|
Report No. : |
348604 |
|
Report Date : |
05.11.2015 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
|
Name : |
STERLING JEWELERS, INC. |
|
|
|
|
Registered Office : |
375 Ghent Road, Fairlawn, OH 44333 |
|
|
|
|
Country : |
United States |
|
|
|
|
Date of Incorporation : |
01.03.1955 |
|
|
|
|
Legal Form : |
Corporation - Profit |
|
|
|
|
Line of Business : |
Retail of Jewelers. |
|
|
|
|
No. of Employees : |
28,949 (for the group) |
RATING & COMMENTS
|
MIRA’s Rating : |
Ba |
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
Status : |
Moderate |
|
|
|
|
Payment Behaviour : |
Slow but correct |
|
|
|
|
Litigation : |
Exist |
NOTES:
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail: infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – March 31, 2015
|
Country Name |
Previous Rating (31.12.2014) |
Current Rating (31.03.2015) |
|
United States |
A1 |
A1 |
|
Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
|
Insignificant |
A1 |
|
Low |
A2 |
|
Moderate |
B1 |
|
High |
B2 |
|
Very High |
C1 |
|
Restricted |
C2 |
|
Off-credit |
D |
UNITED STATES - ECONOMIC
OVERVIEW
The US has the most technologically powerful economy in the world, with a per capita GDP of $54,800. In 2014, however, US GDP ran second to China’s, when compared on a Purchasing Power Parity basis; the US lost the top spot, where it had stood for more than a century. In the US, private individuals and business firms make most of the decisions, and the federal and state governments buy needed goods and services predominantly in the private marketplace. US business firms enjoy greater flexibility than their counterparts in Western Europe and Japan in decisions to expand capital plant, to lay off surplus workers, and to develop new products. At the same time, they face higher barriers to enter their rivals' home markets than foreign firms face entering US markets. US firms are at or near the forefront in technological advances, especially in computers and in medical, aerospace, and military equipment; their advantage has narrowed since the end of World War II. The onrush of technology has been a driving factor in the gradual development of a "two-tier labor market" in which those at the bottom lack the education and the professional/technical skills of those at the top and, more and more, fail to get comparable pay raises, health insurance coverage, and other benefits. But the globalization of trade, and especially the rise of low-wage producers, has put additional downward pressure on wages and upward pressure on the returns to capital. Since 1975, practically all the gains in household income have gone to the top 20% of households. Since 1996, dividends and capital gains have grown faster than wages or any other category of after-tax income. Imported oil accounts for nearly 55% of US consumption. Crude oil prices doubled between 2001 and 2006, the year home prices peaked; higher gasoline prices ate into consumers' budgets and many individuals fell behind in their mortgage payments. Oil prices climbed another 50% between 2006 and 2008, and bank foreclosures more than doubled in the same period. Besides dampening the housing market, soaring oil prices caused a drop in the value of the dollar and a deterioration in the US merchandise trade deficit, which peaked at $840 billion in 2008. The sub-prime mortgage crisis, falling home prices, investment bank failures, tight credit, and the global economic downturn pushed the United States into a recession by mid-2008. GDP contracted until the third quarter of 2009, making this the deepest and longest downturn since the Great Depression.
To help stabilize financial markets, in October 2008 the US Congress established a $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The government used some of these funds to purchase equity in US banks and industrial corporations, much of which had been returned to the government by early 2011. In January 2009 the US Congress passed and President Barack OBAMA signed a bill providing an additional $787 billion fiscal stimulus to be used over 10 years - two-thirds on additional spending and one-third on tax cuts - to create jobs and to help the economy recover. In 2010 and 2011, the federal budget deficit reached nearly 9% of GDP. In 2012, the federal government reduced the growth of spending and the deficit shrank to 7.6% of GDP. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan required major shifts in national resources from civilian to military purposes and contributed to the growth of the budget deficit and public debt. Through 2014, the direct costs of the wars totaled more than $1.5 trillion, according to US Government figures. US revenues from taxes and other sources are lower, as a percentage of GDP, than those of most other countries. In March 2010, President OBAMA signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, a health insurance reform that was designed to extend coverage to an additional 32 million American citizens by 2016, through private health insurance for the general population and Medicaid for the impoverished. Total spending on health care - public plus private - rose from 9.0% of GDP in 1980 to 17.9% in 2010. In July 2010, the president signed the DODD-FRANK Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, a law designed to promote financial stability by protecting consumers from financial abuses, ending taxpayer bailouts of financial firms, dealing with troubled banks that are "too big to fail," and improving accountability and transparency in the financial system - in particular, by requiring certain financial derivatives to be traded in markets that are subject to government regulation and oversight. In December 2012, the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) announced plans to purchase $85 billion per month of mortgage-backed and Treasury securities in an effort to hold down long-term interest rates, and to keep short term rates near zero until unemployment dropped below 6.5% or inflation rose above 2.5%. In late 2013, the Fed announced that it would begin scaling back long-term bond purchases to $75 billion per month in January 2014 and reduce them further as conditions warranted; the Fed ended the purchases during the summer of 2014. Long-term problems include stagnation of wages for lower-income families, inadequate investment in deteriorating infrastructure, rapidly rising medical and pension costs of an aging population, energy shortages, and sizable current account and budget deficits.
|
Source
: CIA |
Company name: STERLING
JEWELERS, INC.
Address: 375 Ghent Road, Fairlawn, OH 44333
- USA
Telephone: +1
330-668-5000
Fax: +1 330-668-5062
Website: www.sterlingjewelers.com
Corporate ID#: 245363
State: Ohio
Judicial form: Corporation - Profit
Date incorporated: March 1,
1955
Stock: 100
shares common
Value: No
par value
Name of manager: Mark
LIGHT
Business:
Sterling Jewelers is a wholly owned subsidiary of Signet Jewelers
Limited.
Sterling Jewelers is one of the largest specialty retail jewelers in
Ohio.
As of February 1, 2014, the Company operated a network of 1,471 stores
in 50 states, including stores that trade nationally in malls and off-mall
locations under the Kay Jewelers brand, and regionally under the mall-based
brands; and destination superstores under the Jared The Galleria Of Jewelry
brand, as well as Ultra stores.
Office of the Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC):
The company is not listed on the OFAC list.
The Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List is a publication of OFAC
which lists individuals and organizations with whom United States citizens and
permanent residents are prohibited from doing business.
EIN: 34-0630873
Staff: 28,949 (for the group)
Operations & branches:
At the headquarters, we
find the corporate office, store and warehouse.
As of January 31, 2015, group operated a network of 2,868 stores in the
United States.
Shareholders:
Signet Jewelers Limited
Clarendon House
2 Church Street
Hamilton, HM11
Bermuda
Phone: 441-296-5872
Signet Jewelers Limited engages in the retail sale of jewelry and
watches in the United States, the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland, and the
Channel Islands. Its Sterling Jewelers division operates stores in malls and
off-mall locations under the Kay Jewelers, Kay Jewelers Outlet, Jared The
Galleria Of Jewelry, Jared VaultTM, Jared Jewelry BoutiqueTM, Jared Vivid, JB
Robinson Jewelers, Marks & Morgan Jewelers, Every kiss begins with Kay, He
went to Jared, Celebrate Life. Express Love., the Leo Diamond, Hearts Desire, Artistry Diamonds, Charmed
Memories, Diamonds in Rhythm, and Open Hearts by Jane Seymour names. As at
January 31, 2015, it operated 1,504 stores in 50 states. The company’s Zale
division operates jewelry stores and mall-based kiosks in shopping malls under
the Zales, Zales JewelersTM, Zales the Diamond Store, Zales the Online Diamond
StoreTM, Zales Outlet, Gordon's Jewelers, Peoples Jewellers, Peoples the
Diamond Store, Peoples Outlet the Diamond Store, Mappins, Piercing Pagoda,
Arctic Brilliance Canadian DiamondsTM, Candy Colored Diamonds and Gemstones,
Celebration Diamond, The Celebration Diamond Collection, and Unstoppable LoveT
names. As of January 31, 2015, it operated 972 jewelry stores and 605
mall-based kiosks. Its UK Jewelry division operates stores in shopping malls
and prime ‘High Street’ locations under the H.Samuel, Ernest Jones, Ernest
Jones Outlet Collection, Leslie Davis, and Forever Diamonds names. As at
January 31, 2015, this division operated 498 stores.
The company also operates a diamond polishing factory, which is involved
in diamond sourcing and manufacturing activities.
Signet Jewelers Limited was founded in 1950 and is based in Hamilton,
Bermuda.
Signet Jewelers Limited is
listed with the NYSE under symbol SIG.
Sales 2014-2015: USD
5,736,300,000= (fiscal year ending January 31)
Net profit:
USD 381,300,000=
Management:
Mark LIGHT is the President and CEO.
Mark S. Light has been the Chief Executive Officer of Signet Jewelers
Inc. since 2002.
Mr. Light serves as the Chief Executive Officer and President of
Sterling Jewelers, Inc. He served as Chief Operating Officer of U.S. Division
at Signet Jewelers Limited since 2002.
Mr. Light joined Signet Jewelers Limited in 1978.
He serves as an Independent Director of Regis Corp.
He served as an Executive Director of Signet Jewelers Limited from
January 12, 2006 to October 2008.
Gary CIOLLI is the Controller.
Mr. Ciolli was working for Limited Brands for nearly 15 years prior to
joining Sterling Jewelers.
Edward HRABAK is Executive Vice President and COO.
Mr. Hrabak has been the Chief Operating Officer and Executive Vice
President of Sterling Jewelers, Inc. since June 30, 2012.
He served as Senior Vice President of Merchandising and General
Merchandise Manager of Sterling Jewelers, Inc.
He joined Sterling in 1987 as a Merchandise Buyer.
In United States, privately
held corporations are not required to publish any financials.
On a direct call, a
financial assistant controlled the present report and confirmed that all
financials are consolidated into the parent company.
Banks: Huntington National Bank
Legal filings
& complaints:
There company is creditor in numerous bankruptcies in several courts and
there are several legal cases pending.
Secured debts
summary (UCC):
37 UCC listed in Ohio
Trade references:
Date reported: July 2015
High credit: USD 30,000
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: June 2015
Line of business: Office supply
Paying status: 3 day beyond terms
Date reported: July 2015
High credit: USD 3,000
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: June 2015
Line of business: Telecommunications
Paying status: 3 day beyond terms
Domestic credit history:
Domestic credit history
appears as follow:
|
Monthly Payment Trends - Recent Activity |
|
Date |
Up to 30 DBT |
31-60 DBT |
61-90 DBT |
>90 DBT |
||
|
02/15 |
$11,696,400 |
95% |
4% |
1% |
0% |
0% |
|
03/15 |
$9,015,900 |
81% |
17% |
1% |
1% |
0% |
|
04/15 |
$6,863,000 |
93% |
4% |
2% |
1% |
0% |
|
05/15 |
$7,240,400 |
90% |
7% |
2% |
1% |
0% |
|
06/15 |
$8,740,700 |
90% |
7% |
2% |
1% |
0% |
|
07/15 |
$8,081,100 |
89% |
10% |
0% |
1% |
0% |
According to our credit analysts, during the last 6 months, payments were
currently made with an average of 2 to 5 days beyond terms.
International
credit history:
Payments of imports are currently made with an average of 5 days beyond
terms.
The banks and financial
institutions confirmed late payments but remain confident.
The Company is in good
standing.
This means that all local
and federal taxes were paid on due date.
The risk is medium.
Our opinion:
A business connection may
be conducted but we suggest you to check regularly the way of payments.
DIAMOND INDUSTRY – INDIA
-
From
time immemorial, India is well known in the world as the birthplace for
diamonds. It is difficult to trace the origin of diamonds but history
says that in the remote past, diamonds were mined only in India. Diamond
production in India can be traced back to almost 8th Century B.C.
India, in fact, remained undisputed leader till 18th Century
when Brazilian fields were discovered in 1725 followed by emergence of S.
Africa, Russia and Australia.
-
The
achievement of the Indian diamond industry was possible only due to combination
of the manufacturing skills of the Indian workforce and the untiring and
unflagging efforts of the Indian diamantaires, supported by progressive
Government policies.
-
The
area of study of family owned diamond businesses derives its importance from
the huge conglomerate of family run organizations which operate in the diamond
industry since many generations.
-
Some
of the basic traits of family run business enterprises include spirit of
entrepreneurship, mutual trust lowers transaction costs, small, nimble and
quick to react, information as a source of advantage and philanthropy.
-
Family
owned diamond businesses need to improve on many fronts including higher standard
of corporate governance, long-term performance – focused strategies, modern
management and technology.
-
Utmost
caution is to be exercised while dealing with some medium and large diamond
traders which are usually engaged in fictitious import – export, inter-company
transactions, financially assisted by banks. In the process, several public
sector banks lost several hundred million rupees. They mostly diverted borrowed
money for diamond business into real estate and capital markets.
-
Excerpts
from Times of India dated 30th October 2010 is as under –
-
Gem
& Jewellery Export Promotion Council in its statistical data has shown the
export of polished diamonds to have increase by 28 % in February 2013. Compared
to $ 1.4 bn worth of polished diamond export in February, 2012, India exported
$ 1.84 billion worth of polished diamonds in February 2013. A senior executive
of GJEPC said, “Export of cut and polished diamonds started falling month-wise
after the imposition of 2 % of import duty on the polished diamonds. But
February, 2013 has given a new ray of hope to the industry as the export of
polished diamonds has actually increased by 28 %. It means the industry
is on the track of recovery and round tripping of diamonds has stopped
completely.” Demand has started coming from the US, the UK, Japan and China.
India’s polished diamond export is expected to cross $ 21 bn in 2013-14.
-
The
banking sector has started exercising restraint while following prudent risk
management norms when lending money to gems and jewellery sector. This follows
the implementation of Basel III accord – a global voluntary regulatory standard
on bank capital adequacy, stress testing and market liquidity.
Standard & Poor’s
|
United
States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'AA+' Due To Political Risks,
Rising Debt Burden; Outlook Negative |
|
Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
·
We
have also removed both the short- and long-term ratings from CreditWatch
negative.
·
The
downgrade reflects our opinion that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress
and the Administration recently agreed to falls short of what, in our view,
would be necessary to stabilize the government's medium-term debt dynamics.
·
More
broadly, the downgrade reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability, and
predictability of American policymaking and political institutions have
weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic challenges to a degree more
than we envisioned when we assigned a negative outlook to the rating on April
18, 2011.
·
Since
then, we have changed our view of the difficulties in bridging the gulf between
the political parties over fiscal policy, which makes us pessimistic about the
capacity of Congress and the Administration to be able to leverage their
agreement this week into a broader fiscal consolidation plan that stabilizes
the government's debt dynamics any time soon.
·
The
outlook on the long-term rating is negative. We could lower the long-term
rating to 'AA' within the next two years if we see that less reduction in
spending than agreed to, higher interest rates, or new fiscal pressures during
the period result in a higher general government debt trajectory than we
currently assume in our base case.
TORONTO (Standard & Poor's) Aug. 5,
2011--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that it lowered its
long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of America to 'AA+' from
'AAA'. Standard & Poor's also said that the outlook on the long-term rating
is negative. At the same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed its 'A-1+'
short-term rating on the U.S. In addition, Standard & Poor's removed both
ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed on July 14, 2011, with
negative implications.
The transfer and
convertibility (T&C) assessment of the U.S.--our assessment of the
likelihood of official interference in the ability of U.S.-based public- and
private-sector issuers to secure foreign exchange for
debt service--remains 'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term rating on the U.S.
because we believe that the prolonged controversy over raising the statutory
debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate indicate that further near-term
progress containing the growth in public spending, especially on entitlements,
or on reaching an agreement on raising revenues is less likely than we
previously assumed and will remain a contentious and fitful process. We also
believe that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration
agreed to this week falls short of the amount that we believe is necessary to
stabilize the general government debt burden by the middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the rating was prompted by
our view on the rising public debt burden and our perception of greater
policymaking uncertainty, consistent with our criteria (see "Sovereign Government Rating Methodology
and Assumptions ," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41). Nevertheless, we
view the U.S. federal government's other economic, external, and monetary
credit attributes, which form the basis for the sovereign rating, as broadly
unchanged.
We have taken the ratings off CreditWatch
because the Aug. 2 passage of the Budget Control Act Amendment of 2011 has
removed any perceived immediate threat of payment default posed by delays to
raising the government's debt ceiling. In addition, we believe that the act
provides sufficient clarity to allow us to evaluate the likely course of U.S.
fiscal policy for the next few years.
The political
brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as America's governance
and policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and less predictable
than what we previously believed. The statutory debt ceiling and the threat of
default have become political bargaining chips in the debate over fiscal
policy. Despite this year's wide-ranging debate, in our view, the differences
between political parties have proven to be extraordinarily difficult to
bridge, and, as we see it, the resulting agreement fell well short of the
comprehensive fiscal consolidation program that some proponents had envisaged
until quite recently. Republicans and Democrats have only been able to agree to
relatively modest savings on discretionary spending while delegating to the
Select Committee decisions on more comprehensive measures. It appears that for
now, new revenues have dropped down on the menu of policy options. In addition,
the plan envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare and little change in
other entitlements,
the containment of which we and most other
independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal sustainability.
Our opinion is that elected officials remain
wary of tackling the structural issues required to effectively address the
rising U.S. public debt burden in a manner consistent with a 'AAA' rating and
with 'AAA' rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign Government Rating
Methodology and Assumptions," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs
36-41). In our view, the difficulty in framing a consensus on fiscal policy
weakens the government's ability to manage public finances and diverts
attention from the debate over how to achieve more balanced and dynamic
economic growth in an era of fiscal stringency and private-sector deleveraging
(ibid). A new political consensus might (or might not) emerge after the 2012
elections, but we believe that by then, the government debt burden will likely
be higher, the needed medium-term fiscal adjustment potentially greater, and
the inflection point on the U.S. population's demographics and other
age-related spending drivers closer at hand (see "Global Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going
Gray Will Likely Cost Even More Green, Now," June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's takes no position on
the mix of spending and revenue measures that Congress and the Administration
might conclude is appropriate for putting the U.S.'s finances on a sustainable
footing.
The act calls for as much as $2.4 trillion
of reductions in expenditure growth over the 10 years through 2021. These cuts
will be implemented in two steps: the $917 billion agreed to initially,
followed by an additional $1.5 trillion that the newly formed Congressional
Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction is supposed to recommend by
November 2011. The act contains no measures to raise taxes or otherwise enhance
revenues, though the committee could recommend them.
The act further provides that if Congress
does not enact the committee's recommendations, cuts of $1.2 trillion will be
implemented over the same time period. The reductions would mainly affect
outlays for civilian discretionary spending, defense, and Medicare. We
understand that this fall-back mechanism is designed to encourage Congress to
embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure savings, as the committee might
recommend.
We note that in a letter to Congress on Aug.
1, 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated total budgetary
savings under the act to be at least $2.1 trillion over the next 10 years
relative to its baseline assumptions. In updating our own fiscal projections,
with certain modifications outlined below, we have relied on the CBO's latest
"Alternate Fiscal Scenario" of June 2011, updated to include the CBO
assumptions contained in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In general, the CBO's
"Alternate Fiscal Scenario" assumes a continuation of recent
Congressional action overriding existing law.
We view the act's measures as a step toward
fiscal consolidation. However, this is within the framework of a legislative
mechanism that leaves open the details of what is finally agreed to until the
end of 2011, and Congress and the Administration could modify any agreement in
the future. Even assuming that at least $2.1 trillion of the spending
reductions the act envisages are implemented, we maintain our view that the
U.S. net general government debt burden (all levels of government combined,
excluding liquid financial assets) will likely continue to grow. Under our
revised base case fiscal scenario--which we consider to be consistent with a
'AA+' long-term rating and a negative outlook--we now project that net general
government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to
79% in 2015 and 85% by 2021. Even the projected 2015 ratio of sovereign
indebtedness is high in relation to those of peer credits and, as noted, would
continue to rise under the act's revised policy settings.
Compared with previous projections, our
revised base case scenario now assumes that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, due to
expire by the end of 2012, remain in place. We have changed our assumption on
this because the majority of Republicans in Congress continue to resist any
measure that would raise revenues, a position we believe Congress reinforced by
passing the act. Key macroeconomic assumptions in the base case scenario
include trend real GDP growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near 2%
annually over the decade.
Our revised upside scenario--which, other
things being equal, we view as consistent with the outlook on the 'AA+'
long-term rating being revised to stable--retains these same macroeconomic
assumptions. In addition, it incorporates $950 billion of new revenues on the
assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners lapse from 2013
onwards, as the Administration is advocating. In this scenario, we project that
the net general government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the
end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside scenario--which, other
things being equal, we view as being consistent with a possible further
downgrade to a 'AA' long-term rating--features less-favorable macroeconomic
assumptions, as outlined below and also assumes that the second round of
spending cuts (at least $1.2 trillion) that the act calls for does not occur.
This scenario also assumes somewhat higher nominal interest rates for U.S.
Treasuries. We still believe that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key
reserve currency confers a government funding advantage, one that could change
only slowly over time, and that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose
monetary policy at a time of fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible
that interest rates could rise if investors re-price relative risks. As a
result, our alternate scenario factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in
10-year bond yields relative to the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In
this scenario, we project the net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP
in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to 101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios also take into account
the significant negative revisions to historical GDP data that the Bureau of
Economic Analysis announced on July 29. From our perspective, the effect of these
revisions underscores two related points when evaluating the likely debt
trajectory of the U.S. government. First, the revisions show that the recent
recession was deeper than previously assumed, so the GDP this year is lower
than previously thought in both nominal and real terms. Consequently, the debt
burden is slightly higher. Second, the revised data highlight the sub-par path
of the current economic recovery when compared with rebounds following previous
post-war recessions. We believe the sluggish pace of the current economic
recovery could be consistent with the experiences of countries that have had
financial crises in which the slow process of debt deleveraging in the private
sector leads to a persistent drag on demand. As a result, our downside case
scenario assumes relatively modest real trend GDP growth of 2.5% and inflation
of near 1.5% annually going forward.
When comparing the U.S. to sovereigns with
'AAA' long-term ratings that we view as relevant peers--Canada, France,
Germany, and the U.K.--we also observe, based on our base case scenarios for
each, that the trajectory of the U.S.'s net public debt is diverging from the
others. Including the U.S., we estimate that these five sovereigns will have
net general government debt to GDP ratios this year ranging from 34% (Canada)
to 80% (the U.K.), with the U.S. debt burden at 74%. By 2015, we project that
their net public debt to GDP ratios will range between 30% (lowest, Canada) and
83% (highest, France), with the U.S. debt burden at 79%. However, in contrast
with the U.S., we project that the net public debt burdens of these other
sovereigns will begin to decline, either before or by 2015.
Standard & Poor's transfer T&C
assessment of the U.S. remains 'AAA'. Our T&C assessment reflects our view
of the likelihood of the sovereign restricting other public and private
issuers' access to foreign exchange needed to meet debt service. Although in
our view the credit standing of the U.S. government has deteriorated modestly,
we see little indication that official interference of this kind is entering
onto the policy agenda of either Congress or the Administration. Consequently,
we continue to view this risk as being highly remote.
The outlook on the long-term rating is
negative. As our downside alternate fiscal scenario illustrates, a higher
public debt trajectory than we currently assume could lead us to lower the
long-term rating again. On the other hand, as our upside scenario highlights,
if the recommendations of the Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit
Reduction--independently or coupled with other initiatives, such as the lapsing
of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners--lead to fiscal consolidation
measures beyond the minimum mandated, and we believe they are likely to slow
the deterioration of the government's debt dynamics, the long-term rating could
stabilize at 'AA+'.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.65.57 |
|
UK Pound |
1 |
Rs.101.13 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.71.80 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Analysis Done by
: |
KAS |
|
|
|
|
Report Prepared
by : |
ASH |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest capability
for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit
transaction. It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest
and principal sums |
Large |
|
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General
unfavourable factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for
payment of interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with
full security |
|
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
|
-- |
NB |
New Business |
-- |
|
This score serves as a reference to assess
SC’s credit risk and to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is
calculated from a composite of weighted scores obtained from each of the major
sections of this report. The assessed factors and their relative weights (as
indicated through %) are as follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend (10%) Operational size
(10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL)
or its officials.