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Report No. : |
345713 |
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Report Date : |
26.10.2015 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
|
Name : |
SUZLON ROTOR CORPORATION |
|
|
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Registered Office : |
1711 s. Highway 75, Pipestone, MN 56164 |
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Country : |
United States |
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Date of Incorporation : |
09.08.2005 |
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Legal Form : |
Corporation – Profit |
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Line of Business : |
Manufacture rotor blades with a capacity of 600 MW/year |
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No. of Employees : |
288 |
RATING & COMMENTS
|
MIRA’s Rating : |
Ba |
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
Status : |
Satisfactory |
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Payment Behaviour : |
No Complaints |
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Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES:
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail: infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – March 31, 2015
|
Country Name |
Previous Rating (31.12.2014) |
Current Rating (31.03.2015) |
|
USA |
A1 |
A1 |
|
Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
|
Insignificant |
A1 |
|
Low |
A2 |
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Moderate |
B1 |
|
High |
B2 |
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Very High |
C1 |
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Restricted |
C2 |
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Off-credit |
D |
USA - ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
The US has the most technologically powerful economy in the world, with a per capita GDP of $54,800. US firms are at or near the forefront in technological advances, especially in computers, pharmaceuticals, and medical, aerospace, and military equipment; however, their advantage has narrowed since the end of World War II. Based on a comparison of GDP measured at Purchasing Power Parity conversion rates, the US economy in 2014, having stood as the largest in the world for more than a century, slipped into second place behind China, which has more than tripled the US growth rate for each year of the past four decades.
In the US, private individuals and business firms make most of the decisions, and the federal and state governments buy needed goods and services predominantly in the private marketplace. US business firms enjoy greater flexibility than their counterparts in Western Europe and Japan in decisions to expand capital plant, to lay off surplus workers, and to develop new products. At the same time, they face higher barriers to enter their rivals' home markets than foreign firms face entering US markets.
Long-term problems for the US include stagnation of wages for lower-income families, inadequate investment in deteriorating infrastructure, rapidly rising medical and pension costs of an aging population, energy shortages, and sizable current account and budget deficits.
The onrush of technology has been a driving factor in the gradual development of a "two-tier" labor market in which those at the bottom lack the education and the professional/technical skills of those at the top and, more and more, fail to get comparable pay raises, health insurance coverage, and other benefits. But the globalization of trade, and especially the rise of low-wage producers such as China, has put additional downward pressure on wages and upward pressure on the return to capital. Since 1975, practically all the gains in household income have gone to the top 20% of households. Since 1996, dividends and capital gains have grown faster than wages or any other category of after-tax income.
Imported oil accounts for nearly 55% of US consumption and oil has a major impact on the overall health of the economy. Crude oil prices doubled between 2001 and 2006, the year home prices peaked; higher gasoline prices ate into consumers' budgets and many individuals fell behind in their mortgage payments. Oil prices climbed another 50% between 2006 and 2008, and bank foreclosures more than doubled in the same period. Besides dampening the housing market, soaring oil prices caused a drop in the value of the dollar and a deterioration in the US merchandise trade deficit, which peaked at $840 billion in 2008.
The sub-prime mortgage crisis, falling home prices, investment bank failures, tight credit, and the global economic downturn pushed the United States into a recession by mid-2008. GDP contracted until the third quarter of 2009, making this the deepest and longest downturn since the Great Depression. To help stabilize financial markets, the US Congress established a $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in October 2008. The government used some of these funds to purchase equity in US banks and industrial corporations, much of which had been returned to the government by early 2011. In January 2009 the US Congress passed and President Barack OBAMA signed a bill providing an additional $787 billion fiscal stimulus to be used over 10 years - two-thirds on additional spending and one-third on tax cuts - to create jobs and to help the economy recover. In 2010 and 2011, the federal budget deficit reached nearly 9% of GDP. In 2012, the federal government reduced the growth of spending and the deficit shrank to 7.6% of GDP.
Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan required major shifts in national resources from civilian to military purposes and contributed to the growth of the budget deficit and public debt. Through 2014, the direct costs of the wars totaled more than $1.5 trillion, according to US Government figures. US revenues from taxes and other sources are lower, as a percentage of GDP, than those of most other countries.
In March 2010, President OBAMA signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, a health insurance reform that was designed to extend coverage to an additional 32 million American citizens by 2016, through private health insurance for the general population and Medicaid for the impoverished. Total spending on health care - public plus private - rose from 9.0% of GDP in 1980 to 17.9% in 2010.
In July 2010, the president signed the DODD-FRANK Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, a law designed to promote financial stability by protecting consumers from financial abuses, ending taxpayer bailouts of financial firms, dealing with troubled banks that are "too big to fail," and improving accountability and transparency in the financial system - in particular, by requiring certain financial derivatives to be traded in markets that are subject to government regulation and oversight.
In December 2012, the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) announced plans to purchase $85 billion per month of mortgage-backed and Treasury securities in an effort to hold down long-term interest rates, and to keep short term rates near zero until unemployment dropped below 6.5% or inflation rose above 2.5%. In late 2013, the Fed announced that it would begin scaling back long-term bond purchases to $75 billion per month in January 2014 and reduce them further as conditions warranted; the Fed ended the purchases during the summer of 2014. In 2014, the unemployment rate dropped to 6.2%, and continued to fall to 5.5% by mid-2015, the lowest rate of joblessness since before the global recession began; inflation stood at 1.7%, and public debt as a share of GDP continued to decline, following several years of increase.
|
Source
: CIA |
Company name: SUZLON ROTOR CORPORATION
Address: 1711
s. Highway 75, Pipestone, MN 56164 - USA
Telephone: +1
507-562-6700
Fax: +1 507-562-1107
Website: www.suzlon.com
Corporate ID#: 4012282
State: Delaware
Judicial form: Corporation – Profit
Date incorporated: August
9, 2005
Stock: 1,000
shares common
Value: USD
1= par value
Name of manager: Bhupen
K. BABARIA
Business:
Manufacture rotor blades with a capacity of 600 MW/year.
Office of the Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC):
The company is not listed on the OFAC list.
The Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List is a publication of OFAC
which lists individuals and organizations with whom United States citizens and
permanent residents are prohibited from doing business.
Foreign suppliers
include:
KUSH SYNTHETICS PVT. LTD.
SURVEY NO. 146, VILLAGE MOTI CHIRAI, NH-8A, GANDHIDHAM BHACHAU ROAD,
BHACHAU, KUTCHH, GUJARAT - 370 140 - INDIA
EIN: 20-3276287
Staff: 288
Operations & branches:
At the headquarters, we
find a factory, warehouse and office.
Shareholders:
Suzlon Energy Limited
One Earth, Opp. Magarpatta City,
Hadapsar, Pune 411028, India.
Management:
Bhupen K. BABARIA is the
CEO.
As far as we know, he is not involved in other local corporations.
Subsidiaries And
partnership:
SUZLON WIND ENERGY CORP.
8750 West Bryn Mawr, Ste 720, Chicago, IL 60631
Incorporated in Delaware on October 1, 2001
ID# 3441598
In United States, privately
held corporations are not required to publish any financials.
On a direct call, nobody
accepted to answer our questions.
We sent a fax but no answer
received.
Outside sources (financial
institutions) gave estimate sales for year 2014 in the range of USD 40,000,000=
verse USD 38,000,000= in 2013.
Banks: Bank of India
…
Legal filings
& complaints:
As of today date, there is no legal filing pending with the Courts.
Secured debts summary (UCC):
None
Standard &
Poor’s
|
United States of
America Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'AA+' Due To Political Risks, Rising Debt
Burden; Outlook Negative |
|
Publication date:
05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
We have lowered our long-term sovereign credit rating on the United
States of America to 'AA+' from 'AAA' and affirmed the 'A-1+' short-term
rating.
We have also removed both the short- and long-term ratings from
CreditWatch negative.
The downgrade reflects our opinion that the fiscal consolidation plan
that Congress and the Administration recently agreed to falls short of what, in
our view, would be necessary to stabilize the government's medium-term debt
dynamics.
More broadly, the downgrade reflects our view that the effectiveness,
stability, and predictability of American policymaking and political
institutions have weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic challenges
to a degree more than we envisioned when we assigned a negative outlook to the
rating on April 18, 2011.
Since then, we have changed our view of the difficulties in bridging the
gulf between the political parties over fiscal policy, which makes us
pessimistic about the capacity of Congress and the Administration to be able to
leverage their agreement this week into a broader fiscal consolidation plan
that stabilizes the government's debt dynamics any time soon.
The outlook on the long-term rating is negative. We could lower the
long-term rating to 'AA' within the next two years if we see that less
reduction in spending than agreed to, higher interest rates, or new fiscal
pressures during the period result in a higher general government debt
trajectory than we currently assume in our base case.
TORONTO (Standard & Poor's)
Aug. 5, 2011--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that it lowered
its long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of America to 'AA+'
from 'AAA'. Standard & Poor's also said that the outlook on the long-term
rating is negative. At the same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed its 'A-1+'
short-term rating on the U.S. In addition, Standard & Poor's removed both
ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed on July 14, 2011, with
negative implications.
The transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment of the U.S.--our
assessment of the likelihood of official interference in the ability of
U.S.-based public- and private-sector issuers to secure foreign exchange for
debt service--remains 'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term rating on the U.S. because we believe that the prolonged
controversy over raising the statutory debt ceiling and the related fiscal
policy debate indicate that further near-term progress containing the growth in
public spending, especially on entitlements, or on reaching an agreement on
raising revenues is less likely than we previously assumed and will remain a
contentious and fitful process. We also believe that the fiscal consolidation
plan that Congress and the Administration agreed to this week falls short of
the amount that we believe is necessary to stabilize the general government
debt burden by the middle of the decade.
Our lowering of the rating was prompted by our view on the rising public
debt burden and our perception of greater policymaking uncertainty, consistent
with our criteria (see "Sovereign
Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions ," June 30, 2011,
especially Paragraphs 36-41). Nevertheless, we view the U.S. federal
government's other economic, external, and monetary credit attributes, which
form the basis for the sovereign rating, as broadly unchanged.
We have taken the ratings off CreditWatch because the Aug. 2 passage of
the Budget Control Act Amendment of 2011 has removed any perceived immediate
threat of payment default posed by delays to raising the government's debt
ceiling. In addition, we believe that the act provides sufficient clarity to
allow us to evaluate the likely course of U.S. fiscal policy for the next few
years.
The political brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as
America's governance and policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and
less predictable than what we previously believed. The statutory debt ceiling
and the threat of default have become political bargaining chips in the debate
over fiscal policy. Despite this year's wide-ranging debate, in our view, the
differences between political parties have proven to be extraordinarily
difficult to bridge, and, as we see it, the resulting agreement fell well short
of the comprehensive fiscal consolidation program that some proponents had
envisaged until quite recently. Republicans and Democrats have only been able
to agree to relatively modest savings on discretionary spending while
delegating to the Select Committee decisions on more comprehensive measures. It
appears that for now, new revenues have dropped down on the menu of policy
options. In addition, the plan envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare
and little change in other entitlements, the containment of which we and most
other independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal sustainability.
Our opinion is that elected officials remain wary of tackling the
structural issues required to effectively address the rising U.S. public debt
burden in a manner consistent with a 'AAA' rating and with 'AAA' rated
sovereign peers (see Sovereign
Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions," June 30, 2011,
especially Paragraphs 36-41). In our view, the difficulty in framing a
consensus on fiscal policy weakens the government's ability to manage public
finances and diverts attention from the debate over how to achieve more
balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era of fiscal stringency and
private-sector deleveraging (ibid). A new political consensus might (or might
not) emerge after the 2012 elections, but we believe that by then, the
government debt burden will likely be higher, the needed medium-term fiscal
adjustment potentially greater, and the inflection point on the U.S.
population's demographics and other age-related spending drivers closer at hand
(see "Global
Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Likely Cost Even More Green, Now,"
June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's takes no position on the mix of spending and
revenue measures that Congress and the Administration might conclude is appropriate
for putting the U.S.'s finances on a sustainable footing.
The act calls for as much as $2.4 trillion of reductions in expenditure
growth over the 10 years through 2021. These cuts will be implemented in two
steps: the $917 billion agreed to initially, followed by an additional $1.5
trillion that the newly formed Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit
Reduction is supposed to recommend by November 2011. The act contains no
measures to raise taxes or otherwise enhance revenues, though the committee
could recommend them.
The act further provides that if Congress does not enact the committee's
recommendations, cuts of $1.2 trillion will be implemented over the same time
period. The reductions would mainly affect outlays for civilian discretionary
spending, defense, and Medicare. We understand that this fall-back mechanism is
designed to encourage Congress to embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure
savings, as the committee might recommend.
We note that in a letter to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011, the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) estimated total budgetary savings under the act to be at
least $2.1 trillion over the next 10 years relative to its baseline
assumptions. In updating our own fiscal projections, with certain modifications
outlined below, we have relied on the CBO's latest "Alternate Fiscal
Scenario" of June 2011, updated to include the CBO assumptions contained
in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In general, the CBO's "Alternate Fiscal
Scenario" assumes a continuation of recent Congressional action overriding
existing law.
We view the act's measures as a step toward fiscal consolidation.
However, this is within the framework of a legislative mechanism that leaves
open the details of what is finally agreed to until the end of 2011, and
Congress and the Administration could modify any agreement in the future. Even
assuming that at least $2.1 trillion of the spending reductions the act
envisages are implemented, we maintain our view that the U.S. net general
government debt burden (all levels of government combined, excluding liquid
financial assets) will likely continue to grow. Under our revised base case
fiscal scenario--which we consider to be consistent with a 'AA+' long-term
rating and a negative outlook--we now project that net general government debt
would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 79% in 2015 and
85% by 2021. Even the projected 2015 ratio of sovereign indebtedness is high in
relation to those of peer credits and, as noted, would continue to rise under
the act's revised policy settings.
Compared with previous projections, our revised base case scenario now
assumes that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, due to expire by the end of 2012,
remain in place. We have changed our assumption on this because the majority of
Republicans in Congress continue to resist any measure that would raise
revenues, a position we believe Congress reinforced by passing the act. Key
macroeconomic assumptions in the base case scenario include trend real GDP
growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near 2% annually over the decade.
Our revised upside scenario--which, other things being equal, we view as
consistent with the outlook on the 'AA+' long-term rating being revised to
stable--retains these same macroeconomic assumptions. In addition, it
incorporates $950 billion of new revenues on the assumption that the 2001 and
2003 tax cuts for high earners lapse from 2013 onwards, as the Administration
is advocating. In this scenario, we project that the net general government
debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 77% in 2015
and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside scenario--which, other things being equal, we view
as being consistent with a possible further downgrade to a 'AA' long-term
rating--features less-favorable macroeconomic assumptions, as outlined below
and also assumes that the second round of spending cuts (at least $1.2
trillion) that the act calls for does not occur. This scenario also assumes
somewhat higher nominal interest rates for U.S. Treasuries. We still believe
that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key reserve currency confers a
government funding advantage, one that could change only slowly over time, and
that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose monetary policy at a time of
fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible that interest rates could rise
if investors re-price relative risks. As a result, our alternate scenario
factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in 10-year bond yields relative to
the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In this scenario, we project the
net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to
101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios also take into account the significant negative revisions
to historical GDP data that the Bureau of Economic Analysis announced on July
29. From our perspective, the effect of these revisions underscores two related
points when evaluating the likely debt trajectory of the U.S. government.
First, the revisions show that the recent recession was deeper than previously
assumed, so the GDP this year is lower than previously thought in both nominal
and real terms. Consequently, the debt burden is slightly higher. Second, the
revised data highlight the sub-par path of the current economic recovery when
compared with rebounds following previous post-war recessions. We believe the
sluggish pace of the current economic recovery could be consistent with the
experiences of countries that have had financial crises in which the slow
process of debt deleveraging in the private sector leads to a persistent drag
on demand. As a result, our downside case scenario assumes relatively modest
real trend GDP growth of 2.5% and inflation of near 1.5% annually going
forward.
When comparing the U.S. to sovereigns with 'AAA' long-term ratings that
we view as relevant peers--Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K.--we also
observe, based on our base case scenarios for each, that the trajectory of the
U.S.'s net public debt is diverging from the others. Including the U.S., we
estimate that these five sovereigns will have net general government debt to
GDP ratios this year ranging from 34% (Canada) to 80% (the U.K.), with the U.S.
debt burden at 74%. By 2015, we project that their net public debt to GDP
ratios will range between 30% (lowest, Canada) and 83% (highest, France), with
the U.S. debt burden at 79%. However, in contrast with the U.S., we project
that the net public debt burdens of these other sovereigns will begin to
decline, either before or by 2015.
Standard & Poor's transfer T&C assessment of the U.S. remains
'AAA'. Our T&C assessment reflects our view of the likelihood of the
sovereign restricting other public and private issuers' access to foreign
exchange needed to meet debt service. Although in our view the credit standing
of the U.S. government has deteriorated modestly, we see little indication that
official interference of this kind is entering onto the policy agenda of either
Congress or the Administration. Consequently, we continue to view this risk as
being highly remote.
The outlook on the long-term rating is negative. As our downside
alternate fiscal scenario illustrates, a higher public debt trajectory than we
currently assume could lead us to lower the long-term rating again. On the
other hand, as our upside scenario highlights, if the recommendations of the
Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction--independently or
coupled with other initiatives, such as the lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax
cuts for high earners--lead to fiscal consolidation measures beyond the minimum
mandated, and we believe they are likely to slow the deterioration of the
government's debt dynamics, the long-term rating could stabilize at 'AA+'.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.64.88 |
|
|
1 |
Rs.99.88 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.72.06 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Analysis Done by
: |
KAS |
|
|
|
|
Report Prepared
by : |
DPT |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest
capability for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit
transaction. It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest
and principal sums |
Large |
|
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General unfavourable
factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for payment of
interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall
operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with
full security |
|
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
|
-- |
NB |
New Business |
-- |
|
This score serves as a reference to assess SC’s
credit risk and to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is calculated
from a composite of weighted scores obtained from each of the major sections of
this report. The assessed factors and their relative weights (as indicated
through %) are as follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend (10%) Operational size
(10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL) or
its officials.