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Report No. : |
344638 |
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Report Date : |
16.10.2015 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
|
Name : |
MEHRRA JEWELLERS INC. |
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Registered Office : |
998 El Camino Real, Sunnyvale, CA 94087 - USA |
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Country : |
United States |
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Date of Incorporation : |
12.02.2010 |
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Legal Form : |
Corporation – Profit |
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Line of Business : |
The Company is importer, wholesaler and retailer of
fine diamonds and precious stones jewelry. |
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No. of Employees : |
2 |
RATING & COMMENTS
|
MIRA’s Rating : |
B |
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RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
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26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
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Status : |
Small Company |
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Payment Behaviour : |
No Complaints |
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Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES:
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail: infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – March 31, 2015
|
Country Name |
Previous Rating (31.12.2014) |
Current Rating (31.03.2015) |
|
United States |
A1 |
A1 |
|
Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
|
Insignificant |
A1 |
|
Low |
A2 |
|
Moderate |
B1 |
|
High |
B2 |
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Very High |
C1 |
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Restricted |
C2 |
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Off-credit |
D |
UNITED STATES - ECONOMIC
OVERVIEW
The US
has the most technologically powerful economy in the world, with a per capita GDP
of $54,800. US firms are at or near the forefront in technological advances,
especially in computers, pharmaceuticals, and medical, aerospace, and military
equipment; however, their advantage has narrowed since the end of World War II.
Based on a comparison of GDP measured at Purchasing Power Parity conversion
rates, the US economy in 2014, having stood as the largest in the world for
more than a century, slipped into second place behind China, which has more
than tripled the US growth rate for each year of the past four decades.
In the
US, private individuals and business firms make most of the decisions, and the
federal and state governments buy needed goods and services predominantly in
the private marketplace. US business firms enjoy greater flexibility than their
counterparts in Western Europe and Japan in decisions to expand capital plant,
to lay off surplus workers, and to develop new products. At the same time, they
face higher barriers to enter their rivals' home markets than foreign firms
face entering US markets.
Long-term
problems for the US include stagnation of wages for lower-income families,
inadequate investment in deteriorating infrastructure, rapidly rising medical
and pension costs of an aging population, energy shortages, and sizable current
account and budget deficits.
The
onrush of technology has been a driving factor in the gradual development of a
"two-tier" labor market in which those at the bottom lack the
education and the professional/technical skills of those at the top and, more
and more, fail to get comparable pay raises, health insurance coverage, and
other benefits. But the globalization of trade, and especially the rise of
low-wage producers such as China, has put additional downward pressure on wages
and upward pressure on the return to capital. Since 1975, practically all the
gains in household income have gone to the top 20% of households. Since 1996,
dividends and capital gains have grown faster than wages or any other category
of after-tax income.
Imported
oil accounts for nearly 55% of US consumption and oil has a major impact on the
overall health of the economy. Crude oil prices doubled between 2001 and 2006,
the year home prices peaked; higher gasoline prices ate into consumers' budgets
and many individuals fell behind in their mortgage payments. Oil prices climbed
another 50% between 2006 and 2008, and bank foreclosures more than doubled in
the same period. Besides dampening the housing market, soaring oil prices
caused a drop in the value of the dollar and a deterioration in the US
merchandise trade deficit, which peaked at $840 billion in 2008.
The
sub-prime mortgage crisis, falling home prices, investment bank failures, tight
credit, and the global economic downturn pushed the United States into a
recession by mid-2008. GDP contracted until the third quarter of 2009, making
this the deepest and longest downturn since the Great Depression. To help
stabilize financial markets, the US Congress established a $700 billion
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in October 2008. The government used some
of these funds to purchase equity in US banks and industrial corporations, much
of which had been returned to the government by early 2011. In January 2009 the
US Congress passed and President Barack OBAMA signed a bill providing an
additional $787 billion fiscal stimulus to be used over 10 years - two-thirds
on additional spending and one-third on tax cuts - to create jobs and to help
the economy recover. In 2010 and 2011, the federal budget deficit reached
nearly 9% of GDP. In 2012, the federal government reduced the growth of
spending and the deficit shrank to 7.6% of GDP.
Wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan required major shifts in national resources from civilian
to military purposes and contributed to the growth of the budget deficit and
public debt. Through 2014, the direct costs of the wars totaled more than $1.5
trillion, according to US Government figures. US revenues from taxes and other
sources are lower, as a percentage of GDP, than those of most other countries.
In March
2010, President OBAMA signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, a health insurance reform that was designed to extend coverage to an
additional 32 million American citizens by 2016, through private health
insurance for the general population and Medicaid for the impoverished. Total
spending on health care - public plus private - rose from 9.0% of GDP in 1980
to 17.9% in 2010.
In July
2010, the president signed the DODD-FRANK Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, a law designed to promote financial stability by protecting
consumers from financial abuses, ending taxpayer bailouts of financial firms,
dealing with troubled banks that are "too big to fail," and improving
accountability and transparency in the financial system - in particular, by
requiring certain financial derivatives to be traded in markets that are
subject to government regulation and oversight.
In
December 2012, the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) announced plans to purchase $85
billion per month of mortgage-backed and Treasury securities in an effort to
hold down long-term interest rates, and to keep short term rates near zero
until unemployment dropped below 6.5% or inflation rose above 2.5%. In late
2013, the Fed announced that it would begin scaling back long-term bond
purchases to $75 billion per month in January 2014 and reduce them further as
conditions warranted; the Fed ended the purchases during the summer of 2014. In
2014, the unemployment rate dropped to 6.2%, and continued to fall to 5.5% by
mid-2015, the lowest rate of joblessness since before the global recession
began; inflation stood at 1.7%, and public debt as a share of GDP continued to
decline, following several years of increase.
|
Source
: CIA |
Company name:
MEHRRA JEWELLERS INC.
Address:
998 El
Camino Real, Sunnyvale, CA 94087 - USA
Telephone: +1
408-245-9770
Fax:
-
Website:
-
Corporate ID#:
C3275290
State:
California
Judicial form:
Corporation
– Profit
Date incorporated: February
12, 2010
Stock: -
Value: -
Name of manager: Naresh
MEHRA
Business:
The Company is importer, wholesaler and retailer of fine
diamonds and precious stones jewelry.
Office of the Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC):
The company is not listed on the OFAC list.
The Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List is a
publication of OFAC which lists individuals and organizations with whom United
States citizens and permanent residents are prohibited from doing business.
No name of foreign suppliers available.
EIN: 77-0518490
Staff: 2
Operations & branches:
At the headquarters, we find a
store and office, on lease.
Shareholders:
This is a private Company.
Management:
Naresh MEHRA is the President, Director and CEO.
As far as we know, he is also the President at:
KRISHMA INC.
998 El Camino Real, Sunnyvale, CA 94087
Incorporated in California on Feb. 12, 2010
ID# C3275292
In United States, privately held
corporations are not required to publish any financials.
On a direct call, a sales
assistant controlled the present report but deferred any financials.
We sent a fax but no answer
received.
However, sales estimate for year
2014 is in the range of USD 600,000=
The business is said to be
profitable.
Banks: Wells Fargo Bank
…
Legal filings & complaints:
As of today date, there is no legal filing pending
with the Courts.
Secured debts summary (UCC): None
Haut du formulaire
Trade references:
Date reported: September 2015
High credit: USD 3,000
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: August 2015
Line of business: Payroll
Paying status: As agreed
Date reported: September 2015
High credit: USD 180
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: August 2015
Line of business: Telecommunications
Paying status: On terms
Domestic credit history:
National Credit Bureaus gave a satisfying
credit risk.
According to our credit analysts, during the last 6
months, domestic payments were made on due date.
Other comments:
The Company maintains a regular
business.
The Company is in good standing.
This means that all local and
federal taxes were paid on due date.
The risk is low.
Our opinion:
A business connection may be
conducted.
Standard & Poor’s
|
United
States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'AA+' Due To Political Risks,
Rising Debt Burden; Outlook Negative |
|
Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
·
We
have also removed both the short- and long-term ratings from CreditWatch
negative.
·
The
downgrade reflects our opinion that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress
and the Administration recently agreed to falls short of what, in our view,
would be necessary to stabilize the government's medium-term debt dynamics.
·
More
broadly, the downgrade reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability, and
predictability of American policymaking and political institutions have
weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic challenges to a degree more
than we envisioned when we assigned a negative outlook to the rating on April
18, 2011.
·
Since
then, we have changed our view of the difficulties in bridging the gulf between
the political parties over fiscal policy, which makes us pessimistic about the capacity
of Congress and the Administration to be able to leverage their agreement this
week into a broader fiscal consolidation plan that stabilizes the government's
debt dynamics any time soon.
·
The
outlook on the long-term rating is negative. We could lower the long-term
rating to 'AA' within the next two years if we see that less reduction in
spending than agreed to, higher interest rates, or new fiscal pressures during
the period result in a higher general government debt trajectory than we
currently assume in our base case.
TORONTO (Standard & Poor's) Aug. 5,
2011--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that it lowered its
long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of America to 'AA+' from
'AAA'. Standard & Poor's also said that the outlook on the long-term rating
is negative. At the same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed its 'A-1+'
short-term rating on the U.S. In addition, Standard & Poor's removed both
ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed on July 14, 2011, with
negative implications.
The transfer and
convertibility (T&C) assessment of the U.S.--our assessment of the
likelihood of official interference in the ability of U.S.-based public- and
private-sector issuers to secure foreign exchange for
debt service--remains 'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term rating on the U.S.
because we believe that the prolonged controversy over raising the statutory
debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate indicate that further
near-term progress containing the growth in public spending, especially on
entitlements, or on reaching an agreement on raising revenues is less likely
than we previously assumed and will remain a contentious and fitful process. We
also believe that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration
agreed to this week falls short of the amount that we believe is necessary to
stabilize the general government debt burden by the middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the rating was prompted by
our view on the rising public debt burden and our perception of greater
policymaking uncertainty, consistent with our criteria (see "Sovereign Government Rating
Methodology and Assumptions ," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs
36-41). Nevertheless, we view the U.S. federal government's other economic,
external, and monetary credit attributes, which form the basis for the
sovereign rating, as broadly unchanged.
We have taken the ratings off CreditWatch
because the Aug. 2 passage of the Budget Control Act Amendment of 2011 has
removed any perceived immediate threat of payment default posed by delays to
raising the government's debt ceiling. In addition, we believe that the act
provides sufficient clarity to allow us to evaluate the likely course of U.S.
fiscal policy for the next few years.
The political
brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as America's governance
and policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and less predictable
than what we previously believed. The statutory debt ceiling and the threat of
default have become political bargaining chips in the debate over fiscal
policy. Despite this year's wide-ranging debate, in our view, the differences
between political parties have proven to be extraordinarily difficult to
bridge, and, as we see it, the resulting agreement fell well short of the
comprehensive fiscal consolidation program that some proponents had envisaged
until quite recently. Republicans and Democrats have only been able to agree to
relatively modest savings on discretionary spending while delegating to the
Select Committee decisions on more comprehensive measures. It appears that for
now, new revenues have dropped down on the menu of policy options. In addition,
the plan envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare and little change in
other entitlements,
the containment of which we and most other
independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal sustainability.
Our opinion is that elected officials remain
wary of tackling the structural issues required to effectively address the
rising U.S. public debt burden in a manner consistent with a 'AAA' rating and
with 'AAA' rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign Government Rating
Methodology and Assumptions," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs
36-41). In our view, the difficulty in framing a consensus on fiscal policy
weakens the government's ability to manage public finances and diverts
attention from the debate over how to achieve more balanced and dynamic
economic growth in an era of fiscal stringency and private-sector deleveraging
(ibid). A new political consensus might (or might not) emerge after the 2012
elections, but we believe that by then, the government debt burden will likely
be higher, the needed medium-term fiscal adjustment potentially greater, and
the inflection point on the U.S. population's demographics and other
age-related spending drivers closer at hand (see "Global Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going
Gray Will Likely Cost Even More Green, Now," June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's takes no position on
the mix of spending and revenue measures that Congress and the Administration
might conclude is appropriate for putting the U.S.'s finances on a sustainable
footing.
The act calls for as much as $2.4 trillion
of reductions in expenditure growth over the 10 years through 2021. These cuts
will be implemented in two steps: the $917 billion agreed to initially,
followed by an additional $1.5 trillion that the newly formed Congressional
Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction is supposed to recommend by
November 2011. The act contains no measures to raise taxes or otherwise enhance
revenues, though the committee could recommend them.
The act further provides that if Congress
does not enact the committee's recommendations, cuts of $1.2 trillion will be implemented
over the same time period. The reductions would mainly affect outlays for
civilian discretionary spending, defense, and Medicare. We understand that this
fall-back mechanism is designed to encourage Congress to embrace a more
balanced mix of expenditure savings, as the committee might recommend.
We note that in a letter to Congress on Aug.
1, 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated total budgetary
savings under the act to be at least $2.1 trillion over the next 10 years
relative to its baseline assumptions. In updating our own fiscal projections,
with certain modifications outlined below, we have relied on the CBO's latest
"Alternate Fiscal Scenario" of June 2011, updated to include the CBO
assumptions contained in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In general, the CBO's
"Alternate Fiscal Scenario" assumes a continuation of recent
Congressional action overriding existing law.
We view the act's measures as a step toward
fiscal consolidation. However, this is within the framework of a legislative
mechanism that leaves open the details of what is finally agreed to until the
end of 2011, and Congress and the Administration could modify any agreement in
the future. Even assuming that at least $2.1 trillion of the spending
reductions the act envisages are implemented, we maintain our view that the
U.S. net general government debt burden (all levels of government combined,
excluding liquid financial assets) will likely continue to grow. Under our
revised base case fiscal scenario--which we consider to be consistent with a
'AA+' long-term rating and a negative outlook--we now project that net general
government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to
79% in 2015 and 85% by 2021. Even the projected 2015 ratio of sovereign
indebtedness is high in relation to those of peer credits and, as noted, would
continue to rise under the act's revised policy settings.
Compared with previous projections, our
revised base case scenario now assumes that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, due to
expire by the end of 2012, remain in place. We have changed our assumption on
this because the majority of Republicans in Congress continue to resist any
measure that would raise revenues, a position we believe Congress reinforced by
passing the act. Key macroeconomic assumptions in the base case scenario
include trend real GDP growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near 2%
annually over the decade.
Our revised upside scenario--which, other
things being equal, we view as consistent with the outlook on the 'AA+'
long-term rating being revised to stable--retains these same macroeconomic
assumptions. In addition, it incorporates $950 billion of new revenues on the
assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners lapse from 2013
onwards, as the Administration is advocating. In this scenario, we project that
the net general government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the
end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside scenario--which, other
things being equal, we view as being consistent with a possible further
downgrade to a 'AA' long-term rating--features less-favorable macroeconomic
assumptions, as outlined below and also assumes that the second round of
spending cuts (at least $1.2 trillion) that the act calls for does not occur.
This scenario also assumes somewhat higher nominal interest rates for U.S.
Treasuries. We still believe that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key
reserve currency confers a government funding advantage, one that could change
only slowly over time, and that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose
monetary policy at a time of fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible
that interest rates could rise if investors re-price relative risks. As a
result, our alternate scenario factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in
10-year bond yields relative to the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In
this scenario, we project the net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP
in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to 101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios also take into account
the significant negative revisions to historical GDP data that the Bureau of
Economic Analysis announced on July 29. From our perspective, the effect of
these revisions underscores two related points when evaluating the likely debt
trajectory of the U.S. government. First, the revisions show that the recent
recession was deeper than previously assumed, so the GDP this year is lower
than previously thought in both nominal and real terms. Consequently, the debt
burden is slightly higher. Second, the revised data highlight the sub-par path
of the current economic recovery when compared with rebounds following previous
post-war recessions. We believe the sluggish pace of the current economic
recovery could be consistent with the experiences of countries that have had
financial crises in which the slow process of debt deleveraging in the private
sector leads to a persistent drag on demand. As a result, our downside case
scenario assumes relatively modest real trend GDP growth of 2.5% and inflation
of near 1.5% annually going forward.
When comparing the U.S. to sovereigns with
'AAA' long-term ratings that we view as relevant peers--Canada, France,
Germany, and the U.K.--we also observe, based on our base case scenarios for
each, that the trajectory of the U.S.'s net public debt is diverging from the
others. Including the U.S., we estimate that these five sovereigns will have
net general government debt to GDP ratios this year ranging from 34% (Canada)
to 80% (the U.K.), with the U.S. debt burden at 74%. By 2015, we project that
their net public debt to GDP ratios will range between 30% (lowest, Canada) and
83% (highest, France), with the U.S. debt burden at 79%. However, in contrast
with the U.S., we project that the net public debt burdens of these other
sovereigns will begin to decline, either before or by 2015.
Standard & Poor's transfer T&C
assessment of the U.S. remains 'AAA'. Our T&C assessment reflects our view
of the likelihood of the sovereign restricting other public and private
issuers' access to foreign exchange needed to meet debt service. Although in
our view the credit standing of the U.S. government has deteriorated modestly,
we see little indication that official interference of this kind is entering
onto the policy agenda of either Congress or the Administration. Consequently,
we continue to view this risk as being highly remote.
The outlook on the long-term rating is
negative. As our downside alternate fiscal scenario illustrates, a higher
public debt trajectory than we currently assume could lead us to lower the
long-term rating again. On the other hand, as our upside scenario highlights,
if the recommendations of the Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit
Reduction--independently or coupled with other initiatives, such as the lapsing
of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners--lead to fiscal consolidation
measures beyond the minimum mandated, and we believe they are likely to slow
the deterioration of the government's debt dynamics, the long-term rating could
stabilize at 'AA+'.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.64.82 |
|
UK Pound |
1 |
Rs.100.41 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.74.50 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Analysis Done by
: |
DIV |
|
|
|
|
Report Prepared
by : |
TRU |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest
capability for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit
transaction. It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest
and principal sums |
Large |
|
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General unfavourable
factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for payment of
interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with full
security |
|
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
|
-- |
NB |
New Business |
-- |
|
This score serves as a reference to assess SC’s
credit risk and to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is calculated
from a composite of weighted scores obtained from each of the major sections of
this report. The assessed factors and their relative weights (as indicated
through %) are as follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend (10%) Operational size
(10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL) or
its officials.