MIRA INFORM REPORT
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Report No. : |
322560 |
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Report Date : |
18.05.2015 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
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Name : |
WHITE COLOR GEMS |
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Formerly Known As : |
WHITE COLOR GEMS, INC. |
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Registered Office : |
550 S. Hill Street, Ste 925, Los Angeles, CA 90013 - USA |
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Country : |
United
States |
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Date of Incorporation : |
18.12.2000 |
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Legal Form : |
Corporation – Profit |
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Line of Business : |
Importer, Wholesaler and
Distributor of Diamonds. |
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No. of Employees : |
3 |
RATING & COMMENTS
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MIRA’s Rating : |
B |
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RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
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26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
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Status : |
Small Company |
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Payment Behaviour : |
No Complaints |
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Litigation : |
Exist |
NOTES:
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail: infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – December 31, 2014
|
Country Name |
Previous Rating (30.09.2014) |
Current Rating (31.12.2014) |
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United States |
A1 |
A1 |
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Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
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Insignificant |
A1 |
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Low |
A2 |
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Moderate |
B1 |
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High |
B2 |
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Very High |
C1 |
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Restricted |
C2 |
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Off-credit |
D |
UNITED STATES - ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
The US has the largest and most
technologically powerful economy in the world, with a per capita GDP of
$49,800. In this market-oriented economy, private individuals and business
firms make most of the decisions, and the federal and state governments buy
needed goods and services predominantly in the private marketplace. US business
firms enjoy greater flexibility than their counterparts in Western Europe and
Japan in decisions to expand capital plant, to lay off surplus workers, and to
develop new products. At the same time, they face higher barriers to enter
their rivals' home markets than foreign firms face entering US markets. US
firms are at or near the forefront in technological advances, especially in
computers and in medical, aerospace, and military equipment; their advantage has
narrowed since the end of World War II. The onrush of technology largely
explains the gradual development of a "two-tier labor market" in
which those at the bottom lack the education and the professional/technical
skills of those at the top and, more and more, fail to get comparable pay
raises, health insurance coverage, and other benefits. Since 1975, practically
all the gains in household income have gone to the top 20% of households. Since
1996, dividends and capital gains have grown faster than wages or any other
category of after-tax income. Imported oil accounts for nearly 55% of US
consumption. Crude oil prices doubled between 2001 and 2006, the year home
prices peaked; higher gasoline prices ate into consumers' budgets and many
individuals fell behind in their mortgage payments. Oil prices climbed another
50% between 2006 and 2008, and bank foreclosures more than doubled in the same
period. Besides dampening the housing market, soaring oil prices caused a drop
in the value of the dollar and a deterioration in the US merchandise trade
deficit, which peaked at $840 billion in 2008. The sub-prime mortgage crisis,
falling home prices, investment bank failures, tight credit, and the global
economic downturn pushed the United States into a recession by mid-2008. GDP
contracted until the third quarter of 2009, making this the deepest and longest
downturn since the Great Depression. To help stabilize financial markets, in
October 2008 the US Congress established a $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP). The government used some of these funds to purchase equity in
US banks and industrial corporations, much of which had been returned to the
government by early 2011. In January 2009 the US Congress passed and President
Barack OBAMA signed a bill providing an additional $787 billion fiscal stimulus
to be used over 10 years - two-thirds on additional spending and one-third on
tax cuts - to create jobs and to help the economy recover. In 2010 and 2011,
the federal budget deficit reached nearly 9% of GDP. In 2012 the federal
government reduced the growth of spending and the deficit shrank to 7.6% of
GDP. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan required major shifts in national resources
from civilian to military purposes and contributed to the growth of the budget
deficit and public debt. Through 2011, the direct costs of the wars totaled
nearly $900 billion, according to US government figures. US revenues from taxes
and other sources are lower, as a percentage of GDP, than those of most other
countries. In March 2010, President OBAMA signed into law the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, a health insurance reform that was designed
to extend coverage to an additional 32 million American citizens by 2016,
through private health insurance for the general population and Medicaid for
the impoverished. Total spending on health care - public plus private - rose
from 9.0% of GDP in 1980 to 17.9% in 2010. In July 2010, the president signed
the DODD-FRANK Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, a law designed to
promote financial stability by protecting consumers from financial abuses,
ending taxpayer bailouts of financial firms, dealing with troubled banks that
are "too big to fail," and improving accountability and transparency
in the financial system - in particular, by requiring certain financial
derivatives to be traded in markets that are subject to government regulation
and oversight. In December 2012, the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) announced
plans to purchase $85 billion per month of mortgage-backed and Treasury
securities in an effort to hold down long-term interest rates, and to keep
short term rates near zero until unemployment drops below 6.5% or inflation
rises above 2.5%. In late 2013, the Fed announced that it would begin scaling
back long-term bond purchases to $75 billion per month in January 2014 and
reduce them further as conditions warranted; the Fed, however, would keep
short-term rates near zero so long as unemployment and inflation had not
crossed the previously stated thresholds. Long-term problems include stagnation
of wages for lower-income families, inadequate investment in deteriorating
infrastructure, rapidly rising medical and pension costs of an aging
population, energy shortages, and sizable current account and budget deficits.
|
Source
: CIA |
Company
name & address
Company name: WHITE COLOR GEMS
Address: 550 S. Hill Street, Ste
925, Los Angeles, CA 90013 - USA
Telephone: +1
213-623-5370
Fax: +1 213-623-8737
Website: -
Corporate ID#: C237523
State: California
Judicial form: Corporation – Profit
Date incorporated: 12-18-2000
Stock: -
Value: -
Name of manager: MAHENDRA
S. JAIN
ACTIVITIES & OPERATIONS
History:
A former WHITE COLOR GEMS,
INC. was incorporated on 01-10-1994 under
ID# C1737064, was
dissolved.
It was located at same
address and managed by Mahendra S. JAIN.
Business:
Importer, wholesaler and
distributor and diamonds, doing business as
ALLIED GEMS INTERNATIONAL.
Office
of the Foreign Assets Control (OFAC):
The company is not listed on the OFAC list.
The Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List is a publication of OFAC
which lists individuals and organizations with whom United States citizens and
permanent residents are prohibited from doing business.
The Company imports mainly
from India.
No name of foreign suppliers available.
EIN: 95-4836658
Staff: 3
Operations & branches:
At the headquarters, we find
a store located in the prestigious International Jewelry Center of Los Angeles,
on lease.
SHAREHOLDERS
& MANAGERS
Shareholders:
This is a JAIN family owned and managed company.
Management:
Mahendra S. JAIN is the President
Sunil Kumar JAIN is Vice President and Secretary.
As far as we know, they are involved in other local corporations,
including:
UNIVERSAL GEMS OF CALIFORNIA
550 S. Hill Street, Ste 925, Los Angeles, CA 90013
Incorporated in California on 01-14-1981
ID# C1034304
FINANCIALS
In United States, privately
held corporations are not required to publish any financials.
On a direct call, a sales
assistant controlled the present report but deferred any financials.
We sent a fax but no answer
received.
However, sales declared for
year 2014 is in the range of USD 600,000=
(same as 2013)
The business is said to be
profitable.
Banks: State Bank of India
707 Wilshire Blvd, Los
Angeles, CA 90017
Ph: +1 213-623-7250
LEGAL FILINGS
Legal filings & complaints:
State: California
Case number: 5:14-cv-01316-JGB-MAN
Plaintiff: Carolyn A. Dye
Defendant: White Color Gems et al.
Jesus G. Bernal, presiding
Margaret A. Nagle, referral
Date filed: 06/27/2014
Date of last filing: 03/10/2015
State: California
Case number: 2:14-ap-01391-BB
Plaintiff: Carolyn A. Dye
Defendant: White Color Gems et al.
Case type: appelate related
bankruptcy: 2:13-bk-34228-BB Judge: Sheri Bluebond
Date filed: 06/06/2014 Date of last filing: 07/29/2014
COMPANY CREDIT HISTORY
Trade references:
Date reported: February 2015
High credit: USD 1,000
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: January 2015
Line of business: Office supply
Paying status: On terms
Date reported: February 2015
High credit: USD 5,000+
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: January 2015
Line of business: Payroll
Paying status: As agreed
Date reported: February 2015
High credit: USD 300
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: January 2015
Line of business: Telecommunications
Paying status: On terms
Domestic credit history:
Domestic credit history
appears as follow:
|
Monthly Payment
Trends - Recent Activity |
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National Credit Bureaus gave
a satisfying credit rating.
International credit history:
Payments of imports are currently made on terms.
Other comments:
The Company maintains its
business.
The bank confirmed a
regular account.
The Company is in good
standing.
This means that all local
and federal taxes were paid on due date.
The risk remains low.
Our opinion:
A business connection may
be conducted.
DIAMOND
INDUSTRY – INDIA
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From time immemorial, India is well
known in the world as the birthplace for diamonds. It is difficult to
trace the origin of diamonds but history says that in the remote past, diamonds
were mined only in India. Diamond production in India can be traced back to
almost 8th Century B.C. India, in fact, remained undisputed
leader till 18th Century when Brazilian fields were discovered in
1725 followed by emergence of S. Africa, Russia and Australia.
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The achievement of the Indian diamond
industry was possible only due to combination of the manufacturing skills of
the Indian workforce and the untiring and unflagging efforts of the Indian
diamantaires, supported by progressive Government policies.
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The area of study of family owned
diamond businesses derives its importance from the huge conglomerate of family
run organizations which operate in the diamond industry since many generations.
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Some of the basic traits of family run
business enterprises include spirit of entrepreneurship, mutual trust lowers
transaction costs, small, nimble and quick to react, information as a source of
advantage and philanthropy.
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Family owned diamond businesses need
to improve on many fronts including higher standard of corporate governance,
long-term performance – focused strategies, modern management and technology.
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Utmost caution is to be exercised
while dealing with some medium and large diamond traders which are usually
engaged in fictitious import – export, inter-company transactions, financially
assisted by banks. In the process, several public sector banks lost several
hundred million rupees. They mostly diverted borrowed money for diamond
business into real estate and capital markets.
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Excerpts from Times of India dated 30th
October 2010 is as under –
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Gem & Jewellery Export Promotion
Council in its statistical data has shown the export of polished diamonds to
have increase by 28 % in February 2013. Compared to $ 1.4 bn worth of polished
diamond export in February, 2012, India exported $ 1.84 billion worth of
polished diamonds in February 2013. A senior executive of GJEPC said, “Export
of cut and polished diamonds started falling month-wise after the imposition of
2 % of import duty on the polished diamonds. But February, 2013 has given a new
ray of hope to the industry as the export of polished diamonds has actually
increased by 28 %. It means the industry is on the track of recovery and
round tripping of diamonds has stopped completely.” Demand has started coming
from the US, the UK, Japan and China. India’s polished diamond export is
expected to cross $ 21 bn in 2013-14.
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The banking sector has started
exercising restraint while following prudent risk management norms when lending
money to gems and jewellery sector. This follows the implementation of Basel
III accord – a global voluntary regulatory standard on bank capital adequacy,
stress testing and market liquidity.
Standard & Poor’s
|
United
States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'AA+' Due To Political Risks,
Rising Debt Burden; Outlook Negative |
|
Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
- We have
lowered our long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of
America to 'AA+' from 'AAA' and affirmed the 'A-1+' short-term rating.
·
We
have also removed both the short- and long-term ratings from CreditWatch
negative.
·
The
downgrade reflects our opinion that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress
and the Administration recently agreed to falls short of what, in our view, would
be necessary to stabilize the government's medium-term debt dynamics.
·
More
broadly, the downgrade reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability, and
predictability of American policymaking and political institutions have
weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic challenges to a degree more
than we envisioned when we assigned a negative outlook to the rating on April
18, 2011.
·
Since
then, we have changed our view of the difficulties in bridging the gulf between
the political parties over fiscal policy, which makes us pessimistic about the
capacity of Congress and the Administration to be able to leverage their
agreement this week into a broader fiscal consolidation plan that stabilizes
the government's debt dynamics any time soon.
·
The
outlook on the long-term rating is negative. We could lower the long-term
rating to 'AA' within the next two years if we see that less reduction in
spending than agreed to, higher interest rates, or new fiscal pressures during
the period result in a higher general government debt trajectory than we
currently assume in our base case.
TORONTO (Standard & Poor's) Aug. 5,
2011--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that it lowered its
long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of America to 'AA+' from
'AAA'. Standard & Poor's also said that the outlook on the long-term rating
is negative. At the same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed its 'A-1+'
short-term rating on the U.S. In addition, Standard & Poor's removed both
ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed on July 14, 2011, with
negative implications.
The transfer and
convertibility (T&C) assessment of the U.S.--our assessment of the
likelihood of official interference in the ability of U.S.-based public- and
private-sector issuers to secure foreign exchange for
debt service--remains 'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term rating on the U.S.
because we believe that the prolonged controversy over raising the statutory
debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate indicate that further near-term
progress containing the growth in public spending, especially on entitlements,
or on reaching an agreement on raising revenues is less likely than we
previously assumed and will remain a contentious and fitful process. We also
believe that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration
agreed to this week falls short of the amount that we believe is necessary to
stabilize the general government debt burden by the middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the rating was prompted by
our view on the rising public debt burden and our perception of greater
policymaking uncertainty, consistent with our criteria (see "Sovereign
Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions ," June 30, 2011,
especially Paragraphs 36-41). Nevertheless, we view the U.S. federal
government's other economic, external, and monetary credit attributes, which
form the basis for the sovereign rating, as broadly unchanged.
We have taken the ratings off CreditWatch
because the Aug. 2 passage of the Budget Control Act Amendment of 2011 has
removed any perceived immediate threat of payment default posed by delays to
raising the government's debt ceiling. In addition, we believe that the act
provides sufficient clarity to allow us to evaluate the likely course of U.S.
fiscal policy for the next few years.
The political
brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as America's governance
and policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and less predictable
than what we previously believed. The statutory debt ceiling and the threat of
default have become political bargaining chips in the debate over fiscal
policy. Despite this year's wide-ranging debate, in our view, the differences
between political parties have proven to be extraordinarily difficult to
bridge, and, as we see it, the resulting agreement fell well short of the
comprehensive fiscal consolidation program that some proponents had envisaged
until quite recently. Republicans and Democrats have only been able to agree to
relatively modest savings on discretionary spending while delegating to the
Select Committee decisions on more comprehensive measures. It appears that for
now, new revenues have dropped down on the menu of policy options. In addition,
the plan envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare and little change in
other entitlements,
the containment of which we and most other
independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal sustainability.
Our opinion is that elected officials remain
wary of tackling the structural issues required to effectively address the
rising U.S. public debt burden in a manner consistent with a 'AAA' rating and
with 'AAA' rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign
Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions," June 30, 2011,
especially Paragraphs 36-41). In our view, the difficulty in framing a
consensus on fiscal policy weakens the government's ability to manage public
finances and diverts attention from the debate over how to achieve more
balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era of fiscal stringency and
private-sector deleveraging (ibid). A new political consensus might (or might
not) emerge after the 2012 elections, but we believe that by then, the
government debt burden will likely be higher, the needed medium-term fiscal
adjustment potentially greater, and the inflection point on the U.S.
population's demographics and other age-related spending drivers closer at hand
(see "Global Aging
2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Likely Cost Even More Green, Now,"
June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's takes no position on
the mix of spending and revenue measures that Congress and the Administration
might conclude is appropriate for putting the U.S.'s finances on a sustainable
footing.
The act calls for as much as $2.4 trillion of
reductions in expenditure growth over the 10 years through 2021. These cuts
will be implemented in two steps: the $917 billion agreed to initially,
followed by an additional $1.5 trillion that the newly formed Congressional
Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction is supposed to recommend by
November 2011. The act contains no measures to raise taxes or otherwise enhance
revenues, though the committee could recommend them.
The act further provides that if Congress
does not enact the committee's recommendations, cuts of $1.2 trillion will be
implemented over the same time period. The reductions would mainly affect
outlays for civilian discretionary spending, defense, and Medicare. We
understand that this fall-back mechanism is designed to encourage Congress to
embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure savings, as the committee might
recommend.
We note that in a letter to Congress on Aug.
1, 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated total budgetary
savings under the act to be at least $2.1 trillion over the next 10 years
relative to its baseline assumptions. In updating our own fiscal projections,
with certain modifications outlined below, we have relied on the CBO's latest
"Alternate Fiscal Scenario" of June 2011, updated to include the CBO assumptions
contained in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In general, the CBO's
"Alternate Fiscal Scenario" assumes a continuation of recent
Congressional action overriding existing law.
We view the act's measures as a step toward
fiscal consolidation. However, this is within the framework of a legislative
mechanism that leaves open the details of what is finally agreed to until the
end of 2011, and Congress and the Administration could modify any agreement in
the future. Even assuming that at least $2.1 trillion of the spending
reductions the act envisages are implemented, we maintain our view that the
U.S. net general government debt burden (all levels of government combined,
excluding liquid financial assets) will likely continue to grow. Under our
revised base case fiscal scenario--which we consider to be consistent with a
'AA+' long-term rating and a negative outlook--we now project that net general
government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to
79% in 2015 and 85% by 2021. Even the projected 2015 ratio of sovereign
indebtedness is high in relation to those of peer credits and, as noted, would
continue to rise under the act's revised policy settings.
Compared with previous projections, our
revised base case scenario now assumes that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, due to
expire by the end of 2012, remain in place. We have changed our assumption on
this because the majority of Republicans in Congress continue to resist any
measure that would raise revenues, a position we believe Congress reinforced by
passing the act. Key macroeconomic assumptions in the base case scenario
include trend real GDP growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near 2%
annually over the decade.
Our revised upside scenario--which, other
things being equal, we view as consistent with the outlook on the 'AA+'
long-term rating being revised to stable--retains these same macroeconomic
assumptions. In addition, it incorporates $950 billion of new revenues on the
assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners lapse from 2013
onwards, as the Administration is advocating. In this scenario, we project that
the net general government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the
end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside scenario--which, other
things being equal, we view as being consistent with a possible further
downgrade to a 'AA' long-term rating--features less-favorable macroeconomic
assumptions, as outlined below and also assumes that the second round of
spending cuts (at least $1.2 trillion) that the act calls for does not occur.
This scenario also assumes somewhat higher nominal interest rates for U.S.
Treasuries. We still believe that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key
reserve currency confers a government funding advantage, one that could change
only slowly over time, and that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose
monetary policy at a time of fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible
that interest rates could rise if investors re-price relative risks. As a
result, our alternate scenario factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in
10-year bond yields relative to the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In
this scenario, we project the net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP
in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to 101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios also take into account
the significant negative revisions to historical GDP data that the Bureau of
Economic Analysis announced on July 29. From our perspective, the effect of
these revisions underscores two related points when evaluating the likely debt
trajectory of the U.S. government. First, the revisions show that the recent
recession was deeper than previously assumed, so the GDP this year is lower
than previously thought in both nominal and real terms. Consequently, the debt
burden is slightly higher. Second, the revised data highlight the sub-par path
of the current economic recovery when compared with rebounds following previous
post-war recessions. We believe the sluggish pace of the current economic
recovery could be consistent with the experiences of countries that have had
financial crises in which the slow process of debt deleveraging in the private
sector leads to a persistent drag on demand. As a result, our downside case
scenario assumes relatively modest real trend GDP growth of 2.5% and inflation
of near 1.5% annually going forward.
When comparing the U.S. to sovereigns with
'AAA' long-term ratings that we view as relevant peers--Canada, France,
Germany, and the U.K.--we also observe, based on our base case scenarios for
each, that the trajectory of the U.S.'s net public debt is diverging from the
others. Including the U.S., we estimate that these five sovereigns will have
net general government debt to GDP ratios this year ranging from 34% (Canada)
to 80% (the U.K.), with the U.S. debt burden at 74%. By 2015, we project that
their net public debt to GDP ratios will range between 30% (lowest, Canada) and
83% (highest, France), with the U.S. debt burden at 79%. However, in contrast
with the U.S., we project that the net public debt burdens of these other
sovereigns will begin to decline, either before or by 2015.
Standard & Poor's transfer T&C
assessment of the U.S. remains 'AAA'. Our T&C assessment reflects our view
of the likelihood of the sovereign restricting other public and private
issuers' access to foreign exchange needed to meet debt service. Although in
our view the credit standing of the U.S. government has deteriorated modestly,
we see little indication that official interference of this kind is entering
onto the policy agenda of either Congress or the Administration. Consequently,
we continue to view this risk as being highly remote.
The outlook on the long-term rating is
negative. As our downside alternate fiscal scenario illustrates, a higher
public debt trajectory than we currently assume could lead us to lower the
long-term rating again. On the other hand, as our upside scenario highlights,
if the recommendations of the Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit
Reduction--independently or coupled with other initiatives, such as the lapsing
of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners--lead to fiscal consolidation
measures beyond the minimum mandated, and we believe they are likely to slow
the deterioration of the government's debt dynamics, the long-term rating could
stabilize at 'AA+'.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.63.58 |
|
|
1 |
Rs.100.30 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.72.38 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Analysis Done by
: |
DIV |
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Report Prepared
by : |
VNT |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest capability
for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit
transaction. It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest
and principal sums |
Large |
|
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General
unfavourable factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for
payment of interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with
full security |
|
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
|
-- |
NB |
New Business |
-- |
|
This score serves as a reference to assess
SC’s credit risk and to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is
calculated from a composite of weighted scores obtained from each of the major sections
of this report. The assessed factors and their relative weights (as indicated
through %) are as follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend (10%) Operational size
(10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL)
or its officials.