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Report No. : |
343966 |
|
Report Date : |
08.10.2015 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
|
Name : |
THAI GEMS, INC. |
|
|
|
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Registered Office : |
2 West 46th Street, New York, NY 10036 – USA |
|
|
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Country : |
United
States |
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Date of Incorporation : |
10.09.1998 |
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Legal Form : |
Corporation – Profit |
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Line of Business : |
The Company is importer and wholesaler of fine diamonds. |
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No. of Employees : |
02 |
RATING & COMMENTS
|
MIRA’s Rating : |
B |
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RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
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Status : |
Small Company |
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Payment Behaviour : |
No Complaints |
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Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES:
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail: infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – March 31, 2015
|
Country Name |
Previous Rating (31.12.2014) |
Current Rating (31.03.2015) |
|
United States |
A1 |
A1 |
|
Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
|
Insignificant |
A1 |
|
Low |
A2 |
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Moderate |
B1 |
|
High |
B2 |
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Very High |
C1 |
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Restricted |
C2 |
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Off-credit |
D |
UNITED STATES - ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
Since the late 1970s China has moved from a closed, centrally planned system to a more market-oriented one that plays a major global role - in 2010 China became the world's largest exporter. Reforms began with the phasing out of collectivized agriculture, and expanded to include the gradual liberalization of prices, fiscal decentralization, increased autonomy for state enterprises, growth of the private sector, development of stock markets and a modern banking system, and opening to foreign trade and investment. China has implemented reforms in a gradualist fashion. In recent years, China has renewed its support for state-owned enterprises in sectors considered important to "economic security," explicitly looking to foster globally competitive industries. The restructuring of the economy and resulting efficiency gains have contributed to a more than tenfold increase in GDP since 1978. Measured on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis that adjusts for price differences, China in 2014 stood as the largest economy in the world, surpassing the US for the first time in modern history. Still, China's per capita income is below the world average.
After keeping its currency tightly linked to the US dollar for years, in July 2005 China moved to an exchange rate system that references a basket of currencies. From mid 2005 to late 2008 cumulative appreciation of the renminbi against the US dollar was more than 20%, but the exchange rate remained virtually pegged to the dollar from the onset of the global financial crisis until June 2010, when Beijing allowed resumption of a gradual appreciation. In 2014 the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) doubled the daily trading band within which the RMB is permitted to fluctuate.
The Chinese government faces numerous economic challenges, including: (a) reducing its high domestic savings rate and correspondingly low domestic consumption; (b) facilitating higher-wage job opportunities for the aspiring middle class, including rural migrants and increasing numbers of college graduates; (c) reducing corruption and other economic crimes; and (d) containing environmental damage and social strife related to the economy's rapid transformation. Economic development has progressed further in coastal provinces than in the interior, and by 2014 more than 274 million migrant workers and their dependents had relocated to urban areas to find work. One consequence of population control policy is that China is now one of the most rapidly aging countries in the world. Deterioration in the environment - notably air pollution, soil erosion, and the steady fall of the water table, especially in the North - is another long-term problem. China continues to lose arable land because of erosion and economic development. The Chinese government is seeking to add energy production capacity from sources other than coal and oil, focusing on nuclear and alternative energy development.
Several factors are converging to slow China's growth, including debt overhang from its credit-fueled stimulus program, industrial overcapacity, inefficient allocation of capital by state-owned banks, and the slow recovery of China's trading partners. The government's 12th Five-Year Plan, adopted in March 2011 and reiterated at the Communist Party's "Third Plenum" meeting in November 2013, emphasizes continued economic reforms and the need to increase domestic consumption in order to make the economy less dependent in the future on fixed investments, exports, and heavy industry. However, China has made only marginal progress toward these rebalancing goals. The new government of President XI Jinping has signaled a greater willingness to undertake reforms that focus on China's long-term economic health, including giving the market a more decisive role in allocating resources. In 2014 China agreed to begin limiting carbon dioxide emissions by 2030. China also implemented several economic reforms in 2014, including passing legislation to allow local governments to issue bonds, opening several state-owned enterprises to further private investment, loosening the one-child policy, passing harsher pollution fines, and cutting administrative red tape.
|
Source
: CIA |
Company name: THAI GEMS, INC.
Reg. address: 2 West 46th Street, New
York, NY 10036 – USA
Headquarters: 50 West
47th Street, Ste 2001, New York, NY 10036 - USA
Telephone: +1
212-944-9441
Fax: +1 212-944-9163
Website: -
Corporate ID#: 2296198
State: New York State
Judicial form: Corporation – Profit
Date incorporated: September
10, 1998
Stock: 200
shares common
Value: No
par value
Name of manager: SANJEEV
JAIN
Business:
The Company is importer and wholesaler of fine diamonds.
Office
of the Foreign Assets Control (OFAC):
The company is not listed on the OFAC list.
The Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List is a publication of OFAC
which lists individuals and organizations with whom United States citizens and
permanent residents are prohibited from doing business.
No name of foreign suppliers available.
EIN: -
Staff: 2
Operations & branches:
At the headquarters, we
find the corporate office and showroom, on lease.
Shareholders:
This is a private Company.
Management:
Sanjeev JAIN is the President and CEO.
As far as we know, he is involved in other corporations, including:
HOUSE OF DIAMONDS, INC.
Incorporated in New York State on 10-29-2003
ID# 2971087
In United States, privately
held corporations are not required to publish any financials.
On a direct call, the
manager controlled the present report but deferred any financials.
We sent a fax but no answer
received.
However, sales estimate for
year 2014 is in the range of USD 600,000=
The business is said to be
profitable.
Banks: JPMorgan Chase Bank
…
Legal filings & complaints:
As of today date, there is no legal filing pending with the Courts.
Secured debts summary (UCC):
None
COMPANY CREDIT HISTORY
Trade references:
Date reported: September 2015
High credit: USD 3,000
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: August 2015
Line of business: Payroll
Paying status: As agreed
Date reported: September 2015
High credit: USD 100
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: August 2015
Line of business: Telecommunications
Paying status: On terms
Domestic credit history:
Domestic credit history
appears as follow:
|
Monthly Payment
Trends - Recent Activity
|
National Credit Bureaus gave
a satisfying credit rating.
According to our credit analysts, during the last 6 months, domestic
payments were made on terms.
International credit history:
Payments of imports are currently made on terms.
Other comments:
The Company maintains a
regular business.
The Company is in good
standing.
This means that all local
and federal taxes were paid on due date.
The risk is low.
Our opinion:
A business connection may
be conducted.
DIAMOND INDUSTRY – INDIA
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From
time immemorial, India is well known in the world as the birthplace for
diamonds. It is difficult to trace the origin of diamonds but history
says that in the remote past, diamonds were mined only in India. Diamond
production in India can be traced back to almost 8th Century B.C.
India, in fact, remained undisputed leader till 18th Century
when Brazilian fields were discovered in 1725 followed by emergence of S.
Africa, Russia and Australia.
-
The
achievement of the Indian diamond industry was possible only due to combination
of the manufacturing skills of the Indian workforce and the untiring and
unflagging efforts of the Indian diamantaires, supported by progressive
Government policies.
-
The
area of study of family owned diamond businesses derives its importance from
the huge conglomerate of family run organizations which operate in the diamond
industry since many generations.
-
Some
of the basic traits of family run business enterprises include spirit of
entrepreneurship, mutual trust lowers transaction costs, small, nimble and
quick to react, information as a source of advantage and philanthropy.
-
Family
owned diamond businesses need to improve on many fronts including higher
standard of corporate governance, long-term performance – focused strategies,
modern management and technology.
-
Utmost
caution is to be exercised while dealing with some medium and large diamond
traders which are usually engaged in fictitious import – export, inter-company
transactions, financially assisted by banks. In the process, several public
sector banks lost several hundred million rupees. They mostly diverted borrowed
money for diamond business into real estate and capital markets.
-
Excerpts
from Times of India dated 30th October 2010 is as under –
-
Gem
& Jewellery Export Promotion Council in its statistical data has shown the
export of polished diamonds to have increase by 28 % in February 2013. Compared
to $ 1.4 bn worth of polished diamond export in February, 2012, India exported
$ 1.84 billion worth of polished diamonds in February 2013. A senior executive
of GJEPC said, “Export of cut and polished diamonds started falling month-wise
after the imposition of 2 % of import duty on the polished diamonds. But
February, 2013 has given a new ray of hope to the industry as the export of
polished diamonds has actually increased by 28 %. It means the industry
is on the track of recovery and round tripping of diamonds has stopped
completely.” Demand has started coming from the US, the UK, Japan and China.
India’s polished diamond export is expected to cross $ 21 bn in 2013-14.
-
The
banking sector has started exercising restraint while following prudent risk
management norms when lending money to gems and jewellery sector. This follows the
implementation of Basel III accord – a global voluntary regulatory standard on
bank capital adequacy, stress testing and market liquidity.
Standard & Poor’s
|
United
States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'AA+' Due To Political Risks,
Rising Debt Burden; Outlook Negative |
|
Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
·
We have also removed both the short- and long-term ratings
from CreditWatch negative.
·
The downgrade reflects our opinion that the fiscal
consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration recently agreed to
falls short of what, in our view, would be necessary to stabilize the
government's medium-term debt dynamics.
·
More broadly, the downgrade reflects our view that the
effectiveness, stability, and predictability of American policymaking and
political institutions have weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic
challenges to a degree more than we envisioned when we assigned a negative
outlook to the rating on April 18, 2011.
·
Since then, we have changed our view of the difficulties in
bridging the gulf between the political parties over fiscal policy, which makes
us pessimistic about the capacity of Congress and the Administration to be able
to leverage their agreement this week into a broader fiscal consolidation plan
that stabilizes the government's debt dynamics any time soon.
·
The outlook on the long-term rating is negative. We could
lower the long-term rating to 'AA' within the next two years if we see that
less reduction in spending than agreed to, higher interest rates, or new fiscal
pressures during the period result in a higher general government debt
trajectory than we currently assume in our base case.
TORONTO (Standard &
Poor's) Aug. 5, 2011--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that it
lowered its long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of America
to 'AA+' from 'AAA'. Standard & Poor's also said that the outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. At the same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed
its 'A-1+' short-term rating on the U.S. In addition, Standard & Poor's
removed both ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed on July 14, 2011,
with negative implications.
The
transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment of the U.S.--our assessment of
the likelihood of official interference in the ability of U.S.-based public-
and private-sector issuers to secure foreign exchange for
debt service--remains
'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term
rating on the U.S. because we believe that the prolonged controversy over
raising the statutory debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate
indicate that further near-term progress containing the growth in public
spending, especially on entitlements, or on reaching an agreement on raising
revenues is less likely than we previously assumed and will remain a
contentious and fitful process. We also believe that the fiscal consolidation
plan that Congress and the Administration agreed to this week falls short of
the amount that we believe is necessary to stabilize the general government
debt burden by the middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the
rating was prompted by our view on the rising public debt burden and our
perception of greater policymaking uncertainty, consistent with our criteria
(see "Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions
," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41). Nevertheless, we view the U.S.
federal government's other economic, external, and monetary credit attributes,
which form the basis for the sovereign rating, as broadly unchanged.
We have taken the ratings
off CreditWatch because the Aug. 2 passage of the Budget Control Act Amendment
of 2011 has removed any perceived immediate threat of payment default posed by
delays to raising the government's debt ceiling. In addition, we believe that
the act provides sufficient clarity to allow us to evaluate the likely course
of U.S. fiscal policy for the next few years.
The
political brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as America's
governance and policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and less
predictable than what we previously believed. The statutory debt ceiling and
the threat of default have become political bargaining chips in the debate over
fiscal policy. Despite this year's wide-ranging debate, in our view, the
differences between political parties have proven to be extraordinarily
difficult to bridge, and, as we see it, the resulting agreement fell well short
of the comprehensive fiscal consolidation program that some proponents had
envisaged until quite recently. Republicans and Democrats have only been able
to agree to relatively modest savings on discretionary spending while
delegating to the Select Committee decisions on more comprehensive measures. It
appears that for now, new revenues have dropped down on the menu of policy
options. In addition, the plan envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare and
little change in other entitlements,
the containment of which
we and most other independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal
sustainability.
Our opinion is that
elected officials remain wary of tackling the structural issues required to effectively
address the rising U.S. public debt burden in a manner consistent with a 'AAA'
rating and with 'AAA' rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions,"
June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41). In our view, the difficulty in
framing a consensus on fiscal policy weakens the government's ability to manage
public finances and diverts attention from the debate over how to achieve more
balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era of fiscal stringency and
private-sector deleveraging (ibid). A new political consensus might (or might
not) emerge after the 2012 elections, but we believe that by then, the
government debt burden will likely be higher, the needed medium-term fiscal
adjustment potentially greater, and the inflection point on the U.S.
population's demographics and other age-related spending drivers closer at hand
(see "Global Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Likely Cost Even
More Green, Now," June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's
takes no position on the mix of spending and revenue measures that Congress and
the Administration might conclude is appropriate for putting the U.S.'s
finances on a sustainable footing.
The act calls for as much
as $2.4 trillion of reductions in expenditure growth over the 10 years through
2021. These cuts will be implemented in two steps: the $917 billion agreed to
initially, followed by an additional $1.5 trillion that the newly formed
Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction is supposed to
recommend by November 2011. The act contains no measures to raise taxes or
otherwise enhance revenues, though the committee could recommend them.
The act further provides
that if Congress does not enact the committee's recommendations, cuts of $1.2
trillion will be implemented over the same time period. The reductions would
mainly affect outlays for civilian discretionary spending, defense, and
Medicare. We understand that this fall-back mechanism is designed to encourage
Congress to embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure savings, as the
committee might recommend.
We note that in a letter
to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated
total budgetary savings under the act to be at least $2.1 trillion over the
next 10 years relative to its baseline assumptions. In updating our own fiscal
projections, with certain modifications outlined below, we have relied on the
CBO's latest "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" of June 2011, updated to
include the CBO assumptions contained in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In
general, the CBO's "Alternate Fiscal Scenario" assumes a continuation
of recent Congressional action overriding existing law.
We view the act's
measures as a step toward fiscal consolidation. However, this is within the
framework of a legislative mechanism that leaves open the details of what is
finally agreed to until the end of 2011, and Congress and the Administration
could modify any agreement in the future. Even assuming that at least $2.1
trillion of the spending reductions the act envisages are implemented, we
maintain our view that the U.S. net general government debt burden (all levels
of government combined, excluding liquid financial assets) will likely continue
to grow. Under our revised base case fiscal scenario--which we consider to be
consistent with a 'AA+' long-term rating and a negative outlook--we now project
that net general government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the
end of 2011 to 79% in 2015 and 85% by 2021. Even the projected 2015 ratio of
sovereign indebtedness is high in relation to those of peer credits and, as
noted, would continue to rise under the act's revised policy settings.
Compared with previous
projections, our revised base case scenario now assumes that the 2001 and 2003
tax cuts, due to expire by the end of 2012, remain in place. We have changed
our assumption on this because the majority of Republicans in Congress continue
to resist any measure that would raise revenues, a position we believe Congress
reinforced by passing the act. Key macroeconomic assumptions in the base case
scenario include trend real GDP growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near
2% annually over the decade.
Our revised upside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as consistent with the
outlook on the 'AA+' long-term rating being revised to stable--retains these
same macroeconomic assumptions. In addition, it incorporates $950 billion of
new revenues on the assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners
lapse from 2013 onwards, as the Administration is advocating. In this scenario,
we project that the net general government debt would rise from an estimated
74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside
scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as being consistent with a
possible further downgrade to a 'AA' long-term rating--features less-favorable
macroeconomic assumptions, as outlined below and also assumes that the second
round of spending cuts (at least $1.2 trillion) that the act calls for does not
occur. This scenario also assumes somewhat higher nominal interest rates for
U.S. Treasuries. We still believe that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key
reserve currency confers a government funding advantage, one that could change
only slowly over time, and that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose monetary
policy at a time of fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible that
interest rates could rise if investors re-price relative risks. As a result,
our alternate scenario factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in 10-year
bond yields relative to the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In this
scenario, we project the net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP in
2011 to 90% in 2015 and to 101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios
also take into account the significant negative revisions to historical GDP
data that the Bureau of Economic Analysis announced on July 29. From our
perspective, the effect of these revisions underscores two related points when
evaluating the likely debt trajectory of the U.S. government. First, the
revisions show that the recent recession was deeper than previously assumed, so
the GDP this year is lower than previously thought in both nominal and real
terms. Consequently, the debt burden is slightly higher. Second, the revised
data highlight the sub-par path of the current economic recovery when compared
with rebounds following previous post-war recessions. We believe the sluggish
pace of the current economic recovery could be consistent with the experiences
of countries that have had financial crises in which the slow process of debt
deleveraging in the private sector leads to a persistent drag on demand. As a
result, our downside case scenario assumes relatively modest real trend GDP
growth of 2.5% and inflation of near 1.5% annually going forward.
When comparing the U.S.
to sovereigns with 'AAA' long-term ratings that we view as relevant
peers--Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K.--we also observe, based on our
base case scenarios for each, that the trajectory of the U.S.'s net public debt
is diverging from the others. Including the U.S., we estimate that these five
sovereigns will have net general government debt to GDP ratios this year
ranging from 34% (Canada) to 80% (the U.K.), with the U.S. debt burden at 74%.
By 2015, we project that their net public debt to GDP ratios will range between
30% (lowest, Canada) and 83% (highest, France), with the U.S. debt burden at
79%. However, in contrast with the U.S., we project that the net public debt
burdens of these other sovereigns will begin to decline, either before or by
2015.
Standard & Poor's
transfer T&C assessment of the U.S. remains 'AAA'. Our T&C assessment
reflects our view of the likelihood of the sovereign restricting other public
and private issuers' access to foreign exchange needed to meet debt service. Although
in our view the credit standing of the U.S. government has deteriorated
modestly, we see little indication that official interference of this kind is
entering onto the policy agenda of either Congress or the Administration.
Consequently, we continue to view this risk as being highly remote.
The outlook on the
long-term rating is negative. As our downside alternate fiscal scenario
illustrates, a higher public debt trajectory than we currently assume could
lead us to lower the long-term rating again. On the other hand, as our upside
scenario highlights, if the recommendations of the Congressional Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction--independently or coupled with other
initiatives, such as the lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high
earners--lead to fiscal consolidation measures beyond the minimum mandated, and
we believe they are likely to slow the deterioration of the government's debt
dynamics, the long-term rating could stabilize at 'AA+'.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.65.25 |
|
|
1 |
Rs.99.53 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.73.47 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Analysis Done by
: |
HEE |
|
|
|
|
Report Prepared
by : |
TPT |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest
capability for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit
transaction. It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest
and principal sums |
Large |
|
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General unfavourable
factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for payment of
interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with
full security |
|
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
|
-- |
NB |
New Business |
-- |
|
This score serves as a reference to assess SC’s
credit risk and to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is calculated
from a composite of weighted scores obtained from each of the major sections of
this report. The assessed factors and their relative weights (as indicated
through %) are as follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend (10%) Operational size
(10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL) or
its officials.