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Report No. : |
346588 |
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Report Date : |
31.10.2015 |
IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
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Name : |
GRANITE DIRECT, INC. |
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Registered Office : |
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Country : |
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Date of Incorporation : |
07.16.2009 |
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Legal Form : |
Corporation – Profit |
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Line of Business : |
Subject is importer and wholesaler of
granite slabs. |
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No. of Employees : |
2 |
RATING & COMMENTS
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MIRA’s Rating : |
B |
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RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
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26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
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Status : |
Small Company |
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Payment Behaviour : |
No Complaints |
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Litigation : |
Clear |
NOTES:
Any query related to this report can be made
on e-mail: infodept@mirainform.com
while quoting report number, name and date.
ECGC Country Risk Classification List – March 31, 2015
|
Country Name |
Previous Rating (31.12.2014) |
Current Rating (31.03.2015) |
|
United
States |
A1 |
A1 |
|
Risk Category |
ECGC
Classification |
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Insignificant |
A1 |
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Low |
A2 |
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Moderate |
B1 |
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High |
B2 |
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Very High |
C1 |
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Restricted |
C2 |
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Off-credit |
D |
UNITED STATES - ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
The US has the most technologically powerful economy in the world, with a per capita GDP of $54,800. US firms are at or near the forefront in technological advances, especially in computers, pharmaceuticals, and medical, aerospace, and military equipment; however, their advantage has narrowed since the end of World War II. Based on a comparison of GDP measured at Purchasing Power Parity conversion rates, the US economy in 2014, having stood as the largest in the world for more than a century, slipped into second place behind China, which has more than tripled the US growth rate for each year of the past four decades.
In the US, private individuals and business firms make most of the decisions, and the federal and state governments buy needed goods and services predominantly in the private marketplace. US business firms enjoy greater flexibility than their counterparts in Western Europe and Japan in decisions to expand capital plant, to lay off surplus workers, and to develop new products. At the same time, they face higher barriers to enter their rivals' home markets than foreign firms face entering US markets.
Long-term problems for the US include stagnation of wages for lower-income families, inadequate investment in deteriorating infrastructure, rapidly rising medical and pension costs of an aging population, energy shortages, and sizable current account and budget deficits.
The onrush of technology has been a driving factor in the gradual development of a "two-tier" labor market in which those at the bottom lack the education and the professional/technical skills of those at the top and, more and more, fail to get comparable pay raises, health insurance coverage, and other benefits. But the globalization of trade, and especially the rise of low-wage producers such as China, has put additional downward pressure on wages and upward pressure on the return to capital. Since 1975, practically all the gains in household income have gone to the top 20% of households. Since 1996, dividends and capital gains have grown faster than wages or any other category of after-tax income.
Imported oil accounts for nearly 55% of US consumption and oil has a major impact on the overall health of the economy. Crude oil prices doubled between 2001 and 2006, the year home prices peaked; higher gasoline prices ate into consumers' budgets and many individuals fell behind in their mortgage payments. Oil prices climbed another 50% between 2006 and 2008, and bank foreclosures more than doubled in the same period. Besides dampening the housing market, soaring oil prices caused a drop in the value of the dollar and a deterioration in the US merchandise trade deficit, which peaked at $840 billion in 2008.
The sub-prime mortgage crisis, falling home prices, investment bank failures, tight credit, and the global economic downturn pushed the United States into a recession by mid-2008. GDP contracted until the third quarter of 2009, making this the deepest and longest downturn since the Great Depression. To help stabilize financial markets, the US Congress established a $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in October 2008. The government used some of these funds to purchase equity in US banks and industrial corporations, much of which had been returned to the government by early 2011. In January 2009 the US Congress passed and President Barack OBAMA signed a bill providing an additional $787 billion fiscal stimulus to be used over 10 years - two-thirds on additional spending and one-third on tax cuts - to create jobs and to help the economy recover. In 2010 and 2011, the federal budget deficit reached nearly 9% of GDP. In 2012, the federal government reduced the growth of spending and the deficit shrank to 7.6% of GDP.
Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan required major shifts in national resources from civilian to military purposes and contributed to the growth of the budget deficit and public debt. Through 2014, the direct costs of the wars totaled more than $1.5 trillion, according to US Government figures. US revenues from taxes and other sources are lower, as a percentage of GDP, than those of most other countries.
In March 2010, President OBAMA signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, a health insurance reform that was designed to extend coverage to an additional 32 million American citizens by 2016, through private health insurance for the general population and Medicaid for the impoverished. Total spending on health care - public plus private - rose from 9.0% of GDP in 1980 to 17.9% in 2010.
In July 2010, the president signed the DODD-FRANK Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, a law designed to promote financial stability by protecting consumers from financial abuses, ending taxpayer bailouts of financial firms, dealing with troubled banks that are "too big to fail," and improving accountability and transparency in the financial system - in particular, by requiring certain financial derivatives to be traded in markets that are subject to government regulation and oversight.
In December 2012, the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) announced plans to purchase $85 billion per month of mortgage-backed and Treasury securities in an effort to hold down long-term interest rates, and to keep short term rates near zero until unemployment dropped below 6.5% or inflation rose above 2.5%. In late 2013, the Fed announced that it would begin scaling back long-term bond purchases to $75 billion per month in January 2014 and reduce them further as conditions warranted; the Fed ended the purchases during the summer of 2014. In 2014, the unemployment rate dropped to 6.2%, and continued to fall to 5.5% by mid-2015, the lowest rate of joblessness since before the global recession began; inflation stood at 1.7%, and public debt as a share of GDP continued to decline, following several years of increase.
|
Source
: CIA |
Company name: GRANITE
DIRECT, INC.
Address: 730
South Jason Street, Unit 30, Denver, CO 80223 - USA
(not 73)
Telephone: +1
303-282-8317
Fax: -
Website: coloradogranite.com
Corporate ID#: 20091378986
State: Colorado
Judicial form: Corporation
– Profit
Date incorporated: 07-16-2009
Stock: 1,000
shares common
Value: No
par value
Name of manager: Gabriella
Paula BIKADI
Business:
The Company is importer and wholesaler of
granite slabs.
Office of
the Foreign Assets Control (OFAC):
The company is not listed on the OFAC
list.
The Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List
is a publication of OFAC which lists individuals and organizations with whom
United States citizens and permanent residents are prohibited from doing
business.
Foreign suppliers include:
COM. EXP. DE MARM. E GRANITOS
ITAPOAMA – BRAZIL
EIN: -
Staff: 2
Operations & branches:
At the headquarters, we find a large
warehouse and office, on 10,000 sq. ft.
Shareholders:
This is a family owned and managed
company.
Management:
Gabriella Paula BIKADI is the
President and Director.
Louis BIKADI is Vice President and
Director.
As far as we know, they are not involved
in other local corporations.
Subsidiaries
And partnership: None
In United States, privately held
corporations are not required to publish any financials.
On a direct call, nobody accepted to
answer our questions.
We sent an email but no answer
received.
However, sales estimate for year
2014 is in the range of USD 200,000=
The business is said to be
profitable.
Banks: US Bank
Legal filings & complaints:
As of today date, there is no legal filing
pending with the Courts.
Secured debts summary (UCC): None
Haut du formulaire
Trade references:
Date reported: October 2015
High credit: USD 3,000
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: September 2015
Line of business: Office supply
Paying status: On terms
Date reported: October 2015
High credit: USD 4,000
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: August 2015
Line of business: Payroll
Paying status: As agreed
Date reported: October 2015
High credit: USD 220
Now owing: 0
Past due: 0
Last purchase: September 2015
Line of business: Telecommunications
Paying status: On terms
Domestic credit history:
National Credit Bureaus gave a
satisfying credit risk.
According to our credit analysts, during
the last 6 months, domestic payments were made on due date.
International credit history:
Payments of imports are currently made on
terms.
Other comments:
The Company maintains a regular
business.
The Company is in good standing.
This means that all local and
federal taxes were paid on due date.
Last report was filed on March 4,
2015.
The risk is low.
Our opinion:
A business connection may be
conducted.
Standard & Poor’s
|
United
States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'AA+' Due To Political Risks,
Rising Debt Burden; Outlook Negative |
|
Publication
date: 05-Aug-2011 20:13:14 EST |
·
We have lowered
our long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of America to 'AA+'
from 'AAA' and affirmed the 'A-1+' short-term rating.
·
We
have also removed both the short- and long-term ratings from CreditWatch
negative.
·
The downgrade reflects our opinion that the fiscal
consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration recently agreed to
falls short of what, in our view, would be necessary to stabilize the
government's medium-term debt dynamics.
·
More broadly, the downgrade reflects our view that
the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of American policymaking and
political institutions have weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic
challenges to a degree more than we envisioned when we assigned a negative
outlook to the rating on April 18, 2011.
·
Since then, we have changed our view of the
difficulties in bridging the gulf between the political parties over fiscal
policy, which makes us pessimistic about the capacity of Congress and the
Administration to be able to leverage their agreement this week into a broader
fiscal consolidation plan that stabilizes the government's debt dynamics any
time soon.
·
The outlook on the long-term rating is negative. We
could lower the long-term rating to 'AA' within the next two years if we see
that less reduction in spending than agreed to, higher interest rates, or new
fiscal pressures during the period result in a higher general government debt
trajectory than we currently assume in our base case.
TORONTO (Standard & Poor's) Aug. 5, 2011--Standard
& Poor's Ratings Services said today that it lowered its long-term
sovereign credit rating on the United States of America to 'AA+' from 'AAA'.
Standard & Poor's also said that the outlook on the long-term rating is
negative. At the same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed its 'A-1+'
short-term rating on the U.S. In addition, Standard & Poor's removed both
ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed on July 14, 2011, with
negative implications.
The transfer and convertibility
(T&C) assessment of the U.S.--our assessment of the likelihood of official
interference in the ability of U.S.-based public- and private-sector issuers to
secure foreign exchange for
debt service--remains 'AAA'.
We lowered our long-term rating on the U.S.
because we believe that the prolonged controversy over raising the statutory
debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate indicate that further
near-term progress containing the growth in public spending, especially on
entitlements, or on reaching an agreement on raising revenues is less likely
than we previously assumed and will remain a contentious and fitful process. We
also believe that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the
Administration agreed to this week falls short of the amount that we believe is
necessary to stabilize the general government debt burden by the middle of the
decade.
Our lowering of the rating was prompted by
our view on the rising public debt burden and our perception of greater
policymaking uncertainty, consistent with our criteria (see "Sovereign Government Rating
Methodology and Assumptions ," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41).
Nevertheless, we view the U.S. federal government's other economic, external,
and monetary credit attributes, which form the basis for the sovereign rating,
as broadly unchanged.
We have taken the ratings off CreditWatch
because the Aug. 2 passage of the Budget Control Act Amendment of 2011 has
removed any perceived immediate threat of payment default posed by delays to
raising the government's debt ceiling. In addition, we believe that the act
provides sufficient clarity to allow us to evaluate the likely course of U.S.
fiscal policy for the next few years.
The political brinksmanship of
recent months highlights what we see as America's governance and policymaking
becoming less stable, less effective, and less predictable than what we
previously believed. The statutory debt ceiling and the threat of default have
become political bargaining chips in the debate over fiscal policy. Despite
this year's wide-ranging debate, in our view, the differences between political
parties have proven to be extraordinarily difficult to bridge, and, as we see
it, the resulting agreement fell well short of the comprehensive fiscal
consolidation program that some proponents had envisaged until quite recently.
Republicans and Democrats have only been able to agree to relatively modest
savings on discretionary spending while delegating to the Select Committee
decisions on more comprehensive measures. It appears that for now, new revenues
have dropped down on the menu of policy options. In addition, the plan
envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare and little change in other
entitlements,
the containment of which we and most other
independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal sustainability.
Our opinion is that elected officials remain
wary of tackling the structural issues required to effectively address the
rising U.S. public debt burden in a manner consistent with a 'AAA' rating and
with 'AAA' rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign Government Rating
Methodology and Assumptions," June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs
36-41). In our view, the difficulty in framing a consensus on fiscal policy
weakens the government's ability to manage public finances and diverts attention
from the debate over how to achieve more balanced and dynamic economic growth
in an era of fiscal stringency and private-sector deleveraging (ibid). A new
political consensus might (or might not) emerge after the 2012 elections, but
we believe that by then, the government debt burden will likely be higher, the
needed medium-term fiscal adjustment potentially greater, and the inflection
point on the U.S. population's demographics and other age-related spending
drivers closer at hand (see "Global Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going
Gray Will Likely Cost Even More Green, Now," June 21, 2011).
Standard & Poor's takes no position on
the mix of spending and revenue measures that Congress and the Administration
might conclude is appropriate for putting the U.S.'s finances on a sustainable
footing.
The act calls for as much as $2.4 trillion
of reductions in expenditure growth over the 10 years through 2021. These cuts
will be implemented in two steps: the $917 billion agreed to initially,
followed by an additional $1.5 trillion that the newly formed Congressional
Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction is supposed to recommend by
November 2011. The act contains no measures to raise taxes or otherwise enhance
revenues, though the committee could recommend them.
The act further provides that if Congress
does not enact the committee's recommendations, cuts of $1.2 trillion will be
implemented over the same time period. The reductions would mainly affect
outlays for civilian discretionary spending, defense, and Medicare. We
understand that this fall-back mechanism is designed to encourage Congress to
embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure savings, as the committee might recommend.
We note that in a letter to Congress on Aug.
1, 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated total budgetary
savings under the act to be at least $2.1 trillion over the next 10 years
relative to its baseline assumptions. In updating our own fiscal projections,
with certain modifications outlined below, we have relied on the CBO's latest
"Alternate Fiscal Scenario" of June 2011, updated to include the CBO
assumptions contained in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In general, the CBO's
"Alternate Fiscal Scenario" assumes a continuation of recent
Congressional action overriding existing law.
We view the act's measures as a step toward
fiscal consolidation. However, this is within the framework of a legislative
mechanism that leaves open the details of what is finally agreed to until the
end of 2011, and Congress and the Administration could modify any agreement in
the future. Even assuming that at least $2.1 trillion of the spending
reductions the act envisages are implemented, we maintain our view that the
U.S. net general government debt burden (all levels of government combined,
excluding liquid financial assets) will likely continue to grow. Under our
revised base case fiscal scenario--which we consider to be consistent with a
'AA+' long-term rating and a negative outlook--we now project that net general
government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to
79% in 2015 and 85% by 2021. Even the projected 2015 ratio of sovereign
indebtedness is high in relation to those of peer credits and, as noted, would
continue to rise under the act's revised policy settings.
Compared with previous projections, our
revised base case scenario now assumes that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, due to expire
by the end of 2012, remain in place. We have changed our assumption on this
because the majority of Republicans in Congress continue to resist any measure
that would raise revenues, a position we believe Congress reinforced by passing
the act. Key macroeconomic assumptions in the base case scenario include trend
real GDP growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near 2% annually over the
decade.
Our revised upside scenario--which, other
things being equal, we view as consistent with the outlook on the 'AA+'
long-term rating being revised to stable--retains these same macroeconomic
assumptions. In addition, it incorporates $950 billion of new revenues on the
assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners lapse from 2013
onwards, as the Administration is advocating. In this scenario, we project that
the net general government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the
end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.
Our revised downside scenario--which, other
things being equal, we view as being consistent with a possible further
downgrade to a 'AA' long-term rating--features less-favorable macroeconomic
assumptions, as outlined below and also assumes that the second round of
spending cuts (at least $1.2 trillion) that the act calls for does not occur.
This scenario also assumes somewhat higher nominal interest rates for U.S.
Treasuries. We still believe that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key
reserve currency confers a government funding advantage, one that could change
only slowly over time, and that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose
monetary policy at a time of fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible
that interest rates could rise if investors re-price relative risks. As a
result, our alternate scenario factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in
10-year bond yields relative to the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In
this scenario, we project the net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP
in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to 101% by 2021.
Our revised scenarios also take into account
the significant negative revisions to historical GDP data that the Bureau of
Economic Analysis announced on July 29. From our perspective, the effect of
these revisions underscores two related points when evaluating the likely debt
trajectory of the U.S. government. First, the revisions show that the recent
recession was deeper than previously assumed, so the GDP this year is lower
than previously thought in both nominal and real terms. Consequently, the debt
burden is slightly higher. Second, the revised data highlight the sub-par path
of the current economic recovery when compared with rebounds following previous
post-war recessions. We believe the sluggish pace of the current economic
recovery could be consistent with the experiences of countries that have had
financial crises in which the slow process of debt deleveraging in the private
sector leads to a persistent drag on demand. As a result, our downside case
scenario assumes relatively modest real trend GDP growth of 2.5% and inflation
of near 1.5% annually going forward.
When comparing the U.S. to sovereigns with
'AAA' long-term ratings that we view as relevant peers--Canada, France,
Germany, and the U.K.--we also observe, based on our base case scenarios for
each, that the trajectory of the U.S.'s net public debt is diverging from the
others. Including the U.S., we estimate that these five sovereigns will have
net general government debt to GDP ratios this year ranging from 34% (Canada)
to 80% (the U.K.), with the U.S. debt burden at 74%. By 2015, we project that
their net public debt to GDP ratios will range between 30% (lowest, Canada) and
83% (highest, France), with the U.S. debt burden at 79%. However, in contrast
with the U.S., we project that the net public debt burdens of these other
sovereigns will begin to decline, either before or by 2015.
Standard & Poor's transfer T&C
assessment of the U.S. remains 'AAA'. Our T&C assessment reflects our view
of the likelihood of the sovereign restricting other public and private
issuers' access to foreign exchange needed to meet debt service. Although in
our view the credit standing of the U.S. government has deteriorated modestly,
we see little indication that official interference of this kind is entering
onto the policy agenda of either Congress or the Administration. Consequently,
we continue to view this risk as being highly remote.
The outlook on the long-term rating is
negative. As our downside alternate fiscal scenario illustrates, a higher
public debt trajectory than we currently assume could lead us to lower the
long-term rating again. On the other hand, as our upside scenario highlights,
if the recommendations of the Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit
Reduction--independently or coupled with other initiatives, such as the lapsing
of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners--lead to fiscal consolidation
measures beyond the minimum mandated, and we believe they are likely to slow
the deterioration of the government's debt dynamics, the long-term rating could
stabilize at 'AA+'.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
|
Currency |
Unit
|
Indian Rupees |
|
US Dollar |
1 |
Rs.65.22 |
|
UK Pound |
1 |
Rs.99.93 |
|
Euro |
1 |
Rs.71.67 |
INFORMATION DETAILS
|
Analysis Done by
: |
KAR |
|
|
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|
Report Prepared
by : |
TRU |
RATING EXPLANATIONS
|
RATING |
STATUS |
PROPOSED CREDIT LINE |
|
|
|
>86 |
Aaa |
Possesses an extremely sound financial base with the strongest
capability for timely payment of interest and principal sums |
Unlimited |
|
|
71-85 |
Aa |
Possesses adequate working capital. No caution needed for credit
transaction. It has above average (strong) capability for payment of interest
and principal sums |
Large |
|
|
56-70 |
A |
Financial & operational base are regarded healthy. General unfavourable
factors will not cause fatal effect. Satisfactory capability for payment of
interest and principal sums |
Fairly Large |
|
|
41-55 |
Ba |
Overall operation is considered normal. Capable to meet normal
commitments. |
Satisfactory |
|
|
26-40 |
B |
Capability to overcome financial difficulties seems comparatively
below average. |
Small |
|
|
11-25 |
Ca |
Adverse factors are apparent. Repayment of interest and principal sums
in default or expected to be in default upon maturity |
Limited with
full security |
|
|
<10 |
C |
Absolute credit risk exists. Caution needed to be exercised |
Credit not
recommended |
|
|
-- |
NB |
New Business |
-- |
|
This score serves as a reference to assess SC’s credit risk
and to set the amount of credit to be extended. It is calculated from a
composite of weighted scores obtained from each of the major sections of this
report. The assessed factors and their relative weights (as indicated through
%) are as follows:
Financial
condition (40%) Ownership
background (20%) Payment
record (10%)
Credit history
(10%) Market trend
(10%) Operational
size (10%)
This report is issued at your request without any
risk and responsibility on the part of MIRA INFORM PRIVATE LIMITED (MIPL)
or its officials.