are currently made with an average of 5 to 10 days beyond terms.
Other comments:
The Company is in good
standing.
This means that all local
and federal taxes were paid on due date.
The risk is medium/low.
Our opinion:
A business connection may
be conducted but we suggest you to check regularly the terms of payments.
Standard & Poor’s
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United
States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'AA+' Due To Political Risks, Rising
Debt Burden; Outlook Negative |
|
Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
- We have
lowered our long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of
America to 'AA+' from 'AAA' and affirmed the 'A-1+' short-term rating.
·
We
have also removed both the short- and long-term ratings from CreditWatch
negative.
·
The
downgrade reflects our opinion that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress
and the Administration recently agreed to falls short of what, in our view,
would be necessary to stabilize the government's medium-term debt dynamics.
·
More
broadly, the downgrade reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability, and
predictability of American policymaking and political institutions have
weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic challenges to a degree more
than we envisioned when we assigned a negative outlook to the rating on April
18, 2011.
·
Since
then, we have changed our view of the difficulties in bridging the gulf between
the political parties over fiscal policy, which makes us pessimistic about the
capacity of Congress and the Administration to be able to leverage their
agreement this week into a broader fiscal consolidation plan that stabilizes
the government's debt dynamics any time soon.
·
The
outlook on the long-term rating is negative. We could lower the long-term
rating to 'AA' within the next two years if we see that less reduction in
spending than agreed to, higher interest rates, or new fiscal pressures during
the period result in a higher general government debt trajectory than we
currently assume in our base case.
TORONTO (Standard & Poor's) Aug. 5,
2011--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that it lowered its
long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of America to 'AA+' from
'AAA'. Standard & Poor's also said that the outlook on the long-term rating
is negative. At the same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed its 'A-1+'
short-term rating on the U.S. In addition, Standard & Poor's removed both
ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed on July 14, 2011, with
negative implications.
The transfer and
convertibility (T&C) assessment of the U.S.--our assessment of the
likelihood of official interference in the ability of U.S.-based public- and
private-sector issuers to secure foreign exchange for
debt service--remains 'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term rating on the U.S.
because we believe that the prolonged controversy over raising the statutory
debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate indicate that further near-term
progress containing the growth in public spending, especially on entitlements,
or on reaching an agreement on raising revenues is less likely than we
previously assumed and will remain a contentious and fitful process. We also
believe that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration
agreed to this week falls short of the amount that we believe is necessary to
stabilize the general government debt burden by the middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the rating was prompted by
our view on the rising public debt burden and our perception of greater
policymaking uncertainty, consistent with our criteria (see "Sovereign
Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions ," June 30, 2011,
especially Paragraphs 36-41). Nevertheless, we view the U.S. federal
government's other economic, external, and monetary credit attributes, which
form the basis for the sovereign rating, as broadly unchanged.
We have taken the ratings off CreditWatch
because the Aug. 2 passage of the Budget Control Act Amendment of 2011 has
removed any perceived immediate threat of payment default posed by delays to
raising the government's debt ceiling. In addition, we believe that the act
provides sufficient clarity to allow us to evaluate the likely course of U.S.
fiscal policy for the next few years.
The political
brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as America's governance
and policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and less predictable
than what we previously believed. The statutory debt ceiling and the threat of
default have become political bargaining chips in the debate over fiscal
policy. Despite this year's wide-ranging debate, in our view, the differences
between political parties have proven to be extraordinarily difficult to
bridge, and, as we see it, the resulting agreement fell well short of the
comprehensive fiscal consolidation program that some proponents had envisaged
until quite recently. Republicans and Democrats have only been able to agree to
relatively modest savings on discretionary spending while delegating to the
Select Committee decisions on more comprehensive measures. It appears that for
now, new revenues have dropped down on the menu of policy options. In addition,
the plan envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare and little change in
other entitlements,
the containment of which we and most other
independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal sustainability.
Our opinion is that elected officials remain
wary of tackling the structural issues required to effectively address the
rising U.S. public debt burden in a manner consistent with a 'AAA' rating and
with 'AAA' rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign
Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions," June 30, 2011,
especially Paragraphs 36-41). In our view, the difficulty in framing a
consensus on fiscal policy weakens the government's ability to manage public
finances and diverts attention from the debate over how to achieve more
balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era of fiscal stringency and
private-sector deleveraging (ibid). A new political consensus might (or might
not) emerge after the 2012 elections, but we believe that by then, the
government debt burden will likely be higher, the needed medium-term fiscal
adjustment potentially greater, and the inflection point on the U.S.
population's demographics and other age-related spending drivers closer at hand
(see "Global Aging
2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Likely Cost Even More Green, Now,"
June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's takes no position on
the mix of spending and revenue measures that Congress and the Administration
might conclude is appropriate for putting the U.S.'s finances on a sustainable
footing.
The act calls for as much as $2.4 trillion
of reductions in expenditure growth over the 10 years through 2021. These cuts
will be implemented in two steps: the $917 billion agreed to initially,
followed by an additional $1.5 trillion that the newly formed Congressional
Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction is supposed to recommend by
November 2011. The act contains no measures to raise taxes or otherwise enhance
revenues, though the committee could recommend them.
The act further provides that if Congress
does not enact the committee's recommendations, cuts of $1.2 trillion will be
implemented over the same time period. The reductions would mainly affect
outlays for civilian discretionary spending, defense, and Medicare. We
understand that this fall-back mechanism is designed to encourage Congress to
embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure savings, as the committee might
recommend.
We note that in a letter to Congress on Aug.
1, 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated total budgetary savings
under the act to be at least $2.1 trillion over the next 10 years relative to
its baseline assumptions. In updating our own fiscal projections, with certain
modifications outlined below, we have relied on the CBO's latest
"Alternate Fiscal Scenario" of June 2011, updated to include the CBO
assumptions contained in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In general, the CBO's
"Alternate Fiscal Scenario" assumes a continuation of recent
Congressional action overriding existing law.
We view the act's measures as a step toward
fiscal consolidation. However, this is within the framework of a legislative
mechanism that leaves open the details of what is finally agreed to until the
end of 2011, and Congress and the Administration could modify any agreement in
the future. Even assuming that at least $2.1 trillion of the spending
reductions the act envisages are implemented, we maintain our view that the
U.S. net general government debt burden (all levels of government combined,
excluding liquid financial assets) will likely continue to grow. Under our
revised base case fiscal scenario--which we consider to be consistent with a
'AA+' long-term rating and a negative outlook--we now project that net general
government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to
79% in 2015 and 85% by 2021. Even the projected 2015 ratio of sovereign
indebtedness is high in relation to those of peer credits and, as noted, would
continue to rise under the act's revised policy settings.
Compared with previous projections, our
revised base case scenario now assumes that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, due to
expire by the end of 2012, remain in place. We have changed our assumption on
this because the majority of Republicans in Congress continue to resist any
measure that would raise revenues, a position we believe Congress reinforced by
passing the act. Key macroeconomic assumptions in the base case scenario
include trend real GDP growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near 2%
annually over the decade.
Our revised upside scenario--which, other
things being equal, we view as consistent with the outlook on the 'AA+'
long-term rating being revised to stable--retains these same macroeconomic
assumptions. In addition, it incorporates $950 billion of new revenues on the
assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners lapse from 2013
onwards, as the Administration is advocating. In this scenario, we project that
the net general government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the
end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside scenario--which, other
things being equal, we view as being consistent with a possible further
downgrade to a 'AA' long-term rating--features less-favorable macroeconomic
assumptions, as outlined below and also assumes that the second round of
spending cuts (at least $1.2 trillion) that the act calls for does not occur.
This scenario also assumes somewhat higher nominal interest rates for U.S.
Treasuries. We still believe that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key reserve
currency confers a government funding advantage, one that could change only
slowly over time, and that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose
monetary policy at a time of fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible
that interest rates could rise if investors re-price relative risks. As a
result, our alternate scenario factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in
10-year bond yields relative to the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In
this scenario, we project the net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP
in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to 101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios also take into account
the significant negative revisions to historical GDP data that the Bureau of
Economic Analysis announced on July 29. From our perspective, the effect of
these revisions underscores two related points when evaluating the likely debt
trajectory of the U.S. government. First, the revisions show that the recent
recession was deeper than previously assumed, so the GDP this year is lower
than previously thought in both nominal and real terms. Consequently, the debt
burden is slightly higher. Second, the revised data highlight the sub-par path
of the current economic recovery when compared with rebounds following previous
post-war recessions. We believe the sluggish pace of the current economic
recovery could be consistent with the experiences of countries that have had
financial crises in which the slow process of debt deleveraging in the private
sector leads to a persistent drag on demand. As a result, our downside case
scenario assumes relatively modest real trend GDP growth of 2.5% and inflation
of near 1.5% annually going forward.
When comparing the U.S. to sovereigns with
'AAA' long-term ratings that we view as relevant peers--Canada, France,
Germany, and the U.K.--we also observe, based on our base case scenarios for
each, that the trajectory of the U.S.'s net public debt is diverging from the
others. Including the U.S., we estimate that these five sovereigns will have
net general government debt to GDP ratios this year ranging from 34% (Canada)
to 80% (the U.K.), with the U.S. debt burden at 74%. By 2015, we project that
their net public debt to GDP ratios will range between 30% (lowest, Canada) and
83% (highest, France), with the U.S. debt burden at 79%. However, in contrast
with the U.S., we project that the net public debt burdens of these other
sovereigns will begin to decline, either before or by 2015.
Standard & Poor's transfer T&C
assessment of the U.S. remains 'AAA'. Our T&C assessment reflects our view
of the likelihood of the sovereign restricting other public and private
issuers' access to foreign exchange needed to meet debt service. Although in
our view the credit standing of the U.S. government has deteriorated modestly,
we see little indication that official interference of this kind is entering
onto the policy agenda of either Congress or the Administration. Consequently,
we continue to view this risk as being highly remote.
The outlook on the long-term rating is
negative. As our downside alternate fiscal scenario illustrates, a higher
public debt trajectory than we currently assume could lead us to lower the
long-term rating again. On the other hand, as our upside scenario highlights,
if the recommendations of the Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit
Reduction--independently or coupled with other initiatives, such as the lapsing
of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners--lead to fiscal consolidation
measures beyond the minimum mandated, and we believe they are likely to slow
the deterioration of the government's debt dynamics, the long-term rating could
stabilize at 'AA+'.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.63.58 |
|
|
1 |
Rs.100.30 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.72.38 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Analysis Done by
: |
KAR |
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Report Prepared
by : |
VNT |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest capability
for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit
transaction. It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest
and principal sums |
Large |
|
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General
unfavourable factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for
payment of interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with
full security |
|
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
|
-- |
NB |
New Business |
-- |
|
This score serves as a reference to assess
SC’s credit risk and to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is
calculated from a composite of weighted scores obtained from each of the major sections
of this report. The assessed factors and their relative weights (as indicated
through %) are as follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend (10%) Operational size
(10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL)
or its officials.